JUDGMENT 1. - This petition u /Sections 401, Criminal Procedure Code is directed against the order dated 17.1.97 whereby the learned Special Judge, C.B.I. Cases, Jaipur dismissed petitioners' application in Special Case No. 33/92 for dropping the proceedings against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to him to try them. 2. The petitioners were alleged to have committed offences punishable u/Sections 120- 8, 420,218,465,467,471, Indian Penal Code and Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act of 1947) during the year 1986. After investigation of the case the CBl/SPE, Jaipur submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioners in the Court of the learned Special Judge on 8.1992 for commission of the aforementioned offence. Offences punishable u/Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act of 1988) were also mentioned in the report. Charges for appropriate offences had yet not been framed by the learned Special Judge that the petitioners, like others in similar cases, moved applications challenging the very jurisdiction of the learned Special judge to try them. The common objection raised by the petitioners and other persons, being prosecuted for similar offences in other cases was that since the offences alleged to have been committed by them were committed during the period the Act of 1947 was in force but the learned Special Judge was appointed under the provisions of Act of he was having no jurisdiction to try the petitioners in this case and others in their respective cases. The learned Special Judge by a very well-written and well-reasoned order, held with reference to the relevant provisions contained in the ti : Acts and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Amendment Act of 1952) and the General Clauses Act, 1897 that he had jurisdiction to try the petitioners for the offences with which they may be charged in the case. It maybe mentioned that it was not agitated before the learned Special Judge that the charges were baseless or groundless against them. On that aspect of the case the learned Judge has reserved his opinion and has yet to frame charges for appropriate offences against the petitioners. It may further be pointed out here that no other objection was also raised before the learned Judge. The learned Judge rejected the application of the petitioners vide his order under challenge. Hence this petition. 3. Mr. It may further be pointed out here that no other objection was also raised before the learned Judge. The learned Judge rejected the application of the petitioners vide his order under challenge. Hence this petition. 3. Mr. Bajwa, the learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that the petitioners were not covered under the definition of "public servant" as envisaged by Act of 1947. I find that no such objection was ever raised by the petitioners before the learned Judge in their applications, as reproduced in the memo of the application/ petition No. 1n the course of their arguments before him. I do not find the relevant facts on my record to assume that the petitioners could not have been prosecuted for the offences under the Indian Penal Code and /or the Act of 1947. I thus find no merits in this argument and reject it as such.It was next urged by Mr. Bajwa that the offences punishable u/Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of Act of 1947 being not so severely punishable as offences u/Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Act of are, a Special Judge appointed u /Section 3/ of the Act of 1988 for trial of offences u /Sections 1)(d) and 13(2) of Act of 1988, which the present incumbent of the office is that no jurisdiction to try the offences under the repealed Act of 1947 and if so appointed his appointment was invalid for want of power to the State Government to so appoint him. The argument advanced is totally misconceived and liable to be rejected outright for more than one reasons.At the cost of repetition it may be observed that the learned Judge has yet to apply his mind as to whether the police report and the documents submitted therewith disclose the commission of any offence and if so under which provision of which law the offence so disclosed is punishable. Therefore, it cannot be assumed or presumed that the learned Judge intends to charge the petitioners u/Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Act of 1988 and not u /Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of Act of 1947 under which the offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners are stated to be punishable. That apart, offences punishable u/Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of Act of 1947 and those punishable u/Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Act of 1988 are of the same kind and nature. That apart, offences punishable u/Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of Act of 1947 and those punishable u/Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Act of 1988 are of the same kind and nature. The difference in punishment awardable under the provisions of the two enactments does not affect the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try them as Article 20(1) of the Constitution clearly provides that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission of the offence. This part of Mr. Bajwa's argument thus has no merits at all. 4. It is beyond any dispute that offences punishable under the Act of 1947 were triable by the Special Courts created and Special judges appointed under the provisions of that Act and the Amendment Act of 1952. Both the said Acts stood repealed by Section 30(1) of the Act of 1988. Offences punishable under the Act of 1988 are triable by Special Judges appointed under Section 4 of 1988. But what about the trial of the offences committed during the period the repealed Act of 1947 and Amendment Act of were in force? This situation has been visualised by the Legislature while enacting the Act of 1988 and the provisions contained in Sections 26, 28, 30 and 31 of the Act of 1988 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which are reproduced below for ready reference, make the things quite clear : "26. Special Judges appointed under Act of 1952 to be Special Judges appointed under this Act-Every Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, for any area or areas and is holding office on the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be a Special Judge appointed under Section 3 of this Act for that area or areas and, accordingly on and from such commencement, every such Judge shall continue to deal with all the proceedings pending before him on such commencement in accordance with the provisions of this Act." "28. Act to be in addition to any other lain--The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and No. 1n derogation of, any other law for the time being in force and nothing contained herein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which might, apart from this Act, be instituted against him." "30. Act to be in addition to any other lain--The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and No. 1n derogation of, any other law for the time being in force and nothing contained herein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which might, apart from this Act, be instituted against him." "30. Repeal and Saving-(1) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (46 of 1952) are hereby repealed. 2. Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, insofar as it is No. 1 inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of this Act." "31. Omission of certain Sections of Act of 1860-Sections 161 to 165-A (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code shall be omitted, and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall apply to such omission as if the said Sections had been repealed by a Central Act." "6. Effect of repeal-Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the appeal shall not (a) revive anything No. 1n force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any of offence committed against any enactment so repealed; (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not bean passed." 5. A combined reading of the above provisions clearly leads one to the conclusion that an accused who is alleged to have committed offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code and/or the Act of 1947 can be tried even after the coming into force of Act of 1988. For that purpose the repeal of the Act of 1947 and the Amendment Act of 1952 shall not exonerate the offender under the repealed Act of 1947 of his liability to prosecution and punishment in view of clear mandate contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 read with the later part of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. The appointment of the Special Judge under Section 3/4 of the Act of 1988 for trial of offences punishable under the repealed Act of 1947 shall not at all affect his jurisdiction to punish the offender under the Act of 1947. The learned Judge has rightly observed that neither the competency of the Legislature to arm the State Government to create the Special Courts and to appoint the Special Judges of such Courts for the purposes of trial of the offenders under the repealed Act of 1947 nor the power exercised by the State Government in that behalf was required to begone into nor was he competent to decide such issues at the time of and for the purposes of the disposal of the application moved by the applicants. I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Special Judge has jurisdiction to try the offences and the offenders in the present case. My views, I think, get ample support in this behalf from the decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Mahesh Chand v. State of UP., 1993 Crl.L.J.1151 , and of the Karnataka High Court in the case of R.S. Kalakapur v. State of Karnataka, Crl.L.J. 2696. This argument of Mr. Bajwa is also rejected. 6. It was next urged by Mr. Bajwa that the sanction granted in the present case was not valid in law. No such objection was ever raise d by the petitioners before the learned Special Judge. Before me also it was not told as to how the sanction accorded for the prosecution of the petitioners in this case was invalid in law and what was the defect therein. On my examination of the objection raised by Mr. No such objection was ever raise d by the petitioners before the learned Special Judge. Before me also it was not told as to how the sanction accorded for the prosecution of the petitioners in this case was invalid in law and what was the defect therein. On my examination of the objection raised by Mr. Bajwa I find no material on my record in support of such objection. The same is over-ruled as I fail to notice any failure of justice to have in fact been occasioned or likely to be occasioned by the supposed invalidity in the sanction accorded in this case.No other point was agitated before me.Before parting with the record of the case I would like to observe that neither any provision in the Act of 1947, Act of 1988 or Amendment Act of 1952 No. 1n the Code of Criminal Procedure, requires or obliges a Special Judge to hear the parties at a stage before charge. It has generally been noticed by this Court that trial of offences under the two Acts hardly commences without devoting too much and undeserved time to the hearing, given repeatedly to the accused, before they are heard on charges and appropriate charges are framed against them. Then, as and when an order is passed by the Special Judge the same is challenged before this Court and despite there being specific provision in Section 19(3) of Act of 1988 against stay of the proceedings such stay stands impliedly granted when the record of the Trial Court is requisitioned in this Court. Provisions like Section 4(11 of Act of 1988 and Section 109, Criminal Procedure Code expect speedy disposal of criminal cases. It is, therefore, desirable that whenever the Special Judges hear either of the parties to a case tinder the Act of 1947 or Act of at a stage prior to that of the framing of the charge in respect of any objection relating to jurisdiction, sanction, etc. they should hear them for the purposes of framing charges against them and simultaneously with their decisions on the objections raised by the parties should also express their opinion on the necessity of framing appropriate charges or discharging them of the offences the accused were forwarded to be tried by them. they should hear them for the purposes of framing charges against them and simultaneously with their decisions on the objections raised by the parties should also express their opinion on the necessity of framing appropriate charges or discharging them of the offences the accused were forwarded to be tried by them. Then they must proceed to hold the trial of the offences with which the accused have at all been charged, on day to day basis as mandated in Section 4(4) of Act of 1988. This may perhaps prevent the fast collapsing system of delivery of criminal justice. 7. In the result, this application has no merits and it dismissed accordingly.Application dismissed. *******