T. E. Haja Maideen v. Moona Abdul Latif — 1997 DIGILAW 1360 (MAD)

Judgment : 1. The petitioners obtained a decree in Originating Summons No.238 of 1984 of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore, and they filed E.P.No.1 of 1989, on the file of the District Court, East Thanjavur at Nagapattinam, to execute the same. The lower court dismissed the same finding that the alleged order to be executed is not a final order, that the petitioners have not obtained any permission from the Reserve Bank of India as required under Secs.26(6) and 47(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and that the alleged decree had been superseded. Aggrieved against the same, the petitioners have filed the above revision. 2. On the basis of the ‘order for leave’, on the file of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore in Oringinating Summons No.238 of 1984 dated 2.4.1984, in which it was ordered that “pursuant to Sec.20 of the Arbitration Act (Chapter 16), the plaintiffs be at liberty to enforce the award of M/ s.M.Momamoo, S.K.Jafer, T.A.Aminullah, K.Hammed Ghouse Maricar and Al Chidambaram for payment of $80,747,13 in the same manner as judgment or order to the same effect; and mat the costs of the application and of any judgment which may be entered hereunder be taxed and paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs.” 3. In the said order, the defendant, Moona Abdul Latif was given 14 days time after the service of me Order to apply to set aside the order and it is further directed that the award shall not be enforced until after the expiration of that period or he applied within that period to set aside the order, or until after the application is finally disposed of. Thereafter on 16.1.1985 the plaintiffs filed an affidavit before the High Court of the Republic of Singapore to the effect that me defendant has not made any application to set aside the order even after the expiration of the said period of 14 days from 2.4.1984 and that the estimated cost was $12,000.00. 4. Thereafter on 16.1.1985 the plaintiffs filed an affidavit before the High Court of the Republic of Singapore to the effect that me defendant has not made any application to set aside the order even after the expiration of the said period of 14 days from 2.4.1984 and that the estimated cost was $12,000.00. 4. Subsequently, under the provisions of Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act, 1958, the High Court of Malaysia at Kuala Lampur entertained an application in Originating Summons No.A189/84 and in the said Application, the counsel on both sides appeared and it was ordered that the defendant should pay to the plaintiffs a sum of $80,747,13 only by instalments of $3,000.00 per month with effect from 8.4.1985 to the date of full realisation and costs to be taxed pursuant to Sec.11 of the Debtors Act, 1957. Thereafter, it seems, the High Court, of Malaysia at Kuala Lampur adjudicated the defendant as bankrupt in No.4303/ 92-86, dated 6.10.1986. On this background, the plaintiffs filed E.P.No.1 of 1989 to execute the Originating Summons No.238 of 1984 on the file of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore. 5. Sec.44-A of the Code deals with the powers and the manner of execution of foreign decrees. It provides for execution in India of a decree of any superior courts of any reciprocating territory.Sec.44-A of the Code was inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure by Sec.2 by Amendment Act, 1937. Subsequently it was amended in 1952. Under Sec.44-A of the Code execution of a foreign decree is entrusted to a District Court by filing a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior courts of any reciprocating territory. Such filing of the decree of foreign court becomes executable in India as if it had been passed by the District Court. 6. Sec.44-A of the Code reads as follows: “Execution of decrees passed by Courts in reciprocating territory::(1) Where a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior courts of any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court. 6. Sec.44-A of the Code reads as follows: “Execution of decrees passed by Courts in reciprocating territory::(1) Where a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior courts of any reciprocating territory has been filed in a District Court, the decree may be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court. (2) Together with the certified copy of the decree shall be filed a certificate from such superior court stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purpose of proceedings under this section, be conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction of adjustment. (3) The provisions of Sec.47 shall as from the filing of the certified copy of the decree apply to the proceedings of a District Court executing a decree under this section, and the District Court shall refuse execution of any such decree, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of Sec.13. Explanation-I:‘Reciprocating territory’ means any country or territory outside India which the Central government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a reciprocating territory for the purposes of this section; and ‘Superior Courts’, with reference to any such territory, means such courts as may be specified in the said notification. Explanation-II:‘decree’ with reference to a superior court means any decree or judgment of such Court under which a sum of money is payable, not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty, but shall in no case include an arbitration award, even if such an award is enforceable as a decree or judgment.” 