Judgment : 1. The defendants who lost before both the courts below are the appellants. The respondent filed suit O.S.No.1068 of 1978 before the District Munsif, Sattur, for declaration and injunction and for recovery of compensation of Rs.400, alleging as follows: The suit property was Muthulasha Sahib Thaikkal and the vacant site belonged to the said Thaikkal Trust. The respondent was the trustee and in management and control of the trust. The Government had given a grant under title deed No.531 of 1866. Every year in the month of Dulhaitha, Santhanakudu and flags hoisting ceremony and other connected religious functions would be conducted in the suit property in the Thaikkal, where a great Muslim saint was interred. The property lay to the North of the first appellant Pallivasal. The first appellant Pallivasal was quite distinct and separate from the Thaikkal. Both were having separate title deeds and were managed by different persons. The trustees of both the Pallivasal and the Thaikkal were relations. Therefore, a compound wall was raised surrounding both the properties, viz., the Mosque and the Thaikkal. But, there were separate gates and entrances for both the properties. The suit property had been in the possession and enjoyment of the respondent and his ancestors from time immemorial. The property was also used as a burial ground for the members of the family of the respondent. The respondents great grandfather was a trustee and after his life time his son was the trustee followed by the respondents father. In the year 1959 when the respondents father was the trustee, one Subbiah Thevar trespassed into the suit property and put up a fuel wood shop. The respondents father filed suit O.S.No.5 of 1959 before the Principal District Munsifs Court, Sattur, for eviction and damages. The said Subbiah Thevar produced a document purporting to be a lease deed executed by the then trustee of the first appellant in his favour. The respondents father withdrew the said suit with liberty to file a fresh suit with necessary parties. He filed another suit in O.S.No.87 of 1960 impleading the then trustee of the first appellant Pallivasal along with the said Subbiah Thevar. The suit ended in a decree. Subsequently, on 20.7.1962 the respondents father leased out a portion of the suit property to one Ammena Bevi. He filed another suit in O.S.No.87 of 1960 impleading the then trustee of the first appellant Pallivasal along with the said Subbiah Thevar. The suit ended in a decree. Subsequently, on 20.7.1962 the respondents father leased out a portion of the suit property to one Ammena Bevi. The Suit property was assigned Door No.42 by the Municipality and the door number given to the first appellant Mosque and other buildings was different. In view of the decision in O.S.No.87 of 1960, the first appellant could not claim any right. There were 11 vagai trees in the suit property. The second appellant was the trustee at the time of the filing of the suit he acting on behalf of the first appellant, cut and removed the branches of the trees and sold the same of Rs.400. The respondent gave a police complaint to Sivakasi Police, who advised the respondent to file a civil suit. The suit was therefore instituted. 2. The first appellant filed a written statement and an additional written statement and they were adopted by the second appellant. The contents of the same were as follows: The description of the property in the plaint was not correct. The respondent was not a trustee of the Thaikkal Trust and he was not entitled to sue. He should prove the existence of such a trust. The inams granted had been resumed by the Government. It was not correct to state that the suit property was granted to the said trust in 1866 under title deed No.531. It was granted only to Muthulla Sahib Mosque. There was no list of properties granted with details of survey number or extent. There was no document of title in favour of the respondent with regard to the suit property. The ceremonies referred to in the plaint were conducted by the Muslim Community and not by the trust. The first appellant Pallivasal was managing the entire property including the suit property for several decades. The respondent was a member of the first appellants jamath. The pallivasal raised a compound wall surrounding the Mosque and the tomb in 1924 and there were a common pathway and entrances and there were no separate gateways and entrances. The first appellant Pallivasal had provided electric light for the tomb and the charges were paid only by the Pallivasal. The compound wall was raised by the Pallivasal at its expense. The first appellant Pallivasal had provided electric light for the tomb and the charges were paid only by the Pallivasal. The compound wall was raised by the Pallivasal at its expense. There was no diving fence demarcating the properties. The suit property was always in favour of the first appellant Pallivasal. The suits O.S.Nos.5 of 1959 and 87 of 1960 were not known to the first appellant. There was no lease to Ammena Bevi on 20.7.1962. The suit property was not in Door No.41 and Door No.41 was not assigned in the name of Muthulasha Sahib Thaikkal. Pallivasal was not a party to the suit O.S.No.87 of 1960. There was no question of res judicata. The trees belonged to the Pallivasal and each year the trustee of the Pallivasal used to cut the branches and sell them. The report to the Police had been