This is an appeal against the acquittal arising out of judgment dated 31.7.90 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) Lunglei in GR Case No. 67 of 1975 thereby acquitting the accused respondent on the charge under section 302 IPC giving him the benefit of doubt. 2. Before proceeding any further in the matter, it needs to be noted that the Judiciary has not yet separated from the Executive and the mandate and message of Article 50 of the Constitution still remains a printed word even in the 50th year of the Independence of the country. This observation has become necessary in the context of this case which was disposed of 15 years after the commission of offence and the appeal is being decided today exactly 7 (seven) years after the delivery of the judgment of the trial Court. 22 years have elapsed between the date of commission of offence, the trial of the accused and disposal of the appeal. 3. The criminal justice is still administered b)'the Deputy Commissioner and his Assistants as contemplated in the Rules for the Regulation of the Procedure of Officers appointed to Administer Justice in the Lushai Hills, 193 7. Even going by the provisions contained in Regulations particularly Regulation 11. which dictates expeditious disposal of criminal cases. The case at hand has taken 15 years at the trial stage and another 7 years for disposal of the appeal, a sad commentary in itself. It is the time and in need of rather that the judiciary is separated from the Executive and the sooner it is done is better in the interest of the people of this State. 4. Coming to the prosecution case, the deceased and the accused are from the same battalion in the CRPF posted at the material time at Lunglei. On 14.5.75 around 3.45 in the afternoon the deceased Constable Charan Singh had come to the water guard for detailing Sepoy on duty, while he was talking with the Guard Commandar Raj Narayan and Nk Moti Singh, it is alleged that the accused who was also on guard duty till few minutes prior to the incident fired a shot at Charan Singh from his service Rifle, the injured Charan Singh was immediately rushed to the Civil Hospital at Lunglei. all attempts at saving his life"failed and he succumbe4 to the injuries around 9 PM in the same night. 5. all attempts at saving his life"failed and he succumbe4 to the injuries around 9 PM in the same night. 5. It was next day that an FIR. Ext 1 was lodged at Lunglei PS on the basis of which a case under section 302IPC was registered and taken under investigation. PW 12 coducted he ivestigatioi and receiving the FIR he proceeding to the Hospital held an inquest and prepared report, Ext 11. Visiting the place of occurrence, he seized Rifle No.55270 with bullet magazine containing 4 rounds and one fired cartridges. He also seized Duty Register of the Quarter Guards. The dead body was sent for post mortem examination which was conducted by PW 9. The post mortem examination report is Ext 6. According to this report, Charan Singh died due to internal haemorrhage as a result of injury to inferior vena cava caused by bullet. Statements of witnesses were recorded. On completion of investigation the accused was charged and tried for above offence as already noted above, the trial Court acquitted him giving the benefit of doubt. Hence this appeal against acquittal. 6. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has raised the following points : (1) That the findings recorded by the trial Court are perverse; (2) That the trial Court has failed to appreciate eye witness on account of the occurrence in a realistic manner in its true perspective; (3) The so called benefit of doubt given to the accused is a result of a vacillating fickle minds on the part of the trial Court. According to him there is clinching evidence of eye witnesses particularly that of PW 2. Thakur Singh. PW 3 Ami Chand which is amply corroborated by a report of the Ballistic Expert, the post mortem examination report and res geslae evidence of PW 5 Naik Moti Singh and PW 7 Rajnarayan, Learned Amicus Curiae placing reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in Tota Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083 submitted that the view taken by the trial Court of the evidence available on record can by no means said to be perverse and that a mere possibility of taking a different view of the evidence on record is not a justifiable ground for interference. Referring to Sarad Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 , learned counsel urged that the circumstances established in the case do not unerringly point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. He also submitted that the accused was not properly examined under section 313 CrPC. Before proceeding further, it would not be out of place to quote the following passage from Tota Singh's case : "This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the appellate Court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate Court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous." It is strictly within the narrow ambit and scope of interference, as permissible under the law and in the light of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court we are considering the impugned judgment of acquittal. 7. Let us, therefore, see on what grounds the trial Court has acquitted the accused respondent. 