Honble MADAN, J.–Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State. (2). This is a case in which the accused was convicted of offence publishable under Section 326 IPC and sentenced to two years Simple Imprisonment by the trial court with a fine of Rs. 200/-. Aggrieved by the order of conviction, an appeal was preferred to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rajgarh (Alwar) and the said Appellate Court vide order dated 26.2.97, the said appellate court reversed the order of conviction passed against the accused Chagan Singh by the trial court and acquitted the accused by giving him the benefit of doubt. (3). I have perused both, the order of acquittal as well as the order of convic- tion. Prima-facie, I am of the view that there have to be very strong and cogent reasons for disturbing the findings of acquittal recorded by the trial court and the law is so well settled that if there is one judgment of acquittal while another of conviction, it is primarily duty of the State to prefer an appeal and in the instant case no such appeal was preferred by the State against the order of acquittal by the appellate court. From the perusal of the order of the appellate court it is clear that specific findings have been recorded in paras 19 and 20 of the said order wherein the appellate court has specifically observed that from the nature of the injuries suffered by the complainant it is difficult to assign any positive role to the accused. Out of the two accused who had participated namely, Magan Singh and Chhagan Singh, Magan Singh was given the benefit of probation and released by the trial court. While accused Chhagan Singh was convicted for offence under Sec. 326 IPC. (4). From the perusal of the impugned order it is further apparent that the material witnesses were not examined by the trial court and it is for this reason that the appellant court has reversed the findings of the trial court giving the benefit of doubt to the accused. (5). (4). From the perusal of the impugned order it is further apparent that the material witnesses were not examined by the trial court and it is for this reason that the appellant court has reversed the findings of the trial court giving the benefit of doubt to the accused. (5). During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that from the nature of injuries suffered by the complainant it is apparent that injuries were caused by sharp edged weapon and were grievous in nature and this fact is borne out from the statement of PW 3 Lala Ram. This fact has however been negatived by the appellate court on the ground that the injuries suffered by the complainant have not proved by the statement of the eye witnesses. The law is well settled that the findings of the acquittal recorded by the appellate court should not be lightly interfered with by the Revisional court and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the impugned order of the appellate court does not call for any interference. I am fortified in my observations from the Judgment of Delhi High Court in the matter of Waisuddin vs. State (Delhi Admn.) (1), D.B. Judgment of this court in the matter of Ruda Ram & Ors. vs. State of Raj. (2), D.B. Judgment of this Court in the matter of Kishori & Ors. vs. State of Raj. (3) and Judgment of Allahabad High Court in the matter of Sudhir Kumar Shukla vs. State (4). (6). During the course of hearing it has been brought to my notice that the state has not preferred any appeal against the order of acquittal. However, this is subject to verification from the official records as so stated by the learned Public Prosecutor. (7). In this case, admittedly the material eye-witnesses who were examined by the trial Court have not supported the prosecution case as regards the nature of injuries as recorded by the Medical Jurist in his Injury Report and in the absence of corroboration the Appellate Court has rightly held that from the nature of injuries suffered by the complainant no definite role can be attributed to the accused and in my view the accused was rightly held entitled to the benefit of doubt. Further, it cannot be established from the evidence recorded by the trial Court as to which of the accused had caused injuries to the complainant. (8). Apart from inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, the Appellate Court has also noted material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and it is for this reason that the Appellate Court had passed a well reasoned order reversing the finding of the conviction recorded by the trial Court. In my view, the impugned-order of the Appellate Court does not suffer from any illegality, impropriety or jurisdictional error so as to call for any interference by this Court. (9). As a result of the above, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly rejected.