Judgment B. S. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS contempt petition was heard along with the main writ petition No. 198/94 as being linked with the said writ petition. The opposite party No. 1 had filed an F. I. R. against petitioners on 29-3-1992 and on her request, the Deputy Secretary, Home, passed an order dated 14-10-1993 to transfer the investigation from one officer to another. However, the said order was not given effect to and the police report was filed before the competent Court, by the Investigation Officer, who had been restrained to investigate vide order dated 14-10-93. However, the same was rejected by the Court vide order dated 26-10-1993 which directed another officer to investigate the case as per earlier order dated 14-10-1993. Order dated 26-10-1993 was also not complied with. The competent criminal Court issued proceedings for contempt vide order dated 30-3-1994. Applicants filed writ petition No. 198/1994 wherein by way of passing an interim order dated 10-5-1994 this Court stayed operation of orders dated 14-10-1993, 26-10-1993 and 30-3-1994 till further orders. ( 2 ) THE non-petitioner No. 1 filed another F. I. R. on 30-3-1995 as contained in Annexure R1/2 to this petition. Newspapers, namely, "teesra Prahar" and " Punjab Kesri" whereof non-petitioners Nos. 4 and 5 are the editors, published the news about lodging of the said F. I. R. on 4-4-1995. The instant contempt petition has been filed on the basis that the said F. I. R. has been lodged to circumvent the interim order dated 10-5-1994 and it amounts to interference with the administration of justice and, relief sought in this petition is that the proceedings be quashed and investigation be stayed. ( 3 ) IN reply to this petition, the non-applicants Nos. 4 and 5 i. e. Sri Raj Kumar Vyas and Sri Vijay Kumar, came forward with a plain and simple defence that they are the editors of newspapers and their correspondents had sent them the news after verifying it from the police station and they published it in good faith. They were not aware of the earlier proceedings and the Court order. The news was published in a routine manner and no ulterior motive can be attributed to them and there was no wilful defiance of any order of the Court by them. They were not aware of the earlier proceedings and the Court order. The news was published in a routine manner and no ulterior motive can be attributed to them and there was no wilful defiance of any order of the Court by them. They also stated that had they been aware of earlier Court proceedings, they could not have published the said news and they also tendered their absolute and unconditional apology. ( 4 ) NON-APPLICANT No. 1 filed a detailed reply, taking two defences; Firstly, that she had filed an application under clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution on 6-4-1995 after serving copy of the same on the counsel for the applicants and the order dated 10-5-1994 has not been extended after 6-4-1995, the interim order passed earlier ceased to be effective after a lapse of 14 days from the date of filing the application on 6-4-1995. Secondly, the new F. I. R. was regarding fabrication of the photograph and circulating the same for the purpose of defaming her and prejudicing her case. As the F. I. R. was based on completely new facts/ allegations it has nothing to do with the charges/allegations, in regard of which proceedings are pending in this Court. ( 5 ) NON-APPLICANT No. 3 filed the reply stating that on receiving the complaint on 29-3-1995, S. H. O. made on endorsement on the report that a criminal case involving the same facts and already been investigated and no inquiry/investigation was made on the said report. Thus, question of violation of the order dated 10-5-94 does not arise. ( 6 ) TAKING into consideration the defence adopted by non-applicants Nos. 4 and 5, we are of the considered opinion that applicants could not make any good ground for punishing the said non-applicants Nos. 4 and 5 for publishing the news in their newspapers as there is no material on record to establish that they had done it in wilful defiance of any order of this Court. Moreover, it has neither been alleged nor pleaded that the said non-applicants were holding a parallel trial. No reference was made to the earlier proceedings in the news. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any grave and mischievous tendency to publish the news. The act in order to be contumacious should be so grave, that it warrants punishing the wrongdoer. No reference was made to the earlier proceedings in the news. Thus, it cannot be said that there was any grave and mischievous tendency to publish the news. The act in order to be contumacious should be so grave, that it warrants punishing the wrongdoer. Therefore, we are of the view that the said publication does not fall in the category, which comes in the ambit of criminal contempt. ( 7 ) SIMILARLY, non-applicant No. 3 was under obligation to receive the complaint and consider whether it was worth investigation. After examining the contents of the complaint, he reached the conclusion that on similar allegations, an investigation had been made earlier and matter was subjudice. No investigation was made and, therefore, he is also not liable to be punished. ( 8 ) NOW, we examine the case against non-applicants Nos. 1 and 2. Their first defence is that as application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution was not heard and taken up by the Court, the interim order dated 10-5-1994 came to an end automatically after a lapse of 14 days from 6-4-1995 i. e. the date of filing of the application. Sub-clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution provides that if an interim order has been passed without giving an opportunity of being heard to the other side and the said party makes an application to the Court to vacate the interim order, the Court should dispose of such application within two weeks from the date of its