JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal preferred by the appellants arises out of the impugned order, dated 26.11.1977 passed by Addl. District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur whereby the said court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellants filed against the defendant-respondents. 2. The facts which are relevant for deciding the present appeal briefly stated are that the present appellants who are the legal heirs of Shri Banshidhar Sharma (since deceased) had filed a suit for possession, declaration, injunction and rendition of accounts in the court of Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur against the defendant-respondents on 15.7.1961 relating to the following u properties which are more fully described in paras 1 to 5 of the plaint as specified herein below (a) Temple of "Baiji ka Mandir" which comprised of temples of: (i) Mahadevji (ii) Thakur Laxmi Narainji. (b) Residential accommodation. (c) 24 shops below the temple complex. (d) Bagichi or Garden. 3. The aforesaid temples were worshiped and maintained as their own temples by the ancestors of the appellants. This fact is also borne out and D established from the relevant documents which the appellants have placed on the record. 4. It will be pertinent to mention the brief background for the purpose of deciding the controversy between the parties to the suit which has been discussed by the trial court vide impugned order & decree dated 26.11.1977 against which the present appeal has been preferred and which is now being decided finally by this judgment on merits. 5. During the life time of the appellants' ancestor Pt. Jairamji the temple of Mahadevji was rebuilt and rejuvenated by Shri Jamana Ji Manas of Niradanu in 1708 AD (samvat 1765) with full recognition of the sole rights of the plaintiffs" 0 common ancestor Pt. Jairamji and his descendants with regard to the determination of the rights of Mahantship and Shibaiatship as well as rights of the management of the said temple. During the life time of Pt. Jagannathji, Ctiela of Swami Sanwal Dassji, the construction of the said temple was further extended by virtue of addition of several apartments which arc presently existing at the site 5 as per the records. These were consecrated for the idol of Thakur Shri Laxrni Narainji, which was installed in the said temple with full religious ceremonies by Sint. Jagannathji, Ctiela of Swami Sanwal Dassji, the construction of the said temple was further extended by virtue of addition of several apartments which arc presently existing at the site 5 as per the records. These were consecrated for the idol of Thakur Shri Laxrni Narainji, which was installed in the said temple with full religious ceremonies by Sint. Vichitra Kumariji in the presence of Maharaja Sawai Jai Singhji of Jaipur State in 1737 AD (samvat 1794). 6. Apart from above an absolute, complete and irrevocable gift of the said temple and its properties was made to the plaintiffs' common ancestor Pt. Jagannathji vide Ex.25 of the summoned record. In 1753 AD (samvat 1810) shops under the temple were dedicated by Vichitra Kumariji for the maintenance, welfare and upkeep of the temple of Thakur Laxmi Narainji vide Ex. 31 on the record. In 1788 AD (samvat 1845) after the demise of Swami Ramasi Kinkar, Mahant Ram Sevak's right to perform seva pooja of the deity installed in the aforesaid temple achieved its recognition vide Ex. 24 on the record through common ancestors of the appellant. It is thus manifestly clear to this court that since the establishment of the said temple and the properties forming part of the periphery of the temple, i.e., shops, gardens etc. appurtinent to it remained in absolute control and in continuous management and shibaiatship of the plaintiffs' ancestors by devolution in accordance with their personal law. In order to substantiate his contentions in this regard during the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellants had invited the attention of this court to the pedigree of the appellants' ancestors which is also available on the summoned record of the trial court at page C/23/5 and is further established and has been verified by the appellants from the certified copy of the said pedigree issued by the office of Chairman, Nagar Palika, Soru (Eta) and also from another certified copy of the said document issued by the office of Tehsildar, Amber which is a part of the record and was furnished to the appellants on an application moved by them under O. 41 R.27 CPC to this court during the course of hearing of this appeal. 7. 7. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellants further stated at the bar that during the reign of Maharaja Ram Singhji of Jaipur in 1868 AD (samvat 1925) the common ancestor of the appellants, Pt. Mahadeoji proceeded on long pilgrimage and under the circumstances handed over the custody of the idols/deities of the temple in question of Laxmi Narainji to Dharmarth department of Jaipur State now known as Devasthan department as a trustee which was authorised to realise and collect the rent of 24 shops appurtinent to the said temple. Consequently the Devasthan department became the trustee of the temple for looking after the maintenance, upkeep and management of the said temple. 8. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants during the course of hearing of this appeal that subsequently an occasion to handover the side temple to the Jaipur State had arisen in view of the fact that the then Ruler of Jaipur Maharaj Sawai Ram Singhji had ordered all the Pandits to put the Shiva Tilak of three Lines horizontally i.e. in place of the Vaishnu Tilak (i.e. 'U') on the forehead of all idols in their respective temples. This directive of the Ruler with regard to the Tilak on the forehead being contrary to religious faith, belief and practice was not acceptable to Mahadeoji, the then Mahant of the Temple in question i.e. of Laxminarainji, who was the ancestor of the plaintiff, since he wanted to avoid confrontation with the then Ruler of the Jaipur State Mahadeoji i.e. the appellants ancestors who had proceeded on pilgrimage after temporarily handing over the general administration and welfare of the Temple to the care of the State in Dharmarth Department. This was only with regard to Temple of Laxminarainji and not with regard to Mahadeoji because in the case of Mahadeoji's temple i.e. of Lord Shiva, there was no dispute as regards the anointing the Shiva Tilak as aforesaid. Hence, the temple of Mahadeoji was left with his own followers by Pt. Mahadeoji before he proceeded for Pilgrimage. 9. With regard to the religious dispute over the Headmark "Tilakkon ka Jhagada" i.e. the dispute with regard to Tilaks has been an infamous dispute in the history of Jaipur State which has been reported in the historical books as well as in other documents. Mahadeoji before he proceeded for Pilgrimage. 9. With regard to the religious dispute over the Headmark "Tilakkon ka Jhagada" i.e. the dispute with regard to Tilaks has been an infamous dispute in the history of Jaipur State which has been reported in the historical books as well as in other documents. This fact is borne out from the application which was moved by the learned counsel for the appellant for permission to file additional documents in accordance with order 41 Rule 27 and Section 151 CPC and which was allowed by this Court at the outset after due notice to the learned counsel for the respondents during the course of hearing of the appeal vide order dated 16.5.97. The said application was moved by Shri R.