BARIN GHOSH, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants before us filed a writ petition, in which they challenged the institution of Criminal Case No. C/284/93 by filing a complaint dated March 24, 1993, under Sections 276b and 278b of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings, notices and orders relating thereto. ( 2 ) IN the writ petition, the appellants contended that until March 31, 1994, they carried on business in partnership in the name and style of "bhagwati Prasad Mahendra Kumar". On and from April 1, 1994, the said partnership firm has been dissolved and since then it is a proprietary concern of appellant No. 1. Until its dissolution, the said firm was an income-tax assessee assessed under the status of a "registered firm". The said firm maintained its accounts in accordance with the mercantile system of accountancy. During the accounting year ended on December 31, 1983, the assessment year 1984-85, the said firm credited the accounts of its creditors with the interest payable to them on the loans taken from them. Under Section 194a (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the said firm, at the time of crediting of such interest to the account of the payee or at the time of payment thereof, whichever is earlier, was obliged to deduct income-tax thereon at the rate in force and under Section 200 of the said Act was required to pay within the prescribed time, the sum so deducted to the credit of the Central Government. Though the said firm had credited interest payable and had shown deduction of tax therefrom, but due to paucity of funds and bad liquidity position could neither pay the interest to the creditors, nor could pay the tax so shown to have been deducted to the Central Government within the time so specified. However, subsequently the interest as well as the tax deducted was paid to the creditors and to the Central Government respectively. For the relevant assessment year deduction of tax on interest amounted to Rs. 2,17,476. Till March, 1990, a sum of Rs. 34,396 was paid and the balance of Rs. 1,83,080 was paid on February 19, 1991. However, subsequently the interest as well as the tax deducted was paid to the creditors and to the Central Government respectively. For the relevant assessment year deduction of tax on interest amounted to Rs. 2,17,476. Till March, 1990, a sum of Rs. 34,396 was paid and the balance of Rs. 1,83,080 was paid on February 19, 1991. Prior thereto on March 2, 1990, the said firm received a letter dated February 27, 1990, from the Income-tax Officer, Ward 3 (6), Calcutta, wherein it was stated that although the said firm has deducted tax of Rs. 2,17,476, it has failed to deposit the same within the stipulated period and, therefore, the said firm was required to show cause why prosecution should not be launched under Section 276b of the said Act. In reply to the said letter dated March 2, 1990, the said firm submitted before the said Income-tax Officer that a sum of Rs. 34,396 has already been paid to the Central Government and the balance would be paid soon on realisation of funds and, subsequently, the balance was paid on February 19, 1991. Thereafter, in June, 1993, the appellants and the said firm received from the court of the learned Ninth Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, a summons and a copy of a criminal complaint dated March 24, 1993, filed by the said Income-tax Officer against the appellants and the said firm, where it was stated that the said complaint was duly authorised by the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal IX, Calcutta, by his order dated March 18, 1993. In the meantime and after receipt of the said letter dated February 27, 1990, the said firm did riot hear anything either from the said Income-tax Officer or from the said Commissioner of Income-tax. On March 24, 1993, learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of receiving the said complaint and thereafter the appellants were enlarged on bail by the learned Ninth Metropolitan Magistrate. It was contended that the said criminal proceedings were not maintainable and should be dismissed. On March 24, 1993, learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of receiving the said complaint and thereafter the appellants were enlarged on bail by the learned Ninth Metropolitan Magistrate. It was contended that the said criminal proceedings were not maintainable and should be dismissed. It was stated that no such criminal complaint could be filed against the partners of the said firm since the payer of interest alone was defined to be the person responsible for paying within the meaning of the appropriate provisions of the said Act and under the said Act the partnership firm and its partners are different entities and thus the said firm alone was responsible. It was also stated that the complaint so launched does not disclose an offence because the principal ingredients constituting the offence in a matter like this had not been alleged. It was stated that the authorisation accorded to initiate such criminal proceedings was made mechanically without taking into account the relevant factors and in particular the payment of the full amount of the tax deducted at source. In addition to that, various other grounds were taken to assail the matter complained of in the writ petition as mentioned above. ( 3 ) THE writ petition was moved upon notice to the respondents before a learned single judge of this court when the matter was argued threadbare. The learned single judge of this court by an order dated April 28, 1995, summarily rejected the writ petition. After holding, inter alia, that the writ jurisdiction in a matter like this should be exercised only in rare cases, the present is not such a rare case and that it would be the obligation of the accused to make out some cause or excuse which is sufficiently reasonable for explaining non-payment of tax, but it would not be the obligation of the complainant, the Income-tax Officer, to plead or prove the negative. The learned single judge also felt that he is not called upon to make any comment upon the argument that because a partnership firm or a company cannot be sent to jail and compulsory imprisonment is provided for the offences, those would vanish altogether from the