filing and if such application is not disposed of in the said stipulated period, the interim order shall stand vacated automatically on expiry of said stipulated period. ( 9 ) ISSUE involved herein came up for consideration before the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Kumar Agarwal v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1991 Cal 272 and after examining the entire scheme of the amendment Act of the Constitution, the Court came to the conclusion that the provisions are mandatory and if the application for vacation of interim order is not disposed of within the stipulated period, the ex parte interim order shall automatically stand vacated. However, the Court further held that there is nothing in the constitutional provisions which prevents the Court to grant an interim order afresh after hearing the parties, if there are sufficient grounds to pass such fresh order. However, the Court further held that there is nothing in the constitutional provisions which prevents the Court to grant an interim order afresh after hearing the parties, if there are sufficient grounds to pass such fresh order. The Court further observed that interpreting the said provisions of the Constitution as directory would be contrary to the intent of the legislature and the plain language of the statute does not suggest it. The Court observed as under at page 275 :-". . . Interpreting the provision of the Constitution, inserted by a careful amendment thereof almost after three decades of the working of the Constitution and I must not construe any such provision as to render that provision almost meaningless with such clear word, staring at the face categorically providing for the consequences of non-compliance and enjoining that the interim order. . . shall stand vacated. " ( 10 ) THE Court has further compared it with the provisions of Rule 3-A of Order 39 of Code of Civil Procedure inserted by the amendment Act of 1976 which provides that where an ex parte injunction is granted, the Court is duty bound to dispose of the application of interim relief within thirty days and if it is not so heard, the Court is under obligation to record the reasons for such inability. As the legislature did not put any such similar provision in clause (3) of Article 226 and provides for a clear, specific categorical direction for automatic vacation of an ex parte interim order, it leaves an inescapable conclusion that the provisions of Article 226 (3) are mandatory. ( 11 ) IN Gheesa Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1981 Raj 65 , the same provision was held by this Court to be mandatory. The Court further observed as under - that the said provision is mandatory as the Court has observed as follows at page 66 :-"it is obvious that the intention of keeping the provisions for automatic vacation of such order. . . is that the party who obtains an ex parte stay order should not be allowed to abuse or misuse the process of the Court by proceeding in a leisurely manner. . . . . is that the party who obtains an ex parte stay order should not be allowed to abuse or misuse the process of the Court by proceeding in a leisurely manner. . . in case, after obtaining ex parte stay order petitioner fails to discharge his duty and prolongs ex parte stay order either by non-service on the respondents or by not taking active steps to get the case listed in Court, he can do so at his own peril. " ( 12 ) THE Court further observed that it is the solemn duty of the party obtaining the interim order also to take steps to get the matter listed immediately after filing of the stay vacation application. In Committee of Management of Shri Maheshwari Inter College v. State of U. P. , (1994) 1 UPLBEC 63. Allahabad High Court examined the rules of Chapter XXII of Part IV of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1956 which provides for considering the stay vacation application, and came to the conclusion that the object behind this procedural safeguard is to ensure that an ex-parte order passed behind the back of the opposite party, remains subject to the exception contained in the second proviso of Rule 1 of Chapter XXII of the said rules, which is pari materia of Clause (3) of Article 226, the Constitution of India and the said rules have been framed in consonance with the provisions of said clause (3) and inserted by amending the said Rules in 1981. It has further been observed therein that the provisions are mandatory in character. ( 13 ) THE same view was reiterated by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Ashish Ram v. Security Officer, 1991 (18) ALR 24. ( 14 ) WHILE determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory, in addition to the language used therein, the Court has to examine the context in which the provision is used and the purpose it seeks to achieve. It may also be necessary to find out the intent of the legislature for enacting it and the serious and general inconveniences or injustice to persons relating thereto from its application. It may also be necessary to find out the intent of the legislature for enacting it and the serious and general inconveniences or injustice to persons relating thereto from its application. The provision is mandatory if it is passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something and prescribes the formalities for doing certain things (vide Raza Buland Sugar Company Ltd. v. Municipal Board, AIR 1965 SC 895 ; and State of Haryana v. Raghuvir Dayal, 1995 (1) SCC 133 ). ( 15 ) IN view of the above, the provisions under consideration are mandatory in nature and strict adherence has to be observed to these provisions. ( 16 ) IN State of J and K v. Mohammed Yakub Khan, (1992) 4 SCC 167 , the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under :-"the High Court should have first taken up the stay matter without any threat to the respondents in the writ case of being punished for contempt. Only after disposing it of, the other cases should have been taken