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants for permission to bring on record the judgments of the learned Additional District Judge No. 6, Jaipur City, Jaipur concerning the properties involved in the aforesaid appeal and permission was also sought for bringing on record certified copies of the documents marked as Annexures-B/1 to Annexurc-B/5. On perusal of the said documents it was revealed that they are very essential for deciding the present appeal and as per the settled law the court may at its discretion in the interest of justice at any stage may allow the filing of the documents even at the appellate stage if the same are necessary to meet the ends of justice and were consequently allowed to be taken on record in terms of the aforesaid order. 10. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the appellants further contended at the bar that soon after his return from pilgrimage the appellants' ancestor had requested the State Government to handover the possession of the Temple which had temporarily been given to the State alongwith the account of rent realised from the shops appurtinent to the Zemplc but this was not done and the State kept on vacillating on the issue of handing over the Temple of Laxmi Narayanji as well as possession of the shops back to the appellant on one pretext or the other. Thereafter, the appellants carried out voluminous correspondence for restoration of possession of the Temple as well as the shops in question but with no result and this ultimately led to the filing of the civil suit which was decided by the impugned order dated 26.11.77 by ADJ No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur giving rise to the filing of the present appeal. 11. From the pleadings of the parties it is apparent that the management of temple in the suit was being done by the state from the time Pandit Mahadeoji i.e. Plaintiff's ancestors handed over the same during the duration of his pilgrimage till 1955 A.D. and this fact has not been disputed by the respondents. Hence I am of the view that the temporary entrustment of the temples with regard to its management by the State as trustee would by itself not confer any permanent right of its management nor would confer any title to the State to manage the property in dispute as lawful owner and the present appellants who are the legal heirs of the original plaintiff are not only entitled to retain its possession but also entitled to lawfully protect and manage the same. It is well established preposition of law that a trustee has only a right of temporary entrustment of the property in question and is answerable to the creator of the trust and if the creator of the trust has lost the confidence which he had reposed in the said trustee he has every right to dissolve the trust and the trustee at its sole option exercised unilaterally cannot continue with the trust and as a matter of fact in the instant case no documentary evidence has been placed on the record by the state Government which would establish that temporary entrustment with regard to the management of temples and shops in question had restored a permanent lien or a legal right of management of the said properties as their own. I an fortified in my aforesaid observations from documents Ex. 1, dated 21.1.1.955 which is a letter of the State Government addressed to the plaintiffs by which it had agreed in principle to hand over the temples in dispute back to the plaintiff keeping in view his past association with the said temple. I an fortified in my aforesaid observations from documents Ex. 1, dated 21.1.1.955 which is a letter of the State Government addressed to the plaintiffs by which it had agreed in principle to hand over the temples in dispute back to the plaintiff keeping in view his past association with the said temple. It is only thereafter when the plaintiff insisted that he should be given back its management on his return from pilgrimage that the defendant-state with malafide intentions had changed its mind not to do so. I am further of the view that the trial court has committed grave illegality in deciding the issues against the plaintiff. The plaintiff who had examined himself as PW 1 in support of his case had further produced all necessary and relevant corroborative evidence which fully establishes the lawful rights and interest of the ancestors of the plaintiff and subsequently of the plaintiff and the present appellants over the property in dispute. From the documentary evidence, i.e., Exs. 8 to 22, 28 to 32, 33 to 49 it is amply established that the plaintiff and his ancestors were in continuous lawful possession of the disputed property as rightful owners and were managing the same in their own right. Exhibits 32 and 33 are rent notes which can safely be relied upon being more than 30 years old and in support of which presumption of their legality can safely be drawn in accordance with section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. From the perusal of Ex. 28 which is a letter of the telephone department addressed to the plaintiff it is evidently clear that the plaintiff has been mentioned as owner of the property in dispute. The trial court has obviously misconstrued and misinterpreted the documents relied upon by the defendant-respondents vide Ex. A 1 to A 15 which in my view have no bearing whatsoever in view of the fact that in the year 1955 an order had been passed by Devasthan Department in favour of the plaintiff. Exs. A 16 and A 17 do not contain any admission of the plaintiff and notwithstanding this fact the trial court has obviously misconstrued the same as plaintiff's admissions by ignoring and overlooking the plaintiff's evidence. I am further of the opinion that the trial court had misconstrued the document Ex. Exs. A 16 and A 17 do not contain any admission of the plaintiff and notwithstanding this fact the trial court has obviously misconstrued the same as plaintiff's admissions by ignoring and overlooking the plaintiff's evidence. I am further of the opinion that the trial court had misconstrued the document Ex. 1 by erroneously holding that the plaintiff's appointment as a Mahant was temporary and in fact from a bare perusal of the said documents it is apparent that the appointment is temporary and subject to revision if necessary and which only relates to the budget and not with regard to the management of the temple in dispute. It is obviously misconstruction of Ex. 1 which has resulted in recording erroneous findings by the trial court on issue No. 3. The trial court has further misconstrued in not appreciating that document Ex. 2 does not affect the passing of the order Ex. I dated 21.1.1955 in any manner whatsoever which was neither in accordance with law nor in conformity to Article 299 of the Constitution of India. In my view the trial court has committed grave illegality in misconstruing the document Ex. 1 by observing that even if it be assumed that Ex. 2 does not cancel Ex. 1, still on the basis of Ex. 1, the plaintiff cannot claim right of management of the temple and in fact the respondents have attempted to make out a case in their favour by drawing erroneous conclusion on the basis of some hand written application of the plaintiff vide Ex.A. 1 which was only with regard to performing of 'Sahstra Chandi Yagya' ' lgL= p.Mh ;K ' for Bhajan Party Jagmohan ( Hktu ikB ds fy;s txeksgu ) and extension of time for various other functions till Ex. 15. The only inference which can be drawn from the perusal of above documents is that in fact the plaintiff was trying his best to persuade the respondent-State to hand over the possession of the temple to him which had been temporarily given to the State as a trustee and the State has obviously committed breach of trust by not doing so. In this context I would like to observe that it is not necessary that creation of Trust must be by way of a written document and its evidentiary value can certainly be drawn in favour of a party creating the Trust i.e. the plaintiff late Shri Banshidhar on the basis of oral evidence on the record which is amply proved and established in this case. 12. It would not be out of place to mention that the respondents had called the plaintiffs many times to discuss the modalities regarding transfer of possession of the temple which is evident from Exs. 8 to 22 with regard to the plaintiff's letter dated 30.12.1953. From the perusal of Ex.A. 8 it is apparent that the plaintiff had specifically described the temple as his own in the following manner - 13. 