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1997 DIGILAW 1386 (RAJ)

Satya Prakash v. Madan Lal

1997-11-21

A.S.GODARA

body1997
JUDGMENT 1. - This Civil Revision Petition has been preferred under Section 115, CPC by the defendant-petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 21-8-97 whereby the learned Addl. Civil Judge (JD) No. 1, Jodhpur dis-allowed application filed by the petitioner under the provisions of Order 14, Rule 5, read with Section 151, CPC with a prayer to amend issue No. 1 thereby displacing the burden of proof initially laid on the defendant to prove that the rent was paid as per the provisions of law within the stipulated period and so the defendant-petitioner was not a defaulter, in Civil Original Suit No. 198/97 instituted by the plaintiff-non-petitioner on the ground of neither payment nor tendering the amount of rent due from the defendant-petitioner for more than six months. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused and considered the legality and regularity of the impugned order so passed by the learned trial Judge. 3. The plaintiff-non-petitioner brought suit on the ground of default in payment of rent as envisaged by provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act, 1950) against the defendant-petitioner inter alia pleading in para 7 of the plaint that the plaintiff was ignorant about the fact whether the defendant-tenant had deposited any rent of the tenanted premises and whether the same was deposited according to the contract of tenancy and as per the legal provisions therefor and he was also never informed about it by the defendant and so the defendant had defaulted by failing to pay rent of the suit premises beginning from June, 1992 thereby committing a default of six months or more and hence he has liable-to be evicted from the suit premises. 4. The defendant-petitioner denied that he had committed any default in payment of rent, incurring any liability of ejectment from the suit premises and, the learned trial Judge framed issue No. 1 as referred to above whereby the defendant petitioner was required to discharge burden that he had already paid full rent of the suit premises according to law and he was not a defaulter. The parties did not agitate there against and, consequently, both the parties completed their evidence and, at the fag end of the trial, an application was so moved by the defendant-petitioner before the trial Court with a request that issue No. 1 so framed be amended thereby placing the burden of proof an the plaintiff-non-petitioner instead of the same having been placed wrongly on the Mendant-petitioner. However, the learned trial Judge vide his impugned order held that the issues were framed on the basis of pleadings and resultant issues arising from the material opposition of facts as pleaded by the plaintiff non-petitioner and denied/affirmed by the defendant-petitioner and, consequently, it was held that the burden of proof of issue No. 1 so already framed by the trial Court was correctly framed and there was no necessity for its amendment for determining the matter in controversy between the parties and hence the payer was refused. 5. Being aggrieved, the defendant-petitioner has preferred this revision petition, as above. 6. As regards question of onus of proof in regard to either default in payment of rent by the tenant-defendant or the latter having paid tie rent as per the contract, as pleaded by Ike latter, this is a question of fact to be determined and, in view of the pleadings of tie parties since the plaintiff brought the suit with the averments that the tenant defendant, to his knowledge, did not pay the rent and, besides, in case the same was paid, it was not according to the terms of the contract and hat, as also required by the provisions of Section 19-A of the Act. 1950. Subject to the previsions of this Section every tenant is required to pay rent within the time fixed by contract or in absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following lie month for which it is payable. 1950. Subject to the previsions of this Section every tenant is required to pay rent within the time fixed by contract or in absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following lie month for which it is payable. The plaintiff has pleaded default in payment of rent and tret he had never been paid this amount and it was never in his knowledge that any rent for which the defendant is alleged to have fallen into arrears, has already been deposited by any other mode permissible by the law and, consequently, on the face of pleading of the defendant, there being no dispute in regard to the tenanted premises as well as the relationship of the parties being that of a landlord and a tenant and even as per the case of the defendant-petitioner, the disputed rent having not been paid to the plaintiff himself, the lower court in its wisdom in view of the pleadings of the defendant that the rent had already been deposited according to law and there was no fault on the part of the defendant-tenant thereby incurring any liability of ejectment from the suit premises and, in view of these circumstances, there being no objection to it, from the side of the defendant-tenant himself, the parties completed their evidence and now the suit is on the verge of final disposal. 7. It may also be observed that the question of burden of proof has virtually become academic since both the parties to the suit for ejectment have tendered their evidence and the same is pending at the final stage of hearing arguments of the parties and as also held in the decision rendered in Ziaul Hasan v. Pannalal, 1972 MPLJ 91 . 