7. But the District Court shall refuse to execute such a decree if it shown to the satisfaction of the court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (0 of Sec. 13 of the Code, which reads as follows: “13. But the District Court shall refuse to execute such a decree if it shown to the satisfaction of the court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (0 of Sec. 13 of the Code, which reads as follows: “13. When foreign judgment not conclusive: Aforeign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except- (a) Where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction; (b) Where it has not been given on the merits of the case; (c) Where it appears on the face of proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or refusal to recognise the law of India in cases in which such law is applicable; (d) Where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice; (e) Where it has been obtained by fraud; (f) Where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force (India)”. 8. While assailing the finding of the lower court that the judgment sought to be executed had not been given on merits and it is not a final order, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the order passed by the High Court of Malaysia at Kuala Lampur in Originating Summons No.A-189 of 1984 granting permission to the respondent to pay the amount in instalments and the said order was passed in the presence of the respondent. So, it cannot be said that the order passed by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore in Originating Summons No.238 of 1984 is not a final order. 9. Explanation II to Sec.44-A defines ‘decree’ in which it is stated as follows: ‘decree’ with reference to a superior court means any decree or judgment of such court under which a sum of money is payable, not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty, but shall in no case include an arbitration award, even if such an award is enforceable as a decree or judgment. 10. The order dated 2.4.1984 in Originating Summons No.238 of 1984, which the petitioners wanted to execute may be an arbitration award. 10. The order dated 2.4.1984 in Originating Summons No.238 of 1984, which the petitioners wanted to execute may be an arbitration award. But in view of the above proviso, it cannot be said as a decree. It is an order issuing notice to the defendant to raise objection for the passing of final order. The affidavit dated 16.1.1985 showing the estimated cost itself proves that the order sought to be executed is not the final decree and not passed on merits. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied on the decision in Mohamed Abdulla v. P.M.Abdul Rahim Mohamed Abdulla v. P.M.Abdul Rahim Mohamed Abdulla v. P.M.Abdul Rahim, (1985)1 MLJ. 24wherein the learned Judge has held as follows: “Sec. 13 (b) of the Code by itself does not speak about any controversy. The element of controversy may be relevant only to find out whether the adjudication was on merits. Even if that test is to be applied I find that at the relevant point of time there was in fact a controversy and that only forced the plaintiff to go to court and that controversy was eased out subsequently after the service of summons on the defendant and the defendant passing on the letter of consent. This is not a case of a judgment being obtained on the simple ground of non-appearance of the defendant or on his failure to comply with a provision of law. This is a case of a controversy existing on the date of the suit, which got solved by the judgment-debtor agreeing to take decree subsequently. ” On the basis of the said judgment, the learned counsel has submitted that since the order passed by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore was not set aside, and, accepting the order dated 2.4.1984 the defendant had given consent to pay the decree amount in instalment, now it cannot be alleged that there is no decree at all. As the petitioners want to execute the order dated 2.4.1984 passed by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore and not the order passed by the High Court of Malaysia directing the respondent to pay the amount in instalments, the nature of the order has to be seen only on the basis of the order dated 2.4.1984 itself and not on the basis of the subsequent action. The decision cited by the learned Senior Counsel has dealt with a case in which the parties have given a written consent and on that basis the decree was passed. In support of the submission that the order passed by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore is a final order and passed on merits, no material is placed before me. 12. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of R.A.Mahmomed Kashim v. Seeni Pakir R.A.Mahmomed Kashim v. Seeni Pakir R.A.Mahmomed Kashim v. Seeni Pakir, 52 MLJ. 240: A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 265 considered a foreign judgment which was passed on default of appearance of the defendant without trial on evidence. This Court following the Privy Council decision in A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 121reported in held that this was not a judgment on the merits of the case. It also said that there was in principle no distinction between a case where the defence of the defendant was struck out for not answering the interrogatories and the case such as the one before them where the defendant did not appear at all. In both the cases, this Court said, the merits of the case had not been gone into. It overr ruled an earlier judgment of this Court in Jamoo Hassan v. Mohammed Ohuthu Jamoo Hassan v. Mohammed Ohuthu Jamoo Hassan v. Mohammed Ohuthu, A.I.R. 1925 Mad 155 which had held that in a case where the defendant did not appear and raise a defence, there would be an implied admission of the plaintiffs claim and hence the ex parte judgment should be considered as a judgment on merits. 13. The abovesaid decision of the Full Bench of this Court was followed in a subsequent decision of this Court in the case of A.S.Arunachalam Chettiar v. Mohammed Salihu Marakayar A.S.Arunachalam Chettiar v. Mohammed Salihu Marakayar A.S.Arunachalam Chettiar v. Mohammed Salihu Marakayar , A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 133: 107 I.C. 810. Here also this Court said that under the provisions of Sec.l3(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure a foreign judgment was not a judgment on merit where the defendant though served had remained absent and a judgment against him was pronounced exparte. 14. 133: 107 I.C. 810. Here also this Court said that under the provisions of Sec.l3(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure a foreign judgment was not a judgment on merit where the defendant though served had remained absent and a judgment against him was pronounced exparte. 14. In A.N.Abdul Rahman v. J.M.Mahomed Ali A.N.Abdul Rahman v. J.M.Mahomed Ali A.N.Abdul Rahman v. J.M.Mahomed Ali, A.I.R. 1928 Rangoon 319an ex parte judgment of a foreign court where the judgment had been granted without taking the plaintiffs evidence but only on his pleading sin view of the absence of the defendant to appear and defend the suit, was considered as not a judgment on merit under Sec.13(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court observed that a decision on merits involves the application of the mind of the court to the truth or falsity of the plaintiffs case; and therefore though a judgment passed after a judicial consideration of the matter by taking evidence may be a decision on the merits even though passed ex parte, a decision passed without evidence of any kind but passed only on the plaintiffs pleadings cannot be held to be a decision on merits. 15. In the case Ephrayin H Ephrayim v. Turner, Morrison & Co. Ephrayin H Ephrayim v. Turner, Morrison & Co. Ephrayin H Ephrayim v. Turner, Morrison & Co. , A.I.R. 1930 Bom. 511 the provision of Sec.13(b) were once again considered. In that case a foreign judgment was obtained from the court at Basra. The defendant had been served with the writ of summons. The defendant had given a power of attorney to a pleader in Basra which power of attorney was in force at the time When the suit was heard. On behalf of the defendants the pleader applied for an adjournment which was not granted. Thereafter, the court proceeded to go into the papers in the form of proceedings and to pass a decree against the defendants. The court held that no defence had been raised but merely an adjournment was asked for which was refused. The judgment which proceeded exparte had proceeded on the evidence of the plaintiff and the papers in the form of suit. The court held that in such a case the judgment cannot be said to be one which is not on merits. The judgment which proceeded exparte had proceeded on the evidence of the plaintiff and the papers in the form of suit. The court held that in such a case the judgment cannot be said to be one which is not on merits. Therefore, it held that the judgment though it was exparte was on merits and hence was not hit by Sec.13(b). 16. While considering the similar issue, the Division Bench of this Court in R.M.V.V.Achi v. R.M.A.R. Chettiar R.M.V.V.Achi v. R.M.A.R. Chettiar R.M.V.V.Achi v. R.M.A.R. Chettiar, A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 141 has held as follows: “No oral evidence has been let in by the parties since the appellant conceded before the trial court that the respondent is an Indian subject and never resided in Singapore. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge on this point found that the respondent did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Singapore Courts and that the Singapore Court which passed the judgment Ex.A-17 against the respondent is not competent to pass such a judgment and the judgment, therefore, was a nullity.