JUDGMENT - BATTA R.K., J.:---The petitioners, who are manufactures of barges, had manufactured a barge for transport of ores for V.M. Salgaonkar Brothers, Pvt. Ltd., in their shipyard, at Kelossim, Goa. While the said barge was under manufacture, the petitioners by letter dated 3-5-1986 requested the Superintendent of Excise, Vasco-da-Gama to confirm whether the said barge for transport of ores would be exempted from payment of Central Excise duty by virtue of Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986. The Superintendent of Excise, by letter dated 30-5-1986, confirmed that the barge would be exempted from payment of Central Excise Duty. The said barge was cleared without payment of excise duty. Subsequently, the petitioners filed classification list (Serial No. 21/86-87) in respect of another barge M.V. Neil claiming total exemption from excise duty under Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 read with Trade Notice No. 3/T.I. No. 68(1)/84 dated 1-3-1984 and the said classification list was duly approved by Assistant Collector of Customs, namely, respondent R.G. Nagvenkar. On 13-5-1987, the petitioners got barge M.V. Neil, which was manufactured for one B.P. Haryani, cleared without payment of Central Excise in conformity with the Classification List No. 21/86-87 dated 18-8-1986. The said M.V. Neil is a vessel specified for the transport of ores. 2. On 4-12-1987, Superintendent of Central Excise, Vasco-da-Gama, issued Show Cause Notice to the petitioners on the ground that barge M.V. Neil, an inland vessel, cannot be treated as ocean going vessel in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in (M/s. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India)1, 1987(2) Bom.C.R. 691 , wherein it was held that the primary purpose and actual use would be relevant considerations for deciding as to whether a vessel is an ocean going vessel or not. It was further alleged in the said notice that the very fact that the vessel M.V. Neil, which is ore carrying vessel and registered with Captain of Ports as inland vessel, by itself, would show that the vessel M.V. Neil is not an ocean going vessel. The notice further states that since the said barge M.V. Neil was exempted from payment of excise duty on the ground that it was ocean going vessel but in the light of the Apex Court judgment in M/s. Chowgule Co. The notice further states that since the said barge M.V. Neil was exempted from payment of excise duty on the ground that it was ocean going vessel but in the light of the Apex Court judgment in M/s. Chowgule Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), it could not be treated as ocean going vessel and, as such, liable to pay the excise duty at 15% ad- valorem, which works out to Rs. 7,20,000/-. Accordingly, the petitioners were directed to show cause as to why the differential duty amounting to Rs. 7,20,000/- should not be recovered from the petitioners under section 11-A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter called 'the said Act' ). 3. The petitioners had filed reply to show cause and by order dated 30th June, 1988, the Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Goa, rejected the cause shown by the petitioners and confirmed demand for payment of excise duty to the tune of Rs. 7,20,000/-. It is this order which is impugned in this writ petition and the petitioners seek directions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the said order. No return has been filed by the respondents. 4. The Assistant Collector of Customs, respondent No. 1, relying upon the Apex Court judgment in M/s. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) had held that since vessel M.V. Neil is carrying ore from mining head (loading point) to the port area by inland waterways and was, though registered with the Captain of Ports as inland vessel, the said vessel M.V. Neil could not be treated as ocean going vessel so as to qualify for exemption under Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986. In respect of the contention of the petitioners that the classification could not be revised it was held by respondent No. 1 that if there is change of circumstances or change in the law, then principle of constructive res judicata would not come in the way and classification could be revised under such circumstances. He also rejected argument advanced by the petitioners on the basis of promissory estoppel against the Government. 5. He also rejected argument advanced by the petitioners on the basis of promissory estoppel against the Government. 5. Learned Senior Advocate Shri S.K. Kakodkar, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, placed before us the following propositions for consideration:- (1) Barge used for transport of ore is included in Ocean Going Vessels in view of the judgment in (Vipul Shipyard, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay)2, 1985(19) E.L.T. 122, and Trade Notice No. 3/T.I. No. 68(1)/84 dated 1-3-1984; (2) Classification which had been approved by the Assistant Collector of Customs is binding on the department unless the department had challenged the same in appeal or revision in the absence of which, classification cannot be re-opened by notice under section 11-A of the said Act; (3) Notification No. 227/87-CE dated 24-9-1987 issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter called 'the said Rules') which substituted Entry at Serial No. 12 has retrospective effect from the coming into force of the Original Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 and (4) Government is not entitled to recover the excise duty in the case under consideration in view of the operation of the principle of promissory estoppel. 6. We shall deal with these submissions one by one along with the submissions made by learned Additional Central Government Counsel Shri S.N. Joshi. In order to appreciate the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to enumerate the backdrop in which the controversy in question has arisen. 