D. P. MOHAPATRA, CJ. ( 1 ) THE Committee of Management, Tagore Uchchatar Madhyamic Vidyalaya, Dilawarganj, farrukhabad, through its Manager Devendra. Singh and Om Narain Singh, Principal, Tagore uchchatar Madhyamic Vidyalaya, Dilawarganj, Farrukhabad, the petitioners of Civil Misc. Writ petition No. 24363 of 1997, have filed this appeal challenging the order dated 31. 7. 1997 in which the learned Single Judge summarily dismissed the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. The relevant portion of the order reads: "taking into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record I am not inclined to interfere at this stage while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India specially when the petitioners can get their grievances redressed by approaching the Deputy Director, of Education of the region concerned as clarified by this Court in the case of Shandar Hussain and Anr. v. Deputy Director of Education, Moradahad and Ors. , reported in 1995 A. C. J. 1244. In the aforesaid view of the matter this writ petition is dismissed leaving it open to the petitioners to avail the other remedy. " ( 2 ) IN the writ-petition the petitioner-appellants challenged the order passed by the District inspector of Schools, Farrukhabad, Respondent No. 1, directing "single operation" of the joint salary account of the institution under the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the u. P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other employees) Act, 1971 (U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 ). The said order was passed on the ground that the Committee of Management of the institution had declined to take steps for payment of salary to two teachers and one Class IV employee, who were arrayed as respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in the writ-petition and are respondents 3 to 5 in this appeal, despite the order of the District inspector of Schools holding that they are entitled to draw salary under U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971. 3, 4 and 5 in the writ-petition and are respondents 3 to 5 in this appeal, despite the order of the District inspector of Schools holding that they are entitled to draw salary under U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971. Apparently, the order was passed under second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 in which it is laid down, inter alia that in the case referred to in the proviso to Sub-section (2), or where a difficulty arises in the disbursement of salaries due to any default of the management the inspector may instruct the Bank that the account shall be operated only by himself or by such other officer as may be authorised by him in that behalf and may at any time revoke such instruction. As noted above, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ-petition without entering in to merit of the case holding that the petitioners can approach the Deputy Director of education of the concerned region for redress of their grievances. The learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decision in the case of Shandar Hussain and Anr. v. Deputy Director of education, Moradahad and Ors. (supra ). ( 3 ) WE have heard Sri Ashok Khare for appellants, learned Standing Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri P. C. Mishra for respondents 3, 4 and 5. ( 4 ) THE question that arises is whether the learned Single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was right in declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy? to put it differently the question is whether an order passed by the District Inspector of Schools under, the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 is appealable/revisable or otherwise open to scrutiny by the Regional Deputy Director of education? ( 5 ) SRI Ashok Khare, learned Counsel for appellants, strenuously urged that since the order of the district Inspector of Schools was passed in exercise of the statutory power under Section 5 of the u. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 and the Act does not make any provision for appeal or revision against such an order of the District Inspector of Schools to the Deputy Director of Education, the learned Single Judge was in error in declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy. The further submission of Sri Ashok Khare was that the view taken in Shandar hussains case (supra), on which the learned Judge has-based his decision in the present case, is erroneous. Sri Khare has placed reliance on another Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Committee of Management, Lakhauri Inter College, Lakhauri, District Moradabad and anr. v. Deputy Director of Education, 12th Region, Moradabad and Ors. , (1995) 2 U. P. L. B. E. C. 784, in which reliance has been placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of magan Ram Yadav v. Deputy Director of Education and Ors. , (1980) U. P. L. B. E. C. 6 (FB ). ( 6 ) SRI P. C. Misra, learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 5, on the other hand, submitted that though there is no specific provision in U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 for filing an appeal or revision against the order of the District Inspector of Schools under the second proviso to Sub-section (1)of Section 5 before the Regional Deputy Director of Education, the latter has supervisory jurisdiction over the actions of the District Inspector of Schools in the matter of management of the institution and, therefore, urged the Counsel, no fault can be found with the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy. At the threshold of this submission Sri Misra drew our attention to Rule 19 of the U. P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Rules, 1993, in which it is laid down, inter alia, that admissibility of salary against posts indicated from time to time as sanctioned, shall be determined by a Committee, which shall consist of the District inspector of Schools, who will be President of the Committee; the Account Officer in the