JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. 1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. Facts giving rise to this appeal are that initially proceedings under Section 163 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred as the 'Act') where initiated against the Respondent for his having encroached upon the Government land measuring five marlas. These proceedings came to be taken up before Assistant Collector, Ist Grade, Badsar, District Hamirpur. Since the plea of title by way of adverse possession was raised by the Respondent, who claimed possession over the land in question for a period beyond thirty years in relation to the land in question, the Revenue Officer below proceeded to determine the question as if he was a civil court. By means of order dated 3-3-1994, Badri Respondent was declared to be the owner in possession of the land comprised in Khasra No. 2347/2296/1 measuring 5 marlas situate the Tika Chakmoh, Tehsil Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P. under Section 163 of the Act. This order of Assistant Collector is appealable under Section 163(5) of the Act. Limitation for filing the appeal before the District Judge is thirty days. However from the record of the trial court, it appears that instead of filing the appeal within time, a time-barred appeal was filed alongwith an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. This application was contested and resisted by the present Respondent Badri and by means of impugned order, the said application as well appeal both have been dismissed. Hence, this appeal. 2. Shri M.L. Chauhan, learned Assistant Advocate General has submitted that the delay in filing the appeal before the lower appellate court was neither wilful nor intentional, but was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Appellant and in any event either due to inaction or laxity on the part of the officials of the State, the larger public interest should not suffer. It was further submitted that it is a matter of common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represennts collective cause of the community. Decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise-is a routine. On these basis, Shri Chauhan has submitted that pendantic approach of explaining each day's delay may not be insisted upon. He has further submitted that transaction of business of Government being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. In these circumstances, insistence upon explaining the delay in filing the appeal by the Court would not be just because it would result in failure of public interest. 3. Lastly, it was submitted that this is a fit case where the delay should have been condoned in filing the appeal before the lower appellate court and in not doing so, the said Court has fallen into grave error. 4. On the other hand, Shri Bhuvnesh Sharma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent has urged that no cause much less a sufficient cause has been made out by the State either in the application or in the evidence led in support of the said application before the lower appellate court for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. According to him, in case and any action had been taken against the official(s) due to whose laxity, the appeal got time-barred, the same should have been brought on record in support of its plea by the State. 5. It is a matter of common knowledge that in the matters relating to State, there is no personal interest involved of anyone and further the files have to be processed at different levels and by different persons who take decisions in such matters. In case either on account of inaction or laxity on the part of the functionaries of the State, its interest is allowed to suffer, then it would result in causing harm to the interest of public at large. Moreover, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. This is necessary because of typical functioning by the Government functionaries in dealing with the matters in routine manner. Moreover, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. This is necessary because of typical functioning by the Government functionaries in dealing with the matters in routine manner. In the event of delay being condoned all that will happen is that the Appellant concerned (State in the present case) would get a chance of its case being heard on merits as by condonation of delay in filing the appeal, the appeal is not going to be allowed. Besides this, the courts are respected for doing substantial justice between the parties and not for throwing out the cases on technical pleas like limitation. Needless to point out here that when grant of substantial justice is pitted against the technical plea like limitation, the latter will give way to the former. 6. Lastly, pendantic approach for explaining each day's delay is not to be insisted upon. In the face of this position, there is no merit in the contention of Shri Bhuvnesh Sharma that the dismissal of the appeal on account of its being time-barred by the lower appellate should be upheld. 7. In support of the aforesaid proposition, reference may be made to the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantrag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 132 and Special Tehsildar, Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750. 8. Nothing has been brought to my notice to take a contrary view on behalf of the Respondent. In these circumstances, order dated 30-4-1996 passed by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur is hereby set aside and the application filed by the Appellant before the lower appellate court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed subject to payment of Rs. 1,000 as costs. The lower appellate court is directed to register the appeal and dispose it of in accordance with law after hearing the parties. Costs would be paid by the State before the next date of hearing. Parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate court on 24-2-1997. Registry will ensure that the record is received in the said court well in time before the next date of hearing. Costs would be paid by the State before the next date of hearing. Parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate court on 24-2-1997. Registry will ensure that the record is received in the said court well in time before the next date of hearing. This appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.