7. By Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982 the Central Government, in the exercise of powers conferred under Rule 8(1) of the said Rules had exempted goods of the description specified in the Schedule thereto annexed and falling under Item No. 68 of the First Schedule to the said Act from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon under section 3 of the said Act. Under serial No. 32 of the said Schedule to the notification, ocean going vessels were exempted from payment of excise duty. By Trade Notice No. 3/T.N. No. 68(1)/84, the Government had clarified that ocean going vessels under Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982 will include, amongst others, vessels specified for transport of ore. It is necessary to reproduce the said trade notice which is as under:--- "COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE, GOA TRADE NOTICE NO. 3/T.I. NO. By Trade Notice No. 3/T.N. No. 68(1)/84, the Government had clarified that ocean going vessels under Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982 will include, amongst others, vessels specified for transport of ore. It is necessary to reproduce the said trade notice which is as under:--- "COLLECTORATE OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE, GOA TRADE NOTICE NO. 3/T.I. NO. 68(1)/84 CENTRAL EXCISE Subject:---CE-Scope of the term 'Ocean-going vessels' under Notifica tion No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982---Regarding. ....... Trade is informed that Government has considered that the 'Ocean-going -vessels' under Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982 will include the following:--- (a) Liners; cargo-vessels for various kinds including refrigerator vessels for the transport of meat, fruit etc; vessels specified for the transport of particular goods (grain, coal, ores, etc.); tankers (petrol, wine etc.) yatchs and other sailing vessels; cable ships ice-breakers; floating factories of all kinds (for processing whales, preserving fish etc.); whale catchers trawlers and other fishing vessels; lifeboats scientific research vessels; weather ships; vessels for the transportation and mooring of buoys; pilot boats; hopper-barges for the disposal of dredged material etc. (b) Warships of all kinds including submarines; (c) Tugs; dredgers, fire-floats and salvage ships for purpose of notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982. F. No. 7/20/68/84-CX.I Panaji 1-3-1984. Sd/- (G.V. NAIK) ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS CENTRAL EXCISE, GOA." 8. By Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986, the Central Government in exercise of Rule 8(1) of the said Rules and in supersession of Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982 exempted goods of the description specified in the Schedule thereto annexed and falling under Schedule to Central Excise and Tariff Act, 1985 (hereinafter called 'the Tariff Act 1985') from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon under section 3 of the said Act. In the said Notification dated 10-2-1986, at Serial No. 12 is entry relating to ocean going vessel which was exempted from payment of duty. 9. By Notification No. 227/87-CE dated 24-9-1987, the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 8(1) of the said Rules, substituted for entry at serial No. 12, namely, "Ocean Going Vessels" in the Scheduled Annexed to Notification dated 10-2-1986 the following entry: "goods falling under heading Nos. 9. By Notification No. 227/87-CE dated 24-9-1987, the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 8(1) of the said Rules, substituted for entry at serial No. 12, namely, "Ocean Going Vessels" in the Scheduled Annexed to Notification dated 10-2-1986 the following entry: "goods falling under heading Nos. 89.01, 89.02, 89.04, 89.05 (excluding floating or submersible drilling or production platforms) and 89.06." It will be appropriate, at this stage, to reproduce the said notification since the second limb of argument advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners rests on this notification:--- "------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ New Delhi, the 24th September, 1985 2 Asavina, 1909 (Sa-Ka) NOTIFICATION No. 227/87-CENTRAL EXCISES In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby directs that each of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), specified in Column (2) of the table hereto annexed, shall be amended or further amended, as the case may be, in the manner specified in the corresponding entry in Column (3) of the said table: TABLE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sl. Notification Amendment No. No. date (1) (2) (3) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. 82/84-Central Excises, In the said notification dated the 31st March, 1984 (i) in the opening paragraph and in Clause (i) of Proviso, for the word "ocean going vessels", the words, figures and brackets "goods falling under heading Nos. 89.01, 89.02, 89.04, 89.05 (ex- cluding floating or submersible drilling or production plat forms) and 89.06" shall be substituted. (ii) the Explanation shall be omitted. 2. 76/86-Central Excises, In the Schedule to the said dated the 10th February, Notification, for S. No. 12 and 1986 the entry relating thereto, the following S. No. and entry shall be substituted, namely :-- "12 Goods falling under heading Nos. 89.01, 89.02, 89.04, 89.05 (excluding floating or submers- ible drilling or production plat- forms) and 89.06." 3. 431/86-Central Excises, In the said notification, in the dated the 6th October, 1986 opening paragraph, for the words "ocean-going vessels", the words, figures and brackets "goods falling under heading Nos. 89.01, 89.02, 89.04, 89.05 (ex- cluding floating or submersible drilling or production platforms) and 89.06" shall be substituted. Sd/- (C.P. Srivastava) F.No. 352/5/87/TRU Under Secretary to the Government of India." 10. Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 came into force on 28th February, 1986. The Excise Act, 1985 came into force on 28-2-1986. 89.01, 89.02, 89.04, 89.05 (ex- cluding floating or submersible drilling or production platforms) and 89.06" shall be substituted. Sd/- (C.P. Srivastava) F.No. 352/5/87/TRU Under Secretary to the Government of India." 10. Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 came into force on 28th February, 1986. The Excise Act, 1985 came into force on 28-2-1986. Thus, prior to 28-2-1986, barges specified for transport of ores were excisable under Item No. 68 of the First Schedule to the said Act and from 28-2-1986, after coming into force of the Tariff Act, 1985, such barges were classified under Tariff Heading No. 86.01. The barge M.V. Neil/in question was cleared on 13-5-1987 without payment of Central Excise. According to learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, barges for transport of ore were cleared till show cause notice dated 4-12-1987 without payment of excise duty under tariff heading "Ocean going vessel". He further submitted that the period between 28th February, 1986 when Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 came into force and Notification No. 227/87-CE dated 24th September, 1987 by which "Ocean going vessel" which figured at Serial No. 12 in Notification dated 10th February, 1986, was substituted by Entry 12 (goods falling under heading No. 89.01 etc.) is the grey area which the Court is required to examine for the decision in this writ. 11. Elaborating his first submission, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners urged before us that neither notification dated 1-11-1982 nor notification dated 10-2-1986 had defined "Ocean going vessels", but the Government had clarified by trade notice dated 1-3-1984 that ocean going vessels in notification dated 1-11-1982 would include amongst others, vessels specified for transportation of ores. According to Shri Kakodkar, the clarification issued by the Government would continue even after Notification dated 10-2-1986 since therein also same expression was used, namely, "Ocean going vessel", unless, the said clarification was changed by the Government. In this connection, it has been urged that trade notices issued by Government/Board are binding on the authorities. According to Shri Kakodkar, the clarification issued by the Government would continue even after Notification dated 10-2-1986 since therein also same expression was used, namely, "Ocean going vessel", unless, the said clarification was changed by the Government. In this connection, it has been urged that trade notices issued by Government/Board are binding on the authorities. To make his submission good, he has relied upon (Navgujarat Paper Industries v. Superintendent of Central Excise and others)3, 1977 E.L.T. (J-67), (Guest Keen Williams Ltd. v. Union of India and others)4, 1980 E.L.T. 6, (Star Chemicals (Bombay) Ltd. v. Union of India and others)5, 1980 E.L.T. 133, (Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading Company)6, 1988(3) S.C.C. 570 , (Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India)7, 1990(45) E.L.T. 197 , (Ranadey Micronutrients v. Collector of Central Excise)8, 1996(87) E.L.T. 19 , Vipul Shipyard, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1985(19) E.L.T. 122, (G.R. Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Panaji, Goa)9, Writ Petition No. 32 of 1985 and Writ Petition No. 33 of 1985, Chowgule Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1176 and (Chowgule Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Vishakhapatnam)10, 1995(80) E.L.T. 680. 12. In order to appreciate the first submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, it is necessary to briefly refer to the principles laid down in the judgments having bearing on this submission. 13. The Apex Court in (The State of Bombay and another v. F.N. Balsara)11, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318, had laid down that Notification containing order made in exercise of power given by the Act has force of law. 14. In Navgujarat Paper Industries v. Superintendent of Central Excise and others (supra), the controversy was in relation to Tariff Item No. 17 of Schedule 1 of the said Act and the question which arose was as to what would be the effect of trade notices issued in that behalf. In order to get out of the trade Notice No. 250/70 of September 17, 1970, the learned Assistant Government Pleader in that case had relied upon certain observations of the Apex Court in (Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India)12, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 48. In order to get out of the trade Notice No. 250/70 of September 17, 1970, the learned Assistant Government Pleader in that case had relied upon certain observations of the Apex Court in (Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India)12, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 48. In that case, Collector of Central Excise, while acting in his quasi judicial capacity, was swayed by the executive instructions given to him by the Central Board of Revenue and it was in this context that the Apex Court had observed that no authority, however, high placed, can control the decision of judicial or quasi judicial authority and the executive instructions given to Collector of Excise by the Central Board had completely vitiated the proceedings thereby making the judicial process a mockery. It was held therein that directions issued by Central Board of Revenue which are not under Rule 238 of the Rules framed under the Act are not binding on Collector deciding the appeal. In the case before the Gujarat High Court it was found that the Collector and the Revenue Authorities had by their trade notice held out a representation to the manufacturers and, as such, it was not open to the department to get out from the stand taken in the trade notice, especially when the manufacturers had acted on those trade notices and had entered upon their manufacturing programme on the basis of what had been stated in the trade notices. The Gujarat High Court relied upon Apex Court judgment in (Union of India and others v. M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies)13, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 718, wherein it was pointed out that even if a trade notice amounts to not more than executive instructions, it would be binding on the department and department would be estopped from contending that what was mentioned in the trade notice should not be adhered to. Reliance was placed on para 16 of the Apex Court judgment at page 725 which runs as under:--- "Therefore, even assuming that the provisions relating to the issue of trade notices offering inducement to the prospective exporters are in character executive, the Union Government and its offices are, on the authorities of this Court, not entitled at their mere