'Sewame namra nivedan hai ki prarthi ke Mandir Shri Laxmi Narainji mai ( izkFkhZ ds eanhj Jh y{eh ukjk;.k th esaA ). It will be pertinent to mention that the plaintiff was helpless against the might of the state and was always apprehending that the state would use its brute force to throw the plaintiff out of the premises of the temple lock, stock and barrel. Therefore, the plaintiff was treading with trepidation. 14. During the course of hearing of the appeal an application for grant of an ad-interim stay was moved by the appellant's counsel vide S.B. Civil Second Stay Application No. 163/96 which was heard and decided by this court in terms of its order dated 22.11.1996. Therefore, the plaintiff was treading with trepidation. 14. During the course of hearing of the appeal an application for grant of an ad-interim stay was moved by the appellant's counsel vide S.B. Civil Second Stay Application No. 163/96 which was heard and decided by this court in terms of its order dated 22.11.1996. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that as per the traditions and customs prevalent at the relevant time, appellants' ancestors have been carrying on Puja of Lord Shiva in temple in question situated in Khanda Manak Chowk Jaipur and after the plaintiff's demise, his legal heirs, i.e. the present appellants who were substituted as on the record by an order of this court after due notice to the respondents, have been carrying on Shiva Puja of the idols installed in the Temple continuously and have also been in continuous physical possession of the suit premises since 1955 upto 1988 and it was in lieu of their continuous possession that the State Government had given possession of the Temple to the appellants' ancestors i.e. Late Shri Banshidhar (original plaintiff in the suit) in the year 1955 itself which is evident from Exh. 1 on the record. In view of the aforesaid circumstances and also in view of the threatened illegal action of the respondents to dislodge the appellants from their possession over the property in question, a suit for Declaration, injunction and rendition of accounts was filed by the original plaintiff late Shri Banshidhar vide Civil Suit No. 71/74 *(86/81) which was dismissed by the trial court by the impugned judgment/order dated 26.11.77 which is now under challenged before this court in the present Appeal. It is pertinent to mention in this context that on 11.1.78 the present appeal was listed for admission before the learned Division Bench of this court when the following order was passed - "Issue notice to the G.A. and the respondents. Meanwhile the appellant shall not be dispossessed from the premises where he resides. The rest of the relief claimed by the appellant will be considered after the notice are served." 15. Thereafter on 10.10.96 the appeal was taken up for hearing on second stay application which was moved by the appellants' counsel and the arguments were heard. After examining the rival claims and vide Exh. The rest of the relief claimed by the appellant will be considered after the notice are served." 15. Thereafter on 10.10.96 the appeal was taken up for hearing on second stay application which was moved by the appellants' counsel and the arguments were heard. After examining the rival claims and vide Exh. A-1, A-9 and A- 10, respectively this court directed that in the meanwhile the status-quo which existed as on the date of passing of the order dated 11/01/1978 in respect of the premises in question shall continue pending the hearing and disposal of this Appeal.It stood well established that the original plaintiff and after his demise his legal heirs i.e. present appellants have been in continuous physical possession of properties in question right from the year 1955 till they were unlawfully dispossessed by the state-respondent in the year 1988 and have also been performing Seva Puja regularly in respect of Idols of the Deity installed in temple in question and the appointment of Late Shri Banshidhar as Pujari/Mahant is also borne out from the documents Ex.A-7 by which he was given possession of the said premises i.e. temple as well 24 shops. From the perusal of document Ex. A-8 it is borne out that Late Shri Banshidhar had moved an application to the respondents for his appointment as Pujari of the Temple and this fact is also confirmed from documents Exh. A-9 and A-10, respectively. All these aspects have been elaborately discussed in the earlier order dated 22.11.96 which was passed by this court after giving detailed hearing to the learned counsel for the parties and have been dealt with elaborately. 16. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length with regard to the merits of the appeal and also perused the relevant documents on the record. 17. During the course of hearing Shri S.B. Mathur, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently contended at the bar that the possession of the original plaintiff and thereafter of the appellants in the temple in question as well as the shops appurtenant thereto has been unlawful. 17. During the course of hearing Shri S.B. Mathur, learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently contended at the bar that the possession of the original plaintiff and thereafter of the appellants in the temple in question as well as the shops appurtenant thereto has been unlawful. The learned counsel for the respondents has not been successful in establishing as to how and in what manner the original plaintiff and subsequently his legal heirs, i.e., the present appellants had acquired possession of the temple in question as well as the shops and merely by saying that the State had taken over the possession of the suit R/3 dated 19.11.1988, without either discussing the mode and the procedure adopted by the State in doing so would by itself not be sufficient to establish any lawful claim of the State over the temple as well as the other properties referred to above. It has been stated in the reply filed by the State to the second stay application which was decided by this court vide order, dated 22.11.1996 that the plaintiff-appellant was in unlawful possession of the property as a trespasser, and if it was so, it was the duty of the respondent to follow the procedure established by law, i.e., the State should have initiated and followed due process of law by resorting to execution proceedings before the executing court for execution of the impugned decree passed by the trial court on 26.11.1977 which admittedly the respondents had failed to adopt and instead of resorting to the said lawful procedure, took unlawful possession of the suit premises from the appellants by restoring to the procedure which is neither warranted nor permissible in law. It is surprising to note that the State machinery had resorted to this unlawful procedure instead of moving to the trial court for execution of the decree in accordance with law and merely on the basis of an administrative order passed by the State Government the possession of the said property could not be taken by the functionaries of the State in the manner in which it has been done in this case. 18. 