scene even in so far as the partners themselves are concerned. The learned single judge also felt that he is not called upon to make any comment upon the argument that because a partnership firm or a company cannot be sent to jail and compulsory imprisonment is provided for the offences, those would vanish altogether from the scene even in so far as the partners themselves are concerned. The learned single judge also observed that the complaints are not bad ab initio, they call for a good defence to be made out if the allegations in the complaint are substantiated before the learned Magistrate, without which a conviction would automatically follow, because, in the petition of complaint, there is no reasonable cause or excuse justifying non-payment. The learned single judge lastly observed that keeping the writ petition pending might unjustly affect the prosecution. ( 4 ) AGAINST the said order of the learned single judge, dated April 28, 1995, the present appeal has been preferred. At the hearing, it was urged on behalf of the appellants, inter alia, that deduction and payment of tax on interest is a statutory obligation imposed by the said Act. Non-payment of tax deducted at source exposes the person responsible for payment, statutorily defined to punishment, which has also been prescribed by the said Act itself and the ingredients for an offence so punishable has also been specifically prescribed by the said Act and if they are absent, it cannot be said that a complaint relating to such offence has at all been made out. It was contended that having regard to the provisions of the said Act, the appellants are not persons responsible for payment and in any event the complaint in question does not contain an averment to the effect that the appellants, "without reasonable cause or excuse" have failed to deduct or after deducting failed to pay tax. In that regard learned counsel appearing for the parties ably argued their points by referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court, the changes effected to the said Act by the Legislature and the implications thereof. We are very grateful to counsel who argued before us for enlightening us in that regard. In that regard learned counsel appearing for the parties ably argued their points by referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court, the changes effected to the said Act by the Legislature and the implications thereof. We are very grateful to counsel who argued before us for enlightening us in that regard. But before we venture to accept the arguments of learned counsel of the parties in regard to those aspects of the matter, we feel we must first venture to find out whether in a case like this we should at all permit writ jurisdiction of this court to be used. ( 5 ) IN Delhi Development Authority v. Smt. Lila D. Bhagat, three learned judges of the Supreme Court were concerned with five civil appeals and two criminal appeals, which were disposed of by a common judgment. In that case, the respondents in those appeals were being prosecuted by the Delhi Development Authority for alleged violation of Section 14 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. Some of the persons, so prosecuted, challenged the legality of the prosecution by filing writ petitions and some by filing criminal petitions for quashing of the conviction or prosecution. The Supreme Court while dealing with the matter in paragraph 7 of the report observed (page 497) : "in an appropriate case it may be, rather, is, permissible to protect a person from illegal and vexatious prosecution by grant of an appropriate writ or in exercise of the inherent or revisional powers of the High Court. " The Supreme Court, however, on the merits found that the prosecutions initiated by the said authority against the respondents are not cases of that type. The question there was, whether the master-plan had specified any use of the buildings as distinguished from land. The Supreme Court held that it was a question of fact in each case, whether the master-plan had specified a particular use of a particular building and whether the person prosecuted had incurred the penal liability under Section 29 (2) of the said Act for the alleged violation of Section 14 thereof. The Supreme Court then observed that instead of leaving the matter to be decided by the criminal court, the High Court unjustifiably and illegally took upon itself the task of holding, on interpretation of and on reading the master-plan, that it had not specified any use of building as distinguished from land. The Supreme Court then observed that instead of leaving the matter to be decided by the criminal court, the High Court unjustifiably and illegally took upon itself the task of holding, on interpretation of and on reading the master-plan, that it had not specified any use of building as distinguished from land. The Supreme Court further observed that it was primarily and essentially within the domain of the criminal court, where the prosecutions were pending, to arrive at its own conclusion on appreciation of the entire evidence placed before it. ( 6 ) IN Smt Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, three learned judges of the Supreme Court were dealing with a matter where the High Court had set aside the order of the Magistrate issuing process against the respondents in exercise of his discretion under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that case, the son of the appellant before the Supreme Court was waylaid and murdered and accordingly, the appellant filed a report before the police. The police, after investigation, filed a charge-sheet under Sections 302, 114, 147, 148 and other sections of the Indian Penal Code against some persons accused. The appellant was not satisfied with the investigation by the police and, therefore, filed a complaint before the Magistrate alleging that the respondents before the Supreme Court had, in fact, abetted the offence of murder committed by the other accused. On receiving the complaint, the Magistrate decided to hold an enquiry. The enquiry was held. The Magistrate was, thereafter, transferred. The next incumbent directed investigation by the police. The matter went up to the High Court. The High Court quashed that order and directed the Magistrate to enquire. That incumbent having left, his replacement, after hearing arguments and considering the evidence recorded by the first Magistrate, directed process to be issued against respondents Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 204 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 then approached the High Court, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which revision was allowed, against which special leave was granted and ultimately the matter was decided. 