JUDGMENT 1. :- This appeal has been filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, against the judgment and order dated 11.7.1997 passed by the learned Single Judge by which the writ petition of the appellant challenging notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act has been dismissed. 2. The factual matrix of the case reveal that a notification under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was published in the gazette on 23.12.1983, contained in Annx. 5 to this petition, providing for proposed acquisition of the land measuring 296 bighas and 1 biswas, situated in the revenue estate of Mauja Kesarpur, district Pali, for public purpose as the land was needed for Rajasthan Industrial Development & Investment Corporation (RIICO). The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 10.12.1984, providing for acquisition of land measuring 222 bighas and 9 biswas only, including the appellant's land measuring 13 bighas and 5 biswas, as is evident from Annx. 6 to the petition. 3. The appellant had purchased the land in dispute in 1981 and claims that mutation has been made in his favour but Section 9 notice was not issued to the appellant, rather it was served upon the original owner Mr. Shankar Singh on 16.12.1985. The possession of the land was taken after Section 6 declaration by resorting to provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act. The appellant filed the writ petition before this Court on 21.6.1985. The appellant had not prayed for interim relief for not dis-possessing him from the land in question, rather he prayed that the respondents be restrained from construction and development of the said land. The appellant could not succeed before the learned Single Judge, hence this appeal. 4. Heard Shri B.L. Purohit, learned Counsel for the appellant. Mr. Purohit has vehemently argued that Section 4 notification was not given due publicity and the substance thereof was not affixed at conspicous places nor publicity was made by beat of drums and, therefore, the respondents failed to ensure compliance of the mandate of law. There-is no substance in this submission. The total land acquired had been 222 bighas and 9 biswas, which belonged to large number of persons, as is evident from Section 4 notification itself. There-is no substance in this submission. The total land acquired had been 222 bighas and 9 biswas, which belonged to large number of persons, as is evident from Section 4 notification itself. Had this been so, the other persons could have raised grievance to his effect and it cannot be said that other persons came to know about Section 4 notification and the appellant was the only exception. The appellant had challenged the entire notification, as prayer had been made for quashing the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act. His prayer is not limited to the land belonging to him. Such a relief cannot be granted by the Court, particularly, in view of the fact that the persons who had been owners of the lands, subject matter of acquisition, had not challenged the acquisition. The possession of the land was taken in 1984 itself and construction over the same been made long back. Shri Purohit has fairly conceded to this factual aspect. 5. In Pista Devi v. State of U.P. AIR 1986 Supreme Court 2025 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that where a large tract of land is acquired and the land belong to large number of persons, challenging the entire acquisition at the instance of one or few persons should not be entertained, as it would hamper the development of the entire land and purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired would stood frustrated at the behest of few persons though the other affected persons have accepted the acquisition proceeding and accepted the award etc. 6. In the instant case, as the appellant has not confined the relief sought to the land belonging to him only, the writ petition itself seems to be misconceived and the appellant cannot challenge the acquisition of the total area. In the instant case, the area acquired has already been developed by investing a huge amount and it would be even difficult to identify the land of the appellant. 7. It is next submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that the land acquisition proceedings vitiated as the appellant had not been served with a notice under Section 9(3) of the Act. There is no force in this contention also. 7. It is next submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that the land acquisition proceedings vitiated as the appellant had not been served with a notice under Section 9(3) of the Act. There is no force in this contention also. The Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a consistent view that the provisions of Section 9(3) are not mandatory and if the compliance has not been made, the acquisition proceedings will not vitiate as it amounts to mere irregularity in service and is curable and on account thereof the award does not become invalid. [vide State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Uma Shankar Rajabhau, 1996 (1) SCC 299 and State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalaxmi Ammal and Ors., 1996 (7) SCC 269 ]. 8. There is another aspect of the case also. The appellant challenged Section 4 notification by filing a writ petition on 21st June, 1985 though Section 4 notification had been issued on 23.12.1983. It is not open for the appellant to challenge Section 4 notification or say that the due publicity was not made, at such a belated stage, as it is settled that when a person challenges Section 4 notification, on any ground, it should be challenged within reasonable period and if the acquisition is challenged at a belated state, the petition deserves to be dismissed only on this count. As explained by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 Sc 1020 , wherein it has been held that where a large area of land is acquired and the plots which are subject to acquisition belong to large number of persons, if other persons have not challenged the acquisition proceedings it is difficult to believe that appellant was not aware of the initiation of the acquisition proceedings as the acquisition of the said land would be the talk of the town in a short time and if the person interested failed to approach the writ court within reasonable period, the petition should fail only on the ground of delay. 9. A Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi and Ors., AIR 1974 Sc 2077 has observed as under: ". . 9. A Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi and Ors., AIR 1974 Sc 2077 has observed as under: ". . .to have sat in fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on the grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium of delatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner." 10. Same view has been taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 2190 , wherein it was observed that respondent was not entitled to challenge the validity of Section 4 notification after an unreasonable lapse of time. If public notice as required by Section 4 of the Act was not given and that would per se vitiate the notification under Section 4, the person interested should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. 11. The issue of delay in filing the writ petition was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Smt Sudama Devi v. Commissioner and Ors., 1983 (2) SCC 1 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: "There is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is, in fact, doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event one thing is clear and beyond doubt that no such period of limitation can be laid down either under the rules made by the High Court or by practice. For every case, it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner." (emphasis added) 12. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner." (emphasis added) 12. In the instant case, admittedly Section 4 notification was challenged after a lapse of one and half year. Section 6 declaration was challenged after the possession had been taken by the respondents and the respondents started development over the acquired land. Thus, it is difficult to hold, particularly in view of the judgments referred to hereinabove, that the appellant could have challenged Section 4 notification and Section 6 declaration, at such a belated stage, thus, the petition is liable to be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches. 13. The next submission made by Mr. Purohit is that the respondents did not resort to the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act and thus, the appellant could not have been deprived of his legitimate right to file objection under Section 5A of the Act. 14. The appellant did not furnish the full particulars of the ease. It is worth mentioning that Section 4 notification was issued in respect of area measuring 296-1-0 bighas, while Section 6 declaration was made only in respect of 222-9-0 bighas. Thus, while issuing Section 6 declaration, a large area of the land i.e. measuring 73-12-0 bighas was exempted from acquisition. Appellant failed to explain as to how the land was exempted from acquisition, without hearing the 'persons interested'. In the writ petition, the appellant has mentioned in ground (vi) that some land was subsequently "de-requisitioned" arbitrarily. It was a case of acquisition and not of requisition. Thus, the appellant failed to provide for any factual foundation to determine the issue on facts. Moreover, the Court is not obliged to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on such vague pleadings. Thus, this submission is also rejected for want of proper substantiation of the averment. 15. No other point is urged. Thus, in view of the above, we find no force in this Special Appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.Application Allowed. *******