State of Rajasthan v. Dr. Mahaveer Chand — 1997 DIGILAW 1293 (RAJ)

Honble SINGH, J.–Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent. (2). Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23rd July, 1996 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2853/87. By the aforesaid order the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent Dr. Mahaveer Chand and quashed the order dated 5th May, 1986 passed by the appellant under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Conrol and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1958). (3). The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may be summarised as below:– (4). The respondent-petitioner Dr. Mahaveer Chand is an employee of the State Government of Rajasthan. In the year 1981 he was serving as Lecturer in the Department of Psychiatry in S.N. Medical College, Jodhpur. He liked to visit foreign countries and applied for passport. The State Government was requested to issue a ``No Objection Certificate, which was granted subject to the conditions that the applicant would proceed only after getting the sanction from the competent authority; he would not extend his leave without the prior approval of the Government; he would not undertake any study while abroad; he would not join foreign assignment while abroad and his resignation from abroad shall would not be accepted and no foreign exchange would be made available through any Government channel. The respondent obtained the passport and proceeded to visit foreign countries. In the first instance, he was granted six days Privileged Leave w.e.f. 12th October, 1981 to 17th October, 1981. Later on, the respondent applied for six months leave without pay by submitting an application in the prescribed form. The leave applied for was granted by the State Government vide letter dated 24th December, 1981. The res- pondent moved another application for grant of further leave for the period from 18th April, 1981 to 17th October, 1982. This application was also granted by the State Government vide order dated 27th April, 1982. The respondent did not join his duties and moved another application for leave for the period from 18th October, 1982 to 17th April, 1983. This application was allowed and leave was granted to him vide order dated 16th December, 1981. The endorsement made on the copy of the order dated 16.12.82 (Annex.6) was to the effect that future leave would be considered on returning from abroad. This application was allowed and leave was granted to him vide order dated 16th December, 1981. The endorsement made on the copy of the order dated 16.12.82 (Annex.6) was to the effect that future leave would be considered on returning from abroad. No further leave was granted to the respondent subsequent to 16th April, 1982. The respondent remained outside the country and moved applications for further, but no further leave was granted to him. He returned to India and resumed his duties on 19th May, 1984. He was placed under suspension vide order dated 6th December, 1983, and therefore, on19th May, 1984 when he reported for duty, he was treated as under suspension. The suspension order was recalled vide order dated 15th March 1985 and w.e.f. 15th March, 1985 the applicant continued to work on his post. On 16th August, 1985 an order was passed to the effect that the respondent would be deemed to have remained under awaiting of posting orders from 15th March, 1985 to 5th April, 1985. In the same order, it was further observed that the respondent shall be treated as on duty during the period from 15th March, 1985 to 5th April, 1985 and that is pay and allowances will be regularised in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules. (5). The respondent applied for leave from time to time, but leave was not granted. The State Government commenced an inquiry against the respondent under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. The Memorandum, Statement of allegations and Charge-sheet was served on the respondent. He submitted his reply and a departmental inquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 was conducted by the Commi- ssioner, Departmental Enquiries, Jaipur. (6). After conducting the inquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958, the Commissioner, Departmental Enquiries gave his findings. He held that the charges against the delinquent public servant were not proved. The report of the Inquiry Officer was considered by the State Government. The State Government dis-agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and held that the respondent was guilty of the charges framed against him. He was found guilty of two charges. He held that the charges against the delinquent public servant were not proved. The report of the Inquiry Officer was considered by the State Government. The State Government dis-agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and held that the respondent was guilty of the charges framed against him. He was found guilty of two charges. The first was that he dis-obeyed the conditions subject to which No Objection Certificate was granted by the State Government on 18.9.81 and the second charge was that he wilfully absented himself from duty without prior sanction of leave and did not com- ply with the directions of senior officers of the State Government. As a result of the finding arrived at by the State Government that the charges framed against the respondent were proved, three annual grade increments with cumulative effect were stopped vide order dated 5th May, 1986 passed by His Excellancy the Governor of Rajasthan. (7). The respondent did not file any writ petition against the order dated 5th May 1986 for more than one year. (8). On 8th October, 1987, the period for which the respondent remained absent