office of the Inspector; and the District Basic Education Officer and urged, relying on Sub-rule (3) of rule 19, that any person aggrieved by an order under Sub-rule (2) may, within fifteen days of communication of such order, prefer an appeal to the Deputy Director of Education of the region and the order of the Deputy Director shall be final, but in course of argument he fairly conceded the position that Rule 19 (3) has no application to the present case inasmuch as it is the decision under Sub-rule (2) which is appealable under Sub-rule (3) and the Committee as contemplated in sub-rule (2) has not taken any decision in the instant case regarding admissibility of salary against the posts held by respondents 3 to 5. The learned Standing Counsel, appearing for respondents 1 and 2, too fairly accepted the position that there is no statutory provision in the act or the Rules for filing an appeal/revision against the order of the District Inspector of schools directing single operation of the joint salary account of an Institution. ( 7 ) ON the factual back-drop of the case and the provisions of the Act and Rules noted above the question of sustainability of the order of the learned Single Judge under challenge is to be considered. ( 7 ) ON the factual back-drop of the case and the provisions of the Act and Rules noted above the question of sustainability of the order of the learned Single Judge under challenge is to be considered. The position is well settled and it was not disputed by any of the Counsel appearing before us that the appeal is a creature of the statute and if there is no provision in the Act or the rules providing for an appeal against an order passed under any provision of the statute, the court cannot create the one and direct the aggrieved party to approach for redressal of its grievance for such an order would amount to creation of a Tribunal or forum for determination of a dispute which is not provided for in the Statute since that being a legislative function is not within the competence/jurisdiction of the Court. If any authority in support of this proposition is necessary, we may take note of a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal no. 480 of 1993, Udit Narain Kshetriya High School Society, Padrauna, District Deoria and Anr. v. District Magistrate, Deoria, reported in 1993 HVD (Alld.)Vol. IV. p. 242, in which it was held that the constitution of adjudicatory tribunals is a legislative act; it is for the legislature to prescribe tribunals for adjudication of disputes of various nature and it is not for the Courts to constitute such tribunals; where no specific tribunal has been prescribed by the legislature for resolution of a dispute of particular nature, such dispute may be taken to the Civil Court unless the jurisdiction is barred by a statutory provision. In Civil Mis. Writ Petition No. 11736 of 1996, sheo Shanker Singh Yadav v. State of U. P. and Ors. (decided on 28. 11. 1996), Reported in (1997) 1 UPLBEC 462 (DB), referring to several decisions of the Apex Court, Karnal improvement Trust v. Prakashwanti, 1995 (5) S. C. C. 159, A. R. Antuley v. R. S. Naik, 1988 (2)S. C. C. 602, and of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Sardar Hassan Siddiqui v. State transport Appellate Tribunal, A. I. R. 1986 Alld. 132 and other cases and the case of Udit Narain kshetriya High School Society (supra), this Court held that the Court cannot usurp legislative function and cannot rewrite the legislation for the reason that the Court has no power to legislate and that in the absence of any statutory provision vesting appellate power in the authority concerned the Court cannot direct the authority to determine the dispute raised in the case. ( 8 ) FROM the conspectus of views taken in the aforementioned decisions the position is manifest that in the absence of any provision in U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 and the Rules framed thereunder providing for filing of an appeal/revision before the Regional Deputy Director of Education against the order of the | District Inspector of Schools under the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 5, the Court cannot direct resolution of a dispute arising out of such an order by the Deputy Director of Education. More importantly, there will be no justification for dismissing the writ petition in limine on the ground of alternate remedy when such remedy is not provided in law under the Act or Rules, This is particularly so when the District Inspector of Schools by virtue of the power vested under the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 passed the order for single operation of the joint salary account of the institution in as much as exercise of statutory power under the second proviso to Sub-section (1)of Section 5 of the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 is albeit open to judicial review under Article. 226 of the Constitution, but it is not subject to appellate or revisional control by the Regional Deputy director of Education. The matter might have stood on a different footing had the order under challenge been a purely administrative order not referable to a statutory power, the Deputy director of Education, in that event, being a superior authority over the District Inspector of schools could be directed by this Court to consider the matter and pass-appropriate orders. The order passed by a statutory authority in exercise of a statutory power is open to challenge in the manner prescribed under the said statute or the Rules framed thereunder. The order passed by a statutory authority in exercise of a statutory power is open to challenge in the manner prescribed under the said statute or the Rules framed thereunder. Therefore, the resultant position is that the learned Single Judge was not right in summarily dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy. ( 9 ) IN the case of Shandar Hussain v. Deputy Director of Education, Moradabad and Ors. (supra), the learned Judge had dealt with a dispute relating to attestation of the signatures of. the Manager of the Committee of Management of a recognised institution. The order passed by the concerned district Inspector of Schools attesting the signatures of the Manager of the Committee of management was directed to be considered by the Deputy Director of Education of the concerned region since he was the authority to take a final decision in the matter under Section 16-A (7) of the UP. