JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. (Oral) Heard learned counsel for the parties and I have also gone through the records, of this case. 2. State has preferred this revision petition feeling aggrieved by the judgment passed by Shri B.D. Sharma, Additional Sessions Judge, Nahan. dated 31.3.1994 in Criminal Appeal No. 24-N/10 of 1993. By means of impugned judgment, appeal filed by the respondent against order of confiscation of Truck No. HIN-388 by the authorised officer belonging to the petitioner has been set aside and the truck in question has been ordered to be released on the respondents furnishing security bond in the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to be furnished by him to the satisfaction of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rajgarh undertaking to produce the same as and when called upon to do so. 3. Brief facts of this case are that as per prosecution the truck in question stands duly registered in the name of respondent, which was found to be involved in the illicit export of forest produce, i.e. timber on 24.12.1991. The matter having been brought to the notice of the authorized officer (Division Forest Officer, Rajgarh, Forest Division. Rajgarh), show cause notice was issued within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended by the Himachal Pradesh Second Amendment Act, since no reply was received within the stipulated period of 7 days, in those circumstances vide order dated 4th May, 1992, the aforesaid authorized officer ordered the confiscation as according to him, it was involved in the smuggling of the timber. Here it may be appropriate to mention that notice was also issued to Satpal, S/o Ram Swaroop, who vide his reply dated 16th April, 1992 had dis-owned any connection with the truck in question and had fourther asked the officer concerned to enquire from Ashwani respondent. It is in this background as well as on account of non filing of reply to show cause notice that the confiscation of the truck was ordered. Against the aforesaid order of confiscation, the respondent preferred an appeal under Section 59 of the Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of Himachal Pradesh which has been allowed. This order passed by the appellate authority has been questioned by the State in the present case. 4. Against the aforesaid order of confiscation, the respondent preferred an appeal under Section 59 of the Indian Forest Act as amended by the State of Himachal Pradesh which has been allowed. This order passed by the appellate authority has been questioned by the State in the present case. 4. It may be appropriate to point out here that by means of the Indian Forest (Himachal Pradesh Second Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act No. 51 of 1991), certain amendments were made to the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1991. For the purpose of the present revision, we are concerned with the provisions of Section 52(2)(3), Section 52-A, 52-B as well as with Section 59 as incorporated by. the aforesaid Act. 5. As pointed here in above. the authorized officer was of the view that since the truck in question was used for smuggling of timber and the owner-Ashwani -respondent had not filed reply to the show cause notice and the other person to whom notice had been issued had specifically dis-owned the truck in question besides pleading that matter may be enquired from the respondent Therefore, the order dated 4th May, 1992 came into existence and thereafter in appeal, the impugned order had been passed. If a reference is made to the provisions of Section 52-A, 52-B supra, the sum and substance of these Sections is that these Sections which clothe the authorities concerned with the power to order confiscation of all tools, ropes, chains, boats of vehicles used in committing such offences has to be in respect of the property "which is the property of the State Government" (emphasis supplied). Thus before passing any order of confiscation in respect of any of the aforesaid things, including a vehicle there has to be some prima facie material to show that the offence that has been committed in relation to the forest produce was the property of the government. A bare perusal of the order passed by the authorized officer on 4th May, 1992 shows that there was no such material to prima facie enable him to hold that the offence had been committed in relation to the forest produce which is the property of the State Government. A bare perusal of the order passed by the authorized officer on 4th May, 1992 shows that there was no such material to prima facie enable him to hold that the offence had been committed in relation to the forest produce which is the property of the State Government. Records of the case are before the court and there also, no such material is there on the basis of which it could be said that the timber in question was the property of the State Government, Statutory presumption under Section 69 was pressed into service by Shri Chauhan, learned Assistant Advocate General, in support of the present revision petition by urging that since the respondent did not claim the property, therefore, the timber in question has to be presumed to be belonging to the State Government. The question of raising statutory presumption would arise when the matter is taken to trial as the presumption raised under Section 69 of the Indian Forest Act is a matter of evidence and cannot by itself be made a ground for convicting a person without there being any other fact having been proved on record in that behalf. 6. Looking to the stringent provisions enacted by the State Amendment, supra, it is expected that in addition to simply seizing the vehicle in question as well as the alleged forest produce, it is expected of the prosecution to bring some material which may prima facie establish that the forest produce in respect of which forest offence had been committed corresponds with the same having been committed in relation to the said forest produce belonging to the government. It is in these circumstances that after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned from whom the property or vehicle was seized, order can be passed: 7. Further, safe-guard in favour of such person where confiscation is ordered is provided in the shape of appeal under Section 59(2) to the Court of Sessions and revision under Section 59-A as inserted by the State Amendment to the Conservator of Forest It may not be out of place to point out here that so far the appellate order is concerned, finality is attached thereto in accordance with the provisions of Section 59(3) of the Indian Forest Act, supra. Looking to the present case in the light of the aforesaid requirements of law, matter with regard to the commission of forest offence was brought to the notice of authorized officer by the police officials concerned and the forest produce viz. timber as well as the vehicle, i.e. truck in question was also produced before the authorized officer which was allegedly used in the commission of offence. There was no material brought to show that the property seized i.e. timber in the present case, belongs to the State Government and it was for this reason that the truck in question was ordered to be released by the appellate court below, as aforesaid. Reason for ordering so was that since the forest offence which had been committed, according to the prosecution, was not prima facie established to have been committed in respect of such property belonging to the State Government, consequently the authorized officer lacked jurisdiction to have proceeded under Section 52-A and 52-B as uncreated by. the State Amendment, supra. 8. Another contention raised on behalf of the respondent was that in view of the express provisions of Section 59(3) added by the Amending Act, supra, this revision is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed on this ground also. There appears to be enough substance in this submission. A perusal of the said provision supports this submission and, therefore, this contention raised on behalf of the respondent is upheld. 9. In addition to the aforesaid reasons, this matter need not detain us any further in view of the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Criminal Revision 30 of 1994, State o/H.P. v. Dhanwant Singh and Criminal Revision 61 of 1994 State of H.P. v. Sunder Singh & Anr.. wherein identical view has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 10. Faced with this situation, Shri Chauhan. learned Assistant Advocate General, urged that this Court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. wherein identical view has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 10. Faced with this situation, Shri Chauhan. learned Assistant Advocate General, urged that this Court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this behalf it may be appropriate to mention that no doubt, in a given situation this court is not precluded for securing the ends of justice to pass such orders as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of court and /or otherwise to secure the ends of justice under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as well as to keep the Courts and Tribunals within the territories to which it exercises jurisdiction within the bound of its limits to pass such orders as may be considered appropriate. But the question that has to be seen is whether circumstances of the present case warrant exercise of such powers vested in this court of not. Neither there is any material prima facie brought on record to hold that the forest offence alleged wherein the truck in question was involved was in relation to the forest produce belonging to the government nor any other infirm ity could be pointed out by the learned Assistant Advocate General to hold which m ay call for interference in exercise of die aforesaid powers vested in this court. It may further be appropriate to point out that residuary powers of this Court which were pressed into service by the learned Assistant Advocate General have to be exercised sparingly, that too, after a proper case had been made out. In this view of the matter also the contention appears to have been raised simply to be rejected. 11. No other point has been raised in support of this revision petition. 12. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it is obvious that there is no merit in this revision petition which is dismissed accordingly. Petition dismissed.