from duty without prior sanction of leave, was regularised and it was directed that his absence from duty during the period from 18th April, 83 to 5th Decem- ber, 83 (232 days) shall be treated as extra ordinary leave without pay and his absence from duty during the period from 6th December, 83 to 5th April, 85 (486 days) shall be treated as extra ordinary leave without pay. It was further observed in the order that the period for which extra ordinary leave was being granted, would not be counted for any purposes relating to service of the respondent. On 19th April, 1989, a corrigendum was issued to amend the order dated 8th October, 1987. The correction was made to the effect that in place of the period from 6th December, 83 to 5th April, 85, the period from 6th December, 83 to 14th March, 85 was substituted. (9). The respondent filed the S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2853/87 on 7th Novem- ber, 83 i.e. about one month after the passing of the order dated 8th October, 87, by which his absence from duty was regularised by granting him extra ordinary leave without pay. (9). The respondent filed the S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2853/87 on 7th Novem- ber, 83 i.e. about one month after the passing of the order dated 8th October, 87, by which his absence from duty was regularised by granting him extra ordinary leave without pay. The main ground taken in the writ petition was that the grant of extra ordinary leave to the petitioner for the period from 18th April, 83 to 5th April, 85 vide order dated 8th October, 87, had the effect of exonerating him from both the charges of which he was found guilty and for which he had been punished by imposition of the penalty of the stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect. Some additional grounds were also taken in the writ petition. One of the additional ground was that the petitioner (respondent) had not been informed about the refusal of leave to him and that by the endorsemen t made on Ex.6, he was given to understand that after his return from abroad, his application for grant of leave would be considered. Another additional ground was that the copy of inquiry report was not supplied to him and that the principles of natural justice had not been observed by the State Government before passing the order holding him guilty of both the charges and imposing punishment on him. (10). A perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge shows that the ground which was pressed before the learned Single Judge was that the order dated 8th October, 87 (by which the absence from duty without leave was regularised by grant of extra ordinary leave without pay) amounted to condoning the mis-conduct of the petitioner (respondent). The learned Single Judge held that the order dated 8th October, 87 modified the order dated 5th May, 86 and therefore, it was not necessary to quash any of the orders passed by the State Government. In view of the conclusions arrived at by him, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 5th May, 86 by which three annual increments were stopped with cumulative effect and gave a direction to the State Government to give all the increments to the petitioner and fix his salary in accordance with the law within a period of three months. The State has filed against that order. (11). The State has filed against that order. (11). The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the order dated 5th May, 86 by which the respondent was found guilty of both the charges and penalty was imposed on him was passed by His Excellency the Governor under the Rules of 1958 after carefully considering the evidence produced during the disciplinary inquiry and the findings of the Inquiry Officer and there was no occasion for the review, repeal, modification, or alterations of that order. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the order dated 8th October, 87 on which reliance has been placed by the respondent, was issued by an authority subordinate to His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan and the Officer who issued the order dated 8th October, 87 did not have any jurisdiction to review, alter, or modify the order dated 5th May, 86 passed by His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the ob- ject of passing the order dated 8th October, 87 was not to condone the mis-conduct committed by the respondent, but the real object of the order was to undo the effect of break in service, which had occurred on account of absence from duty without sanction of leave and since the State Government did not want the respondent to suffer the consequence of loss of previous service (prior to absence from duty with- out leave). Therefore, the order was passed on the basis of above three grounds. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the findings given by the learned Single Judge are not in accordance with Rules applicable to this case. (12). The learned counsel for the respondent has not only supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge, he has further submitted that since the writ petition had been allowed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the order dated 5th May, 86 was modified by the order dated 8th October, 87, he did not address to Court on additional grounds taken by the respondent in the writ petition against the order dated 5th May, 86. In view of this submission, we have allowed the learned counsel for the respondent to submit his arguments based on the addi- tional grounds mentioned above on which the order dated 5th May, 86 has been challenged. (13). In this appeal the question that arise for determination are : (1) whether the order dated 5th May, 86 passed by His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan was modified by the order dated 8th October, 87 and the alleged mis- conduct of the respondent was condoned ? If so, whether the penalty imposed on the respondent stood automatically recalled; (2) whether the absence from duty without sanction of leave, in the facts and circumstances of the case amounted to mis-conduct punishable under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958; (3) whether the order dated 5th May, 86 passed by His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan is null and void on the ground that the principles of natural justice were not observed before passing the order against the respondent (petitioner), (4) whether the petitioner is guilty of inordinate delay in filing the writ petition against the order dated 5th May, 86. If so, whether he is entitled to any reief under Article 226 of the Constitution. (14). After hearing the learned counsels for both the parties, we are of the opinion that in view of Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, the view that the order dated 8th October, 87 has modified the order dated 5th May, 86 passed by His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan is untenable. Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules reads as under:– ``86. Absence after expiry of leave.–(1) A Government servant who is absent from duty without leave or before leave applied for has been sanctioned by the competent authority shall be treated to have re- mained wilfully absent from duty; and such absence shall amount to interruption in service involving forfeiture of past service unless, on satisfactory reasons being furnished, the absence is regularized by grant of leave due or is commuted into extra-ordinary leave by the authority competent to sanction leave. (2)(a) A Government servant who remains absent from duty after the expiry of the sanctioned leave or after communication of refusal of extension of leave is not entitled to any pay and allowance for the period of such absence and the period of such absence shall be commuted into extra ordinary leave unless on satisfactory reasons being furnished, the period of absence is regularized by grant of leave due by the authorty to grant leave; (b) wilful absence from duty after the expiry of leave renders a Government servant liable to disciplinary action. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions contained in sub-rules (1) and (2) above the disciplinary authority may initiate departmental proceedings under Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules against a government servant who wilfully remains absent from duty for a period exceeding one month and if the charge of wilful absence from duty is proved against him, he may be removed from service. Government of Rajasthans Decisions (i) Treatment of wilful absence from duty not recognised.–Wilful absence from duty, even though not covered by grant of leave does not entail loss of lien. The period of absence not covered by grant of leave shall have to be treated as `dies non for all purposes, viz. increment, leave and pension. Such absence without leave where it stands singly and not in continuaton of any authorised leave of absence will constitute an interruption of service for the purpose of pension and the entire past service will stand forfeited. (ii) Action for overstayal of leave.–Doubts were raised in certain quarters as to how the cases in which an official overstays the prescribed quantum of extra ordinary leave should be dealt with. The matter has been considered and it is clarified that the aforesaid rule does not take away the power of disciplinary authority to take appro- priate disciplinary authority to take appropriate disciplinary action for any mis- conduct and imposes one of the penalties under Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. Action can, therefore, be taken under these rules for unauthorised absence from duty or over-stayal of leave even for one day, treating it as mis- conduct, if the facts and circumstances of the case warrant such an action. (15). Action can, therefore, be taken under these rules for unauthorised absence from duty or over-stayal of leave even for one day, treating it as mis- conduct, if the facts and circumstances of the case warrant such an action. (15). A bare perusal of the rules shows that if an employee remains absent from duty without sanction of leave, such absence amounts to interruption involving forfeiture of past service unless the absence is regularized by grant of leave due or is commuted into extra-ordinary leave by the authority competent to sanction leave. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 86 provides that a Government servant who remains absent from duty after the expiry of the sanctioned leave is not entitled to any pay and allowance for the period of such and the period of such absence shall be commu- ted into extra-ordinary leave unless on satisfactory reasons being furnished, the period of his absence absence is regularized by grant of leave. Clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 86 makes it very clear that wilful absence from duty after the expiry of leave renders a Government servant liable to disciplinary action. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 86 provides that notwithstanding the provisions contained in sub-rules (1) and (2) above the disciplinary authority may initiate departmental proceedings under Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules against the Government servant who wilfully remains absent from duty for a period exceeding one months and if the charge of wilful absence from duty is proved against him, he may be removed from service. Rule 86 confers upon the State Government the right to take disciplinary action for wilful absence of duty and in view of the fact that wilful absence from duty amounts to interruption in service and forfeiture of past service, it empowers the State Government to regularise the wilful absence from duty by grant of extra-ordinary leave without pay. This provision is obviously for the benefit of the public servant so that he may not suffer double punishment; one un- der the Rules of 1958 and the other by forfeiture of his past service on account of the interruption caused by his wilful absence from duty. This provision is obviously for the benefit of the public servant so that he may not suffer double punishment; one un- der the Rules of 1958 and the other by forfeiture of his past service on account of the interruption caused by his wilful absence from duty. It may also be noted that power to impose punishment on a public servant, though in an incident of employment, is governed by separate Rules, namely, the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 enacted under Article 309 of the Constitu- tion. It is a well established rule of interpretation that when there is a special provision for a certain matter, the general provisions must make room for the special provision. In the matter of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and imposi- tion of penalties for conduct, Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control &Appeal) Rules, 1958 are in the nature of special provisions and they take precedence over the general provisions contained in Rajasthan Service Rules. Therefore, the conduct of disciplinary inquiry and imposition of penalties for mis-conduct is governed not by the Rajasthan Service Rules, but by the Rules of 1958. As a result, nothing contained in rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules can be so interpreted as to confer upon the authority empowered to sanction leave under sub-rule (1) and (2) of Rule 86, to modify or alter the order passed under the Rules of 1958, without resorting to the relevant provisions of those Rules. It is a well established principle of the law that where the law confers a power to do a certain act and prescribes the mode in which the act is to be performed, that act must be performed in that mode and not otherwise. We, therefore, find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the order dated 8th October, 87 passed under Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules cannot modify or alter the order dated 5th May, 1986 passed by His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan in exercise of the powers conferred by the Rules of 1958. (16). All powers, legislative, executive or judicial on shapeless and formless, is viewed independently of the conditions in which they have been conferred and other relevant matters. (16). All powers, legislative, executive or judicial on shapeless and formless, is viewed independently of the conditions in which they have been conferred and other relevant matters. Therefore, if attention is paid to the powers only and not to other relevant matters, all powers would appear to be similar and not subject to any conditions and this approach leads to a wrong conclusion that the powers can be exercised in any manner for any purpose at any time. for all practical purposes, the context in which powers are conferred, the object for which they are conferned, the conditions subject to which the powers can be exercised, the authority who can exercise then, the extent to which they can be exercised, the mode and manner in which they can be exercised are very relevant for serving the object of public good and these matters give a shape and form to the powers and enable the man- kind to conceptualise them in a manner necessary for meeting the real objects. In our view, the provisions of Rajasthan Service Rules are general in nature and they apply to the extent they are not inconsistent with any special provision or when there be no special provision applicable to the matter in hand. Rules of 1958 are in relation to Rajasthan Service Rules special provisions relating to disciplinary action for mis-conduct committed by a government servant and imposition of penalty on him. Therefore, the general provisions of Rule 86 cannot be invoked for the purpose of altering or modifying any order passed by a competent authority under the Rules of 1958. (17). In view of above reasons, we are afraid. It is not possible for us to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Single Judge for quashing the impugned order dated 5th May, 86. (18). The second question to be decided in this appeal is whether the absence from duty of the respondent amounted to mis-conduct in the facts and circumstan- ces of the case. The expression ``mis-conduct has not been defined in the Rules of 1958 nor, it has been defined in the Rajasthan Service Rules. Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules however provides that for wilful absence from duty, disciplinary action can be taken against the public servant. In view of Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, it is not mere absence from duty, which amounts to mis- conduct. Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules however provides that for wilful absence from duty, disciplinary action can be taken against the public servant. In view of Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, it is not mere absence from duty, which amounts to mis- conduct. In order absence from duty may amount to mis-conduct, it must be wilful. The expression ``wilful has not been defined in any rule, but in our view this expression does not convey the same meaning as is conveyed by the expression ``intentional. An employee may intentionally not attend to his duty, but theremay be several reasons for not attending to his duty. It is not necessary to give a catalo- gue of those reasons. Suffice it to say that there may be situations and circumstances in which the public servant may not attend to his duty in spite of the fact that he wants to be the most obedient and loyal servant of his master. The distinction between expression ``wilful and ``intentional can be drawn in view of the Conduct Rules of 1971, which require that every public servant shall at all times maintain integrity and devotion to duty. In our considered view, unless there is lack of devotion to duty, mere absence from duty would not amount to mis-conduct even if such absence is intentional and therefore such absence would not be liable to be called wilful absence from duty. In the order dated 5th May, 86, the disciplinary authority has made observations which give an impression that the disciplinary authority considered mere absence from duty without prior sanction of leave as amounting to wilful absence from duty for the purpose of Rule 86(3) of the Rajasthan Service Rules and Rules of 1958. In our considered view that observation of the disciplinary authority does not correctly lay down the meaning of the expression ``wilful absence from duty or ``misconduct. (19). Whether the delinquent public servant lacked devotion to duty is a question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases is limited to finding out whether disciplinary inquiry was vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, such denial of reasonable opportunity or on account of the fact that the findings are based on no evidence or the dis-proportionate punishment imposed on the employee. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases is limited to finding out whether disciplinary inquiry was vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, such denial of reasonable opportunity or on account of the fact that the findings are based on no evidence or the dis-proportionate punishment imposed on the employee. It would be useful to quote the observations of the Honble Supreme Court made in para 20 of the judgment reported in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Ashok Kumar Arora (1). Their Lordships observed:– ``At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of the appellate court/Authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and on the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. There is catena of judgment of this court which had settled the law on this topics and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to few decisions of this Court on this topic viz., State of Andhra Pradesh vs. S.Sree Rama Rao, 1963(3) SCR 25, State of Andhra Pradesh vs.Chitra Venkata Rao, 1976(1) SCR 521 , Corporation of City of Nagpur and Anr. vs. Ramchandra, 1981(3) SCR 22 and Nelson Motis vs. Union of India and Anr., JT 1992(5) SC 511 = AIR 1992 SC 1981 . (20). In view of the limited jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the only question which can being considered is whether the disciplinary authority arrived at the finding of misconduct on the part of the res- pondent without therebeing any evidence or there as some evidence on the basis of which the disciplinary authority was within its rights to arrive at the finding given in the impugned order. The disciplinary authority, who passed the impugned order dated 5th May, 86 has taken into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the respondent and came to the finding thatthe absence from duty amounted to mis- conduct. The disciplinary authority, who passed the impugned order dated 5th May, 86 has taken into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the respondent and came to the finding thatthe absence from duty amounted to mis- conduct. The respondent (petitioner) went abroad by taking P.L. for six days only and then continued to remain outsie the country and moved one application after other for grant of leave without reporting for duty. It clearly shows that he was not devoted to his duties as a Lecturer of the Department of Psychitary in S.N. Medical College, Jodhpur. He owed a duty to the State Government, to the Medical College and to the students, who depended on him. There is nothing on record to show that he was at all anxious to perform his functions as a Lecturer during the long period for which he remained outside the country. The relationship of master and servant depends upon a bond, which binds the two and it is this bond which manifests itself in the form of devotion on the partof the servant towards the master or the duties assigned to him. Any act which results in lack of devotion on the part of the servant has the necessary consequence of adversely effecting the bond between him and his master and this explains why lack of devotion is considered to be a mis- conduct. Viewed in this light, the best way in which the servant can show that he is devoted to his duties is by obeying the lawful directions given by his master from time to time and seeking instructions from his master by reporting to duty and bringing the relevant facts to the notice of the employer. After going through the reasons given by the disciplinary authority in the order dated 5th May, 86, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that there was no material before the disciplinary authority for arriving at the conclusion that the respondent (petitioner) committed mis-conduct by wilfully absenting himself from duty. (21). After going through the reasons given by the disciplinary authority in the order dated 5th May, 86, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that there was no material before the disciplinary authority for arriving at the conclusion that the respondent (petitioner) committed mis-conduct by wilfully absenting himself from duty. (21). The learned counsel for the respondents has tried to