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and since attestation of signatures of the manager of the Committee of Management was a matter relating to managerial dispute, the regional Deputy Director of Education having been vested with power under the statute could be held to be competent to deal with the matter. In the present case, as we have discussed earlier, the position is. different. The District Inspector of Schools is the only authority vested with power under the second proviso to Sub-section (1.) of Section 5 of the Act to pass an order for single-handed operation of the joint salary account of an institution in the circumstances stated under the provision. The order of the Inspector of Schools is, no doubt, amenable to judicial scrutiny by a competent Court but is not open to challenge before a departmental authority not vested, expressly or impliedly, with any such power under the UP. Act No. 24 of 19. 71. Therefore, the ratio of the decision in Shandar Hussains case (supra), was not available for support in the present case. In this connection we may notice another Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Committee of Management, Lakhauri Inter College, Lakhauri, District moradabad and Anr. v. Deputy Director of Education, 12 Region, Moradabad and Ors. (supra), in which a learned Single Judge, relying on the Full Bench decision in the case of Magan Ram yadav v. Deputy Director of Education and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Education, 12 Region, Moradabad and Ors. (supra), in which a learned Single Judge, relying on the Full Bench decision in the case of Magan Ram yadav v. Deputy Director of Education and Ors. (1980) U. P. L. B. E. C. 6 (FB) (supra), held that since the provisions of the Education Code are merely compilation of departmental instructions and have no statutory force they do not supersede the statute and the regulations. We are of the considered view that Paragraph 16 (8) of the Education Code vesting the Regional Deputy director of Education with the power to exercise general supervision and control over the district Inspector of Schools would not enable the former to sit in appeal/revision over the order passed by the latter in exercise of statutory power under the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of section 5 of U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 for exercise of the power thereunder is not subject to any control by the "regional. Deputy Director of Education. Provisions contained in the Education code may be traceable for their source to Section 9 of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 but being not referable to any provision in the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971, cannot be pressed in service in relation to exercise of power under the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971. In other words, unlike Section 9 (4) of the U. P. Intermediate education Act, 1921 there is not provision in the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 empowering the State government to issue any order in respect of matter covered by the later Act and, therefore, pre-existing Education Code cannot control the exercise of power by District Inspector of schools under Section 5 of U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971. It may be worthwhile to notice that Section 12 of the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 which provides that no order made or direction given by the state Government, the Director, the Regional Deputy Director of Education or the Inspector or other officer in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court, leads to an inference that the order by Inspector directing single operation of salary account cannot be questioned before higher departmental authorities. It may be revoked by the inspector himself as visualised by the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 itself or it may be quashed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but, in the absence of any express provision in the Act, it cannot be disbursed by the Regional Deputy Director of education or any other higher authority of the department. ( 10 ) VIEWED from another angle also, the impugned order becomes unsustainable. During the pendency of this case the Joint Director of Education, Kanpur Region, Kanpur has passed an order on 9. 4. 1997, as submitted by Sri P. C. Misra, holding that respondents 3 to 5 are entitled to draw salary under the provisions of the U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971 and the said order has been challenged by the Committee of Management of the institution in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13318 of 1997 filed in this Court which is still pending. Since the Joint Director of Education, who is indisputably an officer superior in rank to the Deputy Director of Education, has held that the employees concerned, viz. respondents 3 to 5, are entitled to payment of their salary under u. P. Act No. 24 of 1971, no useful purpose will be served in directing the Regional Deputy director of Education to consider the matter of single operation of joint salary account, which is based on the alleged default of the management in payment of salary to these employees under the provisions of U. P. Act No. 24 of 1971. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is allowed. The order dated 31. 7. 1997 dismissing Writ Petition No. 24363 of 1997 is set aside and it is ordered that the writ-petition will be heard along with Writ petition No. 13318 of 1997. Both the cases will be listed before the appropriate Bench in the second week of November, 1997. .