18. Prima-facie, I am of the opinion that since it has not been disputed by the respondents that the original plaintiff Late Shri Banshidhar and after his demise the present appellants have been in continuous possession of the Temple in question with effect from the year 1955 till they were unlawfully dispossessed in respect of both, immovable and movable properties as on 20.11.1988 and since the factum of their continuous and lawful possession is also borne out from the relevant documents placed on the record and as referred to above, the appellants deserve to succeed. It is settled proposition of law that possession is always lawful unless proved to the contrary by cogent and reliable evidence provided the plaintiff has a legal right to establish the same and since the plaintiffs-appellants have succeeded in establishing the same by virtue of relevant documentary and oral evidence on the record they could not be unlawfully dispossessed without due process of law. 19. On behalf of the State-respondent it was contended by Shri Mathur that the plaintiff had applied to Dharmarth Department on 4.11.1953 to grant him permission to perform Bhajans and such permission had been granted for one month and subsequently the said permission was extended from time to time. He further stated that Dharmarth department of the then Jaipur State had neither authorised the plaintiff nor anyone else in his absence to realise and collect the rent of 24 shops in dispute, Bagichi and other properties which are the properties of the State and were and are managed by it. He has refuted the aforesaid contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to the temporary entrustment of the properties in dispute to the State and has specifically stated that neither the plaintiff nor his ancestors had any connection whatsoever with the said temple. He has refuted the aforesaid contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants with regard to the temporary entrustment of the properties in dispute to the State and has specifically stated that neither the plaintiff nor his ancestors had any connection whatsoever with the said temple. The learned counsel for the respondents has not controverted the view of the State Government that the management of the temple as well as the properties in dispute was being done by the plaintiff earlier prior to their handing over the same to the State in view of the fact that he was running an educational institution imparting free education to the children subject to the condition that he will not be entitled to any income derived from the shops and houses attached to the temple and the plaintiff had only the right to maintain and manage the affairs of the temple from the budget allotment annually sanctioned for the said purpose. In my considered opinion this concession recorded by the State Government obviously leads to irresistible conclusion that the plaintiff had been managing the affairs of the temple and other properties in question as a lawful owner and if he did not have that right the question of its management from the budget allotment annually sanctioned by the State Government would not arise. Hence the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents in the face of his arguments as aforesaid that the State had the undisputed right to manage the temple and the properties attached to it, falls to the ground. 20. I have examined both, the documentary as well as oral evidence led on behalf of the State during the trial of the suit and in my considered view the same does not help in advancing the case of the respondents in any manner whatsoever. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's suit vide its impugned judgment and decree, dated 26.11.1977 by observing that the disputed temple was never constructed or founded by the plaintiff-appellants' ancestors and, therefore, their ancestors were not entitled to manage the affairs of the temple in the capacity as Mehant. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's suit vide its impugned judgment and decree, dated 26.11.1977 by observing that the disputed temple was never constructed or founded by the plaintiff-appellants' ancestors and, therefore, their ancestors were not entitled to manage the affairs of the temple in the capacity as Mehant. In this regard the trial court went in detail and on examination of the pleadings of the parties as well as the documents on the record furnished by the plaintiff in support of his case, had recorded its findings against the appellants. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellants had placed reliance on three documents, i.e., Exs. 24, 25 and 31 respectively and none of these documents could give any right, title or interest in the disputed property and the trial court after examining these documents had come to the conclusion that they did not confer any right, title or interest upon the plaintiff-appellants. He further contended that infact the basic documents by which the plaintiff had staked his claim over the property in dispute was in respect of title-holder of the disputed property which was never made available during the pendency of the proceedings and there was no reason for the plaintiff-appellant to contest the same and without any basis he wanted to seek a declaration that they should be held to be founders of the disputed temple. He further contended that from the written statement filed by the respondents, it will be evident that the temple situated in Khanda Manak Chowk was built by the State of Jaipur and hence was the property of the Jaipur State and after its merger, the property vested in the State of Rajasthan. 22. He further contended that from the written statement filed by the respondents, it will be evident that the temple situated in Khanda Manak Chowk was built by the State of Jaipur and hence was the property of the Jaipur State and after its merger, the property vested in the State of Rajasthan. 22. As regards the aforesaid contention I am of the view that the respondents had at no stage ever challenged the continuous physical possession of the original plaintiff late Shri Banshidhar and thereafter of his legal heirs i.e., the present appellants and the law is well settled that even if a person has got no right or title as regards the property of which he is in actual physical possession, he has got a right to protect and manage the same on the plea of adverse possession as against the true owner and from the facts of this case as well as the documents placed on the record it is evident that the state- respondent had at no stage for the past over 30 years had ever challenged the continuous physical possession of the ancestors of the original plaintiff and thereafter of the plaintiff Late Shri Banshidhar who have not only been performing Sewa Puja of the temple in dispute but have also been in its physical possession as well as of the shops appurtenant thereto till they were unlawfully dispossessed by the State-respondent on 20.11.1988. Hence the aforesaid contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents are wholly erroneous being contrary to the record. I am further of the view that merely by advancing the aforesaid plea in the written statement filed by the respondents would not help in establishing the claim of the State-respondent over the property in question. There is not any iota of evidence to suggest that the temple was managed earlier by the Jaipur State through its servants and after its merger with the State of Rajasthan it has been managed through its servants. There is not any iota of evidence to suggest that the temple was managed earlier by the Jaipur State through its servants and after its merger with the State of Rajasthan it has been managed through its servants. Not a single document has been placed on the record by the respondents which would indicate that the temple in question stood vested in the State Government and this question was repeatedly asked during the course of hearing to the learned counsel for the respondents and he was unable to state any reason or to produce supporting evidence which would suggest the vesting of the temple and its properties in question with the State Government. On the contrary the plaintiff-appellants have placed sufficient material on the record during the course of hearing of the appeal as has been discussed in this judgment which clearly indicates the continuous physical possession of the temple and its properties in question earlier with the ancestors of the original plaintiff, and subsequently with Late Shri Banshidhar and thereafter with the present appellants who are the legal heirs of the original plaintiff. I am thus finally of the view that the trial court has very erroneously overlooked the documentary evidence which was placed by the plaintiff- appellants on the record which on true and proper appreciation would clearly establish the right, title and interest and continuous physical possession of the property in question with the plaintiff-appellants. 23. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellants has stated at the bar that when they had objected to their forcible dispossession, they were assured that the State shall explore the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement and this fact is also borne out from the summoned record since the state Government had sought the opinion of learned Advocate General for the state though the concerned file was neither produced nor shown to this court during the course of hearing of this Appeal for reasons best known to the state government. 24. 24. I am of the view that once the posses' Jon of the appellants with regard to the suit premises, i.e., the said temple as well as the other property, i.e., 24 shops forming part of the periphery of the temple has been established and the right to perform traditional 'Sewa Puja' in the said temple which was earlier being performed by late Shri Banshidhar (original plaintiff) and subsequently by the present appellants who are legal heirs of the deceased, has not been disputed by the respondents and which fact is also borne out from the relevant documents as aforesaid and since their forcible and unlawful dispossession from the suit property as on 20.11.1988 has also been established, it was the duty of the respondents to have awaited the decision of this court as regards the result of the appeal instead of resorting to unlawful procedure adopted by them as aforesaid by adopting unlawful measures to forcibly dispossess the appellant from the property in dispute. This court had on a prima facie view of the matter had also directed vide order dated 22.11.1996 that the possession of the property in question be restored back to the appellants and the interim order, dated 10.10.1996 passed by this court was confirmed vide order, dated 22.1.1.19% by which the second stay application was allowed by this court. My observations are also fortified not only from the documents which have been referred to in this order but also from the view taken from the order, dated 25.1.1955 (Ex. 1) whereby the then Hon'ble Minister Incharge of Dharmarth Vibhag (devasthan) had decided to entrust the management of the temple of Shree Laxmi Narainji in view of the past association of the plaintiff with the said temple and also in view of the fact that he had been running an educational institution within the temple premises for imparting free education to the needy premises for imparting free education to the needy children and in view of his compassionate and benevolent approach and consequently he was entrusted with the management and the affairs of the temple from the budget allotment annually sanctioned for the said purpose which arrangement was however, temporary subject to the revision as and when necessary, subsequently in pursuance of the letter dated 22.2.1955 issued from the office of the Asstt. Commissioner Devasthan Department, Jaipur Division, Jaipur handed over the management of the temple in question to late Shri Banshidhar on 1.2.1955 while the management of the shops was not handed over to him. This fact is borne out from the document Ex. 1 which was subject to the condition that the plaintiff was not entitled to any income derived from the shops and houses attached to the temple. After taking over the charge of the temple, the plaintiff continued to represent his case to the Hon'ble Minister Devasthan for lifting the temporary embargo placed on his entitlement for realisation of rent of the shops and houses attached to the temple but without any result. Aforesaid document Ex. 1 has not been disputed by the State. The original plaintiff and appellants continued with the possession of the temple as well as the shops on and notwithstanding the Government's letter, dated 2.7.1958 directing Devasthan Department to take over the possession of the properties in question, the possession of the same was not handed over by the appellants. Y 25. Hence the basic legal questions which are relevant for deciding the controversy between the parties are as to-(A) Whether once the lawful possession of the properties in dispute has been admitted by the State earlier with regard to the original plaintiff and subsequently by his legal heirs, i.e. the present appellants, it was not open to the state-respondent to either dispossess the original plaintiff and subsequently the present appellants whose possession as regards the suit property i.e. the temple and 24 shops etc. has been continuous and accordingly who could not have been dispossessed without observing the due process of law? (B) Once the possession of the original plaintiff and thereafter of his legal heirs i.e. the appellants over the suit property has not been disputed by the state, and the possessory right has been continuous, whether it was open to the respondent-state Government to adopt coercive measures and distress steps by unlawfully depriving the plaintiff and the present appellants as regards their possession of the suit property without obtaining the proper orders from the court of law of competent jurisdiction by getting the decree lawfully executed and on the mere strength of administrative orders passed by the state-respondent it was not open to the state Government to have dispossessed the original plaintiff and thereafter the present appellants from the property in dispute. (C) In a suit for possession, declaration, injunction and rendition of accounts which was filed in the court of Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur by the original plaintiff against the state-respondent as the defendants in the original suit as on 15.7.1961 in respect of the properties as referred to above whether it was open to the respondents to have unlawfully dispossessed them in a manner as has been done in the instant case without having resort to the due process of law? (D) Whether it was not obligatory for the respondents to have got the decree of eviction lawfully executed against the plaintiff-appellants in accordance with law from the competent court? 26. Before entering into any discussion with regard to the above questions, it shall be appropriate to deal with the following issues framed by the trial court on the pleading of the parties which are as under 1. Whether the temples in dispute which were originally founded and established by the plaintiff's ancestors and his ancestors who being She bait and Mahant of the temples in question were entitled as of right to manage and administer the same? 2. Whether the said temples and 24 shops attached to them were founded, built and maintained by the former Jaipur State and managed through their servants? 3. Whether the plaintiff who was in continuous possession of the said temples including properties appurtenant thereto was entitled as of right to administer and manage the same and not in a representative capacity on behalf of the State? 