save the respondent from the charge of wilful absence from duty by submitting that the endorsement made in order Ex.6 conveyed to the respondent that his appliation for leave would be considered after he returns from abroad and that this endorsement nowhere directed the respondent to return to his duty in India by cutting short his visit of the foreign countries. What the learned counsel for the respondent wants us to presume from the endorsement made in Ex.6 is that the respondent was given a license to stay outside the country for as long as he desired and that an unconditional promise was made to him that whenever he would return to India and apply for leave, his application for leave would be considered. In our view the aforesaid conclusion cannot be drawn from the endorsement made on Ex.6. Ex. 6makes it very clear the leave applied for by the respondent was not granted by the State Government, which meant that if the respondent preferred to remain outside, his application for leave would not be considered at all. The endorsement by implica- tion expressed displeasure over the unauthorised stay of the respondent outside the country and his conduct of sending applications from abroad for leave. In this view of the matter, it is difficult to hold that the endorsement made on Ex.6 would mis-lead the respondent into believing that the State Government had given him a license to stay abroad as long as he desired and promised to sanction leave on his coming back to the country. Ex.6, therefore, cannot be pressed into service for showing that the respondent was not guilty of wilful absence from duty. In this special appeal, we are not sitting in appeal over the finding of fact given by the disciplinary authority. Ex.6, therefore, cannot be pressed into service for showing that the respondent was not guilty of wilful absence from duty. In this special appeal, we are not sitting in appeal over the finding of fact given by the disciplinary authority. Since, we have come to the conclusion that there was suffi- cient material on the basis of which the disciplinary authority could form an opinion that the respondent had wilfully absented himself, it cannot be said that the order dated 5th May, 86 is perverse or against the Rules. (22). The next question to be decided in this appeal is whether the order dated 5th May, 86 passed by His Excellency the Government of Rajasthan is null and void on the ground that the principles of natural justice have been violated. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that a copy of the inquiry report was not supplied by the disciplinary authority to the respondent, nor he was given an opportunity of being heard and that no reasons have been given by the disciplinary authority for taking a view different from the view taken by the inquiry officer, and therefore, there is violation of sub-rule (9) and (10) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 provides that the Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge and the Disciplinary Authority may while considering the report of the Inquiring Authority for just and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing remand the case for further/de-novo enquiry, in case it has reason to believe that the enquiry already conducted has been laconic in some respect or the other. (23). (23). Sub-rule (10) of Rule 16 provides that if the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties speci- fied in classes (iv) to (vii) of Rule 14 should be imposed, it shall – (a) furnish to the Government servant a copy of the report of the Inquiry Authority and where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority, a state- ment of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Authority ; and (b) give him a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty, pro- vided that such representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry. (24). The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the observations made in the State of Punjab vs. Bhagat Ram (2), wherein their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court observed that it is unjust and unfair to deny the Government servant copies of statements of witnesses examined during inves- tigation and produced at the inquiry in support of the charges levelled against the Government servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the requirement of giving the Government servant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. The observations made in this judgment do no help the respondent (petitioner) in any manner. Because, in this case, there is no allegation to the effect that during the conduct of inquiry held by the Inquiring Authority, the copies of statements of the witnesses recorded during investigation were not supplied to the petitioner. In fact, the respondent has not pointed out any infirmity in the inquiry conducted by the Inquiring Authority. Therefore, the observations made in this judgment do not help the petitioner (respondent) in any manner. (25). The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is Miss Hira Roop Chandani vs. The State of Raj. & Ors. (3). In that case a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Dy. Therefore, the observations made in this judgment do not help the petitioner (respondent) in any manner. (25). The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is Miss Hira Roop Chandani vs. The State of Raj. & Ors. (3). In that case a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Dy. Commissioner should found the petitioner guilty of a part of the charge and the ground on which the charge itself was based and the Enquiry Officer had clearly found the petitioner not guilty on that charge and in these circumstances, when the Dy. Commissioner was