^#x201D; 17. In this case, the respondent is able to establish that the order dated 2.4.1984 even assuming that the same is a decree or final order, has been passed by the court having no competent jurisdiction to pronounce the same, and so it cannot be executed in view of Sec.13(a) of the Code. 18. It is the admitted fact that the defendant is a permanent resident of Malaysia and not Singapore. On that basis the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the order passed by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore dated 2.4.1984 cannot be construed as a Court having competent jurisdiction to pass that order against a resident of Malaysia. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the said submission is not correct, since the respondent went to sustain the order and to avoid the hurdle under Sec. 13(a) of the Code, the petitioners have to prove that the court which passed the order had competent jurisdiction. But, no material is available before the court to come to the conclusion that even at the time of passing the order dated 2.4.1984 the defendant was a resident of Singapore. But, no material is available before the court to come to the conclusion that even at the time of passing the order dated 2.4.1984 the defendant was a resident of Singapore. On the other hand, the fact that the order was subsequently transferred to Malaysia, and the subsequent order obtained by the petitioners/plaintiffs in the High Court of Malaysia at Kola Lampur on 18.4.1985 itself could how that the defendant was a resident of Malaysia. Moreover, the lower court, on the basis of the documents held that the respondent is a permanent resident of Malaysia. According to Sec.13(a) of the Code, foreign judgment, if not pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be conclusive and under Sec.44-A(3) of the Code, the District Court shall refuse to execute the allege decree. 19. In the light of these authorities and from the above discussion, it is clear that the order sought to he executed is not a decree as it is not a final order. Even if it is taken as a final order, since the said order was not passed on merits, that to a court which is not having competent jurisdiction, it cannot be executed as it is prohibited under Secs.13(a) and (b) of the Code. 20. The lower court has taken the declaration of the defendant as an insolvent before the Malaysian Court as one of the grounds to reject the execution petition. Admittedly, the defendant has been adjudicated as insolvent by the High Court of Malaysia at Kuala Lampur in Bankruptcy No.4303/92-86 dated 6.10.1986. Such finding of the lower court cannot be sustained in view of the decisions in Indian Overseas Bank v. S.M.Mohd Musthaba Indian Overseas Bank v. S.M.Mohd Musthaba Indian Overseas Bank v. S.M.Mohd Musthaba, A.I.R. 1977 Mad. 199 in which the Division Bench has held as follows: “The decision of the Indian Courts are also in accordance with the view we have taken. The earlier case IN RE. Mogi and Co. IN RE. Mogi and Co. IN RE. Mogi and Co. , A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 199 in which the Division Bench has held as follows: “The decision of the Indian Courts are also in accordance with the view we have taken. The earlier case IN RE. Mogi and Co. IN RE. Mogi and Co. IN RE. Mogi and Co. , A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 898 where Rankin, J., held that the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act was a statutory of Indian Legislature and operated wherever, but not elsewhere, that Legislature could given the law and that the Act did not operate as regards immoveables belonging to an insolvent in a foreign country unless it was shown that the foreign law will give effect to the Act. To the same effect is the decision in IN RE. Sumarmul Surana IN RE. Sumarmul Surana IN RE. Sumarmul Surana , A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 124 which followed IN RE. Mogi and Co. IN RE. Mogi and Co. IN RE. Mogi and Co. , A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 898, where it was held that the adjudication order did not operate to vest the insolvents immoveables property situated in a foreign State in the Official Assignee. The point has been elaborately dealt with in Lakhpat Raj Sharma v. Arma Singh Lakhpat Raj Sharma v. Arma Singh Lakhpat Raj Sharma v. Arma Singh, A.I.R. 1962 Punj. 228 Dealing with the effect of Sec.44-A, Civil Procedure Code, the learned Judge observed that the moment a certified copy of a decree of any of the superior courts of any reciprocating territory and a certificate from such superior court stating the extent, if any to which the decree had been satisfied or adjusted were produced in a District Court in India, then the decree might be executed in India as if it had been passed by the District Court. Regarding the effect of the adjudication in a foreign country, after referring to the various decisions, the learned Judge held that there was nothing in law to find that the adjudication order would affect the immovable property of the insolvent in another country. It is clear from the decisions referred to above that so far as immovable property is concerned, the adjudication of the debtor will have no effect, and if the decree-holder satisfied the requirements of Sec.44-A Civil Procedure. Code, execution can proceed.” 