4. Whether Pt. Mahadevji who was the mahant and She bait of the suit temples and who had temporarily handed over the management of the temples and shops attached to them to the Dharmarth Department of the former Jaipur State in samvat 1925 for safety and security and proper management of the said temples as he was going on long pilgrimage could be construed as having permanently bestowed or transferred the right to administer and manage the properties in question to the Dharmarth department now known as Devasthan to the State Government? 5. Whether the plaintiff who was the lineal descendant of Pt. Mahadevji was entitled to claim the possession of the properties in question and also claim rendition of accounts since entitled to since samvat 1925 from the defendants? 6. 5. Whether the plaintiff who was the lineal descendant of Pt. Mahadevji was entitled to claim the possession of the properties in question and also claim rendition of accounts since entitled to since samvat 1925 from the defendants? 6. Whether the statutory notice served on the defendant- State Government prior to the Institution of the suit by the plaintiff was in accordance with law'? 7. Whether the suit was filed within the period of limitation? 8. to which relief the plaintiff is entitled? 27. As regard issue No. 1 it was held by the trial court that the construction of the temple was very old and it was not possible for the plaintiff to lead direct evidence on having resort to strict interpretation of the provisions of Indian Evidence Act. On the basis of documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff on the record of trial court vide documents Exhibits 29 & 30, the trial court held that the temple was constructed by Smt. Vichitra Kumari in samvat year 1794 i.e. (1737 AD): The above documents record the fact that on the occasion of 'Pare' and other related religious ceremonies, the then Ruler of Jaipur State had attended the said ceremonies and consequently the trial court recorded a finding that the said documents cannot be disbelieved since the said documents are part of the history of Jaipur State which were placed on the record by the State Government after obtaining the same from the department of Archeology. On this account itself, the temple known as 'Baiji ka Mandir' was associated with 'Baiji Vichitra Kumariji' for since the time immemorial and hence trial court rejected the stand adopted by the State Government that the temple was constructed by erstwhile Ruler of Jaipur State. The trial court further recorded a finding to the effect that Smt. Vichitra Kumariji installed established the idols of Laxmi Narainji in the aforesaid temples and handed over the same to Shri Jagnnath Pujari and further that the temple was being managed by Mehant Ram Sewak as successor of Pt. Ramsi Kinkar which is apparent from the following (a) The execution of gift deed by Vichitra Kumariji in favour of Jagannathji vide Ex. Ramsi Kinkar which is apparent from the following (a) The execution of gift deed by Vichitra Kumariji in favour of Jagannathji vide Ex. 25 jeth sudi 11 samvat 1974 (1737 A.D.) (b) Exhibit 31 bhadva badi 10 samvat 1810 (1753 A.D.) by which the shops under the temple were dedicated by Vichitra Kumariji, the rent of which was to be utilised for the maintenance and upkeep of the properties in question. (c) Exhibit 24 A patta of samvat 1845 (1788 A.D.) a document executed on the death of Ramsikinar, appointing Mahant Ram Sewak for performing seva puja of the deities installed in the temples. 28. From the perusal of the above documents it is thus apparent that they are not only historical but are undisputed and beyond any doubt or suspicion having been obtained from the archaeology department of Jaipur State. In this regard I may observe that the trial court had obviously failed to consider not only the substantial documentary evidence lead on the record by the original plaintiff late Shri Banshidhar but also the oral testimony of Sajra i.e. the pedigree and statements of PW I Banshidhar, Ramsikinkar, Jagnnath, Jaijairamji, Ramsukhji and Gangadharji who were the real brother and Ramsewakji who was the son of Shri Jagannathji. I am further of the view that the trial court was not justified for not having placed reliance upon the statement of the aforesaid witnesses examined by the plaintiff including other witnesses on wholly untenable grounds that they could not be said to have any personal knowledge of the historical facts and consequently should not have rejected the same on mere conjectures and surmises. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that even the defendants' own witness, namely, DW. 15 Nathulal has admitted pedigree submitted by the plaintiff and which was admitted as correct hence no further proof or evidence was necessary which fully establishes the case set up by the plaintiff. I am further of the view that the trial court had gravely erred in drawing adverse inference against the plaintiff in this regard. As a matter of fact the observations of the trial court are not only contradictory but also contrary to the positive evidence led on the record by the appellants. I am further of the view that the trial court had gravely erred in drawing adverse inference against the plaintiff in this regard. As a matter of fact the observations of the trial court are not only contradictory but also contrary to the positive evidence led on the record by the appellants. I am further of the view that from the perusal of relevant evidence which was led on the record both oral and documentary by the appellants as regards the temple and the shops in question, the obvious conclusion which emerges is that the temple of Laxmi Narainji is a private temple constructed by Vichitra Kumariji and it was entrusted and gifted to the plaintiff's ancestors which was in their long and continuous possession except during the period the plaintiff's ancestors had proceeded on the pilgrimage. Under the Hindu Law it is a well settled proposition that a private religious endowment has been recognised and in the present case the disputed temple has been established as a private temple. I am fortified in my observation from the judgment of the apex court in the matter of Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and others, AIR 1957 S.C. 133 (para 14) wherein the apex court has observed as under "It is settled law that an endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, provided the settler has clearly and unambiguously expressed his intention in that behalf. Where it is provided that ceremonies were performed that would be valuable evidence of endowment but absence of such proof would not be conclusive against it....." 29. The apex court has further observed in this context that, "the mere fact that the public is allowed to visit a temple or Thakurdwara cannot necessarily indicate that the trust is public as opposed to private and that in an endowment in favour of the idol itself, proof if user by the public for interference would be cogent evidence that the dedication was in favour of the public." 