Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. This writ petition arises out of orders passed in a proceeding under Sec.16 (3) of the Bihar land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. The petitioner is the transferee from respondent No.9. Respondent No.4 to 8 filed application for pre-emption which has finally been allowed by the board of Revenue. Respondent Nos.10 to 13 are the subsequent transferees from the petitioner. 2. Respondents 4, 5 and 13 died, respectively, on 8-9-88, 16-12-87 and 26-8-90, i. e. during pendency of this writ petition. An application for substitution of their heirs and legal representatives was filed on 11-9-96. The petitioner has objected to substitution. Counsel for the parties have made detailed submissions in the substitution marter. 3. Mr. Indu Shekhar Pd. Sinha, learned Counsel for the respondents 6 to 8 submitted that an application having been filed after inordinate delay and no sufficient cause have been assigned for the delay, prayer for substitution cannot be allowed. He submitted that sufficiency of cause is a condition precedent which pertains in the jurisdiction of the Court and in the absence of sufficient cause the Court shall not be justified in allowing the prayer. He pointed out in this connection that the plea taken by the petitioner by way of explanation is a false one which not only disentitles him to the relief for substitution but also makes him liable for prosecution. Counsel in this connection referred to a number of decisions reference to which shall be made hereinafter. 4. Mr. S. K. Katariar, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner lives at Asansol where he is engaged as Civil Contractor and as such was unaware of the factum of the deaths of the said respondent (No.4 and 5)until copy of counter affidavit on behalf of respondent 6 to 8 was served on his counsel, on 9-8-96. It was only thereafter that he made enquiry and found that respondent No.13 had also died. The application for substitution was filed soon after on 11-9-98 which cannot be said to be unreasonable time. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that there is no material to support the petitioners case, even prima facie, that he lives away from village at Asansol where he is engaged in contract work. The application for substitution was filed soon after on 11-9-98 which cannot be said to be unreasonable time. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that there is no material to support the petitioners case, even prima facie, that he lives away from village at Asansol where he is engaged in contract work. On the other hand, the respondents filed the certificate of the Sarpanch of the local gram panchayat to the effect that the petitioner lives in his village home where he is engaged in cultivation work. Counsel emphasised that even if the petitioners version of living away from his village is accepted/assumed to be true, it is highly improbable that he would not have paid any visit to his village home for 8-9 years. Counsel argued that the facts stated in the counter affidavit filed in the substitution matter have not been controverted by the petitioner. It was also pointed out that the petitioner claims to be member of the joint family and it is on the ground of his brother being co-sharer of the vendor that the pre-emption application was made. In that view of the matter, even if the petitioner was away from village and ignorant of the developments, any member of the joint family could have taken steps for substitution. 5. In Puran Singh V/s. State of Punjab [ 1996 (2) SCC 205 ] the Apex Court held that the provisions of Order 22 of the code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to writ petitions. This however does not mean that steps for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents are not to be taken. It was observed in that connection : "the petitioner has to take steps for substitution of legal representative within a reasonaoie time. It need not be impressed that it will be unreasonable on the part of the Court to implead the legal representative of the deceased respondent after lapse of several months or years and then to direct them to contest the claim of the petitioner merely on the ground that after the death of the original respondent the right, title or the interest of such respondent has devolved on them. " in paragraph 12 of the judgment it was further observed that - "after the death of the respondent it is incumbent on the part of the petitioner or the appellant to substitute the heirs of such respondent within a reasonable time. For purpose of holding as to what shall be a reasonable time, the High Court may take note of the period prescribed under article 120 of the Limitation Act for substituting the heirs of the deceased defendant or the respondent. However, there is no question of automatic abatement of the writ proceedings. Even if an application is filed beyond 90 days of the death of such respondent, the Court can take into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case for purpose of condoning the delay in filing the application for substitution of the legal representative. This power has to be exercised on well-known and settled principles in respect of exercise of discretionary power by the high Court. " 6. It is on the touchstone of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case that the question as to condonation of delay is to be considered. So far as the petitioner is concerned, only plea taken on his behalf by way of explanation of delay is that he lives away from village home and was ignorant of the developments until 9-8-96. A definite plea has also been taken that he is engaged in civil contract work at Asansol. I called upon the Counsel for the petitioner to produce any material which could prima facie be taken into account in proof of the said plea. No material has either been referred to in the petition/affidavit or at the time of hearing. I find substance in the contention of the Counsel for the respondents about the unliklihood of the petitioner not having knowledge of the deaths, if not within a period of 90 days, within a reasonable time thereafter. The application for substitution has been filed, if the period is to be reckoned from the date of death of respondent No.5, after about nine years. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there has been a long-drawn contest between the parties and had the petitioner been really aware of the deaths, it is not understandable why he would not take steps for substitution. The submission is based on mere conjecture and surmises than on facts. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that there has been a long-drawn contest between the parties and had the petitioner been really aware of the deaths, it is not understandable why he would not take steps for substitution. The submission is based on mere conjecture and surmises than on facts. In the absence of any material whatsoever in support of the contention, and in view of the facts stated in the counter affidavit of the respondents, I am unable to exercise my discretion in favour of the petitioner. 7. Before I conclude, in fairness to the Counsel for the petitioner, I may notice the decisions relied upon by him in the cases reported in 1996 (2) SCC 205 , AIR 1962 SC 361 and AIR 1966 SC 1536 . In view of my findings recorded above I do not think it is necessary for me to refer to the facts of each of the cases. 8. In the result, I hold that the petitioner has failed to make out sufficient cause to explain the delay. Application for substitution (flag b) is accordingly rejected. 9. As a result of rejection of the said application revisional order allowing pre-emption, so far as deceased respondent Nos.4 and 5 are concerned, becomes final. The writ petition therefore cannot be heard on merit as against surviving respondents, for any favourable order in favour of the petition would result in conflicting orders. 10. This writ petition accordingly becomes incompetent as a whole and the same is dismissed. Petition Dismissed.