( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed u/s. 482, Cr. P. C. and it is directed against the order dated 11-9-96 in C. C. No. 1254/95 on the file of the learned Special Court for Economic Offences, Bangalore. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has prayed for quashing of the proceedings and discharging him. The petitioner is shown as the accused in the criminal case before the Trial Court and the respondent is the complainant before the Trial Court. ( 3 ) A complaint has been filed against the petitioner alleging an offence under S. 630 of the Companies Act. The complaint has been lodged on the ground that the petitioner was one of the Directors of the Company and he was granted the premises which is the subject matter of the proceedings during his tenure as a Director of the Company and in spite his term being over, the petitioner has not vacated the premises in question hence, the complaint under S. 630 of the Companies Act. Under the said provision, the criminal court has given power to evict a person and give possession to the complainant. The Special Court has observed that S. 630 of the Act is punishable with fine of Rs. 1,000/- only and therefore, it is a summons case and not a warrant case and therefore, the question of discharge does not arise. It is also observed that the petitioner who had earlier filed a petition under S. 258 of Cr. P. C. did not pursue the same and got it dismissed. ( 4 ) THE petitioner who is accused before the Lower Court submitted before the Special Court that there were two civil suits pending between the same parties in respect of the same subject matter and hence the criminal court cannot consider the petition filed under S. 630 of the Companies Act. It was opposed by the respondent/complainant on the ground that mere pendency of civil proceedings in Civil Courts will not take away the jurisdiction of the Special Court from entertaining the complaint under S. 630 of the Companies Act. The petitioner has cited a case reported in 67 Company Cases 564 (SC ). It was opposed by the respondent/complainant on the ground that mere pendency of civil proceedings in Civil Courts will not take away the jurisdiction of the Special Court from entertaining the complaint under S. 630 of the Companies Act. The petitioner has cited a case reported in 67 Company Cases 564 (SC ). But, the learned Special Judge has distinguished the same and has held that the said judgment was not applicable to the present proceeding pending before him and in regard to another case cited before him of the Bombay High Court, the learned Judge has observed that the nature of the property in the present proceeding before him was not in dispute and therefore, the principle laid down in the Bombay decision was also not applicable. Ultimately, the learned Sessions Judge, dismissed the application. ( 5 ) THE petitioner who is shown as the accused before the Lower Court has come up with this criminal petition filed under S. 482, Cr. P. C. , (hereinafter referred to as the 'code') with a prayer to set aside the impugned order passed by the Special Court and to quash the entire proceedings therein. ( 6 ) SRI B. V. Acharya, learned Senior Counsel who argued for the petitioner submitted relying upon the judgment in Damodar Das Jain v. Krishna Charan Chakraborti, (1990) 67 Com Cas 564 (SC) and judgment of the Bombay High Court in V. D. Futnani v. K. M. Futnani, (1990) 69 Com Cas 585, argued that complicated questions of law and fact arise in the case and therefore, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to decide the same under the provisions of Section 630 of the Companies Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). ( 7 ) ON the other hand, Sri. Naganand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the provisions of Section 630 of the Act is a beneficent provision enacted by the legislature object of which is to provide a summary procedure for retrieving the company property from an officer or an employee of a company who were in possession during the course of their employment and who wrongfully withholds possession of such property. It is submitted that in such cases it is the duty of the court to place a broad and liberal construction on the provisions of S. 630 of the Act in furtherance of the object and purpose of the legislation which would suppress the mischief and defend the remedy. The learned counsel has relied upon several decisions including the one in Abhilash Vinod Kumar Jain v. Cox and Kings (India) Ltd. , AIR 1995 SC 1592 and Texmaco Ltd. v. Arun Kumar Sharma (1991) 70 Com Cas 287 (Delhi) and other cases, which I will be referring in the course of this order. Section 630 of the Companies Act 1956 reads as follows :-"penalty for wrongful withholding of property :-- (1) If any officer or employee of a company-- (a) wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company or (b) having any such property in his possession, wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by this Act; he shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (2) The Court trying the offence may also order such officer or employee to deliver up or refund, within a time to be fixed by the Court, any such property wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly misapplied, or in default, to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. " ( 8 ) A reading of the above extract clearly show that it has been enacted for the benefit of a company to regulate the conduct of the officers and employees of the company. The officers and employees of the company are penalised for wrongfully obtaining possession of any property in his possession wrongfully withholds it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the Act. Section 630 is therefore, meant for safeguarding the property of a company, whether movable or immovable, by wrongful use thereof by the officers or employees of the company. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhilash Vinod Kumar Jain v. Cox and Kings (India) Ltd. , reported in AIR 1995 SC 1592, Section 630 of the Act provides for penal consequence for wrongfully withholding of the property of the company. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhilash Vinod Kumar Jain v. Cox and Kings (India) Ltd. , reported in AIR 1995 SC 1592, Section 630 of the Act provides for penal consequence for wrongfully withholding of the property of the company. The Section has been enacted with the main object of providing speedy relief to a company where its property is wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld by an"employee or an officer" or an "ex-employee or an officer" or anyone claiming under them. The Hon'ble S. C. in the above judgment has observed that : "the Legislature, which is supposed to know and appreciate the needs of the people by enacting Section 630 of the Act manifested that it was conscious of the position that today in the corporate sector private or public enterprise - the employees/officers are often provided residential accommodation by the employer for the 'use and occupation' of the concerned employee during the course of his employment. More often than not it is a part of the service conditions of the employee that the employer shall provide him residential accommodation during the course of his employment. If an employee, a past employee or anyone claiming the right of occupancy under them were to continue to 'hold' the property belonging to the company, after the right to be in occupation has ceased for one reason or the other, it would not only create difficulties for the company, which shall not be able to allot that property to its other employees, but would also cause hardship for the employee awaiting allotment and defeat the intention of the legislature. The Courts are therefore obligated to place a broader, liberal and purposeful construction on the provisions of Section 630 of the Act in furtherance of the object and purpose of the legislation and construe it in a wider sense to effectuate the intendment of the provision. "it has further observed in the course of the said judgment that :-"only an independent valid right, not only to occupation but also to possession of the property belonging to the company, unconnected with the employment of the deceased employee can defeat an action under Section 630 of the Act if it can be established that the concerned deceased employee had not wrongfully nor knowingly applied it for purposes other than those authorised by the employer. In interpreting a beneficent provision the Court must be forever alive to the principle that it is the duty of the Court to defend the law from clever evasion and defeat and prevent perpetration of a legal fraud. "therefore, if in a case if the company who is the complainant is able to prima facie show that the officer or employee of the company has wrongfully obtained possession of the property belonging to the company or that the employee or officer is having in his possession property belonging to the company and he is wrongfully withholding it or knowingly applies it to purposes other than as directed in the articles of the company or authorised by the Act. Therefore, the complainant who comes with the complaint under Section 630 of the Act has to prima facie show that the respondents are the accused in the complaint filed by him under Section 630 of the Act as an officer or employee of the complainant Co. , and the said officer has either wrongfully obtained the company's property or he has been withholding the company property wrongfully. ( 9 ) NOW let us see the facts of this case which are disclosed from the admitted facts on record. The facts are that there is a dispute between the petitioner and the respondent since quite sometime. O. S. No. 1788/91 was filed by the respondent company against the petitioner for declaration that the respondent ceased to be a Director of the Company. Injunction was granted against the respondent restraining him from cutting the rubber trees standing in the company's estate and remove the trees already cut. However, on 2-4-1991, the said suit was disposed of in terms of a compromise petition. It is also admitted that the actual term of the petitioner as a director expired on 30-9-1991. The petitioner filed O. S. 65/92 on the file of the Sub-Judge, Manjeri in Kerala State, restraining the respondent from interfering with his activities as a Director. That suit was ultimately dismissed on 2-1-1995. Thereafter, on 6-1-1995, the respondent filed O. S. No. 148/95 against the petitioner and others for injunction and obtained an ex parte order of injunction. However, on the application filed by the petitioner, the said ex parte order of injunction was modified on 20-3-1995 vacating the restrictions in respect of the property which is the subject matter of this petition. Thereafter, on 6-1-1995, the respondent filed O. S. No. 148/95 against the petitioner and others for injunction and obtained an ex parte order of injunction. However, on the application filed by the petitioner, the said ex parte order of injunction was modified on 20-3-1995 vacating the restrictions in respect of the property which is the subject matter of this petition. Against the said order, the respondent herein filed M. F. A. 802/95 before this Court. This Court, dismissed the said appeal filed by the respondent by its order dated 17-10-1995. ( 10 ) IN the said suit, which was the subject matter of the above mentioned appeal before this court, the claim of the respondent Company was that it was the owner of "a" schedule property of which 'b' 'schedule property forms a part. Admittedly, 'b' schedule property has been leased to a firm called M/s. Ruby Foams of which the petitioner is also a partner. The case put forward by the defendant is that the petitioner who was an executive director of the complainant company ceased to hold the office from 13-9-1991 and he has no right to enter upon 'a' schedule property. In the said suit, the petitioner has been contending throughout that in the 'a' schedule property another firm by name M/s. Ruby Latex Products, of which he as well as the Managing Director of the respondent/company are partners