7. Let us, therefore, see on what grounds the trial Court has acquitted the accused respondent. The impugned judgment is structured into 13 paragraphs, out of them the first six paragraphs are of formal nature supporting with the prosecution story, the procedural compliance of settling (sic) documents to the accused, his pleading not guilty to the charge and claiming to be tried, the number of witnesses examined by the prosecution, and the plea taken by the accused that he was sleeping in the Guard Room are noted in the first six paragraphs. While paragraph 7 is a brief resume of the prosecution evidence and paragraph 11 merely reproduces. The ingredients constituting offence under section 302 IPC. Really speaking whatever reasons and appreciation of evidence is there in the impugned judgment, it is to be found in paragraphs 8 to 13. 8. In paragraph 8. the trial Judge has come to the conclusion mat there was no eye witness to the gun shot being fired by the accused. In paragraph 9 the trial Judge has merely noted that the topography and the site plan and dimension of the Guard Room as deposed by PW 1, Birbal Singh. Paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment concluded the finding that the accused was on duty from 1100 hours to 1300 hours and had deposited his Anns after his duty was over at 1300 hours. Referring to evidence of PW 1, Shri Birbal Singh, PW 2 Shri Thakur Singh, PW 3 Ami Chand and PW 5, Moti Singh, the trial Court has further concluded that the accused left the gun at the Guard Room at the instance of PW 1 Birbal Singh. In the same paragraph, the trial Judge has referred to the seizure and sending of Rifle to the Ballistic Expert and has highlighted the fact that the expert could not determine the exact time as to when the Rifle was fired last. 9. In the same paragraph, the trial Judge has referred to the seizure and sending of Rifle to the Ballistic Expert and has highlighted the fact that the expert could not determine the exact time as to when the Rifle was fired last. 9. Referring to K. Gopal Reddy vs. State of AP, AIR 1979 SC 387 and State of Punjab vs. Bhajan Singh, AIR 1975 SC 258 in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment and reiterating the principle of the degree of proof required in a criminal trial and the difference between may be true and must be true, as explained by the Supreme Court without any reference to the evidence available on record the trial Judge has observed "there may be some suspicious circumstances against the accused yet those circumstances alone cannot lead to an irresistible conclusion that he committed the crime against the deceased". 10. Paragraph 13 repeats the same, without any deliberation or discussions of the evidence available on record and this concludes the judgment giving the benefit of doubt to the accused and holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the foregoing discussions, the following five reasons or grounds as assigned by the trial Court, emerge from the impugned judgment: (i) Absence of eye witness; (ii) Duty hours of the accused and depositing the Rifle by the accused at 1300 hours; (iii) Placing of the Rifle by the accused at the Guard Room at the instance of PW 1 Birbal Singh; (iv) Ballistic Expert not reporting the exact time of firing; and (v) Circumstances established being of a suspicious nature and therefore benefit of doubt given to the accused. 11. Since the learned trial Judge has gone by the theory of reasonable doubt and the benefit of doubt to be given to the accused, the learned Amicus Qiriae has emphasised that the mere possibility of taking a different view of the evidence available on record is not a ground for interference in an appeal for acquittal. It would not be out of place at this stage to dispose of the point with reference to some judgments. "The 'ressonable doubt' is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man. It would not be out of place at this stage to dispose of the point with reference to some judgments. "The 'ressonable doubt' is one which occurs to a prudent and reasonable man. Section 3 while explaining the meaning of the words 'proved' 'disoorved' and 'not proved' lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man. The section is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind, first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of a fact, in other words, 'believe it to exist' and secondly in which though he may not feel absolutely certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances act on the assumption of its existence. The Code while adopting the requirement of the prudent man as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof at the same time contemplates of giving full effect to circumstances or condition of probability or improbability. It is this degree of certainty to be arrived where the circumstances before a fact can be said to be proved. A fact is said to be disproved when the Court believes that it does not exist or considers its non existence so probable in the view of a prudent man. Then comes the third stage where in the view of a prudent man the fact is not proved ie neither proved nor disproved. It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of criminal disputes. It is something different from moral conviction and it is also different from a suspicion. It is the result of a process of keen examination of the entire material on record by a prudent man. There is a difference between a flimsy or fantastic plea which is to be rejected altogether. But a reasonable though incompletely proved plea which casts a genuine doubt on the prosecution version indirectly succeeds. The doubt which the law contemplates is certainly not that of a weak or unduly vacillating capricious, indolent, drowsy or confused mind. It must be the doubt of the prudent man who is assumed to possess the capacity to 'separate the chaff from the grain'. The doubt which the law contemplates is certainly not that of a weak