JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - In this appeal from jail, Kapila alias Pramod Mohapatra (hereinafter referred to as 'accused') questions legality of conviction for offence punishable under Sections 302 and 323 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'IPC') and consequential sentence of imprisonment for life and six months respectively as awarded by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sambalpur. Accused faced trial on the accusation of having committed triple murder and injury to one Kamala Naik (P.W.2) 2. In a nutshell, prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows: On 28.9.1990, in the morning hours at village Prabhasuni Gogua, accused dealt blows by spade on the head of one Madan Sahu, while latter was ploughing his field. Madan sustained severe head injuries and met an instantaneous death. Accused assaulted and dealt blows on the head of one Bijay Sahu who also met similar fate. When Kuni, another person who lost her life, and injured Kamala (P.W.2) and Rukmani Padhi (P.W.3) tried to intervene, accused attacked them by a lathi. At first, he dealt two blows on P.W.2 but she saved herself by jumping into a canal. As Kuni protested she was attacked and as a result of assault by lathi on her head, she also lost her life. The villagers caught hold of accused who made extrajudicial confession of his guilt before them. On the basis of information lodged at Deogarh P.S., investigation was undertaken and on completion thereof, charge sheet was placed. 3. Accused pleaded innocence. Though a specific plea was not taken, an alternative plea of his insanity surfaced. As indicated above, P.Ws. 2 and 3 were stated to be witnesses to the occurrence, while P.Ws. 1, 4 and 6 were post occurrence witnesses. Placing reliance on evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3, and extra-judicial confession before P.Ws. 4 and 6, learned trial Judge found accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. 4. In support of appeal, learned counsel for appellant submitted that evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 cannot be accepted as they were interested for the prosecution and they have not explained motive for killing. Alternatively, it was pleaded that a case for bringing in application of Section 84, IPC has been made out and learned trial Judge was not justified in discarding the plea. 5. Section 34 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. Alternatively, it was pleaded that a case for bringing in application of Section 84, IPC has been made out and learned trial Judge was not justified in discarding the plea. 5. Section 34 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. There is no definition of "unsoundness of mind" in the IPC. Courts have mainly created this expression as equivalent to "insanity". But the term "insanity" itself has no precise definition. It is a term used to describe varying degrees of mental disorder. So, every person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto exempted from criminal responsibility. A distinction is to be made between legal insanity and medical insanity. A Court is concerned with legal insanity and not with medical insanity. The burden of proof rests on accused to prove his insanity, which arises by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, 'Evidence Act') and is not so onerous as that upon the prosecution to prove that the accused committed the act with which he is charged. The burden on the accused is no higher than that resting upon a plaintiff or a defendant in a civil proceeding. {See Dayabhai. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 ). In dealing with cases involving a defence of insanity, distinction must be made between cases, in which insanity is more or less proved and the question is only as to the degree of irresponsibility, and cases, in which insanity is sought to be proved in respect of a person, who for all intents and purposes, appears same. In all case, where previous insanity is proved or admitted, certain considerations have to be borne in mind. Mayne summarises them as follows: "Whether there was deliberation and preparation for the acts whether it was done in a manner, which showed a desire to concealment; whether after the crime, the offender showed consciousness of guilt and efforts to avoid detection, whether, after this arrest, he offered false excuses and made false statements. All facts of this sort are material as bearing on the test, which Bromwell, J. submitted to a jury in such a case, would the prisoner have concealed the act if there had been a policeman at has elbow?' It is to be remembered that these tests are good for cases in which previous insanity is more or less established. All facts of this sort are material as bearing on the test, which Bromwell, J. submitted to a jury in such a case, would the prisoner have concealed the act if there had been a policeman at has elbow?' It is to be remembered that these tests are good for cases in which previous insanity is more or less established. These tests are not always reliable where there is, what Mayne calls, 'inferential insanity'. 