Judgment : 1. The respondents 1 and 2 filed a petition in I.P.No. 19 of 1983 on the file of Sub Court, Udumalpet, to adjudicate the 3rd respondent as insolvent. According to them, the 3rd respondent herein has executed a promissory note on 23. 81 in favour of the respondents 1 and 2 for a sum of Rs. 14,000 and a notice was issued on 29. 81 demanding the 3rd respondent to pay the said amount. On 17. 83 the 3rd respondent herein has executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant herein. According to the respondents 1 and 2, such an alienation was only with a view to defraud the creditor with fraudulent intention and saving the property for himself without meeting the obligations to the creditors. On that basis, they have stated that the 3rd respondent herein had committed an act of insolvency. 2. The appellant herein filed a counter objecting to the averments in the petition stating that the property originally was settled in favour of the minor children under Ex.Bl dated 79. The property was sold under Ex.A3 dated 17. 83 in their favour for himself and minor sons it cannot be said that it amounts to an act of insolvency. 3. The trial court in its order dated 12. 85 rejected the petition and the appeal filed by the respondents 1 and 2 in C.M.A. 47 of 1986, the District Court allowed the appeal and declared the 3rd respondent herein as insolvent. Aggrieved against the same, the appellant has filed the above appeal. 4. Admittedly, the 3rd respondent and his brother purchased the properties under Ex.A4 dated 265. But the 3rd respondent alone has settled all the properties in favour of the minor children showing their mother as a guardian under Ex.Bl dated 79. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent borrowed money from the respondents 1 and 2 under Ex.A2 dated 23. 81. Subsequently under Ex.A3 dated 17. 83, the 3rd respondent sold the properties in favour of the appellant for himself and for minor children. The sale under Ex.A3 has been stated as an act of insolvency. On that basis, the petition was filed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the sale in favour of the appellant was on 17. 83. The petition filed by the respondents 1 and 2 was on 18. 83. The sale under Ex.A3 has been stated as an act of insolvency. On that basis, the petition was filed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the sale in favour of the appellant was on 17. 83. The petition filed by the respondents 1 and 2 was on 18. 83. Relying under section 9(l)(c) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 the learned counsel has submitted that the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded has occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 has submitted that though the document was executed on 17. 83, the document was registered on 18. 83. So the petition is filed within three months from the act of insolvency. In view of his submission, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied on the judgment in Firm Mukund Lai Veerkumar And Another v. Purushottam singh and others, AIR 1968 S.C. 1182 : 1968 (2) SCJ 639 which reads as follows; "It was contended on behalf of the appellants that under section 47 of the Indian Registration Act a registered document operates from the date of its execution even though it may require registration and consequently the registration of the document should be taken to date back to the date of execution by a fiction of law. It was therefore submitted that the starting point of the three months period prescribed under section 9 (1 )(c) of the Act should be the date of execution of the deed of gift and not the date of registration. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act states that for the purpose of making a gift of immovable property the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument in the prescribed manner. Under this section therefore a gift of immoveable property is not valid unless it is effected by a registered instrument. It is true that under section 47 of the Indian Registration Act once a document is registered, the effect begins to commence from the date of execution, but if the document is not registered it can never have any legal effect as a deed of gift. It is true that under section 47 of the Indian Registration Act once a document is registered, the effect begins to commence from the date of execution, but if the document is not registered it can never have any legal effect as a deed of gift. Under section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, it is provided that no document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered shall affect any immoveable property comprised therein unless it has been registered. The section necessarily implies that such a document by reason of its execution alone cannot have the effect of transferring the property. In the present case, therefore, the deed of gift executed by Mukand Lai in favour of Veer Kumar dated 31st October, 1957 cannot be considered to be an act of insolvency unless a valid transfer of property was made by that document and such a "valid transfer could be said to have been made only when the document was registered on 11th March, 1958. The question in the present case is not what was the effect of the registration of the deed of gift, but when did the event take place which effectively transferred, the property. We are not concerned with the point of time from which the document became operative but with the point of time at which the deed of gift became legally effective. The contrary view point for which the appellant contends would ignore the circumstance that if the registration of the deed of gift was not effected within the period of three months the creditor would be deprived of his remedy of relying upon the act of transfer as constituting an act of insolvency. Such an interpretation should be avoided as it would nullify the intention of the statute. On this question there has been divergence of opinion among the various High Courts. In Lakshmi Chand. v. Kesho Ram, it was held by the Full Bench of the Lagore High Court that when a petition was presented alleging that a debtor had committed an act of insolvency by a registered deed, the period of limitation prescribed by section 9(1 )(c) of the Act ran from the date of the registration of the deed and not from the date of the execution thereof. The same view was expressed by the Madras High Court in Sarvathada Iswarayya v. Kuruba Subbanna. In that case, the execution of the sale deed was relied upon as an act of insolvency by a petitioning creditor and it was held by Madhavan Nair and Bardswell, JJ, that the three months period prescribed by section 9 (1 )(c) of the Act must be calculated from the date of the registration of the deed not and not from the date of its execution. The same view was also enunciated by the Allahabad High Court in District Board, Bijno v. Mohammad Abdul Salam. A contrary view has been taken by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in U On Maung v. Maung Shwe Hpaung. It was held that the period of three months referred to in section 54, Provincial Insolvency Act, began to run from the date of execution of the transfer provided it had been properly registered within the specified time. But for the reasons already expressed we hold that the decisions in Lakshmi Chand v. Kesho Ram, in Sarvathada Iswarayya v. Kuruba Subbanna, and in District Board, Bijnor v. Mohammad Abdul Salam, correctly state the law on the point." In view of the above decision of the Apex Court, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the petition is not maintainable cannot be sustained. 6. The learned counsel further submitted that the burden is on the respondents 1 and 2 to prove that the settlement in favour of minor children was not sham and nominal. The appellate court went into that question and held that the settlement in favour of the minor children is nothing but a sham and nominal document. Under Ex.Bl, the 3rd respondent has shown his wife as a guardian for the minors. Having settled the property in favour of the minors under Ex.A3, it is specifically stated that he is the owner of the property along with minor children and he has been enjoying the same. On the basis of the said document, we can come to the conclusion that the document executed under Ex.Bl was nothing but a sham and nominal and not acted upon. Moreover, in the said document, the debts of the 3rd parties were directed to be discharged by the purchaser. The evidence P.W.I also said that the minors are not the owners. 7. Moreover, in the said document, the debts of the 3rd parties were directed to be discharged by the purchaser. The evidence P.W.I also said that the minors are not the owners. 7. In view of the above, I do not find any substantial question of law to be decided in this case. I do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed accordingly. No costs.