21. It is clear from the decisions referred to above that so far as immovable property is concerned, the adjudication of the debtor will have no effect, and if the decree-holder satisfied the requirements of Sec.44-A Civil Procedure. Code, execution can proceed.” 21. The lower court rejected the case of the petitioners on the ground that as the order sought to be executed had been superseded as held in the order dated 30.9.85 in E.P.No.2 of 1985 which order had become final and so there is no order to execute as claimed by the petitioners. On 30.9.1985 the Advocate appeared for the petitioners made an endorsement in E.P.No.2 of 1985 to the effect that ‘since the decree under execution has been superseded this E.P. may be dismissed as not pressed’. Having got the earlier execution petition dismissed on the ground that the order dated 2.4.1984 was superseded, the question of executing the said order now would not arise. 22. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the lower court is not correct in holding that the petitioners should get permission from the Reserve Bank of India or the Central Government under the relevant provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 to execute the decree. Referring to Sec.47(3) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the said provision refers only the legal proceedings being brought in India to recover any sum and not with respect to the proceedings relating to the Foreign judgments or decrees. To appreciate the said contentions, it is necessary to extract the necessary provisions. 23. Sec.9 of the said Act, as far as it is material for our purpose is as follows: “Restrictions on payments:(1) Save as may be provided in and in accordance With any general or special exemption from the provisions of this sub-section which may be granted conditionally or unconditionally by the Reserve Bank, no person in, or resident in, India shall (a) make any payment to or for the credit of any person resident outside India; (b) receive, otherwise man through an authorised dealer, any payment by order or on behalf of any person resident outside India.” 24. Sec.47(3) of the said Act reads as follows: “47. Sec.47(3) of the said Act reads as follows: “47. (3) Neither the provisions of this Act nor any term (whether express or implied) contained in any contract that anything for which the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank is required by the said provisions shall not be done without that permission, shall prevent legal proceedings being brought in India to recover any sum which, apart from the said provisions and any such term, would be due, whether as debt, damages or otherwise, but- (a) the said provisions shall apply to sums required to be paid by any judgment or order of any court as they apply in relation to other sums; (b) no steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order for the payment of any sum to while the said provisions apply except as respects so much thereof as the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case may be, may permit to be paid.” 25. Sec.9 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act totally prohibited making any payment to any person outside India without necessary permission as contemplated underthe provision. The submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that Sec.47(3) of the said Act will apply only to the decrees obtained in India and not to the decrees obtained outside India cannot be sustained. Sec.47(3) of the Act speaks about the decrees obtained in India and further proceedings regarding the recovery of the amount pursuant to the decree. Sub-secs.(a) to (c) of Sec.47 are exceptions to Sec.47(3) of the Act and those provisions will apply to the decrees other than the decrees obtained in India. 26. The Division Bench of this Court in R.M.S.S.Chettiar v. Giam Cheng Kiet R.M.S.S.Chettiar v. Giam Cheng Kiet R.M.S.S.Chettiar v. Giam Cheng Kiet , A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 349 has held as follows: “The words ‘any judgment or order for the payment of any sum’ have to be read together. The words ‘for the payment of any sum’ qualify the words ‘any judgment or order’. The sub-section specifically says that no steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing such judgment, viz., a judgment for the payment of any sum. Undoubtedly, the judgment in question is one for payment of money and the decree-holder is a resident outside India. The words ‘for the payment of any sum’ qualify the words ‘any judgment or order’. The sub-section specifically says that no steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing such judgment, viz., a judgment for the payment of any sum. Undoubtedly, the judgment in question is one for payment of money and the decree-holder is a resident outside India. No steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing this judgment without obtaining the necessary permission of the Reserve Bank of the Central Government. In Lobo v. Fatehkhan Lobo v. Fatehkhan Lobo v. Fatehkhan, (1972)1 MLJ. 41 : 1972 A.I.R. Mad. 323one of us had to consider a similar question, it was held there mat execution of a decree by a resident outside India cannot be levied before obtaining the necessary permission of the Reserve Bank of the Central Government.” 