whim to ignore the promises made by the Government." In view of the above, Gujarat High Court had concluded that even if a trade notice amounts to not more than executive instructions, it would be binding on the department and department would be estopped from contending that what was mentioned in the trade notice should not be adhered to. Therefore, reliance placed by Additional Central Government Counsel in the case before us on the ruling of the Apex Court in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) would not in any manner help the department in getting out of the trade notice dated 1-3-1984. He had also placed reliance on (Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Madras)14, 1986(24) E.L.T. 686, wherein it was laid down by CEGAT, New Delhi, that trade notices cannot override the statutory provisions. However, on account of the view taken in rulings Union of India and others v. Anglo Afgan Agencies (supra) and Navgujrat Paper Industries v. Superintendent Central Excise (supra) and the ruling referred hereinafter the department is bound by trade notices, instructions and classifications issued under section 37-B of the Act. Moreover, in the case under consideration before us, trade notice dated 1-3-1984 had, in fact, explained the expression "Ocean going vessels" which had not been defined in the notification. We shall dwell on this aspect further at a later stage. 15. The view taken by the Gujarat High Court was approved by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Guest Keen Williams Ltd. v. Union of India and others (supra) wherein it was held that the powers of the quasi judicial authorities cannot be controlled by the directions of the Board as a result of which any orders passed pursuant to such directions are neither binding nor valid, but the instructions contained in a trade notice regarding classification of a product would be binding on the department and the department would be estopped from contending to the contrary. 16. 16. In Star Chemicals (Bombay) Ltd. v. Union of India and others (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court relying upon the Division Bench ruling of Gujarat High Court in Navgujarat Paper Industries v. Superintendent of Central Excise and others (supra) reiterated that even if a trade notice amounts to not more than executive instructions, it would be binding on the department and the department would be estopped from contending that what was mentioned in the trade notice should not be adhered to. 17. In Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), a clarification issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs by circular on the exemption granted under Notification No. 31 of 1964 had come up for examination. Under Notification No. 31 of 1964, duty leviable in respect of latex foam as well as products commonly known as tread rubber or camel back, including cushion compound, cushion gum, tread gum and tread packing strips were subjected to a concessional rate of duty, while other rubber products falling under Item No. 16-A were granted an exemption from the levy of duty. In this context of that notification, a question arose as to whether rubber products which are capable of being used for re-treading or re-soling of tyres, but are only used for repairs, would attract duty or not. In this connection, Central Board of Excise and Customs vide circular dated 7-2-1966 had issued clarification on the subject. The Apex Court held that the said circular dated 7-2-1966 could be considered as a contemporaneous exposition of the understanding of the Government while issuing the Exemption Notification of 1964, which makes it clear that, at that time, it was not intended to deny exemption to rubber products used merely for repair purposes. In view of the said clarification, the appellant was entitled to have exemption under the notification. 18. At this stage, we would like to refer to the ruling of the Apex Court in (J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India and others)15, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1173, upon which strong reliance was placed by learned Additional Central Government Counsel. In view of the said clarification, the appellant was entitled to have exemption under the notification. 18. At this stage, we would like to refer to the ruling of the Apex Court in (J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India and others)15, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1173, upon which strong reliance was placed by learned Additional Central Government Counsel. Relying upon this judgment, it was contended that taxing statutes are required to be strictly construed, that in interpreting a fiscal statute, the Court cannot proceed to make good deficiencies, if there are any; that in interpreting taxing entry, the Court cannot take any aid from instructions issued by the Government Department in implementation of that levy and such instructions are totally irrelevant, but for finding out the scope of a particular levy, notification issued by the executive Government providing for exemption from that levy can be looked into as they disclose the overall scheme. In the same judgment, we find that the Apex Court had also observed that all Rules and notifications issued under section 38 of the Act r/w Rule 8(1) of the Rules shall have the effect as if enacted in the Act and if there is any ambiguity in language, benefit of that ambiguity must be given to the assessee. For coming to this conclusion the Apex Court had placed reliance on its earlier judgments in (C.A. Abraham v. I.T.O. Kottayam)16, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 609 and (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Karamchand Premchand Ltd.)17, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1175. In fact, this ruling does not help the respondents in the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration. 19. The Apex Court in (M/s. Swadeshi Polytex Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise)18, A.I.R 1990 S.C. 301, has laid down that it is true that when in a fiscal provision, if benefit of exemption is to be considered, this should be strictly considered. But the strictness of the constructions of exemption notification does not mean that the full effect to the exemption notification should not be given by any circuitous process of interpretation. It was emphasized that after all, exemption notifications are meant to be implemented and trade notices in these matters clarify the stand of the Government for the trade. 