JUDGMENT : R.H. ZAIDI, J. 1. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Petitioner prays for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 22.7.92 passed by prescribed authority, allowing release application filed by Respondent No. 3. u/s 21(1)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972, for short the 'Act' and also order dated 23.8.82 passed by appellate authority dismissing the appeal filed by the Petitioner against the aforesaid order of prescribed authority. 2. Relevant facts of the case are that Petitioner was in occupation of house No. 803, new 4/6/1, Gudri Bazar, Rath Haweli, Faizabad, for short 'building in dispute', as a tenant. Respondent No. 3 filed a release application u/s 21(1)(b) of the Act on the ground that building in dispute was in dilapidated condition and he wanted to reconstruct the same. It was pleaded that building was rendered unfit for residential purposes, it was more than 100 years old. Same, therefore, required demolition and new construction. 3. On receipt of the notice from the Court of prescribed authority, Petitioner filed his written statement denying the allegations made in the release application. It was pleaded that building in question was not in dilapidated condition, nor same was unfit for habitation. Release application was nothing, but pretext to eject Petitioner therefrom. It was pleaded that previously before filing release application, the house No. 804, which is situated appurtenant to the building in dispute, was got released by Respondent No. 3, on the ground that same was in dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction. Said building was released long back. Respondent No. 3 demolished said building, but till date it was not reconstructed. 4. Both parties produced evidence (oral and documentary) for and against. Prescribed authority allowed application by its judgment and order dated 27.2.82, holding that building in question was in dilapidated condition and was required for demolition and reconstruction. It was also held that requirement of Rule 17 of the Rules, framed under the Act, were fulfilled by Respondent No. 3. Petitioner challenged validity of the order passed by the prescribed authority, filed an appeal before the appellate authority. Appeal filed by the Petitioner was ultimately dismissed by the appellate authority by its judgment and order dated 23.8.92. It was also held that requirement of Rule 17 of the Rules, framed under the Act, were fulfilled by Respondent No. 3. Petitioner challenged validity of the order passed by the prescribed authority, filed an appeal before the appellate authority. Appeal filed by the Petitioner was ultimately dismissed by the appellate authority by its judgment and order dated 23.8.92. Thereafter, Petitioner approached this Court and filed present petition challenging validity of the orders passed by the authorities below, as stated above. 5. Writ petition was admitted and ejectment of the Petitioner from the building in question was also stayed by this Court. 6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner vehemently urged that the authorities below acted wholly illegally and contrary to the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder, in allowing release application without considering comparative hardship, which was likely to be caused to the parties, by grant or refusal of the release application, as provided in fourth proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on the decision in 1977 ALJ 311. It was also urged that requirements of Rule 17 were not fulfilled by Respondent No. 3. Therefore, there was no justification for the authorities below, to uphold claim of the said Respondent and to eject Petitioner from the building in question. 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 submitted that release application was filed under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21. Therefore, 4th proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21, had no application in the present case and that the Respondent No. 3 was not required to prove her bona fide need for the building in question. It was also not necessary for the authorities below to look into the comparative hardships of the parties, which was likely to be occasioned by grant or rejection of the release application. It was further submitted that requirements of Rule 17, were fully proved and fulfilled, inasmuch as, a duly sanctioned plan conforming with bye-laws, was produced and financial capacity to construct the building was also proved. Learned Counsel for the Respondent cited certain decisions in support of his submissions, which I will refer to and deal with later on. 8. I have considered rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and also carefully perused the record. 9. Learned Counsel for the Respondent cited certain decisions in support of his submissions, which I will refer to and deal with later on. 8. I have considered rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and also carefully perused the record. 9. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21, which is relevant for the purposes of present case provides as under: 21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant. (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists: (a) ... (b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction. Provided... Provided... Provided... Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship of the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed. 10. Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act, is also relevant, which is quoted below: 17. Application for release on the ground of demolition and new construction. Before allowing an application for release of a building u/s 21(1)(b) on the ground that it is required for purposes of demolition and new construction, the prescribed authority shall satisfy itself: (a) that the building requires demolition; (b) that a proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction has been prepared; (c) that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law in that behalf for the time being in force; and (d) that the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. 11. 