done falsely by the respondent. There was a water tank and the leaves used to fall in the water tank and the branches therefore had to be cut every year. The suit property was worth Rs.40,000 and the Munsif Court, Sattur, had no jurisdiction and the court fee paid was not correct. Under the Wakf Act no suit could be filed without agitating before the Wakf Board or impleading the Board in the suit. The suit was not maintainable under the Wakf Act, 1954. No measurement had been given by the respondent nor pymash number or devadaya number of survey number. No details had been given for the creation of the trust. The suit property was included in O.S.No.76 of 1988 and that suit ended in favour of the jamath. The suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 3. The learned Principal District Munsif, framed appropriate issues and found that the Munsif Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, that the court fee paid was correct, that Muthulasha Sahib Thaikkal Trust had title to the suit property that the respondent was in possession of the suit property and that he was a trustee and entitled to sue. The learned District Munsif, had also found that there was no evidence to show that the suit property was a Wakf Property and Sec.6 of the Wakf Act had no application to the facts of the case and therefore no notice under Sec.57 of the Wakf Act was necessary. The learned District Munsif, had also found that there was no evidence to show that the suit property was a Wakf Property and Sec.6 of the Wakf Act had no application to the facts of the case and therefore no notice under Sec.57 of the Wakf Act was necessary. He also held that the decision in O.S.No.87 of 1960 would not operate as res judicata and bind the first appellant. The respondent was also entitled to compensation of Rs.400. So holding the learned District Munsif decree the suit as prayed for by his judgment and decree dated 28.1.1982. 4. On appeal by the appellants in A.S.No.33 of 1982 to the Subordinate Judges Court, Srivilliputhur, the learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment and decree dated 22.6.1983 confirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved the present second appeal has been filed. 5. At the time of admission of the second appeal the following substantial questions of law were framed for consideration: (1) Whether the plaintiff could claim title on the basis of title deed No.531 dated 10.4.1866 when the same has been resumed by proceedings of the Board of Revenue as early as 1980e (2) Whether the plaintiff could claim title to the plaintiff schedule property when they have not questioned Gazette Notification in 1959 under Sec.6(1) of the Act. and (3) Whether the list of Wakfs published under Sec.5(l) of the Wakf Act has become final and conclusive. The appellants have also filed an application under O.41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for reception of additional documents. The documents sought to be filed are: (1) Xerox copy of the extract of the Inams ‘B’ register, and (2) patta (original) relating to T.S.No.90 and T.S.No.91 Sivakasi. In support of the application for reception of additional documents, in paragraphs 5 and 6 it is stated as follows: “5. Though I have pleaded in the written statement in the suit that title deed 531 has been resumed, I could not get an authenticated copy of the proceedings. I have now got a true copy of the Inam ‘B’ Registrar which would show that the same has been resumed as per proceedings B.P.No.466, dated 10.2.1934 and R.Dis.No.2679/ 30, dated 3.3.1981 and I crave leave to file the same as additional document which would prove that the plaintiff had absolutely no title to the property. I have now got a true copy of the Inam ‘B’ Registrar which would show that the same has been resumed as per proceedings B.P.No.466, dated 10.2.1934 and R.Dis.No.2679/ 30, dated 3.3.1981 and I crave leave to file the same as additional document which would prove that the plaintiff had absolutely no title to the property. I state that I have also obtained patta from the Settlement Authorities, Sivakasi, and I crave leave to file the same also as an additional document. 6.I state that the above documents could not be obtained at the trial of the suit or at the appellant stage and as such I could not file the same. A perusal of the same would clearly show that the title to the property belongs only to the Mosque and that the Muthulla Sha Thaikkal has absolutely no title to the suit property and if the documents filed herewith are not received as additional documents, the appellants would be put to irreparable loss and hardship and the valuable property attached to the Mosque would be taken away by an individual for his personal requirements.” 6. A counter has been filed and in paragraph 5 it is stated as follows: “As regards the allegations in paragraphs Nos.5 and 6 of the second petitioners affidavit, I respectfully state that the petitioners have not made out a case for the production of additional evidence at this stage. Admittedly the petitioners have not been able to produce any authenticated copy of Inam ‘B’ Register. The other documents are also of no significance since the Muthulla Sha Saheb Trust had in any event perfected its title to the property long prior to institution of the suit by being in exclusive possession and enjoyment of it as part of the Thaikka ever since 1866. The petitioners are not entitled to file some new and unauthenticated documents as additional evidence at this belated stage and that too without any proof about their truth and genuineness.” 