20. But the strictness of the constructions of exemption notification does not mean that the full effect to the exemption notification should not be given by any circuitous process of interpretation. It was emphasized that after all, exemption notifications are meant to be implemented and trade notices in these matters clarify the stand of the Government for the trade. 20. The Apex Court in (Collector of Central Excise v. Andhra Sugar Ltd.)19, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 625, has laid down that it is well settled that the meaning ascribed by the authority issuing the notification is a good guide of the contemporaneous exposition of the position of law. It was further observed therein that it is a well settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty has been to construe, execute and apply the same enactment. Similar observations have been made by the Apex Court in (Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd., Cuttack v. The Collector of Central Excise, Bhubaneshwar)20, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1028, to the effect that applying the principles of the decisions of the Apex Court, a contemporaneous interpretation by the administrative authorities is a very useful and relevant guide to the interpretation of the expressions used in a statutory instrument. 21. The next authority which deals with Boards Circulars, Instructions and Trade Notices is (Hindusthan Malleables Forgings Ltd. v. Union of India)21, 1995(61) E.C.R. 492. In this case before the Patna High Court, classification list filed by the petitioner was accepted in appeal by the Collector of Central Excise (appellant). No appeal or revision had been preferred against the said order dated 2nd March, 1990 to the Collector of Central Excise (appellant). However, notice dated 11th of January, 1984 was issued to the petitioner therein under section 11-A of the said Act for the purpose of re-classification of the goods in question. In this case the Exemption Notification No. 208/83 dated 1st August, 1983 as amended by Notification No. 38/84 dated 1st March, 1984 and Notification No. 75/86 dated 10th February, 1986 was involved wherein no excise duty was payable. In this case the Exemption Notification No. 208/83 dated 1st August, 1983 as amended by Notification No. 38/84 dated 1st March, 1984 and Notification No. 75/86 dated 10th February, 1986 was involved wherein no excise duty was payable. Relying upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in Star Chemicals v. Union of India (supra), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that the trade notice regarding classification of a product is binding on the department and the department would be estopped from contending to the contrary. It was also pointed out by the Patna High Court that the Circulars, Instructions as well as trade notices issued on its basis by the Board under the powers conferred upon it under the provisions of Central Excise and Salt Act are binding upon the inferior authorities and once a classification list is approved, the same becomes binding upon the Assistant Collectors unless the authorities take recourse to some other provisions of the Act, that is, procedure for appeal or revision. A similar view was taken in respect of classification list by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in (Ajanta and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and others)22, 1986(23) E.L.T. 318. The Division Bench of the Patna High Court, thus, came to the conclusion that what could not be done directly, cannot be done indirectly and an order which was otherwise binding upon the excise authorities cannot be permitted to be re-opened by initiating a proceeding under section 11-A of the said Act and, as such, respondent had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 11-A of the Act. 22. The case under consideration is practically covered under the judgment of the Patna High Court. Before proceeding to deal with the matter under consideration, we shall refer to the latest judgment of the Apex Court in Ranadey Micronutrients v. Collector of Central Excise (supra) which has material bearing on the controversy involved in this writ petition. In this case, departmental clarifications had been issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs to all principal Collectors, Collectors and Collectors (Appeals) requiring that contents of the circulars be brought to the notice of lower field formations and the trade interests and all pending assessments be finalised on the basis of circulars in question. In this case, departmental clarifications had been issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs to all principal Collectors, Collectors and Collectors (Appeals) requiring that contents of the circulars be brought to the notice of lower field formations and the trade interests and all pending assessments be finalised on the basis of circulars in question. These circulars had been issued in the context of doubts having arisen and representations having been received by the Board. The object of the circulars was to adopt uniform practice. It was held by the Apex Court that such circulars are not advisory in character and they are binding on the Central Excise Officers. It has been further laid down by the Apex Court that it does not lie in the mouth of the revenue authorities to repudiate a circular issued by the Board on the basis that it is inconsistent with a statutory provision inasmuch as consistency and discipline are of far greater importance than the winning or losing of Court proceedings. Such circulars clearly fall within the power conferred under section 37-B of the said Act. We may also point out that the Apex Court in Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Dharmendera Trading Company (supra) while dealing with sales tax matter had observed that neither the State nor any Assistant Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, who are functionaries of the State, was entitled to assert that the concession granted by the State itself was beyond the powers of the State. 