O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) COUNTER and rejoinder-affidavits have been filed, and therefore, this writ petition is being disposed of finally with the consent of learned counsel for the parties at the admission stage. Heard Sri Devendra Dahma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. P. Goel for the respondents. ( 2 ) THE petitioners, three in number, along with others were appointed by the Chairman. Town area Committee. Kishni, district Mainpuri by order dated 24. 9. 1993, w. e. f. 1. 10. 1993 vide annexure 1. Shiv Pratap Singh, petitioner No. 1 and Brijendra Kumar Singh, petitioner No. 2 were appointed as Clerks while Surendra Singh, petitioner No. 3 was appointed as Chaukidar. Subsequently, by order dated 25. 3. 1994, Annexure 2 to the writ petition, the Sub-Divisional magistrate/officer Incharge Town Area Committee cancelled the order of appointment dated 24. 9. 1993 in respect of alt the appointees on the ground that the order was illegal and without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the order of appointment of the petitioners has been cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in clear and flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. It was also urged that the chairman of the Committee was empowered to make appointments in case of emergency under section 11 of the U. P. Town Area Act and, therefore, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate/officer incharge Town Area was not justified in cancelling the appointment orders. ( 3 ) A counter-affidavit has been filed by Sri Prem Shankar Gupta, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, bhogaon, Mainpuri. It is averred that in the Town Area, aforesaid, there were only seven sanctioned posts, namely, that of a Clerk, a Chaukidar and 5 Sweepers, which were already manned : that in the absence of any vacancy, the Chairman could not have made any appointment ; that the procedure prescribed for making appointments was not followed. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners urged that the respondents cannot travel beyond the ground (s) taken to cancel the order of appointments of the petitioners and cannot add up the fresh grounds by means of a counter-affidavit. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election commissioner, New Delhi and others. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election commissioner, New Delhi and others. AIR 1978 SC 851 , in which the Supreme Court observed that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Reliance was placed on the following observations made in Gordhandas Bhaniks case, AIR 1952 SC 16 at page 18: "public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to effect the action and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. " There is much force in the submission made on behalf of the respondent No. 3 that the petitioners were successful in obtaining the appointment in collusion with the Chairman of the town Area Committee. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that the impugned order dated 25. 3. 1994 is bad in law as it has been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on Sri Dhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur and others, 1990 (1) UPLBEC 1, in which Supreme Court has held that the order cancelling appointment without giving an opportunity of hearing to the affected persons was against the principles of natural justice and consequently void. I have perused the said case and find that the observations made by the Supreme Court came to be made in an entirely different set of facts. It was a case where a post did exist. The question was whether it was to be filled by promotion or by direct recruitment. The direct recruit was validly appointed. I have perused the said case and find that the observations made by the Supreme Court came to be made in an entirely different set of facts. It was a case where a post did exist. The question was whether it was to be filled by promotion or by direct recruitment. The direct recruit was validly appointed. The order cancelling his appointment was made without affording the direct recruit an opportunity of hearing. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that the order was passed against the principles of natural justice. In another case in Shravan Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar and others. AIR 1991 SC 309 . Supreme Court found that prior opportunity of hearing should have been given before cancelling the appointment. It was a case in which the district Superintendent of Education, Dhanbad had made the appointments without any authority and the appointments were made as a device of by-passing, reservations and the conditions which were part of appointment order were not complied with. The observations made in this case by the Supreme Court are also not attracted and do not apply on all fours to the present case. In both the cases, referred to above, the posts did exist but the incumbents were illegally appointed either in breach of the policy of promotion or reservation. In the instant case, the appointments were made on the posts which were not in existence and the proper procedure prescribed for the appointment was not followed. The appointments of the petitioners are, in the eyes of law, no appointments at all. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that where it is manifestly clear that the appointments made were void ab initio, the question of affording an opportunity of hearing did not arise, as it would not have made any difference. In this connection, a reference may be made to S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others, AIR 1981 SC 136 . In paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Supreme Court took the view that failure to observe the principles of natural justice would not at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference keeping in view the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. To be more precise, the Supreme Court observed thus : ". . . . . To be more precise, the Supreme Court observed thus : ". . . . . Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice, but because courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where conclusions are controversial, however, slightly, and penalties are discretionary. " In another case in Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh and others, AIR 1993 SC 796 , an unfair selection list was cancelled as the enquiries revealed the allegations of favouritism and corruption. It was held that the cancellation of select list is not open to challenge on the ground that the charges levelled are not established by direct evidence. The Honble Supreme court observed that the "cancellation of such dubious selection list is unassailable on ground of want of hearing to the selectee prior to its cancellation. " ( 6 ) IN the instant case, the appointments of the petitioners were cancelled for bona fide and valid reasons by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate/officer Incharge, Town Area Committee. Even if an opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners, it would not have made any difference and the result would have remained the same that the appointments of the petitioners were illegal. In these circumstances, the order of cancellation of the appointments of the petitioners cannot be said to be bad in law on the ground that opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioners. " ( 7 ) IN the result, it is found that the appointments of the petitioners were made on the posts, which did not exist and without following the proper procedure. The appointments of the petitioners were void, ab initio, and, therefore, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate/officer Incharge Town Area committee respondent No. 3 had the authority and jurisdiction to cancel the collusive appointments made by the Chairman of the Town Area Committee. The petitioners are not entitled to any relief. ( 8 ) THE writ petition fails and is dismissed. The interim orders, if any. passed in this writ petition is vacated. .