Honble JAIN, J. – This revision petition under s. 115 CPC is directed against the order dated 9.7.1996 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rajsamand by which the objection of the petitioners regarding admissibility of the registered Exchange Deed in evidence was rejected. (2). The plaintiff non-petitioners filed a suit against the defendants-petitioners challenging the sale deed executed in favour of the defendants-petitioners No. 1 to 3 by defendant- petitioner No. 4 on certain grounds. In the written statement, the averments stated in the plaint were denied. The plaintiffs examined P.W. 1 Raghunath and when the plaintiffs wanted to tender in evidence the Exchange Deed executed between him and defendant-petitioner Badrilal, the learned counsel app- earing for the defendants objected regarding admissibility of the said document on the ground that by that document, certain immovable properties were exchanged between the parties and, therefore, it was compulsorily registerable under s. 17 of the Registration Act. (3). The learned Civil Judge after hearing arguments of both the parties and relying on Anoopchand Jain vs. Praveen Chandra Jain (1), rejected the objection on the ground that the opposite party had admitted execution of the above document. (4). I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the non-petitioner and have carefully gone through the record of the case. (5). The learned counsel appearing for the non-petitioner has raised a preliminary objection that this revision petition is not maintainable because while passing the impugned order, the learned trial court has not committed any jurisdictional error. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on Harakchand vs. The State of Raj. (2), wherein a Full Bench of this Court has laid down that whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question of law which the trial court was entitled to decide and if an error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. (6). The above view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Harakchands case (supra) was followed by this Court in Anoopchand Jains case (supra). The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sagarmal vs. Gulabchand and Ors. (3), while fol- lowing a Full Bench decision of Lahore High Court in Bibi Gurdevi vs. Mohd. (6). The above view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Harakchands case (supra) was followed by this Court in Anoopchand Jains case (supra). The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sagarmal vs. Gulabchand and Ors. (3), while fol- lowing a Full Bench decision of Lahore High Court in Bibi Gurdevi vs. Mohd. Baksh (4), also took a similar view. (7). On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has contended that this revision petition is maintainable and the objection raised by the learned counsel appearing for the non-petitioners deserves to be not sustain able. He has contended that a Division Bench of this Court in Bharosilal and Anr. vs. Moolchand (5), reviewed all the previous cases decided by this Court regarding the scope of jurisdiction under s. 115 CPC and laid own that in such matters, revision is maintainable. In support of his contention, he has also placed reliance on Ganesh Ram vs. Paras Finance Co. & Anr. (6). (8). I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. This point has been debated in many cases after the Full Bench decision of this Court in Harak Chands case (supra). A Division Bench of this Court in Bharosilal and Anr. vs. Moolchand (supra), reviewed all the previous cases of this Court as also of Honble the Supreme Court while answering whether any revision would lie against an or- der by which the subordinate court has refused to accept documentary evidence under r. 2 of Order 13 CPC notwithstanding the fact that good cause has been shown for the late production of the document and the document is of vital and material importance. On this point, the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench is contained in para 25 of the Judgment, which reads as under : ``On a consideration of the various authorities, we are of the view that illegal assumption of jurisdiction not vested in the court or failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it usually relate to initial stage of a case, but acting illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction comes after the court has validly and lawfully assumed jurisdiction. If in exercise of a jurisdiction vested in it the court acts with illegality or with material irregularity i.e. where there is a exercise of jurisdiction, which the court possesses but the exercise has been in a manner which is illegal or materially irregular, then Clauses (c) of S. 115 (1) would be attracted. It must always be remembered that the powers which have been conferred on the revisional court by virtue of s. 115 are intended with a view to sub-serve the ends of justice and not to defeat them. Now, if, under Order 13 r. 2 CPC, a party applies for producing documentary evidence and offers sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the court and still without assigning any reason, the court refuses to exercise its discretion in favour of the party making an application it is certainly a case where the order of the court suffers from material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in it. A revision petition against such an order will clearly be maintainable. Similarly, if in a case, without the existence of suff- icient cause, the court allows an application filed under O. 13, r. 2, it will have to be held that the court has committed material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction of entertaining application under O. 13 r. 3 CPC. In that event also, a revision petition will be maintainable. Of course, it will be for the High Court to consider as to whether fai- lure of justice has been occasioned on account of passing of