is also located and the respondent is not in possession of the entire 'a' schedule property. Being a partner of that firm M/s. Ruby Latex Products, he has got a right to go to that portion occupied by the said firm. He also contended that throughout he has been in occupation of the godown and office room and he is residing in a portion of the building which is by the side of the 'b' schedule property. This contention of the petitioner which is to the effect that he is in possession of the property in question in a different capacity and not in a capacity as an employee or officer of the company, has been upheld by the trial court and this court at the interlocutory stage of the proceeding had refused to grant an order of temporary injunction to the respondent against the petitioner. There is specific observation made by the trial Court and this Court that the respondents are not entitled to temporary injunction in respect of the portion where M/s. Ruby Latex Products are located. ( 11 ) THIS court in the course of the order in M. F. A. No. 802/95 has observed"the fact that the first defendant is a partner of M/s. Ruby Latex Products in which Sri M. K. Marattukalam who is the Managing Director of the defendant Company is also a partner is not disputed. The Lower Court on the basis of the partnership deed in a suit filed against that firm by the Bank and other documents has prima facie found that this firm is located in 'a' schedule property. The plaintiff has not tried to point out as to where else that firm is located if not in "a" schedule property. If that firm is located in 'a' schedule property then it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot claim to be prima facie in exclusive possession of the portion occupied by that firm the plaintiff cannot seek to prevent the first defendant who is the partner of that firm from visiting that firm. If temporary injunction is granted in respect of the entire 'a' schedule property which would virtually deprive the first defendant of his rights in the firm M/s. Latex Products as he would not be able to attend to the business carried on there. The plaintiff has not disclosed before the Court as to which particular portion is occupied by this firm or in what capacity that firm is carrying on business in a portion of 'a' schedule property. In the circumstances, the trial Court was wholly justified in excluding the portion of 'a' schedule property where this firm is located. " ( 12 ) THIS Court has further observed"the questions whether the first defendant shifted his personal office on that date and whether he occupied the building by the side of M/s. Ruby Foam when he was still a Director are to be considered at a later stage. But the fact that the first defendant is having his personal office in the building by the side of the 'b' schedule property was admitted by the plaintiff in the earlier suit. But the fact that the first defendant is having his personal office in the building by the side of the 'b' schedule property was admitted by the plaintiff in the earlier suit. Taking into consideration this admission as well as the other material on record, the Lower Court has prima facie found that the first defendant is in occupation of those portions by the side of 'b' schedule property. This Court further observed "it may be noted that the Managing Director of the plaintiff Company and first defendant are brothers and these brothers and other close relatives have constituted the plaintiff-Company as well as some other firms. The circumstances under which the defendant has been occupying the disputed portions by the side of 'b' schedule properties have to be investigated during the trial. At this stage, prima facie, there is no material to show that the first defendant occupied the portion by the side of 'b' schedule property only in his capacity as Director of the plaintiff Company. ( 13 ) IN view of the facts above mentioned in the present case there is a genuine dispute between the parties. The parties have approached the Civil Court and the respondent herein, who has filed the complaint under Section 630 of the Act before the lower Court has failed to get an order of temporary injunction against the respondent in respect of the subject matter of the complaint. There is no specific averment made by the respondent as observed by this court in the M. F. A. that the petitioner herein was put in possession of the premises in question because of his position as a Director of the Respondent Company. On the other hand, it is an undisputed fact that there is another firm, office of which is situated within the precincts of the premises, which is the subject matter of the complaint in which the petitioner as well as one of the directors of the complainant Company are partners and they have been attending the said office as partners of that Company. Therefore, it cannot be said in view of the facts of the case that the petitioner has been given the premises in question because of his position as Director of the Company. Therefore, it cannot be said in view of the facts of the case that the petitioner has been given the premises in question because of his position as Director of the Company. Section 630 of the Act will be attracted only if the complainant is able to show that the petitioner has been put in possession of the premises in question in view of his position as a Director of the Company. But the position here is that there are prima facie materials, which disclose that there is genuine dispute between the parties and it cannot be said that the petitioner has been in possession of the premises in question only because of his being Director of the Company. Several judgments have been cited by Sri Naganand, learned counsel in support of his argument that Section 630 of the Companies Act is a special provision to enable the Company to get immediate possession of the Company property which are in wrongful possession of the accused or the respondents. He has cited the judgment reported in 59 Com Cas 417 (Bom) equivalent (sic) 1988 (2) SCR 783 : ( AIR 1988 SC 733 ), Amrit Lal Chum