ORDER D.P.S. Chauhan, J. 1. The revision is directed against the order dt. 19.11.1996 passed on the application moved by the defendant saying that the suit has been satisfied under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevily hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). The Court rejected the application which was moved in Civil Suit No. 78-A/96. This order is challenged on the ground that the Court below has acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in view of the requirement of proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. 2. Though the facts for the purpose of controversy are not necessary, peripheral relevance in required. It is a case in which no issue was framed and no issue has come forward and the order was passed only on the application. Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code is extracted below: 3. Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so tar as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit; Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other than an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question: but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. [Explanation : An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.] 3. Learned counsel in support of his proposition submitted that the Court was bound to decide the question as to whether the suit has been adjusted or not by means of compromise and in this sequence first case relied on was M. Hussain v. Yusuf Husain A.I.R. 1956 All. Learned counsel in support of his proposition submitted that the Court was bound to decide the question as to whether the suit has been adjusted or not by means of compromise and in this sequence first case relied on was M. Hussain v. Yusuf Husain A.I.R. 1956 All. 121 and reliance was placed on paragraph 2. That case was under the provision when Rule 3 quoted supra, was not amended. The amendment took place any C.P.C. Amendment 1976. The amendment introduced the words "in writing and signed by parties", winch words were not available there. In the case relied on issue was framed as to whether there has been a lawful adjustment. On the issue the evidence was led. Here the position is just the different. In that suit the compromise was not filed and for not tiling the compromise the reason was that approval of other two plaintiffs to the compromise was not obtained. It is stated that all that remained to be done was the filing of the compromise on the date fixed. Both the parties admitted that there had been an adjustment but there was a difference with regard to the terms of the adjustment and on that basis the Court observed that it was the duty of the Court to find out what were the terms of the adjustment and the Court having found that the plaintiffs' allegations were correct, it was the duty of the Court to have passed a decree in terms of the compromise. The compromise was filed by the plaintiffs in that case and the argument of the respondents was that the defendant having foiled to sign the compromise which was written out the compromise did not become complete, and the defendant having relied from it the plaintiffs could not claim a decree on the basis of the compromise. The Court did not accept the contention of the respondents and said if the defendant has set up a false story about the terms of the compromise the story could be rejected. The compromise became a completed compromise an soon as the approval of the other two plaintiffs had been obtained to the compromise. Even if the defendant refused to sign the compromise, the compromise could be proved in Court and a decree be passed in terms of it. The compromise became a completed compromise an soon as the approval of the other two plaintiffs had been obtained to the compromise. Even if the defendant refused to sign the compromise, the compromise could be proved in Court and a decree be passed in terms of it. This case has no application now, firstly on account of the facts as stated above and secondly on account of the amendment, as has been stated. 4. Second case relied on was Bhaja Govinda Maikad v. Janki Devi A.I.R. 1980 Ori 108 and the learned counsel has placed reliance on paragraph 3, which contains the provision of Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code, as has been amended. In that case the Court relied on the words in Rule 3 "So far as it related to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit." The Court considered that if a party to a suit alleges that a suit has been adjusted by a lawful agreement and applied to be Court to record and agreement and to pass a decree in accordance therewith but the other party to the suit denies the agreement or wishes to resile from it the question arises whether the Court has power in the one case to decide if the agreement was effected and to pass a decree accordingly; and in the other case to pass a decree in spite of the other party's reluctance. A mention was there about the case of Bandhu Bhagat v. Shah Muhammad Teeju ILR (1892) 14 All. 350 wherein the Allahabad High Court had taken the view that unless parties to the compromise appeared before the Court and accepted the terms, at the moment of moving the Court, the Court had no jurisdiction to record the compromise. 5. Under the rule as amended the filing of the document is a must and it has to be in writing signed by both the parties. 6. Third case in the sequence relied on was of Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram A.I.R. 1957 All 820. In that case a decree on the basis of compromise was passed which decree was challenged by means of the revision on the ground of fraud that the plaintiffs son had persuaded him to sign the compromise by practising fraud and misrepresentation. Third case in the sequence relied on was of Laraiti Devi v. Sia Ram A.I.R. 1957 All 820. In that case a decree on the basis of compromise was passed which decree was challenged by means of the revision on the ground of fraud that the plaintiffs son had persuaded him to sign the compromise by practising fraud and misrepresentation. The facts and circumstances of that case were different and in the facts and circumstances of that case the Court held that when the factum of the compromise was itself disputed the Court was bound to go in to the question and to record a finding whether the compromise had in fact been arrived at or not. In that case the compromise was alleged to be fraudulent and was also. 7. In the present case there is no compromise on the record in writing and signed by the parties. 8. In view of above, I find no merit. Revision application is rejected. 9. Learned counsel thereafter without any material on the record of this Court submitted that the compromise was filed in the Court which was in writing and signed by both the parties. This fact cannot be relied on and the learned counsel states that he does not mean to say that the compromise was in writing and signed by the parties. 10. The order is maintained. Application dismissed