23. To recapitulate briefly the facts for the purpose of decision, it is to be noted that the barge M.V. Neil had been cleared by Superintendent of Central Excise, Vasco-da-Gama without payment of Central Excise duty on 13-5-1987 in pursuance of Classification List No. 21/86-87 filed on 18-8-1986. The Notification No. 76/86-CE which exempted payment of Central Excise is dated 10-2-1986 and the relevant entry is Item No. 12 "Ocean going vessels". The entire controversy between the parties is whether vessels specified for transport of ore would fall in this category of "Ocean going vessels". The Superintendent of Central Excise, Vasco, who had earlier cleared barge M.V. Neil on 13-5-1987 without payment of Central Excise, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Chowgule and Co. The entire controversy between the parties is whether vessels specified for transport of ore would fall in this category of "Ocean going vessels". The Superintendent of Central Excise, Vasco, who had earlier cleared barge M.V. Neil on 13-5-1987 without payment of Central Excise, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) had issued show cause notice to the petitioners that the barge M.V. Neil could not be treated as ocean going vessel and was liable for payment of Central Excise. 24. In this respect, the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the barge used for transport of ore would fall within the expression "Ocean going vessels" in view of TradeNotice No. 3/T.I. No. 68(1)/84 dated 1-3-1984 and the judgment in Vipul Shipyard, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay (supra). It is further submitted by him that the said trade notice which had been issued to clarify doubts regarding the scope of the term "Ocean going vessels" under Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-12-1982 including vessels specified for transport of ores would continue to hold the field under Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 under which "Ocean going vessels" have been exempted from payment of Central Excise. 25. On the other hand, the contention of learned Additional Central Government Counsel is that the trade notices are not binding on the authorities deciding such matters under the Act. In view of the law already discussed on this aspect, we do not find any merit whatsoever in this contention of the learned Additional Central Government Counsel. 26. His next submission is that the trade notice dated 1-3-1984 had only clarified the expression "Ocean going vessels" used under Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982 and the said clarification cannot be extended to Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 with which we are concerned in this writ petition. According to him, ocean going vessel implies that such vessel is used for international trade and relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Chowgule and Co. According to him, ocean going vessel implies that such vessel is used for international trade and relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), urged before us that the primary intended use of vessel is to be considered and if the primary purpose of such vessel is for home consumption, then, notwithstanding that they may be used also for some other purposes outside India, such vessel cannot be treated as ocean going vessel. He also pointed out that the authority which enforces the provisions under the Customs Act and the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 being the same, the interpretation by the Apex Court of "Ocean going vessel" in M/s. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) should be extended to the expression "Ocean going vessels" under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. 27. The Apex Court in this case was dealing with vessel 'S.S. MARATHA' which had been imported and was to be converted into transhipper for use in territorial waters for topping up operations. The question arose whether the said vessel is "goods" for the purposes of section 46(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. It was in this connection that the Apex Court held that though the vessel in question was ordinarily ocean going vessel, yet as the same was converted into transhipper for the purpose of topping up iron ore, such vessel could not be treated as ocean going vessel. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has urged that the principle of pari materia cannot be pressed into service and the interpretation of the Apex Court of "Ocean going vessels" under the Customs Act cannot be imported or extended to interpret the expression "Ocean going vessels" under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. He also pointed out that CEGAT in Chowgule Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Vishakhapatnam (supra), which is the final appellate authority under the Act has held that in view of trade notice dated 1-3-1984 (which has been quoted at pages 6 7 of this judgment in para 7), it appears that the Government wanted to include dredgers within the scope of the term "Ocean going vessels". 28. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Vishakhapatnam (supra), which is the final appellate authority under the Act has held that in view of trade notice dated 1-3-1984 (which has been quoted at pages 6 7 of this judgment in para 7), it appears that the Government wanted to include dredgers within the scope of the term "Ocean going vessels". 28. In our opinion, first of all, the two Acts cannot be treated as pari materia and, secondly, the interpretation of "Ocean going vessels" in the context under the Customs Act cannot be imported to interpret expression "Ocean going vessel" under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, especially on account of clarification which had been issued by the Government under trade notice dated 1-3-1984 under which "Vessels specified for transport of ores" were included within the expression "Ocean going vessels". 