v. Devoprasad Dutta Roy where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering whether a restrictive meaning can be given to the term officer or employee appearing in Sub-Section (1) of Section 630 of the Act. In Krishan Avtar Bahadur v. Col. Irwin Extross (1986) 59 Com Cas 417, a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court has held that"merely because the petitioner had filed a declaratory suit in the Court was not justified in staying the criminal proceedings on the broad theoretical ground that the question of tenancy would more appropriately be dealt with by that Court. "the facts of the said case was, the petitioner-accused was in the employment of the respondent No. 1 company from June, 1962 to June, 30, 1989 when his service was terminated and during his employment, he was allotted a flat in Malhar, Bombay. The said flat was taken on lease by the company before allotting the same to the accused-petitioner. After the accused petitioner's service was terminated, he was called upon to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the flat. But since he did not vacate the flat, a complaint was filed under Section 630 of this Act. The said flat was taken on lease by the company before allotting the same to the accused-petitioner. After the accused petitioner's service was terminated, he was called upon to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the flat. But since he did not vacate the flat, a complaint was filed under Section 630 of this Act. However, the accused petitioner also filed a suit in the Small Cause Court for declaration that in fact he was a tenant of the Company. Therefore, in that case there was no dispute at all about the allotment of a residential premises to the accused because of his employment in the company. That is not the admitted fact here. In S. P. Paliniswamy v. Sree Janardhana Mills Ltd. (1993) 76 Com Cas 323, where the Madras High Court has held that the moment the employment ceases, the employee is no longer entitled to remain in possession of the premises allotted to him and withholding of the premises after cessation of employment, amounts to wrongful withholding punishable as an offence by the Criminal Court, besides being required to vacate and handover possession to the company, which allotted the premises to him. Prosecution against him is, therefore, maintainable. In the said case, before the Madras High Court, there was no controversy that the premises belonged to the Company and also that the accused persons therein were permitted to occupy the premises during their tenure of office as an incident of service. These facts are disputed in this case. ( 14 ) ANOTHER case cited is Texmaco Ltd. v. Ram Dayal, (1993) 78 Com Cas 518 (Delhi ). In the said case also there was no dispute about the premises being allotted to the person, who was in employment of the company and the complaint was filed after he ceased to be in the employment of the company and after his withholding the property in spite of his leaving the company's employment. The said judgment is also not applicable to the facts of this case. The said judgment is also not applicable to the facts of this case. ( 15 ) IN Abdul Quayaum Ansari v. State of Maharashtra, (1991) 70 Com Cas 368, the Bombay High Court was considering the question whether the property of the Company which was wrongly held by its Officer was in possession of his heirs and legal representatives and whether those heirs or legal representatives are liable to be proceeded under Section 630 of the Act. While disposing of the case, the Bombay High Court has observed"the last contention of Sri Moray is regarding the tenancy of a bona fide civil dispute in Civil Suit No. 3492/88 pending in the court of Small Causes. It has to be observed that this suit has been filed after filing of the present complaint. It is now well established that a criminal complaint once lodged should be expeditiously disposed of and the same can be stayed only if the special facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. I do not find any special facts or circumstances in the present case to stay the present criminal prosecution pending the suit. "therefore, the Bombay High Court was of the view that if there are special circumstances, criminal proceedings initiated under Section 630 of the Act would be stayed. Moreover the Civil Suit was filed much after the criminal case. ( 16 ) IN Sushil Mittal alias Shiela v. VXL India Ltd. (1992) 74 Com Cas 836, the Punjab and Haryana Court held that a complaint filed under Section 630 of the Act is maintainable. In that case also admitted facts were that the quarters were allotted to the petitioner on the basis of her being an employee of the company and she had refused to vacate the quarters after her employment was terminated. That is not the position here. As observed in the said judgment an independent right can defeat an action taken under Section 630 of the Act. That is not the position here. As observed in the said judgment an independent right can defeat an action taken under Section 630 of the Act. ( 17 ) IN Damodar Das Jain v. Krishna Charan Chakraborti, (1990) 67 Com Cas 564, the facts were that the appellant company before the Hon'ble Supreme Court filed a complaint under Section 630 of the Act before the jurisdictional Magistrate on the ground that the respondent No. 1 in the case was provided with a company's flat for residence while he was in the employment of the company and he refused to vacate the flat in spite of his service being terminated and sought for eviction of the respondent from the flat by filing a complaint under Section 630 of the Act. The Magistrate passed an order directing eviction of the respondent No. 1. On appeal the Sessions Judge reversed the order of the Magistrate and the said order of the Sessions Judge was confirmed by the High Court. It is against those orders that the Company took up the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court while disposing of the matter has observed that"the High Court dismissed the appeal taking the view that the basic