6. Under Section 84, a person is exonerated from liability for doing an act on the ground of unsoundness of mind if he. at the time of doing the act, it either incapable of knowing (a) the nature of the act, or (b) that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The accused is protected not only when, on account of insanity, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, but also when he did not know either that the act was wrong or that it was contrary to law, although he might know the nature of the act itself. He is, however, not protected if he knew that what he was doing was wrong, even if he did not know that it was contrary to law, even though he did not know that it was wrong. The onus of proving unsoundness of mind is, as stated above, on the accused. But where during the investigation previous history of insanity is revealed, it is the duty of honest investigation to subject the accused to a medical examination and place that evidence before the Court and if this is not done, it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution case and the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused. The onus, however has to be discharged by producing evidence as to the conduct of the accused shortly prior to the offence and his conduct at the time or immediately afterwards, also by evidence of his mental condition and other relevant factors. Every person is presumed to know the natural consequences of his act. Similarly every person is also presumed to know the law. The prosecution has not to establish these facts. 7. Every person is presumed to know the natural consequences of his act. Similarly every person is also presumed to know the law. The prosecution has not to establish these facts. 7. There are four kinds of persons who may be said to be non compos mantia (not of sound mind) i.e. (1) an idiot; (2) one made non compos by illness (3) a lunatic or a mad man; and (4) one who is drunk. An idiot is one who is of non-sane memory from birth, by a perpetual infirmity, without lucid intervals, and those are said to be idiots who cannot count twenty, or tell the days of the week, or who do not know their fathers or mothers, or the like. {See Archbold's Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice'. 35th Edn. pp. 31-32, Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanours, 12 Edn. Vol.2, p. 105; 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown 34). A person made non compos mantia by illness is excused in criminal cases from such acts as are committed while under the influence of his disorder. (See Hale F.C. 30) A lunatic is one who is afflicted by mental disorder only at certain periods and vicissitudes, having intervals of reason. (See Russell 12th Edn. Vol. 1, p.103, 2 Hale FC 31). Madness is permanent. Lunacy and madness are spoken of as acquired insanity, and idiocy as natural insanity. 8. Section 84 embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law, i.e. "actus men facit reve misi mens sit rea" (as an act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention). In order to constitute an offence, the intent and act must convey; but in the case of insane persons, no capability is fastened on them as they have no free will (fusiosis nulla voluntes est). 9. The Section itself provides that the benefit is available only after it is proved that at the time of committing the act, the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The crucial point of time for deciding whether the benefit of this Section should be given or not is the material time when the offence takes place. The crucial point of time for deciding whether the benefit of this Section should be given or not is the material time when the offence takes place. If at that moment a man is found to be labouring under such a defect of reason as not to know the measure of the act he was doing or that, even if he knew it, he did not know it was either wrong or contrary to law, then this Section must be applied. In coming to that conclusion, the relevant circumstances are to be taken into consideration. It would be dangerous to acquit on the defence of insanity upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime. It is only unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground of exempting from criminal responsibility. Stephen in "History of the Criminal Law of England" (Vol. II. page 166) has observed that if a person cuts off the head a sleeping man because, 'it would be great fun to see him looking for it when he woke up", it would obviously be a case where the perpetrator of the act would be incapable of knowing the physical effects of his act. The law recognises nothing but incapacity to realise the nature of the act and presumes that where a man's mind or his faculties of ratiocination are sufficiently clear to apprehend what he is doing, he must always be presumed to intend the consequences of the action he takes. Mere absence of motive for a crime, however atrocious it may be, cannot, in the absence of plea and proof of legal insanity, bring the case within this Section. The Supreme Court in Sheralliwalli Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra 1972 Cr. L 1523(SC), held that the mere fact that no motive has been proved why the accused murdered his wife and child or the Tact that he made no attempt to run away when the door was broken open would not indicate that he was insane or that he did not have the necessary means for the offence. Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of psychopath affords no protection under Section 84 as the law contained in that Section is still squarely based on the outdated M' Nanghton rules of 19th Century England. Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of psychopath affords no protection under Section 84 as the law contained in that Section is still squarely based on the outdated M' Nanghton rules of 19th Century England. The provisions of Section 84 are in substance the same as that laid down in the answers of the Judges to the questions put to them by the House of Lords in M' Nanghton's Case. (1843)-4 St. Tr. (NS) 847. In Sidheswari Dora v. The State of Assam: 1981 Cr LJ 1005, a Bench of Gauhati High Court where the accused killed her ailing child of three and there was also some evidence elicited in cross-examination to show that the accused had suffered from some mental derangement two years prior to the incident, it was held that the mere fact that the murder was committed on a sudden impulse or as a mercy killing was no ground to give her the benefit of Section 84, IPC, even though both euthanasia (mercy killing) and irresistible impulse would entitle the accused in England to get the benefit of diminished responsibility and her crime would be treated as manslaughter (i.e. culpable homicide no amounting to murder). In a latter case, the same High Court felt that where the accused has made out a prime facie case of irresistible impulse the plea has to be taken into consideration in deciding the question of giving benefit of Section 84 (See State of Assam v. Inusheli: 1982 Cr LJ 1044). However, the position has undergone a sea-change in England after enactment of Homicide Act, 1957. We hope that legislative change would he brought in with due regard to the far-reaching advancements in the field of psychology of criminal behaviour. Behaviour, antecedent, attendant and subsequent, to the event, may be relevant in finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of event, but not that remote in time. It is difficult to prove the precise state of the offender's mind at the time of the commission of the offence, but some indication thereof is often furnished by the conduct of the offender while committing it or immediately after the commission of the offence. It is difficult to prove the precise state of the offender's mind at the time of the commission of the offence, but some indication thereof is often furnished by the conduct of the offender while committing it or immediately after the commission of the offence. A lucid interval of an insane person is not merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, but a restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficient to enable to person soundly to judge to acts, but the expression does not necessarily mean complete or perfect restoration of the mental faculties to their original condition. So, if there is such a restoration, the person concerned can do the act with such reason, memory and judgment as to make it a legal act; but merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder is not sufficient. The standard to be applied is whether according to the ordinary standard, adopted by reasonable man, the act was right or wrong. The mere fact that an accused is conceited, odd and his brain is not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and had affected his emotions and will, or that he had committed certain unusual acts, in the past or that he was liable to recurring fits of insanity at short intervals, or that he was subject to getting epileptic fits but there was nothing abnormal in his behaviour, or that his behaviour was quiet, cannot be sufficient to attract the application of Section 84 IPC. 10. Reference has been made by learned counsel for accused to certain statements made by PWs. 1 and 6 about treatments undergone by accused for mental degradation and instability. Learned trial Judge has referred to evidence of PWs. 1 and 18, and observed that sometime in 1985 accused had undergone some treatment. According to him, this statement in no way helps the accused. The accused at the relevant point of time of occurrence was serving as Government employee. A bare reading of Section 84 makes it clear that at the time of committing act which constitutes an offence the person by reason of unsoundness of mind is incapable of knowing nature of the act or that he is doing either wrong or contrary to law. A bare reading of Section 84 makes it clear that at the time of committing act which constitutes an offence the person by reason of unsoundness of mind is incapable of knowing nature of the act or that he is doing either wrong or contrary to law. Even if it is accepted that antecedent facts show some abnormal conduct for which accused was undergoing treatment, that does not per se bring in application of Section 84, IPC. It was pointed by learned counsel for accused that during trial, accused wanted to commit suicide and that is indicative of his insanity. Even if there was any such attempt, that does not establish that at the point of time, the felonious act was committed there was unsoundness of mind. The plea of insanity has teen rightly rejected by learned trial Judge. 11. Analysis made by learned trial Judge relating to evidence of witnesses does not suffer from any infirmity. We find no justification to interfere with conviction recorded and sentence as awarded. Learned counsel for accused submitted that the fact that accused wanted to commit suicide while in custody during trial to show that his mental condition is not in order. While upholding conviction and sentence, we direct that the Doctor attached to jail where accused is presently lodged shall examine himself to find out whether he needs any treatment for instability of mind. If it is felt that better treatment is necessary, he may be treated at the V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital, Burla and for that purpose if necessary, he may be kept in Sambalpur Jail. In that event, he shall be kept for treatment till the Doctor is satisfied that he is mentally fit, or till he is released by order of competent authority or Court. It is open to appellant or any relatives of his to move appropriate authority for continuance of treatment till he is certified to be mentally fit after release. 12. The appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid observations and direction. S.C. Dutta, J. - I agree. Final Result : Dismissed