29. The question which now requires to be determined is whether the said clarification under trade notice dated 1-3-1984 can be extended to Item No. 12 "Ocean going vessels" covered under Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 which was the notification in force when barge M.V. Neil was cleared by the Superintendent, Central Excise without payment of Central Excise. It may also be noted at this stage that, subsequent to the Notification No. 227/87-CE dated 24th September, 1987, the Central Government had substituted for Entry Serial No. 12 in the Schedule to Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10th February, 1986, the following entry, namely; "Goods falling under Heading Nos. 89.01, 89.02, 89.04, 89.05 (excluding floating or submersible drilling or production platforms) and 89.06." Barges and similar vessels for transport of goods fall under Heading No. 89.01. Thus, with effect from 24th September, 1987, the Central Government specifically had exempted barges for transport of goods from payment of excise duty. Thus, as pointed out by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the grey area between 28-2-1986 from which date Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986 came into force till the said notification dated 24th September, 1987 has to be looked into keeping in view the intention of the Central Government to exclude barges for transportation of ores from payment of excise duty prior to 28-2-1986 as well as after 24th September, 1987. 30. 30. The only ground on which show cause notice had been issued for recovery of Central Excise from the petitioners after clearance of barge M.V. Neil without payment of Central Excise was on account of the interpretation of the expression "Ocean going vessels" by the Apex Court in M/s. Chowgule Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra). We have already pointed out that it is not possible to import the said interpretation given under different context under the Customs Act to "Ocean going vessels" into the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. On the contrary, the scope of term "Ocean going vessels" under Notification No. 234/82-CE dated 1-11-1982, which had been explained by trade notice dated 1-3-1984 has to be extended to Item No. 12 "Ocean going vessels" which figures under Notification No. 76/86-CE dated 10-2-1986. We do not find any reason whatsoever as to why the said clarification issued by the Government under trade notice dated 1-3-1984 in respect of "Ocean going vessels" which would include vessels specified for transport of ore should not be extended to the same expression "Ocean going vessel" used under notification dated 10-2-1986 under the same Rules and the same Act. Therefore, unless a contrary intention appears, the clarification issued vide trade notice dated 1-3-1984 under notification dated 1-11-1982 would continue to be in force and the petitioners would be entitled to benefit of the same. Of course, the Central Government had made its intention crystal clear by specifically issuing another notification dated 24th September, 1987. 31. Even after the coming into force of the said notification dated 10-2-1986, the Superintendent of Excise, Vasco vide letter dated 30-5-1986 in pursuance of query of the petitioners vide letter dated 3-5-1986 as to whether barge for transport of ores would be exempted from payment of Central Excise duty, had confirmed that the barge would be exempt from payment of Central Excise duty. However, subsequently, the same Superintendent of Central Excise, Vasco had issued show cause notice dated 4-12-1987 that the barge in question was not exempted from payment of Central Excise duty in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Chowgule and Co. However, subsequently, the same Superintendent of Central Excise, Vasco had issued show cause notice dated 4-12-1987 that the barge in question was not exempted from payment of Central Excise duty in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) under the circumstances, it is crystal clear that Superintendent of Central Excise, Vasco had not at all applied his mind while issuing show cause notice dated 4-12-1987 and the said notice was simply issued on the interpretation of "Ocean going vessels" given by the Apex Court in different context. Therefore, we are of the view that the said show cause notice dated 4-12-1987 cannot be sustained and the same is required to be quashed. It may incidentally be pointed out that the petitioners had filed Writ Petitions Nos. 32/1985 and 33/1985 G.R. Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Panaji Goa another, wherein their application for refund of Central Excise duty paid by them under mistake of law was rejected by Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Panaji by order dated 29th December, 1984. In Writ Petition No. 32 of 1985 the barge in question for carrying iron ore was constructed in 1983 on which the department had charged Central Excise duty. The petitioners relied upon decision of Customs and Excise Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal dated 16th July, 1984 and the case of Vipul Shipyard, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay (supra) and it was contended that under notification dated 1st November, 1982 which was in force "Ocean going vessels" included vessels specified for transport of ores in accordance with trade notice dated 1st March, 1984. The plea of the petitioners was accepted in both the writ petitions and the Central Excise duty already paid was ordered to be refunded vide judgment dated 15th July, 1985 of a Division Bench of this Court. 32. We shall now come to the second challenge of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and we find considerable merit in this submission as well. We have already pointed out that notifications, Board circulars, instructions and trade notices issued by the Government would bind the authorities under the Act and the department is estopped from taking a contrary stand. 