S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J, J. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Standing Counsel repre senting the respondents. 2. Perused the record. 3. In the proceedings under Section 10 (2) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, the Prescribed Authority vide its judgment and order dated 25-1-1976 declared an area of 24 Big has 13 Biswas recorded as agricultural holding in the name of Hublal son of Janaki to be surplus. "the aforesaid order indicates that the notice in respect of the proceedings had been served on Hublal on 7-1-1976 who had neither filed any objec tion nor had appeared seeking any further time to file the same. 4. Thereafter Smt. Sheela Devi one of the petitioners claiming to be a tenure-holder filed an appeal along with an ap plication seeking condonation of delay in filing the same. The appellate authority rejected the said application and dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 2-2-1985, observing that the appellant should have first moved the Prescribed Authority and should have approached the appellate court thereafter. It was observed that in stead of approaching the regular forum she had jumped to the appellate court which was not justified but it was left open to her to approach the Prescribed. Authority for the redressed of her grievan ces directing the prescribed authority to consider the matter sympathetically. 5. The petitioners thereafter moved an application on 18-9-1985 seeking recall of the order dated 25-1- 1976. In the af fidavit filed in support of the aforesaid application, it was asserted that Hublal had executed a sale-deed in respect of his half share in the land in dispute vide the sale-deed dated 21-2- 1972 in favour of Smt. Dev Kali, Smt. Shyam Kali, Smt. Ram Rati, Smt. Sheela Devi and Smt. Subhraji wife of Shiv Kumar and had delivered pos session to the transferees who were con tinuing to be in exclusive possession over the same. It was asserted that Hublal had no right, title or interest left in the land in dispute and the holdings belonging to the objectors had been declared to be surplus treating the same to be belonging to Hublal. It was asserted that the objectors came to know of the order declaring thp land in dispute as surplus on 1 -9-1983. It was asserted that Hublal had no right, title or interest left in the land in dispute and the holdings belonging to the objectors had been declared to be surplus treating the same to be belonging to Hublal. It was asserted that the objectors came to know of the order declaring thp land in dispute as surplus on 1 -9-1983. The true copies of the aforesaid applications filed by Smt Sheela Devi and Smt. Sukhraji have been annexed as An-nexures-4 and 5 to the writ petition, alongwith the copies of the affidavits filed in support thereof. 6. The prescribed authority vide its order dated 6-3-1986 dismissed the aforesaid applications being of the view that there could be no justification for affording an opportunity to file an objec tion as prayed for as the final orders declar ing the land in dispute surplus had already been passed on 25-1-1976. 7. The aforesaid order of the prescribed authority was challenged in an appeal. The appellate authority was of the view that Hublal was alive on 8-6-1973 and the notice was issued to him in the proceedings in question had been served on his daughter-in-law but no objection had been filed by his heirs and the restora tion application before the prescribed authority was also filed after substantial delay which was not explained. 8. The appeal was dismissed holding that since the delay had not been explained properly, the application for restoration deserved to be rejected. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the respondent authorities have manifestly erred in treat ing the applications filed by the petitioners to be the application seeking recall of the order dated 25-1-1976 by way of restora tion even though taking into considera tion the facts asserted in the affidavit filed in support of the aforesaid applications it was apparent that the applicants had raised objections contemplated under Section 11 (2) of the U. P. imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 and had actually prayed for the disposal of those applications on merits. 10. The learned Standing Counsel has urged that the land in dispute had already vested in the State and on the strength of the belated objections, the case could not be allowed to be reopened. 10. The learned Standing Counsel has urged that the land in dispute had already vested in the State and on the strength of the belated objections, the case could not be allowed to be reopened. It was also asserted that the alleged sale-deeds relied upon by the petitioner were factious documents and had been executed only with the intention to defraud the State and the petitioners had no right, title or inter est in the land in dispute. 11. This Court in its Full Bench decision in the case of Baldeo Singh v. State of U. P and others, reported in 1980 All CJ 451 had clarified that an objection under Section 11 (2) of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act can be entertained even after the surplus land had been notified under Section 14 (1) of the Act and had vested in the State. It had also been clarified that in a case where the surplus land had been notified under Sec tion 14 (1), the provisions contained in Section 11 (2) of the said Act afforded an alternative remedy to a person who had not filed statement contemplated under Section 9 of the Act and to whom the notice under sub-section (2) of Section 10 had not been issued. 12. Further in its another Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Charon v. State of U. P. and others, reported in 1978 All. C. J. 455, while upholding the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dilbagh Singh v. State of U. P & others Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 255 of 1976, decided on 16-5- 1978 it had been clarified that inspite of the repeal of sub section (3) to (7) of Section 14 a person claiming to be a tenure-holder though he is not recorded in the revenue papers as such is entitled to file an objection under Section 11 (2) of the Act and get his right adjudicated. 13. It may further be noticed that a Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Abdul Rahman and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, reported in 1979 ACJ10 had observed that an applica tion purporting to be under Section 13-A of the Act submitted by the petitioner in that case was essentially an objection under Section 11 (2) of the Act. This Court had observed further that the said objec tion could not be rejected merely on the ground that one of the sale-deeds hap pened to be of a date subsequent to 24-1 -71 as even in that case it was open to the petitioners to satisfy the prescribed authority that they were entitled to the benefits of proviso (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act. Genuineness of the transfer under the sale-deed had to be considered on merits. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the order rejecting, the ap plication of the petitioner in that case was set aside holding that such a rejection could not be sustained in law. This Court after setting aside the impugned order had directed the Prescribed Authority to con sider the claim of the petitioner treating the application as an objection under Sec tion 11 (2) of the Act. 14. In its decision in the case of Lach-mi Narain and another v. Munni Lal and another, reported in 1963 A. L. J. 821, a Division Bench of this Court had observed that a citizen in this country is entitled to resort to a court of justice for relief from injustice and for protection of his rights and it cannot be conceived that is his duty to quote the correct section of the law under which he is seeking relief and protection. The Division Bench of this Court had emphasised that it is the courts duty to extend him relief and protection according to the law indicating that the Courts have long overgrown the ancient regidity of form and procedure. In that case even though the appellants had wrongly asked for relief under Rule 58, this Court held that the Civil Judge should have treated the objection under Section 47 and should have decided the same on merits. It was observed that it was rather unfortunate that the Civil Judge had misapprehended the legal nature of the objection and had dismissed the same summarily under the proviso to Rule 58. It was further indicated that it would scarcely be just and reasonable to draw a pal of fiction over the Courts blunder and the resulting wrong to the appellants. 15. It was further indicated that it would scarcely be just and reasonable to draw a pal of fiction over the Courts blunder and the resulting wrong to the appellants. 15. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and the position under law as clarified by this court in the decisions referrreferred to hereinabove, I am of the considered opinion that the applica tions filed by the petitioners referred to hereinabove, taking into consideration the assertions made in the affidavits filed in support thereof ought to have been treated as an objection under Section 11 (2) of the Act and disposed of on merits according to law. 16. Sufficient ground has therefore, been made out justifying an interference by this Court. 17. The writ petition accordingly suc ceeds in part. The impugned orders dated 6-3-1996, passed by the Prescribed Authority and the order dated 12-4-1988 passed by the appellate authority, true copies whereof have been filed as An-nexures-4 and 7 respectively to this writ petition are quashed with the direction to the prescribed authority to consider the applications of Smt. Sheela Devi and Smt. Sukhraji in accordance with law treating the same to be objection under Section 11. (2) of the Act. 18. . There shall however, be no or ders as to costs. Petition allowed partly. .