or unduly vacillating capricious, indolent, drowsy or confused mind. It must be the doubt of the prudent man who is assumed to possess the capacity to 'separate the chaff from the grain'. It is the doubt of a reasonable astute and alert mind arrived at after due application of mind to every relevant circumstance of the case appearing from the evidence. It is not a doubt which occurs to a wavering mind." (See Vijayee Singh vs. State of UP, AIR 1990 SC 1459 ) Similarly what is reasonable doubt has been explained by the Supreme Court in State of UP vs. Chet Ram, AIR 1989 SC 1543 which reads as follows : "As an abstract proposition of argument it maybe stated that every case affords potential for two views being taken but it has to be realised that the alternative view must have some content of plausibility in it and without the same, the said view cannot be countenanced in law as a plausible alternative. But where the prosecution evidence is of an unimpeachable nature and affords no scope for two view being taken the same should be accepted." 12. The definition of proof as contained in section 3 of the Evidence Act does not require the fact to be proved with mathematical accuracy and procedure as has been explained by the Supreme Court in State of UP vs. Krishna Gopal, AIR 1988 SC 2154 . 13. Now adverting to the evidence on record, which has been omitted and excluded from consideration by the trial Court while referring to the well known principle of administration of criminal justice, the first witness Birbal Singh has testified that it was around 3.45 PM that he heard a shot being fired at that point of time, it was about a distance to 30 to 35 yards and he saw through the window that the accused was standing with a Rifle in his hand. The fact of hearing the sound of the shot being fired and seeing the accused standing with Rifle in his hand is almost simultaneous just a flicker of a moment, it is not as if the witness heard the sound of a shot being fired and came to the spot after a long lapse of time say 15/20 minutes and saw the accused standing with a Rifle in his hand. This is how the trial Court has approached the evidence of PW 1, totally disregarding the ground realities of life, but for the firing of the shot his (Balbir Singh) attention would not have been attracted to the accused standing with a Rifle in his hand. It is just in a split of a moment that the whole incident occurred, not that on receiving information the witness came to the spot. Of course, PW 1 in his cross examination has admitted that I did not see accused Kishan Singh firing a bullet at Charan Singh and honestly so. he does not advance a false claim of having actually seeing the accused aiming at Charan Singh and firing a shot, but the moment he heard that the shot was being fired and his attention diverted, he saw the accused standing with a Rifle in his hand and this statement of PW 1 has not even been attempted to be challenged, on the other hand what one gets in cross examination of this witness is "when I came to the Quarter Guard I did not see any one else except the accused in the Guard Room". Now this part of the evidence has been altogether overlooked and excluded from consideration by the learned trial Judge. 14. More or less in the same vein is the evidence of PW 2. Thakur Singh. he saw Havildar Major Charan Singh talking to Guard Commander Raj Narayan. PW 7 and Naik Moti Singh. Now this part of the evidence has been altogether overlooked and excluded from consideration by the learned trial Judge. 14. More or less in the same vein is the evidence of PW 2. Thakur Singh. he saw Havildar Major Charan Singh talking to Guard Commander Raj Narayan. PW 7 and Naik Moti Singh. PW 5, he was on sentry duty from 5 AM to 5 PM and it was during his duty hours around 3.45 PM the incident took place, as testified by him, while the deceased w-as talking to the Guard Commander and Naik Moti Singh, he heard sound of gun firing, he looked behind from his sentry position and saw that Charan Singh was lying on the verandah of the Guard Room and Guard Commander Raj Narayan fleeing from scene out of fear, the accused was seen standing with a Rifle just in front of the door of the Guard Room, he slightly moved from his sentry position. There was nothing in his cross examination not even a suggestion to disbelieve him on the point that he saw the accused standing with a Rifle in his hand just in front of the door of the Guard Room. 15. The logic advanced by the trial Judge is that since the duty hours of the accused had expired by 13.00 hours, how could he be in possession of the Rifle ? On one hand there is eye witness stating that he was standing with a Rifle in his hand, on the other hand the learned trial Judge is merely going by the routine charge of duty hours, this is no appreciation of evidence. It is as if impossible for a. Guard to take up Rifle from the Guard Room once the duty hours are over ? While appreciating the evidence the Court has to evaluate the same by applying yardstick of human probability where fire certainly took place, a certain amount of confusion in the minds of those who heard the shot being fired is always there and even an honest and truthfulness witnesses may differ in some details, unrelated to the main incidence. In the instant case, the prosecution witnesses so far as main incident is concerned are consistent. In the instant case, the prosecution witnesses so far as main incident is concerned are consistent. The learned trial Judge has mechanically gone by the honest statements made by the witnesses that they did not see the accused actually firing the shot without making any attempt at reconciling the two simultaneously occurring actions hearing the sound and seeing the accused with Rifle as deposed to by witnesses. There is hardly any appreciation of evidence on the part of the trial Court. 