1 and 2 under Section 204 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 then approached the High Court, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which revision was allowed, against which special leave was granted and ultimately the matter was decided. The Supreme Court in paragraph 5 of its judgment observed (page 1951) : "it is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court or even this court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on the merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code which culminate into an order under Section 204 of the Code. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code which culminate into an order under Section 204 of the Code. Thus, it may safely be held that in the following cases, an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside :" (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused ; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused ; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible ; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by a legally competent authority and the like. " ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court, thereupon, applied those principles to the facts of that case and came to the conclusion that it was not such a case in which the High Court should have quashed the proceedings. ( 8 ) IN Smt. Kanwal Sood v. Nawal Kishore, the Supreme Court was concerned with a case where a person had gifted his property to a trust with a condition that he would stay in the property till his death and the trust would be entitled to take possession of the property after his death. During his lifetime, he invited his brother's widow to stay in the house with him. After the death of the settler, the widow continued to stay and she was served with a notice to quit. On failure, a complaint was filed and the Magistrate convicted the widow for criminal trespass and directed her to pay a fine of Rs. 100. She was further directed to vacate the premises within two months. After the death of the settler, the widow continued to stay and she was served with a notice to quit. On failure, a complaint was filed and the Magistrate convicted the widow for criminal trespass and directed her to pay a fine of Rs. 100. She was further directed to vacate the premises within two months. The Supreme Court held that this was essentially a civil matter and if a suit for eviction had been filed the widow might have been in a position to vindicate her right and justify her possession. To initiate criminal proceedings in the circumstances appears to be only an abuse of the process of the court. The Supreme Court also observed that a mere perusal of the complaint makes it abundantly clear that there is no allegation about the intention of the widow to commit any offence or to intimidate or annoy any person in possession and, therefore, the very condition of the charging Section had not been established by the complaint itself. ( 9 ) IN State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, two learned judges of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case where the High Court in a writ petition quashed the entire criminal proceedings initiated against respondent No. 1 inclusive of the registration of the first information report and had directed respondent No. 2 to pay the costs of respondent No. 1. It so happened that respondent No. 1 was a Minister of the State in 1977 and then became Chief Minister of the State for the period between 1982-87 and thereafter, became a Union Minister. After the general election to the Legislative Assembly of the State was held in June, 1987, respondent No. 2 presented a complaint before the then Chief Minister making certain serious allegations against respondent No. 1. On which, the officer on special duty in the Chief Minister's Secretariat made an endorsement on November 12, 1987, to the effect, "c. M. has seen. For appropriate action" and marked the same to the Director-General of Police who in turn made an endorsement on the same day to the effect "please look into this ; take necessary action and report" and marked the same to the Superintendent of Police, Hissar. For appropriate action" and marked the same to the Director-General of Police who in turn made an endorsement on the same day to the effect "please look into this ; take necessary action and report" and marked the same to the Superintendent of Police, Hissar. This was put up before the Superintendent of Police, Hissar, who was the second appellant before the Supreme Court, on which he had made an endorsement "please register a case and investigate". The third appellant thereafter registered a case on the basis of the said complaint and took up investigation. The third appellant, thereafter, forwarded a copy of the first information report to the Magistrate and proceeded to the spot accompanied by three constables of whom two were handed over one rifle each and fifty cartridges. The respondent thereafter filed a writ petition seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the first information report and also of a writ of prohibition restraining the appellants from further proceeding with the investigation. The High Court initially granted an interim ex parte stay which was thereafter made absolute. While dealing with the matter, the Supreme Court took note of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, contained in Chapter XIV thereof and of the principles of law enunciated by the. Supreme Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code and thereafter gave, by way of illustration, certain categories of cases in which such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice (page 629) ;"1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the first information report do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. 