up. " ( 17 ) MEANING thereby, that so long as the ex parte stay matter in the writ proceedings is not finally disposed of, initiation of contempt proceedings itself will be misconceived. ( 18 ) BUT such a party is under obligation to approach the Court within reasonable time from the date of notice to it; if the stay vacation application is filed in a leisurely manner, the party cannot claim that "interim order stands automatically vacated by operation of law as it would amount to giving such a party premium for its non-action within a reasonable period and the very purpose for which the provision has been enacted, would stand frustrated. ( 19 ) IN the instant case, the interim relief was granted on 10-5-1994 and the application under Article 226 (3) was filed on 6-4-1995. It is not the case of these non-applicants that they were not aware of the interim order from the very beginning. In reply to the affidavit by these non-petitioners the applicants have stated that the order dated 10-5-94 was passed after hearing them. However, the record does not support it. Therefore, the first plea is preposterous and has no substance. They can not press the provisions of Article 226 (3) in their defence. In order to examine the worth of their second plea, we examined and compared both the complaints. However, the record does not support it. Therefore, the first plea is preposterous and has no substance. They can not press the provisions of Article 226 (3) in their defence. In order to examine the worth of their second plea, we examined and compared both the complaints. First complaint dated 29-3-92 mainly contain allegations regarding demand of dowry and misbehaviour. Second complaint dated 4-4-95 contains only four paragraphs. In its first para, the complainant has disclosed her relationship with applicants. Second paragraph reveals the details of her first complaint dated 23-3-1992 and pendency of investigation and the case in criminal Court. Third para contains allegations of defaming her by accusation of having illicit relationship with one Raja Ram Tailor and forging the photographs showing her in idecent poses with one Rajendra Singh Chauhan and circulation of the same. Fourth paragraph contains her allegation of preparing a book-let entitled Usha Rani v. Madho Singh and circulation of the same in the society and in Court premises. Undoubtedly, these allegations were not there in the earlier complaint. It has certainly not been alleged by her in second complaint that there was any demand of dowry after lodging the first complaint. It is worth taking note of that she has not concealed the factum of earlier complaint and investigation pending thereon. Taking all the facts and circumstances, into account, it becomes very much doubtful, whether lodging the second complaint tantamounts to circumventing this Courts order dated 10-5-1994. Whether the photo-graphs are genuine or not, is a matter of investigation. No doubt, the said photographs had been examined by the investigation Officer but no body has considered the genuineness of the same. ( 20 ) CONTEMPT proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and where there is any reasonable doubt, the non-applicants are entitled to benefit of such doubt. In contempt proceedings, all the principles of criminal jurisprudence are applicable. The only departure which is permissible is that the procedure applicable in the criminal law is not to be strictly followed and all that is necessary is that a fair procedure is to be adopted. The alleged contemnor should be aware of the charge against him and he should be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. However, it is settled law that the contempt proceedings cannot be permitted to be used by any one as a "legal thumb screw" against the other party. The alleged contemnor should be aware of the charge against him and he should be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. However, it is settled law that the contempt proceedings cannot be permitted to be used by any one as a "legal thumb screw" against the other party. The contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked to wreck personal vengeance against the alleged contemners. The proceedings should be used under circumspection and only in a case where a party proves it beyond reasonable doubt, it further requires the exercise of such jurisdiction with scrupulous care and it can be exercised only in a crystal clear case. Vide R. v. Bray, 1902 (2) QB 36; Homi Rustam G. Pardiawala v. Sub-Inspector, Baig, AIR 1941 Lahore 196 (sic); Shri Bradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar of High Court, AIR 1974 SC 710 : (1974 Cri LJ 631); Abdul Razak Shahid v. M. S. Ajijwnnisha Begum, AIR 1970 Mad 14 : (1970 Cri LJ 55); Debabrata Bandopadhyaya v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 189 : (1969 Cri LJ 401); B. K. Kar v. Honble the Chief Justice and his other Companions of Orissa High Court, AIR 1961 SC 1367 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 438); M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 127 : (1988 Cri LJ 396) and N. C. Das v. M. A. Mohsin and another. ( 21 ) THUS, in totality of the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the applicants failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the non-applicants have tried to circumvent the order of this Court dated 10-5-1994. ( 22 ) IT may also be relevant to point out that in this contempt petition, the applicants have sought the quashing of the proceedings and stay of investigation in regard to the allegations made in the subsequent complaint. This is something unusual, as in such a case the applicants ought to have filed a fresh writ petition for quashing of such proceedings. The contempt law cannot be resorted to seek such reliefs. This petition has been filed to achieve an ulterior goal by such oblique manner. ( 23 ) THE petition is totally misconceived and fails accordingly. The notices stand discharged. Petition dismissed.