questions involved were whether the company could be said to be a tenant of the said flat as contemplated under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 and whether after the written agreement of licence in favour of the company has expired, it can be said that company was a licensee of the said flat. The Court took the view that both these questions were complicated questions of civil law and that the Magistrate's Court has no jurisdiction to decide the same. The High Court felt that the disputes raised by the respondent herein were bona fide disputes. Before us, it has not been disputed that this view of the High Court was correct as far as the question whether the company could be held to be a tenant of the flat is concerned. "therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order passed by the Lower Court reversing the original order passed by the Magistrate directing eviction of an accused employee of the company under Section 630 of the Act on the ground that bona fide dispute has arisen between them. "therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order passed by the Lower Court reversing the original order passed by the Magistrate directing eviction of an accused employee of the company under Section 630 of the Act on the ground that bona fide dispute has arisen between them. ( 18 ) IN Vishanjee Dungarmal Futnani v. Mrs. Krishna Mohanlal Futnani, (1990) 69 Com Cas 585, the Bombay High Court has held"in this case, the process of criminal court is being misused for coercing respondent No. 1 complainant to settle a purely civil dispute between the parties. The averments made in the complaint and the verification statement of the complainant do not disclose a prima facie case against respondent No. 1 for the alleged offence. The complainant made an incorrect and misleading statement referred to above in the complaint for obtaining a favourable order from learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. "on the said ground, the Bombay High Court quashed proceedings instituted by Company under Section 630 of Act. ( 19 ) THERE is no rule that no case filed under Section 630 of the Act could be stayed by the Higher Court and that the same cannot be quashed when there are circumstances to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P. C. and quash the proceedings. In this case, I am of the view that there is a bona fide dispute between the petitioner and the respondent in relation to premises in question. The respondent company had also approached the Civil Court and produced all the necessary materials before the Civil Court and had suffered an interim order, which had come up to this Court and again suffered an order and this court made an observation to the effect that the complainant respondent has suppressed certain materials and there is no prima facie case for an order of injunction in respect of subject matter of the petition in this favour. This Court refused to accept statement made by respondent complainant to the effect that the petitioner was granted the premises in the question because of his position as a Director in the respondent company. The respondent cannot nullify the said order passed by the Civil Court by resorting to proceedings under Section 630 of the Act. This Court refused to accept statement made by respondent complainant to the effect that the petitioner was granted the premises in the question because of his position as a Director in the respondent company. The respondent cannot nullify the said order passed by the Civil Court by resorting to proceedings under Section 630 of the Act. The intention of complainant-respondent is obvious and as observed by the Bombay High Court in Vishanjee Dungarmal Futnani case, the process of the criminal court is being misused for coercing the petitioner to settle a purely civil and family dispute. ( 20 ) LASTLY it was contention of Sri Naganand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent that this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. to quash the criminal proceedings. It is submitted relying upon the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and several other High Courts that this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. , and quash the criminal proceedings only in exceptional cases where this Court holds that the criminal proceedings are being misused for personal vengeance. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case in the above paragraphs, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner and the respondent being members of the same family are involved in civil disputes and both the parties have gone to civil courts and secured temporary orders and this Court on such an occasion when the parties have come before this Court, had an occasion to observe that there is a pending genuine dispute between the parties and there is no proof till the stage that the petitioner was put in possession of premises in question, which is the subject matter of those proceedings because of his being a Director of the company. Thus the respondent has suffered an order from the hands of this Court and an adverse observation has been made against his interest. The respondent cannot be allowed to nullify orders passed by the civil Courts including this Court by resorting to the proceedings under Section 630 of Act. Therefore, I am of the view that if the present criminal proceeding is allowed to continue against the petitioner, it will be an abuse of process of the court. The respondent cannot be allowed to nullify orders passed by the civil Courts including this Court by resorting to the proceedings under Section 630 of Act. Therefore, I am of the view that if the present criminal proceeding is allowed to continue against the petitioner, it will be an abuse of process of the court. ( 21 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this criminal petition is allowed and the Criminal Proceeding pending against the petitioner in C. C. No. 1254/95 on the file of Special Court for economic offences, Bangalore is hereby quashed. Petition allowed. --- *** --- .