16. It has come in the evidence of PW 3 Ami Chand that no sooner he heard the sound of firing around 3.45 PM he looked at the Quarter Guard and also heard some body shouting 'Accused Ne Mardia'. It is this statement which has been sought to be used as a dying declaration and the learned Amicus Curiae is right in his submission that it cannot be used as a dying declaration. PW 3 does not say that he heard the injured Charan Singh said 'Accused Ne Mardia' and secondly it would be wholly unbelievable for the injured Charan Singh to have used the word 'Accused'. 17. It may also be noted at this stage that all the prosecution witnesses baring the Doctor and the IO are Hincli speaking witnesses and the learned trial Judge 'ho recorded the evidence has used the word 'accused'. It is not really very clear whether the accused was described by his name, by the witness or by the Judge, who merely noted his version. Be that as it may, to be on the safer side, we do not treat it as dying declaration made by the deceased under section 32 of the Evidence Act. But this statement is certainly relevant, under section 6 of the Evidence Act. Illustration (a) to section 6 makes the position very clear : "6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places. Illustrations (a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Illustrations (a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact." The trial Court has not at all adverted to this aspect of the matter- 18. It would thus be seen that the learned trial Judge was palpably wrong in coming to the conclusion that there was no eye witness to the occurrence. In face of the overwhelming evidence available on record, the above finding recorded by the trial Court is wholly perverse and cannot therefore, be sustained in law. It is this perversity which impel us to interfere with the impugned judgment. Apart from the evidence of the eye witnesses as discussed above, there is overwhelming res gestae evidence strongly connected with and constituting an integral part of the act of firing by the accused which has been totally ignored by the trial Court. The post mortem examination report fully supports the prosecution case, there is nothing in cross examination of PW 9 to reject his opinion. The evidence of PWs 10 and 11 as regards seizure of Rifle and other incriminating articles has virtually gone imchallenged. 19. In view of the above discussions, really speaking it is not necessary to go into the principles governing circumstantial evidence as laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarad Sarda's case (supra) the pfosecution case does not depend on circumstantial evidence as has been erroneously presumed to be by the learned trial Judge. There are eye witnesses and apart from eye witnesses there is res gestae evidence as already discussed above. The question of motive, as urged by the learned Amicus Curiae, has its relevance and importance in cases depending on circumstantial evidence. In cases where eye witnesses are available 'motive' loses its significance. 20. Coming to the other ground assigned by the trial Court for acquittal, namely the inability of Ballistic Expert to give the exact time of last firing by the Rifle in question, the resulting opinion of Ballistic Expert is available on record as Ext 7. In cases where eye witnesses are available 'motive' loses its significance. 20. Coming to the other ground assigned by the trial Court for acquittal, namely the inability of Ballistic Expert to give the exact time of last firing by the Rifle in question, the resulting opinion of Ballistic Expert is available on record as Ext 7. The learned trial Judge has merely gone by that part of the opinion that says it is not possible to state the duration of firing overlooking a very material part in the same report to the following effect: "Therefore, it is concluded that the evidence empty fired cartridge case marked as Ex B5 was fired through the Rifle Ex A." 21. As already noted above, the seizure of empty cartridge soon after the incident has noteven been challenged and the Ballistic Expert's report conclusively established that cartridge was fired through the Rifle was seized. Where is the scope to doubt. The seizure of the Rifle and the empty cartridge has not even been challenged (It is not to suggest that in absence of challenge by the accused, the Court has to take it as true). But in the instant case the most reliable piece of evidence, the expert report conclusively established that the empty cartridge as seized soon after the incident was fired from the Rifle which was simultaneously seized. 22. Taking a total view of the evidence available on record, the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge, for basing his judgment of acquittal, stand on quick sand, naturally therefore, the order of acquittal is bound to collapse. Although we are conscious about the long distance time that has lapsed since the commission of crime, as it is said the criminal acts committed died with the man. The time gap, is no doubt unduly long, but that should not deter us from our duty. 23. In view of the foregoing discussions, this appeal deserves to be allowed, it is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of acquittal is set aside. The accused respondent is found to be guilty of offence punishable under section 302 IPC, he is accordingly sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The accused respondent is to surrender to his bail bond.