11. From the plain reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions, it is clear that before passing order of ejectment and allowing application for release u/s 21(1)(b) of the Act, prescribed authority is required to satisfy itself, that building requires demolition and new construction, proper estimate of expenditure for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction has been prepared, a plan has been duly prepared which conforms to the bye-laws or regulations to the local authority, or other statutory authority and that the landlord had financial capacity for the purposes of demolition and new construction. It is not required that before passing order of release under clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21, to take into account likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of application as against likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. Factors which are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21, have been provided under Rule 16 of the Rules. It may be noted that 4th proviso was introduced in the Act by Uttar Pradesh Act No. 28 of 1976 with a view to save validity of the Rule 16. In Bhola Shankar v. Vth Addl. District Judge and Ors. 1980 ALJ 585, it was held that 4th proviso to Section 21(1), applies only to the cases covered by Clause (a) and, not to the cases covered by Clause (b). 12. Similarly, it was ruled in Baldeo Raj v. IVth Addl. District Judge 1982 ALJ 517, that controversy as to bona fide and mala fide need of the landlord in making application was not relevant for the purpose of release application filed under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21. In Jalil Ahmad Vs. Ist Addl. District Judge and Others, (1982) AWC 677, it was ruled that if the release application is filed under Clause (b) of Section 21(1) the authorities not required to make assessment of comparative hardships of the parties. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in Binda Prasad v. 3rd Addl. District Judge, Faizabad 1984 (2) WD 238, ruled that 4th proviso cannot apply to the application under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in Binda Prasad v. 3rd Addl. District Judge, Faizabad 1984 (2) WD 238, ruled that 4th proviso cannot apply to the application under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21. In this case, decision which has been referred to and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner i.e. 1977 LLJ 181, was overruled and the decisions in 1977 LLR 220 ; 1977 WRC 270 ; 1980 ALJ 585 and Jalil Ahmad Vs. Ist Addl. District Judge and Others, (1982) AWC 677, were followed and it was ruled as under: The first question that is canvassed by the learned Counsel is that the language of the fourth proviso to Section 21(1) does not refer to any application being under Clause (a) or Clause (b). Literally interpreted, it applies to all applications u/s 21(1) except in cases covered by the Explanation. In support of his contention he has referred to a decision of Hon'ble D. M. Chandra Shekhar, J. (as he then was) in Jagan Nath Prasad and Anr. v. District Judge, Gonda and Ors, 1977 LLJ 181. In this decision there is no discussion or express decision as to whether the said proviso should apply to applications under Clause (b) as well or not. The judgment shows that the application in that case was both under Clause (a) and under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). For, it is mentioned in the second paragraph of the judgment that the application was made also on the ground that the landlords required the premises for their own occupation. This judgment is based on an assumption that the fourth proviso did apply, apart from the circumstances that the application was covered by both the clauses. As such, it is of no assistance to us in determining the controversy before us. On the other hand, we find that in four other single Judge decisions namely Jhandu Singh v. District Judge 1977 ALR 228; (K.N. Seth, J.,) Rajesh Dayal v. District Judge 1977 UPRCC 270; (Mahavir Singh, J.), Bhola Shankar v. Vth Addl. District Judge and Ors. 1980 ALJ 585; (A. N. Verma, J.), and Jalil Ahmad Vs. Ist Addl. On the other hand, we find that in four other single Judge decisions namely Jhandu Singh v. District Judge 1977 ALR 228; (K.N. Seth, J.,) Rajesh Dayal v. District Judge 1977 UPRCC 270; (Mahavir Singh, J.), Bhola Shankar v. Vth Addl. District Judge and Ors. 1980 ALJ 585; (A. N. Verma, J.), and Jalil Ahmad Vs. Ist Addl. District Judge and Others, (1982) AWC 677: (S. C. Mathur, J.), it has been held that the Fourth Proviso is confined only to applications under Clause (a) and is not applicable to applications under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). 5... Accordingly the decision in Jagannath Prasad (supra) to the extent it suggests that the said proviso would apply even to applications under Clause (b), cannot be considered to be good law and it is, accordingly, overruled. 14. Similar view has been taken consistent by this Court in several other cases. I do not consider it necessary to refer to all those decisions on the subject. 15. In view of the settled law on the point, submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that it was obligatory upon authorities below to record finding on the comparative hardship of the parties, likely to be caused by allowing or rejecting release application, cannot be accepted. So far as the question of requirement of Rule 17, is concerned, argument of learned Counsel for the Petitioner, was that no sanction plan was produced by the contesting Respondents. Therefore, requirements of Rule 17, were not fulfilled. 16. Legally what is required under Rule 17 is a duly prepared plan and not the sanctioned plan. A reference in this regard may be made to the case of Ram Chandra Sinha v. District Judge 1983 (1) LCD 10, wherein it was held as under: 7...... Under this clause the only requirement is that there should be a duly -prepared plan for the building which is to be constructed after demolition of the existing building and this plan should conform to the bye-laws or the regulation of the local authority. A duly prepared plan had been placed on the record by the Petitioners. It was not the case of the opposite parties that the said plan did not conform to the bye laws or the regulations of the local authority. There is no requirement under Rule 17 that a sanctioned plan must be placed on record. A duly prepared plan had been placed on the record by the Petitioners. It was not the case of the opposite parties that the said plan did not conform to the bye laws or the regulations of the local authority. There is no requirement under Rule 17 that a sanctioned plan must be placed on record. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the insistence on filing the sanctioned plan contained in the orders of the two authorities below is not justified. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussions, no case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is made out. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the orders passed by the authorities below Writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Interim order granted by this Court is discharged.