30. From the perusal of the documents Ex. 24 and 25 it is apparent that the proper religious ceremonies were duly performed which obviously is a valuable evidence of endowment as referred to above, and hence the same is not open to challenge being irrevocable. In this reirard the relevant extract from the documents Ex. From the perusal of the documents Ex. 24 and 25 it is apparent that the proper religious ceremonies were duly performed which obviously is a valuable evidence of endowment as referred to above, and hence the same is not open to challenge being irrevocable. In this reirard the relevant extract from the documents Ex. 24 and 25 on translation in English reads as under Exhibit-24: Khas Mohar (Perwana) (Written on Mangsar Budi 6, samvat 1845) "Greetings to Mahant Ram Sewakji of Rivasa. Ramsikinkar who was doing sewa puja of Laxmi Narainji situated in Sawai, Jaipur Sanganer Chowk in temple of Vichitra Kumarji and was collecting rent of shops has died. Now puja is not being carried out on time and no care is taken so these rights are given to you. Use the rent of shops for doing sewa puja." Sd/-N.C. Sharma 3.9.1964. Intermediatary Reporter. Exhibit 25: Copy of Patta 31. Temple in Chaupar Sanganer was constructed by Baiji as Vichitra Kumariji. Idol of Laxmi Narainji was installed and dedicated. Sewa puja was given to Jagnnath, pupil of Swami Sawaldas, Brahmin Gaur, gotra dotoliya resident of Bilochi, Entire rear garden gifted for sewa puja. Puja will continue Sewa Puja and give blessings. For clothing, flowers and puja Rs.125.00 will be paid from pocket money. For another Jyot (light before Thakurji) 3 Kg. oil will be given. In Chaitra (after holi) girls will celebrate. After construction of temple Vichitra Kumari dedicated on Jeth Sudi ll., samvat 1794 and donated for worship. May puja go on and may Guru Jagnnath bestow his blessings till the earth, moon, sun and sky exist. My works will remain the same, otherwise I may be destroyed in hell. 32. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the appellants contended at the bar that Sajra is a part of the record of the history of Jaipur State and which is not only a valuable piece of evidence but is most authentic and reliable for the purpose of determining the same and the trial court has erroneously ignored the said vital evidence while passing impugned order dated 26.11.1977. 33. 33. As regards issue No. 1, i.e. the management of temple and the shops in question, the trial court has opined that since it has not been proved and established that the said properties were constructed by the State because not a single document was placed on the record by the respondents to establish the claim of the State, I am of the view that since the respondent-state had failed to lead positive evidence on the record contrary to the evidence led by the plaintiff, the findings recorded by the trial court to the contrary are not sustainable in the eye of law. I am further of the view that since this finding has not been challenged by the State nor any cross objections have been filed with regard to the same, the said finding so recorded against the State has consequently attained finality and is obiter and binding on the respondents. 34. As regards issue No. 3 1 am of the view that since the plaintiff's possession and the management of the property attached to the temple has admittedly not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents during the course of hearing of the appeal, the findings of the trial court recorded to the contrary is not sustainable in law. In fact it is relevant to mention in this context that the State vide letter dated 21.1.1995 (Ex. 1) had handed over the temple back to the plaintiff keeping in view his past association with the same, hence it is , not open to the respondents to take contrary stand earlier before the trial court and now in appeal before this court. 35. 1) had handed over the temple back to the plaintiff keeping in view his past association with the same, hence it is , not open to the respondents to take contrary stand earlier before the trial court and now in appeal before this court. 35. From the perusal of the relevant documents on the record as placed by the appellants which stands duly proved from the corroborative evidence i.e. oral testimony of the witnesses, I am of the view that the trial court should have taken judicial notice as regards the presumption of their proof in accordance with Section 90 of the Evidence Act which provides as under "Presumption as to documents thirty years old-where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested by persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested." 36. The trial court has obviously placed erroneous interpretation and misinterpreted the documents Ex.A. 1 to A.15 as relied upon by the defendants which have no bearing whatsoever on the controversy in issue. 37. As regards issued No. 4, 1 am of the view that the findings of the trial court on this issue is not sustainable since it had erroneously not taken into consideration the history of the dispute regarding Tilaks and consequently erroneously disbelieved the plaintiff's case that his ancestors had handed over the possession of the temples to the erstwhile Jaipur State in 1868 A.D. (samvat 1925). I am further of the view that the trial court has drawn erroneous conclusions against incontrovertible facts of the history which are recorded and which are fully borne out from relevant the documents on the record. 38. I am further of the view that the trial court has drawn erroneous conclusions against incontrovertible facts of the history which are recorded and which are fully borne out from relevant the documents on the record. 38. As regards issue No. 5, 1 am of the view that the finding of the trial court is not sustainable since it had overlooked the Sajra on the record and also the fact that the plaintiff had in his statements recorded on 24.4.1967, 29.11.1972 and 4.3.1976 respectively had given out the entire pedigree and the relevant documents have erroneously overlooked and ignored by the trial court as placed on the record by the plaintiff and which has also been proved by oral evidence of the plaintiff and admitted by the defendants which is evident from the statement of DW. 15 Nathulal has also remained unshaken in cross examination and hence there is no reason to disbelieve the same. I am fortified in my observations in this regard from the judgment of the Privy Council in the matter of Dolat Singhji v. Khachar Mausur Rulhad & Others, AIR 1936 PC page 150 wherein the Privy Council has observed that real tests are how consistent is the story within itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination and how far it fits in with the test of the evidence and the circumstances of the cas,:. It was further observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council as under "Where a person who is alleged to have made an admission regarding his status in an agreement with the Government files a suit for a declaration as to his status as against others, the Government arc neither a necessary nor a proper party to this question which is independent of the validity or invalidity of the agreement. As between the parties to the suit, it will be necessary to consider whether the statement in the agreement amounts to the admission claimed, and if so to consider its evidential value alongwith the other evidence, as S. 31, Evidence Act, expressly provides that admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. Even if it amounts to a clear admission, it will not act as a bar to the suit." 39. Even if it amounts to a clear admission, it will not act as a bar to the suit." 39. As regards the proposition of law that it was not open to the respondent-State to dispossess or dislodge the appellants from their possession of the temple as well as other property in question without observing due process ,f law. I am of the considered view that it was not open to the State Government to have either dispossessed or to have dislodged the plaintiff-appellants from their lawful possession over the property in dispute as the mere strength of some administrative order as referred to above. I am fortified in my observations from the judgment of the apex court in the matter of Union of India v. M. Bhaskar and other, 1996 (4) SCC 416 wherein identical question had arisen in appeal before the apex court against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench. The dispute was as to whether the Railway Board's memorandum dated 15.5.1987 being in the nature of administrative instructions, whether it was open to the Railway Board to have changed the provisions of the Railway Establishment Manual which was statutory in nature. Since the memorandum of 1987 had been issued by the Railway Authorities which was in consonance with Rule 1-A of the Indian Railways Establishment Code which had been legislated pursuant to the powers conferred upon it. by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and having stated that the recruitment in the lowest grade will be made in accordance with instructions laid down by the Railway Board from time to time which was not contrary to the Railway Establishment Code, it was held that the Board had the valid authority to issue the memorandum being in consonance with the said legislative enactment. 