8. The phrase "burden of proof' has two distinct meanings as explained in Woodroffee and Amir Ali's Law of Evidence (14th Edition) at page 2099 which is extracted herein below : "Shifting of burden. The phrase "burden of proof" has two distinct meanings, namely, the burden of establishing a case remains throughout the entire case, where the pleadings originally place it. It never shifts. The party, whether plaintiff on defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has this burden of proof. The phrase "burden of proof" has two distinct meanings, namely, the burden of establishing a case remains throughout the entire case, where the pleadings originally place it. It never shifts. The party, whether plaintiff on defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has this burden of proof. It is on him at the beginning of the case; it continues on him throughout the case; and when the evidence, by whosoever introduced, is all in, if he has not, by the preponderance of evidence required by law, established his position or claim, the decision of the tribunal must be adverse to such pleader. On the other hand, the burden of proof, in the sense of burden of evidence, may shift constantly, as evidenced is introduced by one side or the other as one scale or the other preponderates over its fellow. To carry out the same metaphor, so often and so long as the scale containing an adverse amount of evidence preponderates to a certain extent by reason of evidence adduced in that behalf, the duty or necessity rests on a party to introduce opposing evidence which shall restore the equipoise or, if possible, strike a new balance." 9. Besides, the question of onus of proof only arises where there is a question of fact to be determined and there is no evidence one way or the other which will enable the Judge to come to a conclusion and then and then the Court has to decide whether the burden of proving the fact lies upon the plaintiff or the defendant. 10. In the instant case, on the basis of pleadings, issue No. 1 has been so framed by the learned trial Judge. 10. In the instant case, on the basis of pleadings, issue No. 1 has been so framed by the learned trial Judge. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that since the plaintiff has asserted that the defendant is a defaulter in payment of the rent as per the terms of the contract and the legal provisions provided therefor incurring a liability of ejectment from the suit premises under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act, 1950 and consequently, on the face of denial of any default having been committed by the tenant-defendant, in view of these assertions regarding non-payment of contracted rent within the stipulated period and thereby committing a default in payment thereof, the burden of issue No. 1 ought to have been placed on the plaintiff instead of the defendant and, therefore, the learned trial Judge overlooked the provisions of R. 5, O. 14, C. P. C. while disallowing amendment of the issue which was necessary for determining the matter in controversy between the parties and in case the impugned order is allowed to stand, it is bound to finally adversely affect and prejudice the right of the defendant-petitioner which will cause an irreparable injury to the defendant-petitioner and, therefore, keeping in view the averments of the parties in Para 7 of the pleadings, the initial burden must have been placed on the plaintiff himself as was also done in a similar case instituted by the plaintiff Madan Lal against another tenant Mohan Lal in which a similar issue, based on the basis of pleadings of the parties, has been framed and the initial burden of proof has been directly placed on the plaintiff-Madan Lal and not on the defendant-tenant Mohan Lal. Therefore, the impugned order be set aside and the application for amendment moved by the defendant-petitioner be allowed with a direction tor amendment of issue No. 1. 11. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner while relying on the decisions rendered in Firm Sitaramv. Therefore, the impugned order be set aside and the application for amendment moved by the defendant-petitioner be allowed with a direction tor amendment of issue No. 1. 11. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner while relying on the decisions rendered in Firm Sitaramv. Shri Gopal, 1980 (2) All India Rent Control Journal 18, Sant Sharan Sharma v. Chiranji Lai, 1988 (1) RLR 588 as well as the decision of single Bench rendered in the case of Major S. K. H Chaiterji v. Gopi Lal and another, S. B. Civil Revision Petition No. 106/93 decided on 12-4-93 wherein it has been held that when there is an admitted contract of tenancy in respect of the suit premises and the landlord-plaintiffs averments are that the defendant-petitioner has not paid the contracted rent according to the terms of the contract and the legal provisions thereby committing default in payment of rent, specially when the defendant avers that he neither paid nor tendered the rent for the disputed period to the landlord plaintiff and instead he has deposited under the provisions of Section 19-A of the Act, 1950, in absence of any proof about the deposit of disputed rent under Section 19-A of the Act 1950 with a view to negative the ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(a), the burden of depositing arrears of rent with due compliance of legal provisions as are laid down under Section 19-A of the Act, 1950 lies squarely on the tenant-defendant and in absence of proof of method of payment or deposit of rent as required by sub-section (3) of Section 19-A, as also held in the decision of Major S. K. Chatterji's case (supra), the burden of depositing the arrears of rent in defence to the ground of eviction as set forth under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act, 1950 cannot be held to be wrongly or illegally placed on the defendant petitioner. 