J. C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has filed the present writ petition for the quashing of the order dated 10. 2. 1987 passed by the 1st addl. District Judge, Ballia in Revision No. 55 of 1984 dismissing the revision as well as the order dated 21. 1. 1984 passed by respondent no. 2 dismissing petitioners objections filed under Section 47, CPC. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 is the decree-holder. On the basis of compromise, a money decree was passed in his favour, which was put in execution in Case no. 50 of 1981. The present petitioner filed objections under Section 47, cpc alleging that the judgment-debtor Ajit narain, father of the objector had with him less than one hectare of land, whose main source. of livelihood was agriculture and his annual household income did not exceed Rs. 2,400/- and the annual household income of this heirs also did not exceed Rs. 2,400/ -. In short the petitioners claim is that the judg-ment-debtor was a "marginal farmer" within the meaning of Section 2 (9) of the U. P. Debt relief Act, 1977, hereinafter referred to as the act and so the decree in question was unexecutable. The Executing Court rejected the said objection and the revision filed by the petitioner, has also been dismissed. Mr. K. N. Rai appeared for the petitioner and Mr. R. N. Singh appeared on behalf of respondent no. 3. Standing Counsel is present for respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued before this court that the Executing court as well as the, revisional court have committed a gross error of law in not -making enquiry into the main question whether or not the petitioner was entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions of the Act on the basis of. his being a "marginal farmer". It is further urged that the petitioner has alternatively claimed that if he could not be treated as "marginal farmer", he was a small farmer within the meaning of Sub-section (11)of Section 2 of the Act and again on this questiort neither any enquiry has been made by both the courts below nor any finding has been recorded and therefore, according to petitioners counsel both the orders are not sustainable in law. ( 3 ) SECTION 4 of the Act makes a provision as to in what circumstances debts stand discharged under the provisions of the Act. Section 4 reads as follows:"4. Discharge of debts-Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any contract, decree or other instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act. (a) every debt, together with any interest, payable on the date of commencement of the Act, by a debtor whose annual household income does not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees shall with effect from the date of such commencement, be deemed to be wholly discharged; (b) every debt payable on the date of such commencement by a debtor whose annual household income exceeds two thousand and four hundred rupees shall be wholly discharged, if the debtor- (i) has paid, in the discharge of his debt, a sum exceeding or equivalent to double the amount of principal in respect of the debt, at any time before such commencement , and such discharge shall be effective from the date of such commencement; (ii) pays after the date of such commencement, a sum which together with any sum already paid in the discharge of such debt, is equivalent to or exceeds double the amount of principal in respect of the debt, or the amount actually whichever is less, and such discharge shall be effective from the date of such payment. "section 22 of the Act creates a bar to suits and other proceedings. Section 22 reads as follows:"bar to certain suits-Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force- (a) no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain a suit, application or proceedings against a small farmer in respect of any debt to which the provisions of this Chapter apply; (b) every such suit, application or proceeding pending before any such court on the date of commencement of this Act shall abate; (c) no decree of a Civil Court in rela-tion to the debt to which the provisions of this Chapter apply shall be executed. " ( 4 ) THE Scheme of the Act 1977 and the provisions make it clear that after the commencement of the Act, a decree passed by a civil court in relation to a debt to which the provisions of Chapter-IV of the Act apply, is not executable. The definition of debt as contained in section 2 (5) of the Act states that "debt" includes all liabilities owing to a creditor in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, payable to a debtor or a small farmer under a decree or order of a civil court or otherwise, and subsisting on the date of commencement of the act, whether sued or not. It would thus follow that even a money decree passed by civil court is included in the definition of "debt" under the provisions of the Act. Section 22 (c) creates a complete bar on the execution of the decree of civil court in relation to a debt to which the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act apply. Section 4 of the Act runs with a. nonobstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or any contract, decree or other instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every debt, together with any interest, payable on the date of commencement of this Act, by a debtor whose annual household income does not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees shall with effect from the date of such commencement, be deemed to be wholly discharged. Section 5 (b) then lays down that no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding against such debtor for the recovery of any debt including, interest, if any. The word debtor has been defined by Section 2 (6) to mean a landless agriculturer, labourer, a marginal farmer, a rural artisan or any urban worker who owes a debt, but does not include a small farmer. The word debtor has been defined by Section 2 (6) to mean a landless agriculturer, labourer, a marginal farmer, a rural artisan or any urban worker who owes a debt, but does not include a small farmer. ( 5 ) THE combined reading of Sections 2 (5), 2 (6), 2 (9), 4 and 5 leads to the conclusion that the liability to pay the debt by a marginal farmer whose annual household income does not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees stand discharged from the date of the commencement of the Act and no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding against such debtor for the recovery of any debt including interest. As already stated above, the word debt includes a decree of the civil court and the reference to the word "proceeding" in clause (b) of Section 5 makes it clear that the bar created therein applies to execution proceedings also. ( 6 ) IN the present case, therefore, the main question which required determination before the courts below was whether the petitioner was a marginal farmer within the definition of Section 2 (9) of the Act and whether his annual household income did not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees so as to discharge him from the liability to pay the "debt" which included the money decree passed against him by the civil court? A perusal of the orders passed by both the courts below, indicates that none of them has gone into this disputed question of fact. The petitioner in his objections claimed that he owns agricultural land less than one hectare and his total annual household, income did not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees. This claim of the petitioner was denied by the decree-holder/respondent and according to him the petitioner owns much more land and his annual income also exceeded the limit of Rs. 2,400/ -. However, the courts below did not prefer to decide this question of fact merely on the ground that since the petitioner did not raise such a plea "before passing of the decree and had entered into a compromise, he was estopped from raising such a plea in his objections filed under section 47, CPC. 2,400/ -. However, the courts below did not prefer to decide this question of fact merely on the ground that since the petitioner did not raise such a plea "before passing of the decree and had entered into a compromise, he was estopped from raising such a plea in his objections filed under section 47, CPC. It may be worthwhile to mention here that the petitioner, who was defendant in the suit filed by the respondent entered into a compromise and on the basis of that compromise money decree was passed. This admission of the petitioner could at best amount to an admission on his part that he agreed for the passing of the decree against him, but there was no such admission nor there could be that he would have no right to challenge the execution of the decree even though its execution under law may be expressly barred. It is well-established principle that admission against law is not enforceable. The compromised entered into the petitioner was only in relation to the passing of the decree and there was no admission on the part of the petitioner that the decree would be executable against him. even though forbidden by law. In this view of the matter, the mere fact that the petitioner had agreed for the passing of the decree as per the compromise and consequently the decree was passed, cannot lead to the conclusion that the petitioner would be estopped from contending before the Executing court that the decree in question is unexecutable under law by virtue of the provisions of U. P. Debt Relief Act, 1977. ( 7 ) SINCE in the present case both the courts below have not gone into the most crucial and relevant questions of fact, the case will have to be sent back to the Executing Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above, as this court while exercising powers under article 226 of the Constitution does not act as a court of fact especially when the enquiry is to be made on a disputed question of fact. ( 8 ) FOR the above reasons, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 10. 2. 1987 passed by respondent no. 1 and the order dated 21. 1. ( 8 ) FOR the above reasons, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 10. 2. 1987 passed by respondent no. 1 and the order dated 21. 1. 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 are set aside and the executing Court is directed to decide the objections of the petitioner filed under Section 47, CPC afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Since the matter has become very old, the Executing court shall decide the objections within a period of two months from date of production of a certified copy of this order. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed case remanded. .