JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—The petitioner-plaintiff is aggrieved by the order dated 5-12-1996, passed by Sub-Judge, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, whereby his application under Order 6, Rule 17, C« P. C. for amendment of the plaint was dismissed. 2. The brief facts are that petitioner-plaintiff filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondent-defendant from making any interference in his suit property, consisting of land measuring 8 biswas, comprised in Khasra No 613/489 situated in Mauza Rajgarh, Pargana Giripar, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Sirmaur and the building constructed thereon by projecting the construction of the first and second floor of his building towards the suit property and also by causing any type of damage to the stairs thereon It was admitted in the plaint that the respondent-defendant is owner of the adjoining land comparised in Khasra No 611/ 489 and 612/489 over which he has raised construction by covering his entire land. But the precise allegations were that the respondent-defendant has no right to make any encroachment on the building of petitioner-plaintiff by way of projecting the construction of first and second floor of his building and to cause any type of damage to the stair case built by him on his land. 3 Now by way of amendment, the pensioner plaintiff intends to withdraw the admission that the respondent defendant is owner of the adjoining land comprised in Khasra No ell/489 and 612/489 and also that he has made construction over his entire land on the ground that he has come to know that the respondent-defendant by conniving with the revenue officials has got his name incorporated in the revenue record in respect of this land on the basis of some fictitious exchange, as such, he has no right, title or interest in the land over which he has made construction despite the stay order by encroaching 15 x 35 square feet out of the suit land which caused the blocking of light and air passing through the windows of the residential house of the plaintiff On these allegations the petitioner-plaintiff has claimed the easementary right of the light and air by way of prescription and has prayed for decree of mandatory injunction for demolishing the alleged construction in addition to decree of permanent prohibitory injunction initially prayed for. 4. 4. The amendment was opposed on the ground that by the admissions made in the plaint valuable right has accrued to the respondent-defendant, the withdrawal of which will cause irreparable loss to him and also that the proposed amendments will change the nature of the suit as altogether different cause of action is being introduced These objections to the proposed amendment weighed with the Sub Judge, Rajgarh and he has dismissed the amendment application Hence, the present petition. 5. This Court has heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-plaintiff has vehemently urged that since the suit is at the initial stage and the respondent-defendant has not filed his written statement, the amendment of the plaint will not cause any loss and injury—-what to talk of irreparable loss and injury to him. According to him, there is no bar to withdraw the admissions if it is justified on the new facts coming to the knowledge of a party withdrawing the admission and it is necessary for adjudication of the dispute raised in the suit In support of his submission, he has relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay and another, AIR 1983 SC 462 and A/Is. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent defendant has opposed the proposed amendment on the ground that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the withdrawal of the admissions would cause irreparable loss and injury to the respondent-defendant According to the learned Counsel, under the garb of the proposed amendment the petitioner-plaintiff intends to change the nature of the suit—by introducing a new cause of action which is not permissible, In support of his submission he has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Mathia v. Prem Lal and others, 1992(2) Sim LC 292. 6 After giving its best consideration to the respective submissions of learned Counsel for the parties this Court finds that the impugned order does not call for any interference as the application for amendment of the plaint has rightly been rejected From the facts, stated hereinabove, it is clear that the suit of the petitioner-plaintiff was for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondent defendant from making any encroachment on his building by way of projecting the construction of his building/first floor and second floor and to cause any type of damage to the stair-case on the averments that the petitioner-plaintiff is owner of the land comparised in Khasra No. 611/489 and 612/489 adjoining to the suit property and also that he has already made construction and has covered his entire land. Now by way of proposed amendment the petitioner-plaintiff has sought mandatory injunction for demolishing the building of the respondent-defendant alleged to have been constructed during the pendency of the suit by encroaching upon 15x35 square feet which has caused blocking of light and air of his building in violation of his easementary rights. The bare perusal of the plaint and proposed amendment makes it clear that by way of proposed amendment the petitioner-plaintiff has changed the very nature of his suit and has introduced altogether fresh cause of action. For seeking decree of mandatory injunction by way of amendment he has not only withdrawn the admission that respondent-defendant is owner of adjoining land and has covered it in entirety by making construction but has also claimed easementary rights over it by way of prescription. Such an amendment is totally inconsistent with the earlier pleading and cannot be permitted, 7, In M/s. Ganesh Trading Co, .v. Moji Ram (supra), the learned Judges of Supreme Court after considering rules of pleading contained in Order 6, Rules 2, 4, 6 7 and 17 have observed in Para 4 that :— "It is clear from the foregoing summary of the main rules of pleadings that provisions for the amendment of pleadings, subject to such terms as to costs and giving of all parties concerned necessary opportunities to meet exact situations resulting from amendments, are intended for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating them. Even if a party or its counsel is inefficient in setting out its case initially the shortcoming can certainly be removed generally by appropriate steps taken by a party which must no doubt pay costs for the inconvenience or expense caused to the other side from its omissions. The error is not incapable of being rectified so long as remedial steps do not unjustifiably injure rights accrued," And further clarified in Para 5 :— "It is true that, if a plaintiff seeks to alter the cause of action itself and to introduce indirectly, through an amendment of his pleadings, an entirely new or incon sistent cause of action, amounting virtually to the substitution of a new plaint or a new cause of action in place of what was originally there, the Court will refuse to permit it if it amounts to depriving the party against which a suit is pending of any right which may have accrued in its favour due to lapse of time But mere failure to set out even an essential fact does not by itself, constitute a new cause of action, A cause of action is constituted by the whole bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove before he can succeed in his suit It must be antecedent to the institution of the suit. If any essential fact is lacking from averments in the plaint because of action will be defective. In that case, an attempt to supply the omission has been and could some time be viewed as equivalent to an introduction of a new cause of action, which cured of its shortcomings, has really become a good cause of action. This, however, is not the only possible interpretation to be put on every defective state of pleadings. Defective pleadings are generally curable if the cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab initio completely absent. This, however, is not the only possible interpretation to be put on every defective state of pleadings. Defective pleadings are generally curable if the cause of action sought to be brought out was not ab initio completely absent. Even very defective pleading may be permitted to be cured, so as to constitute a cause of action where there was none, provided necessary conditions, such as payment of either any additional court fees, which may be payable, or, of costs of the other side are complied with It is only if lapse of time has barred the remedy on a newly constituted cause of action that the Courts should ordinarily, refuse prayers for amendment of pleadings." The learned Judges of Supreme Court have also reviewed number of earlier decisions. The principles laid down in M\s. Ganesh Trading Co, v. Moji Ram (supra) are further reiterated in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahai and another. AIR 1983 SU 462 8 Therefore, by now it is well settled that no amendment will be allowed to introduce a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts prejudicing any right acquired by any party by lapse of time. But all amendments should be allowed which are of clarificatory nature and whereby a different or additional approach to the same facts leading to same cause of action is provided for the purpose of determining the real controversy between the parties. To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Mathia v. Prem Lal and others, 1992 (2) Sim LC 292. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the amendments sought for are not clarificatory in nature and these will change the very nature of the suit by introducing a fresh cause of action to the prejudice of the respondent-defendant. 9. In the result, there is no merit in this revision petition and it is dismissed. No costs. Revision Petition dismissed. -