Honble KHAN, J. – In this case Lalchand Petitioner sold on 20.1.1982 mixed milk to Qutbuddin, Food Inspector (PW 1) near Jhal Ka Kunwan at Tonk. On analysis, the Public Analyst found the sample milk adulterated for its not conforming to the prescribed standard of milk fat content at 4.5% and solid non-fat contents at 8.5%. The sample milk had fat content at 5.2% and solids non-fat at 6.10%. Ontrial the learned C.J.M. Tonk found the petitioner guilty of offence U/s. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (the Act), convicted him as such and sentenced to 1 year Rigorous Imprisonment and Rs. 1,000/- fine. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge, Tonk, confirmed the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. Hence, this revision petition u/s. 397 Cr.P.C. (2). Mr. Narendra Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since the case against the petitioner was not tried as a summary trial case, as required by Sec. 16A of the Act and was tried as a warrant trial case, the trial stood vitiated. However, no prejudice caused to the petitioner by the trial adopted in his case was pointed out. (3). In the case of Shyam Sunder vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (1), a similar question had arisen and the question was referred to a larger Bench for answer. The larger Bench opined that in post conviction cases the trial of a case for offence u/s. 16(1) read with Sec. 7 of the Act by adopting the procedure of a warrant case does not stand vitiated unless prejudice occasioned to the petitioner by trying thecase of the petitioner as per procedure for a warrant case has been shown in the present case, the argument advanced by Mr. Jain has no substance and is accordingly rejected. (4). It was next urged by Mr. Jain that before granting the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner, the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind and there-fore, the very basis for the prosecution of the petitioner was bad. No specific defect, save that the sanction Ex. P. 8 was not prepared in his hand by the sanctioning authority, was pointed out. (5). Jain that before granting the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner, the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind and there-fore, the very basis for the prosecution of the petitioner was bad. No specific defect, save that the sanction Ex. P. 8 was not prepared in his hand by the sanctioning authority, was pointed out. (5). In the case of Nand Kishore vs. State of Raj.(2), have examined this issue and on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhian Singhvs. Municipal Board, Saharanpur (3), have taken the view that what is required for initiation of prosecutions for offences under the Act is the ``written consent of the authority concerned and not ``sanction within the meaning of the term used in other enactments like Prevention of Corruption Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and since ``written consent may be givne even long before a particularoffence has taken place, to institute a particular case or class of cases, no question of applying ones mind to the facts of the case before the institution of prosecution in that case arise. In view of such opinion held by me on this point, there is no merits in Mr. Jains argument either in law or on facts. This argument too is rejected. (6). It was then urged by Mr. Jain that the report of the Public Analyst was notsent to the petitioner, as required by Sec. 13(2) of the Act and hence prejudice was occasioned to him. The Food Inspector has stated on oath that he had personally delivered the copy of Analysts report to the petitioner and obtained his signatures on Ex. P.10. This assertion of Food Inspector does not stand controverted. No such objection was even raised by the petitioner during the trial. I, therefore, find no substance in this argument too. (7). In the end it was submitted by Mr. Jain that looking to the fact that the petitioner comes from a poor family, is the sole bread earner for his family and has faced the ordeal of this litigation for about 14, 15 years, his release on probation orthe part of sentence already undergone by him with nominal increase in fine would meet the ends of justice. (8). Jain that looking to the fact that the petitioner comes from a poor family, is the sole bread earner for his family and has faced the ordeal of this litigation for about 14, 15 years, his release on probation orthe part of sentence already undergone by him with nominal increase in fine would meet the ends of justice. (8). In the case of Nand Kishore (supra) it was held that looking to the gravity of the offence, the likely consequences of such anti social activities threatening the health of the people at large, the legislative mandate contained in Sec. 16(1) andthe judicial approach to the sentencing policy in such cases, the discretion of the court of awarding punishment in such cases stands restricted to the imposition of imprisonment for not less than three months and of fine for not less than Rs. 500/- and that too for adequate and special reasons recorded in the judgment. The reasons pointed out by Mr. Jain are considered as adequate and special and there-fore reduction in the punishment given to the petitioner is made. (9). In view of the above the conviction of the petitioner for offence u/s. 7/16 of the Act is maintained but the sentence awarded to him by the two courts below is reduced to three months Rigorous Imprisonment plus fine of Rs. 5,00/- or in case of default in payment of fine to one month Rigorous Imprisonment more. With thismodification in sentence the petition is dismissed.