40. From the above discussion it is amply clear that if administrative order passed by particular departmental authority is to stand the test of judicial scrutiny, the same must he in strict consonance and in direct conformity with the statutory provisions of an enactment which is in force on the relevant date and if it is contrary to the said legislative enactment, this court would not hesitate in striking down the same as being illegal, and having been passed in excess of authority or jurisdiction not vested in the said authority in accordance with law. In the instant case the administrative order of Devasthan Department on the strength of which the respondent-State had threatened to take possession of the temple and the properties in dispute obviously based on administrative decision of an appropriate authority which was not in consonance with the spirit of the statute which does not permit the possession to be taken of the property in dispute by an appropriate authority without getting the degree executed lawfully and in compliance of due process of law. 41. As regards issue No. 6 whether the notice under Section 80 CPC is defective ? The said issue has been rightly decided in favour of the plaintiff. This finding has not been challenged by the State. 42. As regards issue No. 7 whether the suit is within time ? The learned trial court held that the suit was filed within the period of limitation and hence not bared under the Limitation Act. However, the trial court held the suit was barred as regards the relief to the possession of shops. It was contended that the cause of action for filing the suit as far as shops are concerned arose on 21.1.1955 and when orders for handing over only the temple to the plaintiff was passed and shops were not handed over. The Inter Ex. I clearly says that the plaintiff would "not be entitled to the income at present from the shops and houses attached." It inescapably leads to the conclusion that even on the said dated i.e. 21.1.1955 the matter regarding handing over shops and houses was under active consideration of the state and the embargo in Exhibit-1 was temporary. Even if it is assumed that temporary denial of the income of the shops while handing over the temple ought to have been starting point, the cause of action for the shops arose on 21.01.1955 and hence the suit having been filed on 15.7.1961 was very much within the limitation. As regards the cause of action as far as premises of Lord Laxmi Narayanji temple concerned, the dispute arose on 2.7.1958 when the State Government directed that the possession of the temple be taken back vide Ex. 2. In view of the aforesaid, suit having been filed on 15.7.1961 was well within the limitation for the temples as well as the shops. 43. 2. In view of the aforesaid, suit having been filed on 15.7.1961 was well within the limitation for the temples as well as the shops. 43. With regards to the idols/deities installed in the temple in question it is settled law that the same is a perpetual minor and the dedication once made to an idol cannot be revoked and further that limitation cannot be revoked and further that limitation cannot be pleaded against perpetual minor. I am fortified in my observations in this regards from the relevant extract from text hook "Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts by B.K. Mukherjee wherein it is opined as under: "The mere fact that an idol has been established does not itself creates a debater. A religious trust by way of debater can come into existence only when property is dedicated for worship or service of the idol." 44. As regards issue No. 3, 1 am of the view that the findings recorded by the trial court to the contrary are not sustainable and in view of- the above discussion the appellants are entitled to succeed and have been entrusted with the possession--of the property in question pursuant to the orders of this court, dated-Ir.1978 which was clarified by its subsequent order, dated 10.10.1996 and order dated 22.11.1996, the appellants being legal heirs of Late Shri Banshidhar, are entitled to retain, protect and continue with the possession of the property in question i.e., the temple as well as 24 shops and houses of which they are unlawfully dispossessed by the State without observing the process of law or an order of eviction against Late Shri Banshidhar or the present appellants from the court of competent jurisdiction. 45. It will not be out of place to mention here that the Estate Officer had given a direction with regard to the eviction of five tenants who were in use and occupation of the premises attached to the temple of Shri Laxmi Narayanji which was claimed by the State through the Devasthan Department under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964. The tenants had preferred appeals before the appellate Court, vide its judgment dated 30.9.1996, 28.11.1996 and 29.11.1996 in Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. The tenants had preferred appeals before the appellate Court, vide its judgment dated 30.9.1996, 28.11.1996 and 29.11.1996 in Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 111/1996, 12/1996 and 13/1996, 34/1996 and 31/1995 had allowed the said appeals and quashed and set aside the order of the Estate Officer holding that the relationship of landlord and the tenant was not established. The said judgments have since attained their finality since no appeal has been preferred by the State Government against the said judgments of the appellate court and the respondents were not found to be authorised to realise the rent from the tenants who were in the use and occupation of the property in question. 46. Before parting with the case I would like to observe that during the course of hearing it was brought to the notice of this court by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding information given by the Additional Advocate General to the State Government in file No. F.9/(2)/REB/7/88 of the Devasthan Department by which the State Government was advised to enter into an amicable settlement with the appellants. Learned Advocate Gcncral had also opined that from the correspondence of the State it was clear that the possession over the property in question is that of the original plaintiff Shri Banshidhar and his family members. In view of the above I gave repeated directions to the learned counsel for the respondents to produce the relevant file but the same was never made available to this court during the course of hearing of the appeal. 47. As a result of the above discussion the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 26.11.1977 passed by Addl. District Judge No. I Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 71/74(86/181) dismissing the plaintiff's suit for declaration injunction and rendition of accounts is quashed and set aside, there will be no order as to costs. The summoned record he sent hack forthwith.Appeal allowed - Judgment and decree under appeal set aside. *******