dis-agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it was his duty to have furnished a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, to the petitioner along with the grounds on which the Dy. Commissioner proposed to dis-agree with that report, so that the petitioner could have met the case sought to be made out against him. (26). A perusal of the judgment delivered in that case shows that the facts of that case were different from the facts of this case. In this case, the disciplinary authority has found the petitioner (respondent) guilty of misconduct on the basis of facts, which have fully established. The ground on which the petitioner (respon- dent) was held guilty were not different from the grounds which were taken into consideration by the Inquiry Officer. It is a view taken by the Inquiry Officer that has been deferred by the disciplinary authority. The observations made in the case of Miss Heera Roop Chandani do not help the petitioner (respondent). (27). The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is Kanhaiya Lal Kanther vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (4). In this case, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the provisions of sub-rule (10) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 are mandatory and the disciplinary authority disagreeing with finding of Inquiring Authority on recommendations of Public Service Commission must give reasons for imposing the penalty. (28). All that has been laid down in this case in relation to sub-rule (10) of Rule 16 is that if the disciplinary authority taken a view different from the view taken by the Inquiring Authority or dis-agrees with the recommendations of the Public Service Commission and impose major penalty, the reasons must be given. (28). All that has been laid down in this case in relation to sub-rule (10) of Rule 16 is that if the disciplinary authority taken a view different from the view taken by the Inquiring Authority or dis-agrees with the recommendations of the Public Service Commission and impose major penalty, the reasons must be given. The view of law taken by the learned Single Judge is correct. But, in this case after care- fully perusing the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, we do not find that there has been any violation of sub-rule (10) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. The Disciplinary Authority has given reasons for not accepting the findings of the Inquiry Officer and taking a contrary view. The respondent was accused of two charges. The first was that he was granted leave for the period ending on 17th April, 83, and therefore, he had to report for duty on 18.4.83 and that he wilfully absented himself from duty from 18th April, 83, and the second charge was that vide letter dated 9th September, 83 he was informed that leave applied for w.e.f. 18th April, 83 had been refused and that he had to report for duty, but he did not comply with the order and wilfully absented himself. The Inquiry Officer, on the basis of Ex.P/5, the application for grant of leave for the period from 12.10.81 to 17.10.81 held that the respondent had given his leave address as ``649/D 2/D Bhopal (M.P.), and therefore, it was necessary to send him letters on the address given in Ex.P/5. The Inquiry Officer further held that a perusal of Ex.P/6 to Ex.P/10 show that none of these letters were sent on the address given in Ex.P/5. During the inquiry, P.W.1, stated before the Inquiry Officer, that Ex.P/6, Ex.P/8 and Ex.P/10 were sent on the permanent address of Jodhpur and Ex.P/7 and Ex.P/8 were sent on the address, which was given in that application for leave and these addresses were not identical. We, therefore, hold that the letters Ex.P/6 to Ex.P/10 were not sent at the proper address, and therefore, the delinquent officer was never intimated that his leave after 17th April, 83 had not been granted. He, therefore, exonerated the delinquent officer (respondent) of charge no.1, which related to dis-obedience of the directions contained in Ex.P/6 to Ex.P/10. We, therefore, hold that the letters Ex.P/6 to Ex.P/10 were not sent at the proper address, and therefore, the delinquent officer was never intimated that his leave after 17th April, 83 had not been granted. He, therefore, exonerated the delinquent officer (respondent) of charge no.1, which related to dis-obedience of the directions contained in Ex.P/6 to Ex.P/10. Regarding the second charge, on the basis of endorsement made on Ex.P/4, the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that Ex.P/4 contained an endorsement to the effect that further extension of leave will be considered on his returning from abroad and that this endorsement superseded the condition laid down in Ex.P/1 (No Objection Certificate). Obviously, the Inquiry Officer was of the view that the endorsement made on Ex.P/4, give a license to the respondent (Delinquent Officer) to stay abroad for as long as he like and by implication communicated the promise on behalf of the Government that on his returning from abroad, his application for leave would be considered. The Disciplinary Authority has carefully considered the reasons given by the Inquiring Officer. The Disciplinary Authority took into consideration the fact that the earlier application for leave, which is Ex.P/5 on which the leave address of Madhya Pradesh was given, containe d in a prayer for grant of six days P.L. only and that leave expired on 17th October, 81. In the next application for leave for the period from 18th October, 82 to 17th April, 83, the delinquent officer gave his Jodhpur address and stated therein that he was proceeding to abroad and in subsequent applications, the delinquent officer indicated that he outside the country and in the application for leave, which he gave for the