that order and then only the court will be entitled to pass order accepting the revision petition. In our considered opinion, the view taken by this Court in Radhey Shyams case (supra) as well as in Jagjeet Cotton Mills case (supra) do not lay down correct proposition of law. In fact, in Jagjeet Cotton Mills case, the learned Judge himself observed that in all 4 cases, the trial courts have given reasons in their orders for not receiving the documents and none of the document is going to affect the ultimate decision of the cases in which they have been filed. Learned single Judge in Municipal Board, Bharatpur Vs. Gokul Chand and Ramjilal vs. Durgalal allowed the revision petitions treating them to be maintainable and held that the trial court had erred in not receiving the documents. Learned single Judge in Municipal Board, Bharatpur Vs. Gokul Chand and Ramjilal vs. Durgalal allowed the revision petitions treating them to be maintainable and held that the trial court had erred in not receiving the documents. Similarly, in Nand Kishores case (supra) and Mool Chand Sharmas case (supra), the two learned Judges ente- rtained the revision petitions and allowed them against the orders passed under O. 13, r. 2 CPC, by which applications for production of documentary evidence were allowed by the trial court. Both the learned Judges proceeded on the premise that the revision petitions were maintainable against the orders passed by the trial court under O. 13, r. 2 CPC. (9). In Ganeshrams case (supra) also, Full Bench decision of this Court in Harakchands case (supra) was considered and it was observed that the facts in Ganesh Rams case were different from the facts found in Harakchands case (supra). In Harakchands case (supra), the question was whether a particular docu- ment was admissible in evidence or not and the answer to the question depended upon interpretation of the document and in those circumstances, it was held that it was within the jurisdiction of the court to interpret the document in question and even if the interpretation was wrong and the document was wrongly held to be admissible in evidence, the decision could not be challenged in revision. In Gane- shrams case, the question was whether the document was legally registered or not. Hence, in my opinion, the principles laid down in Harakchands case (supra) could not be applied in Ganeshrams case (supra) on account of different facts. The Punjab and Haryana High Court while following the decision of the Lahore High Court in Bibi Gurdevis case (supra) also took a similar view in Sagarmal vs. Gulab- chands case(supra) as has been taken in Harakchands case (supra). (10). I have carefully gone through the above decisions of this Court regarding the scope of jurisdiction under s. 115 CPC and have also carefully gone through the decision of this Court in Bharosi Lals case (supra). The only point of distinction was that an explanation has been added to s. 115 CPC after the pronouncement of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Harakchands case (supra). The Joint Committee recommended that the expression `case decided should be clarified so as to include the interlocutory order. The only point of distinction was that an explanation has been added to s. 115 CPC after the pronouncement of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Harakchands case (supra). The Joint Committee recommended that the expression `case decided should be clarified so as to include the interlocutory order. Apparently, the explanation has been added after taking into consideration the observations made by their lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s. S.S. Khanna vs. Brg. F.J. Dhillon (7) and Baldevdas vs. Filmistan Distribution (8). It was held in Bharosilals case (supra) that the explanation now makes it clear that the expression ` case decided includes any order made or any order deciding any issue in the course of the suit or other proceedings. It was further held that by addition of this explanation, the scope of the expression `case decided has been widened. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it was held that the view that the explanation added to s. 115 by 1976 Amending Act has widened. The scope and ambit of s. 115 finding support from the decision of Orissa High Court in Tata Iron and Steel Company vs. Rajrishi Exports (9) and in our opinion the judgment of Justice M.C. Jain (as he then was) in Ghevar Chands case (supra) lays down correct principle of law. (11). In my opinion, the explanation has been added after the Full Bench decision of this Court in Harakchands case (supra) but after the amendment, the expression `any case, which has been decided includes `any order made it is true that the expression `any order made includes within its embrace all sorts of orders. Such a wide connotation of course cannot be given to the expression `any order. An order which may ultimately affect the decision of the suit or which may ultimately affect the right of the party, though it is not adjudicating the right, may be covered under the expression `any order. Only to this extent, the scope of s. 115 CPC has been enlarged. The important thing which must be noticed is that since there is no amendment in the provisions of s. 115(1) CPC and therefore, view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Harakchands case still holds goods. Only to this extent, the scope of s. 115 CPC has been enlarged. The important thing which must be noticed is that since there is no amendment in the provisions of s. 115(1) CPC and therefore, view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Harakchands case still holds goods. (12)In this view of the matter, I am firmly of the view that the learned trial court has not committed any jurisdictional error which warrants interference in revision. (13). In the result, I find no force in this revision petition and it is hereby dis- missed with no order as to costs.