12. In the case of Sant Sharan Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble single Judge, while discussing the provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, has observed that when Court has to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, he must prove that those facts exist. 12. In the case of Sant Sharan Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble single Judge, while discussing the provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, has observed that when Court has to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, he must prove that those facts exist. In other words, the burden of proof is to be on the plaintiff and he has to discharge it but when it is of a negative nature, a lesser amount of proof than is usually required may serve the purpose. This proof may also be not necessary on the basis of the allegations made ; by the other party in the written statement, Under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving a fact which is specifically then the knowledge of any person is upon demand considering this legal provision, since Bis also the instant case, the defendant-petitioner, in absence of proof of either payment or tender of the disputed rent to the plaintiff-non-petitioner, has to discharge the proof of payment/deposit of rent to the landlord. After due compliance of the terms of the tract entered into between the parties as well as due compliance of the provisions of section 19-A of the Act, 1950, since all these bets are specifically within the knowledge of tie tenant-defendant, who is presently petitioner before this Court and resultantly, there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court committed any material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction or any illegality while disallowing to amendment application and to have placed tie burden of proof of issue No. 1 on the defendant-petitioner. 13. 13. Besides, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner, while relying on the Full inch decision of this Court rendered in Nagori Ibrahim v. Shahji Babumal, 1954 RLW 331 in which the decision Of this Court rendered in Purohit Swarup Narain v. Gopinath, 1953 RLW 629 was fully approved ding that a wrong allocation of burden of was not open to revision under the visions of Section 115, C.P.C. as the same s not covered by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 115, C.P.C. and, instead, the question of wrong allocation/burden of proof can be raised in appeal under Section 105, C.P.C. from the decree that nay be finally passed in the suit, questioned ts maintainability of the petition itself. 14. Similarly, it has been observed in M. L. Shethi v. R. P. Kapur, 1973 (1) SCR 697 by He Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the scope of Section 115, C.P.C. that a distinction must be drawn between errors committed by ordinate Courts in deciding questions of w which have relation to or are concerned with questions of jurisdiction of the Court and errors of law which have no such relation or connection for the purposes of Section 115. C.P.C. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an inquiry into a question then any subsequent error committed by the Court could not be regarded as an error of jurisdiction because lie question of jurisdiction is determinable at be commencement and not at the conclusion of the enquiry. 15. Similarly, in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltd. v. Union of India through General Manager, Northern Railways, 1989 (1) RLR 409 , the Hon'ble the single Judge of this Court, while disposing of a similar revision petition under Section 115, C.P.C. against an order of the lower Court whereby an application for production of a document filed under Order 13, Rule 2, C.P.C. was disallowed, interpreting the scope of Section 115, C.P.C., while referring to decisions of this Court as well as various High Courts including those of the Apex Court, held that the mere fact that the decision is erroneous in fact or in law does not amount to either an illegality or an irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction by the lower Court. In the instant case as well, since the initial burden of proof was placed on the defendant-petitioner and he never objected to it before the trial Court till the evidence of both the parties was complete and, accordingly, the lower Court does not appear to have committed any illegality or irregularity while disallowing the application so-moved under Order 14, Rule 5, C.P.C. Since addition of Section 151. C.P.C. did not help the petitioner on the application so moved for amendment of the issue was squarely covered by the provisions of Order 14, Rule 5, C.P.C. and so by disallowance of the amendment application so moved by the defendant-petitioner, in the aforesaid circumstances, while rejecting the same vide the impugned order, the learned trial Judge did not commit any jurisdictional error warranting any interference by this Court. 16. On the basis of above discussion, this petition is wholly devoid of any merit and, accordingly, the impugned order does not warrant any interference at this stage. 17. Resultantly, this petition is hereby dismissed, affirming the impugned order but without any order as to costs. However, any observation made in disposal of this revision petition shall not affect final decision of the suit by the trial Court. 18. This revision petition along with its stay petition is disposed of in the manner indicated hereinbefore.Petition dismissed. *******