period commencing from 18th October, 82, he did not give his leave address and in these circumstances it was not possible for the State Government to send letters Ex.P/6 to Ex.P/10 to the delinquent officer, who was outside the country since he had not given his leave address of the foreign country, which he was visiting. The Disciplinary Authority has thus given reasons for taking a view different from the view taken by the Inquiring Officer. A public servant, who goes abroad, must give his address to his employer so that employer may communicate with him. The Disciplinary Authority has thus given reasons for taking a view different from the view taken by the Inquiring Officer. A public servant, who goes abroad, must give his address to his employer so that employer may communicate with him. If an employee, who goes foreign country and does not given his leave address to the employer, he cannot be allowed to complain that injustice has been done to him, because the order of refusing leave to him could not be communicated to him. In any case, it is a finding of fact, which does not appear to be perverse, nor it cannot be said without any reasons. (29). Regarding the other charge, the Disciplinary Authority has clearly stated that the condition laid down in Ex.P/1 (No Objection Certificate) had not been waived, and therefore, the delinquent officer is guilty of violating the condition laid down in Ex.P/1 (No Objection Certification). The view taken by the Inquiry Officer on the basis of endorsement made in Ex.P/4 has not been accepted as correct by the Disciplinary Authority and the view taken by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be said to be perverse or without reason. In these circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order dated 5th May, 86 passed by the Disciplinary Authority does not suffer from the vice of violation of sub-rule (9) or (10) of rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. So far as necessity of personal hearing before passing the impugned order is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent has not brought to our notice any rule, which requires that the Disciplinary Authority was under an legal obligation to put personal hearing to the delinquent officer before passing the impugned order. It has also not been shown to us that prejudice has been caused to the delinquent officer by not giving him a personal hearing before passing the impugned order. In the instant case, the Inquiry Officer had given full opportunity to the respondent to meet both charges for which the Inquiry was held. There was thus no violation of the principles of natural justice. Under the Rules, the Disciplinary Authority was not obliged to give a personal hearing to the respondent before passing the impugned order. In the instant case, the Inquiry Officer had given full opportunity to the respondent to meet both charges for which the Inquiry was held. There was thus no violation of the principles of natural justice. Under the Rules, the Disciplinary Authority was not obliged to give a personal hearing to the respondent before passing the impugned order. In these circumstances, unless it can be shown that a prejudice had been caused to the respondent by not giving him a personal hearing, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be said to be unjust or illegal. The ultimate object of observing the principles of natural justice is to pre- vent the occurrence of injustice to the person against whom proceedings are initiated. Therefore, unless it is shown that prejudice was caused to the person against whom proceedings were initiated, non-observance of the principles of natural justice cannot be made a ground for quashing otherwise legal and just orders passed by public functionaries in exercise of their statutory powers. (30). For the reasons mentioned above, the contention that impugned order is void for non-observance of principles of natural justice and non-compliance of the provisions of sub-rule (9) and (10) of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 must be rejected as untenable. Such question to be considered in this appeal is whether there was inordinate delay in filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated 5th May, 86. (31). The order dated 5th May, 86 was passed by His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan on 5th May, 86. There is no doubt in it that the respondent had received a copy of the order. He has omitted to indicate in his writ petition the date on which he had received a copy of the impugned order. The writ petition was filed on 7.11.87 after the expiry of 14 months from the date of passing of the impugned order. In a case of this kind, this delay cannot be said to be justified for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition was filed on 7.11.87 after the expiry of 14 months from the date of passing of the impugned order. In a case of this kind, this delay cannot be said to be justified for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Since, we have allowed the learned counsel for the respondent to raise all the objections which he wish to raise against the impugned order and have decided them, we make no more observation than this that in a case of this kind, the Government employee, who wants to challenge the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority should approach this Court without unnecessary delay. (32). For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The order dated 23.7.1996 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside and quashed. The writ petition bearing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2853/87 Dr. Mahaveer Chand vs. State of Rajasthan is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we gave no order as to costs.