32. We shall now come to the second challenge of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and we find considerable merit in this submission as well. We have already pointed out that notifications, Board circulars, instructions and trade notices issued by the Government would bind the authorities under the Act and the department is estopped from taking a contrary stand. The classification of barge M.V. Neil under the category "Ocean going vessels" had been approved by Assistant Collector of Customs and unless the said classification had been challenged by the department by having recourse to the procedure for appeal or revision prescribed under the Act, the said classification could not be opened by issuing notice under section 11-A of the said Act. As already pointed out, the judgment of the Patna High Court in Hindusthan Malleables Forgings Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) is applicable on all fours to the case under consideration and we concur with the views expressed by the Patna High Court in the said judgment. Therefore, the department was not justified in taking recourse to section 11-A of the said Act in the absence of recourse for procedure of appeal and revision under the Act in respect of classification which had already been approved. 33. Coming to the third submission, after placing reliance on (Shamrao V. Parulekar and others v. District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay and others)23, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 324 and (K.T. Venkatappa and others v. K.N. Krishnappa and others)24, 1988(17) I.T.R. 678, it has been urged by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that notification dated 24-9-1987 which substituted entry at Serial No. 12 would be retrospective in effect from the date of coming into force of notification dated 10-2-1986. 34. The Apex Court in Shamrao V. Parulekar and others v. District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay and others (supra) while dealing with canons of construction has made the following observations: "The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical Rules and we must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction. 34. The Apex Court in Shamrao V. Parulekar and others v. District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay and others (supra) while dealing with canons of construction has made the following observations: "The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical Rules and we must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all." On the basis of the said observations of the Apex Court and the view expressed by Crawford on Statutory Construction-Interpretation of Laws at pages 110 and 111, the Karnataka High Court in (Shah Chunilal Sohan Raj v. Guru Shantilal)25, 1972(1) Mysore Law Journal 327, had come to the conclusion that when the amending Act states that the old sub-section has been substituted by the new sub-section, the inference is that the legislature intended that substituted provision should be deemed to have been part of the Act from the very inception. 35. On the question of retrospectivity, learned Additional Central Government Counsel relied upon (Garikapathy Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary and others)26, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540 and (Arjun Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others)27, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 703. The Apex Court in Garikapathy Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary and others (supra) has observed that the golden Rule of construction that in the absence of anything in enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time the Act was passed. In Arjun Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others (supra), the Apex Court has laid down that it is well settled Rule of construction that no provision in a statute should be given retrospective effect unless the legislature by express terms or by necessary implication has made it retrospective and that where a provision is made retrospective, care should be taken not to extend its retrospective effect beyond what was intended. 36. By notification dated 24-9-1987 issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, Entry at Serial No. 12 namely "Ocean-going vessels" in the schedule to Notification 76/86-Central Excise, dated 10-2-1986 was substituted by "Goods falling under 89.01" (which covers barges and similar vessels for the transport of persons or goods). Instead of issuing notification in supersession of notification dated 10-2-1986, the Government by notification dated 24-9-1987 merely amended by substituting Entry 12 in notification dated 10-2-1986 by another entry which would cover barges and similar vessels for transport of goods. This, in our opinion, given a vital clue that the notification dated 24-7-1987 was intended to have retrospective effect from 10-2-1986 itself. 37. Moreover, on account of the view which we have taken that the clarification issued by the Government in trade notice dated 1-3-1984 regarding inclusion of vessels specified for transportation of ore within the expression "Ocean going vessels" under notification dated 1-11-1982 would continue under notification dated 10-2-1986 and subsequent specific clarification in this respect under notification dated 24-9-1987, the said substitution of entry under Serial No. 12 in notification dated 10th February, 1986 by including barges under Heading No. 89.01, it can be concluded that the amendment, in the facts and circumstances of this case, shall have retrospective effect, that is to say, from 10th February, 1986, since notification dated 24th September, 1987 is in the nature of clarification on the subject and appears to have been issued to set at rest any ambiguity which might be existing on the subject. 38. Regarding the fourth challenge, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to dwell further on this aspect in view of our findings that the trade notices are binding on the authorities and the authorities are estopped from taking a contrary stand. 39. 38. Regarding the fourth challenge, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to dwell further on this aspect in view of our findings that the trade notices are binding on the authorities and the authorities are estopped from taking a contrary stand. 39. In view of the above, we are of the view that the writ petition is bound to succeed and the show cause notice dated 4-12-1987 issued by Superintendent, Central Excise, Vasco-da-Gama and Order No. 43/AJH/Goa/88 dated 30-6-1988 of the Assistant Collector Customs and Central Excise, Goa, Panaji are required to be quashed. Hence, the same are quashed. Rule made absolute accordingly. Writ petition succeeded. -----