3. 2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the first information report do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the first information report or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the first information report do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the first information report or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. " ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court thereafter observed (page 629) :"we also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases ; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. " ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court ultimately set aside the judgment of the High Court quashing the first information report as not being legally and factually sustainable in law for the reasons mentioned in the judgment, but quashed the commencement as well as the entire investigation for the reason that the third appellant was not clothed with valid legal authority to take up the investigation and to proceed with the same within the meaning of Section 5a (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Supreme Court also set aside the order awarding costs in favour of respondent No. 1 to be paid by respondent No. 2. The Supreme Court held in paragraph 115 of the report that the mala fide exercise of power will assume significance only if an authority acts for an unauthorised purpose and that the proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the power is exercised. On the facts the Supreme Court found that the registration of the case and the intended follow up action was. only to investigate the allegations and to present the case before the court, if sufficient evidence in support of the allegations could be collected but not to make a character assassination of respondent No. 1 and his relatives. ( 12 ) IN Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, two learned judges of the Supreme Court were principally concerned with the locus standi of an applicant seeking quashing of criminal proceeding's and the power of the court to use the inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, suo motu. The Supreme Court held that the petition filed by a citizen to quash a prosecution initiated by filing a first information report by the Central Bureau of Investigation against persons involved in the matter of acquisition of Bofors guns, was not maintainable since the same did not involve public interest. In so far as inherent power conferred by Section 482, the Supreme Court observed that the power so vested in the High Court is very wide but the very plenitude of power requires great caution in its exercise and, therefore, the court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. In so far as inherent power conferred by Section 482, the Supreme Court observed that the power so vested in the High Court is very wide but the very plenitude of power requires great caution in its exercise and, therefore, the court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The Supreme Court also observed that the inherent power so conferred should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. It also observed that the High Court should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their perspective without sufficient material. ( 13 ) IN CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. , two learned judges of the Supreme Court were concerned with a matter arising out of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In that case, two first information reports were filed by the appellant, stating therein, that the respondent and others conspired with a criminal design to defraud the United Bank of India and the Canara Bank to misappropriate the charged stocks lying at different places and to obtain funds without any security. The said banks had filed suits for recovery of their dues and the said suits had been compromised on receiving payments. The first complaint was filed in 1987 and the second in 1989. In 1991, the respondent moved the High Court when the High Court quashed the complaints, holding that the case was basically a matter of civil dispute. The Supreme Court upheld the reasoning of the High Court and further observed that the appellant had sufficient time to complete the investigation for the purpose of framing the charge and that, even if an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence is a compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits instituted by the banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheating. ( 14 ) IN State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, two learned judges of the Supreme Court were dealing with a matter where the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, had been pleased to quash criminal proceedings. In that case, in relation to supply of fertiliser allegedly of sub-standard and spurious quality, a first information report was lodged on behalf of the purchasing authority against some of its previous officers and against the directors of the supplier company. The High Court while dealing with the matter took into consideration the affidavits and documents filed with the writ petition to reach the conclusion, contrary to the charge-sheet filed by the police authority after investigation. The Supreme Court observed that the annexures to the writ petition challenging criminal proceedings against the accused, were neither part of the police reports, nor were relied upon by the investigating officers ; those documents were produced by the accused before the High Court along with the writ petition ; by treating the annexures and affidavits as evidence and by converting itself into a trial court, the High Court cannot declare the accused to be innocent and quash the proceedings; and that the appreciation of evidence is the function of the criminal courts which could not be assumed by the High Court to put an end to the process of investigation and trial as provided under the law. The Supreme Court also observed that in the instant case, there was no material to show that the prosecution against the accused was initiated as a result of any malice on the part of the informant or the investigating officer ; there was no material at all to show that prior to the lodging of the first information report there was any enmity between the accused and the informant or the investigating officer ; the question of mala fide exercise of the power assumes significance only when the criminal proceeding is initiated on extraneous considerations and for an unauthorised purpose. ( 15 ) IN State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid, two learned judges of the Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the criminal proceedings is limited. ( 15 ) IN State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid, two learned judges of the Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the criminal proceedings is limited. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court can interfere only in extreme cases where the charges ex facie do not constitute an offence, but when the matter is debatable it is not amenable to such jurisdiction and the allegations in the chargesheet must be assumed to be true. It further held that the High Court cannot scrutinise materials to find fault in such allegations. ( 16 ) IN Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab, two learned judges of the Supreme Court held that a first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence, it is only relevant in judging the veracity of the prosecution case and the value to be attached to its defence on the facts of each case. Only the essential or broad picture need be stated in the first information report and all minute details need not be mentioned therein. It is not a verbatim summary of the prosecution case. It need not contain details of the occurrence as if it were an encyclopedia of the occurrence. It may not even be necessary to catalogue the overt acts therein. Non-mentioning of some facts or vague reference to some are not fatal. ( 17 ) IN Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, two learned judges of the Supreme Court observed that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. They, however, observed that the power being an extraordinary one it has to be exercised sparingly. They further proceeded to hold that the proceeding against an accused in the initial stage, can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted, in other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint, as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its power under Section 482. In that case, the complaint contained the allegations regarding the taking of a sample which was found to be adulterated on chemical analysis ; the complaint was filed against the company, its directors and the manager. There was nothing to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the directors to hold them vicariously liable. The Supreme Court held that no case against the directors has been made out ex facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the manager of the company was directly in charge of its affairs and, therefore, he could not fall in the same category as the directors. The prosecution against the manager, was, therefore, upheld by the Supreme Court. ( 18 ) IN Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, two learned judges of the Supreme Court applied the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajanlal's case, in the matter of exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the first information report or complaint and held that the High Court was not justified in quashing the first information report and the complaint on the facts of that case. ( 19 ) IN State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pirthi Chand, two learned judges of the Supreme Court were dealing with a case where on receipt of secret information that charas, a contraband, was being dealt with at the bus stand, the head constable, Rattan Singh, along with other police officials were present at the bus stand known as Amb ; they secured the presence of one Pradhan Subhas Chand and one Gurdas Ram and raided the house of the first respondent. On search, they found 1 kilo 15 grams of charas ; they took a sample and divided the same into three parts; one was given to the accused, another was sent to the court and the third one was sent to the chemical examiner for analysis; on analysis it was found that it was charas and, accordingly, a charge-sheet was filed to prosecute the first respondent under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ; after considering the charge-sheet, the learned Sessions Judge discharged the respondent from the offence ; on revision the High Court confirmed the same ; and then the appeal by special leave was taken to the Supreme Court. Therefore, in that case, there was neither an application filed under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned judges, however in paragraph 13 of the report, observed, "when the remedy under Section 482 is available, the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 since efficacious remedy under Section 482 of the Code is available. " In paragraph 12 of the report, the Supreme Court observed as follows (page 980 of AIR 1996 SC) and (page 44 of [1996] 2 SCC) :" It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one- Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint In deciding whether the case is the rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution at its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that first information report is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is conducted (sic concluded) and the charge-sheet is laid, the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider the necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. At that stage it is not the function of the court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider the necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statements of witnesses on the record in support-thereof whether the court could take cognizance of the offence on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out, no further act could be done except to quash the charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases, i. e. , in the rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengeance process of criminal is availed of in laying a complaint or first information report itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence-the court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power. " ( 20 ) THE Supreme Court also observed in paragraph 14 of the report that the evidence collected in a search in violation of law does not become inadmissible in evidence under the Evidence Act. It held that the search may be illegal but the evidence collected, none the less, would be admissible at the trial. At the stage of filing the charge-sheet it cannot be said that there is no evidence and the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge would be committing an illegality to discharge the accused on the ground that Section 50 or other provisions of the said Act have not been complied with. It observed that at the trial an opportunity would be available to the prosecution to prove that the search was conducted in accordance with law and even if the search is found to be in violation of law, what weight should be given to the evidence collected is yet another question to be gone into. It observed that at the trial an opportunity would be available to the prosecution to prove that the search was conducted in accordance with law and even if the search is found to be in violation of law, what weight should be given to the evidence collected is yet another question to be gone into. ( 21 ) IN J. K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers ,two learned judges of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 23 of the report "it is not fair or proper to read a sentence from the judgment of this court (Supreme Court), divorced from the complete context in which it was given and to build up a case treating as if that sentence is the complete law on the subject. Judgments of this court are not to be read in the manner. " In Delhi Development Authority v. Lila D. Bhagat's case, three learned judges of the Supreme Court were concerned with writ applications as well as applications filed under Section 82 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings. While dealing with the matter, they did not distinguish the powers of the High Court under the said two provisions, on the contrary, they dealt with such powers of the High Court collectively. It would, therefore, be safe to ignore the observation of the Supreme Court in Pirthi Chand's case, contained in paragraph 13 of the report as cited above and to proceed on the basis that the powers to be exercised under Section 482 of the Code and under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash criminal proceedings, are more or less identical, to be exercised by the same authority, i. e. , the High Court and in the manner as laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments referred to above. ( 22 ) IN the matter of exercise of such jurisdiction, in the normal circumstances, the High Court should as a matter of principle refuse to intervene, as it should not stand in the way of investigation of trial of an offence. It can (sic) act before issuance of process on a complaint case, since it cannot substitute the discretion of the Magistrate by its own discretion. It can (sic) act before issuance of process on a complaint case, since it cannot substitute the discretion of the Magistrate by its own discretion. It would, however, be its duty to lift the self-restraint imposed by it on itself in rarest of rare cases to prevent abuse of process of law or to prevent harassment of a citizen. The rarest of rare cases are those which shock the conscience of a reasonable man. The court, however, putting itself in the seat of a reasonable man, can neither add nor subtract anything and at the same time cannot admit any evidence, which neither accompanies the complaint, nor is adduced as evidence in support of the complaint. If on the face of the complaint no offence is constituted, but on the basis of such a complaint the judicial machinery is activated giving rise to harassment of a citizen that would shock the conscience of a reasonable person, but the same should be apparent on the face of the complaint itself. If the matter is not so apparent, but to make the same apparent arguments are required to be made, then the matter has to be left to the authorities who have been empowered to investigate into the matter but, however, if the offence has been compounded but still the prosecution is continuing or if an apparent civil dispute has been turned into a criminal case, then of course, the court may intervene, provided the other ingredients for exercise of such jurisdiction are present. The court may also intervene in cases where it is apparent on the face of the record that an action has been filed mala fide to wreak private vengeance. But merely a complaint has been filed by a rival in politics or business would not make the complaint a mala fide complaint. The complaint need not be precise, what is required is the brief facts for which the accused is sought to be prosecuted. According to us it is too much to expect of a complainant to use technical words of a charging section in the complaint or to write the same in the light of the judgments of court which had dealt with similar cases earlier. According to us it is too much to expect of a complainant to use technical words of a charging section in the complaint or to write the same in the light of the judgments of court which had dealt with similar cases earlier. It is true that in order to avoid harassment to a citizen, if he has been charged for his vicarious liability, but the complaint on the face of it does not make any endeavour to establish such vicarious liability, the court may intervene, as any reasonable person would, when he finds that although the person so charged has not been linked with the crime in the complaint itself, he is being prosecuted. However, if on the face of the complaint, the vicarious liability of the accused is prima facie established, although it may not be sustainable at the end, if any decision is taken without trial, the same would tantamount to pre-judging the issue. ( 23 ) APPLYING these principles, we are of the view that in a case as at hand, the High Court should not at all interfere either under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Code. It cannot be said that the complaint does not ex facie disclose an offence. The