7. The petitioners are not entitled to file some new and unauthenticated documents as additional evidence at this belated stage and that too without any proof about their truth and genuineness.” 7. So far as the application for reception of additional evidence is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellants relies on the decision in Inderam Mansaram and another v. Ramdin Bhagwan Prasad and others Inderam Mansaram and another v. Ramdin Bhagwan Prasad and others Inderam Mansaram and another v. Ramdin Bhagwan Prasad and others , A.I.R. 1961.M.P. 200 and submits that additional evidence can be admitted by appellate court to do complete justice between parties. In Arjanasingh v. Kartarsingh Arjanasingh v. Kartarsingh Arjanasingh v. Kartarsingh, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 193 referred to in the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “The discretion to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one, but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitation specified in O.41, Rule 27, C.P.C. If the additional evidence was allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it would be a case of improper exercise of discretion and the additional evidence so brought on the record would have to be ignored and the case decided as if it was non-existent.” Unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent while examining the evidence as it stands, then that would be a legitimate occasion for the application of the rule regarding reception of additional evidence under O.41, Rule 27. The true test is therefore whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration on the additional evidence sought to be adduced. 8. Absolutely no allegation is found in the affidavit in support of the application as to why those documents were not produced before the trial court or the lower appellate court. Even the basic requirements as set out in the provision, viz., O.41, Rule 27 are absent in the affidavit. The first of the documents sought to be produced purports to be a xerox copy of the Inam ‘B’ register. In the absence of production of the Original, it cannot be taken into consideration. So far as the patta is concerned, it has been obtained after the suit. The first of the documents sought to be produced purports to be a xerox copy of the Inam ‘B’ register. In the absence of production of the Original, it cannot be taken into consideration. So far as the patta is concerned, it has been obtained after the suit. In the circumstances, I am of the clear view that no case has been made out for reception of additional evidence at the stage of the second appeal. Having regard to the materials on record, the documents sought to be produced will not in any way advanced the case of the appellants. 9. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that Ex.B-1, dated 22.1.1979 which is a certified copy of the proforma issued by the Secretary, Tamil Nadu Wakf Board, Madras, has not been taken into consideration by the courts below and if it had been done by the courts below, it would have clearly established the case of the appellants. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that Ex.B-1 is after the suit and no reliance at all can be placed on the same. The courts below have adverted to Ex.B-1 and in fact the trial court has referred to the admission made by the second appellant as D.W.I that in Ex.B-1 there was a clear recital to the effect that the respondent was the trustee of Muthullasha Sahib Thaikkal and that Thaikkal was a separate entity and the inamdhar was the respondents father. Apart from Ex.B-1, the courts below have adverted to the several documents relied on by the respondent and come to the conclusion that the suit property belonged to Muthulasha Sahib Thaikkal under an Inam Grant and that the first appellant Mosque had nothing to do with the Thaikkal. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that there were resumption proceedings in the year 1930. May be there were resumption proceedings, but there was absolutely no material to show that pursuant to the resumption proceedings, the respondent lost possession of the property at any time. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that there were resumption proceedings in the year 1930. May be there were resumption proceedings, but there was absolutely no material to show that pursuant to the resumption proceedings, the respondent lost possession of the property at any time. It is also to be noted as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that no proceedings had been taken under Sec.43 of the Wakf Act, 1954 and in these circumstances, even assuming that the property belonged to a Wakf, still since the appellants have no right or claim with regard to the suit property, the courts below were perfectly justified in accepting the case of the respondent. The decision of the courts below has been reached on an appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and sitting in second appeal it is not open to this Court to interfere with a concurrent finding of fact. 10. In the result, the substantial questions of law are answered against the appellants and the second appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.