27. Kailasam, J., in A.B.Labo v. Fateh Khan A.B.Labo v. Fateh Khan A.B.Labo v. Fateh Khan, (1972)1 MLJ. 41 : A.I.R. 1972 Mad 323 has held as follows: “Sec.5 (1), clauses (a) and (c) of the ForeignExchange Regulations Act (VII of 1947) are clear that no payment shall be made to or for the credit of any person resident outside India or made to or for the credit of any person by order or on behalf of any person resident outside India, without the permission from the Reserve Bank of India. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is applicable only to payment of moneys outside India, and not for payment in India to a foreigner or a citizen. I am unable to accept the contention, for Sec.5 does not permit such interpretation, the learned counsel also referred to the preamble of the Act, wherein it is provided that the aim of the Act is for providing for the regulation of certain payments, dealings in foreign exchange and securities and the import and export of currency and bullion. The first part of the preamble clearly shows that the object of the enactment was to regulate payments also. It cannot be said that Sec.5 is beyond the scope of the preamble. I accept the objection raised by the judgment-debtor to the decree payment of the decree amount to the decree-holder or his power of attorney agent. I allow the petition with costs.” 28. It cannot be said that Sec.5 is beyond the scope of the preamble. I accept the objection raised by the judgment-debtor to the decree payment of the decree amount to the decree-holder or his power of attorney agent. I allow the petition with costs.” 28. Following the said decision, in R.M.S.S. Chettiar v. Gian Cheng Kiet R.M.S.S. Chettiar v. Gian Cheng Kiet R.M.S.S. Chettiar v. Gian Cheng Kiet , A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 349 the Bombay High Court in Algemene Bank, Netherland v. Satish Dayalal Choksi Algemene Bank, Netherland v. Satish Dayalal Choksi Algemene Bank, Netherland v. Satish Dayalal Choksi , A.I.R. 1990 Bom. 170 has held as follows: “Under Sec.47(3), therefore, a suit for the enforcement of a guarantee for which permission of the Reserve Bank Central Government would have been required under Sec.26(5) can be brought in India. Filing of a suit, therefore, on such a guarantee cannot be said to be contrary to any law in India because Sec.47, Sub-sec.(3) expressly permits such legal proceedings in India. Such proceedings abroad cannot be said to be violative of any law in India. However, no steps can be taken for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order for the payment of any sum under such a guarantee except in respect of so much thereof as the Central Government or the Reserve bank may permit to be paid. With the result that before a foreign decree passed on such a guarantee can be executed in India, permission of the Reserve Bank or the Central Government for realising such sum is necessary. Sec.47(3)(b) says, “No steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order for the payment of any sum to which the said provisions apply except as respects so much thereof as the Central Government or the Reserve Bank may permit to the paid. An application under O.21, Rule 22 is certainly a stop for the purpose of enforcing a judgment. Under O.21, Rule 11 every application for execution of a decree shall be in writing signed and verified by the applicant and shall contain, inter alia, various particular including the made in which the assistance of the court is required. An application under O.21, Rule 22 is certainly a stop for the purpose of enforcing a judgment. Under O.21, Rule 11 every application for execution of a decree shall be in writing signed and verified by the applicant and shall contain, inter alia, various particular including the made in which the assistance of the court is required. Under O.21, Rule 22, inter alia, where an application for execution of a foreign decree is filed under the provisions of Sec,44-A, leave is obtained ended O.21, Rule 22, it is necessary to make an application under O.21, Rule 11. These are, therefore, clearly proceedings for the purpose of enforcing a foreign judgment. Assuch steps can be taken permission of the Reserve Bank or the Central Government, as the case may be, is necessary under Sec.47(3)(b).” 29. In this case, admittedly, the petitioners have not obtained any permission either from the Central Government or from the Reserve Bank of India. Hence, even on that ground also the petitioners cannot sustain the proceedings. 30. I do not find any merits in this revision. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.