charging section says that if a person, without reasonable cause, fails to deduct or after deducting, fails to pay the tax, as required by or under the provisions of Sub-section (9) of Section 80e or Chapter XVII-B, he shall be punishable. In the complaint it has been stated that accused No. 1, i. e. , the firm, during the accounting year ended on December 31, 1983, relevant to the assessment year 1984-85 had credited amounts of interest in the respective accounts of the creditors, but it had failed to deduct tax at source or to credit the same to the Central Government. It then stated that by not making the actual payment of tax deducted at source in favour of the Central Government in terms of the provisions of Chapter XVIII-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, within the stipulated time, the firm had committed an offence punishable under the subject charging section and that accused Nos. It then stated that by not making the actual payment of tax deducted at source in favour of the Central Government in terms of the provisions of Chapter XVIII-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, within the stipulated time, the firm had committed an offence punishable under the subject charging section and that accused Nos. 2 and 3 being managing partner and partner of accused No. 1 were responsible for the day-to-day business of accused No. 1 and, therefore, all the three accused are guilty of failure to deposit the tax deducted at source bringing their default within the purview of the charging section. The allegations so made cannot be said not ex facie to disclose an offence. It is, however, possible that, on accepting the legal arguments, the court trying the case at any later stage can come to a conclusion that the allegation so made on the facts do not disclose an offence, but that kind of argument cannot, we are of the view, be permitted to be made on a writ petition to stifle the prosecution at the threshold. It also cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence. It was urged that it was not alleged in the complaint itself that the failure as alleged were without reasonable cause or excuse and therefore, the very essential ingredient of the offence is absent. In the complaint as we have stated above, it was not necessary to repeat the technical words of the charging section. The rules of pleading as laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to complaints. Even if it was so required, we are of the view that after narrating the facts, which come squarely within the charging section, the complainant has alleged that the accused have committed an offence punishable under the charging section, which implies all ingredients of the charging section itself. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the initiation of the complaint against the partners is so bad that without any investigation, such initiation should be quashed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the initiation of the complaint against the partners is so bad that without any investigation, such initiation should be quashed. The words "partner" and "partnership" by the definition clause contained in Section 2 (23) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, mean the same thing as assigned to them in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, with the addition that the word "partner" includes any person, who being a minor, has been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. The word "person" for the purpose of the Income-tax Act has been included to mean an individual, a Hindu undivided family, a company, a firm, an association of persons, a local authority and every artificial juridical person. All such persons, but not an individual or a Hindu undivided family, are obliged, at the time of crediting interest on security to deduct income-tax at the rates in force and to pay the same to the Central Government. Such a person shall be the person himself and if it is a company it would include its principal officer. Then again the charging section refers to a person. It was urged before us that the word "person" in Section 276b, i. e. , the charging section, has to be read in harmony and in consonance with Sections 194a and 204 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was urged that Section 194a excludes individuals and therefore partners are not persons mentioned in the charging section. What the appellant sought to urge before us may be correct in law but to find out the accuracy of such submission, one has to venture into a very wide field of law governing the field. This kind of exercise, we are of the view should not be attempted to classify a case as rarest of the rare. The fact that the firm was responsible to pay and the fact that the firm has the same meaning as given in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, meaning thereby compendious mode of carrying on business by more than one person, it cannot, we are of the view, shock the conscience of a reasonable person, if partners along with the partnership firm are charged for having committed an offence by non-payment. There is nothing on record to show that the offence said to have been committed has been compounded. There is nothing on record to show that the offence said to have been committed has been compounded. Merely because payment of interest has been provided for in the Act, it cannot be said that instead of taking steps to recover such interest sanction has been mala fide accorded to prosecute. No enmity has been alleged in the writ petition. There is nothing to show that to wreak private vengeance the complaint was filed. No allegation to that effect has been made. ( 24 ) IN those circumstances, we dismiss the appeal but for reasons altogether different from those of the learned single judge. Before parting, we make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case as put forward before us, nor will the judgment of the learned single judge stand in the way of the learned magistrate to come to a different conclusion on the merits of the case or as to the manner in which the prosecution must proceed, or as to who has what onus and to what extent such onus is to be discharged as well as the manner of discharging the same. There shall be no order as to costs.