H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, filed by employer challenging the award dated 30-4-1992 in w. C. Case No. 103 of 1991 awarding compensation to the tune of rs. 63,994/- minus the amount of Rs. 10,000/- which has already been paid by the employer to the deceased employee. The facts of the case in brief are that one Mehaboob Basha who was a carpenter with the appellant suffered injuries on 30-7-1988 in the accident, as a result of short circuit in the factory and died on 5-8-1988. The undisputed fact is that the appellant paid some amount as compensation to the tune of Rs. 10,000/- to the father and dependent of the deceased employee mehboob Basha. On 7-12-1991, the 1st respondent who is the father of the deceased Mehboob Basha-employee, filed a claim petition under Sections 3 and 10 of the Workmen's compensation Act, claiming compensation. That along with the application for claiming compensation the claimant filed application for condonation of delay in filing the claim petition under Section 10 of Workmen's Compensation Act. The claimant/respondent in his claim petition asserted that at the time of occurrence the age of the deceased workman was 19 years and that he was getting a monthly salary of Rs. 1,000/- from the appellant. Along with the claim petition, the application for condonation of delay was filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On notice being issued the appellant contested the claim and filed a written objection before the workmen's Compensation Commissioner to the effect as under: "that the claim petition was barred by limitation and as such was not maintainable. The employer further denied the claimants' case that the deceased Mehboob Basha was aged 19 years at the time of the accident but no specific age of the deceased was asserted in the written statement at the time of occurrence by the employer. The appellant employer also denied the claimants allegation to the effect that the deceased Mehboob Basha was getting salary of Rs, 1,000/- per month. Employed asserted that the deceased Mehboob Basha was employed on a monthly salary of Rs. 375/ -. No other plea was raised in the written statement. " ( 2 ) THE Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation framed these issues: (a) Whether the accident had taken place out of and in course of employment? Employed asserted that the deceased Mehboob Basha was employed on a monthly salary of Rs. 375/ -. No other plea was raised in the written statement. " ( 2 ) THE Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation framed these issues: (a) Whether the accident had taken place out of and in course of employment? (b) Whether application for condonation of delay deserved to be allowed? (c) Whether the claimant was the dependent of the deceased employee Mehhoob Basha has been proved? (d) Whether the deceased workman Mehboob Basha was aged about 19 years and whether he was drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 1,000/- and the daily allowance of Rs. 20/-per day? (e) Whether the claimant is entitled to the compensation being awarded as claim? (f) What order? ( 3 ) NO other issues admittedly had been pressed nor got framed by the parties. The Workmen's Compensation commissioner answered to the issues in favour of the claimant. The Workmen Compensation Commissioner further held that deceased Mehboob Basha was getting a salary of Rs. 606/- per month. He awarded a compensation to the tune of Rs. 63,994/- minus Rs. 10,000/- which had already been paid. Having felt aggrieved with the award of compensation by the Workmen's compensation Commissioner, the employer i. e. , the appellant has come up in appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's compensation Act in this Court. ( 4 ) I have heard Sri L. M. Chidanandaiah, learned Counsel for the appellant as well as Mrs. Y. Malathi Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondent and the appeal at the stage of admission is heard and is being disposed off. Learned Counsel for the appellant raised before me the following two submission: (1) That in view of Section 53 of the Employees State insurance Act, 1948, the claim petition filed by the claimant/respondent under Sections 3 and 10 of the workmen's Compensation Act, was not maintainable, on account, the respondents having not been entitled to receive or recover any compensation or damage from the appellant and as such the claim petition was ought to have been rejected. (2) That the claim made by the respondent heirs/dependents of the deceased was barred by limitation and as such it should have been dismissed/rejected and the workmen's Compensation Commissioner erred in condoning the delay and in entertaining the claim petition. (2) That the claim made by the respondent heirs/dependents of the deceased was barred by limitation and as such it should have been dismissed/rejected and the workmen's Compensation Commissioner erred in condoning the delay and in entertaining the claim petition. These contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant have hotly been contested by Smt. Y. Malathi, appearing for respondents. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents submitted that no such plea or case has been taken to the effect that claimant was not entitled to get the compensation in view of Section 53 nor was any allegation made to the effect that the deceased was an insured employee. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that this plea of defence or objection under Section 53, should have been raised in the written statement and as it involves question of fact as well as such a plea when it has not been raised in the court below should not be allowed to be urged at this stage of appeal before this Court, especially when no such issue was even pressed nor any evidences was led on the question of fact. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submitted that more than 8 years have passed since the death of the deceased and allowing such a plea to be taken at this stage will cause undue delay and harassment to the respondents for the own fault of the appellant and as such this plea should not be allowed to be raised. Learned Counsel submitted that in order to make section 53 applicable it has to be asserted and proved that the deceased was an insured employee and this question of fact had to be investigated and tried out. When this plea had not been raised Commissioner had not committed any substantial error of law in entertaining or allowing the claim. Learned Counsel for the respondents further contended that the circumstances explained for the delay in the application that the claimant was kept in hopes of being awarded and given proper compensation money by the employer, had been awaiting and that has been the cause for delay which has been taken as sufficient cause by the Commissioner. Learned Counsel for the respondents further contended that the circumstances explained for the delay in the application that the claimant was kept in hopes of being awarded and given proper compensation money by the employer, had been awaiting and that has been the cause for delay which has been taken as sufficient cause by the Commissioner. Learned Counsel further submitted that this finding, to the effect that sufficient cause was there and the condoning of the delay by Court relying on the assertion made by the appellant/claimant amounts to nothing but a finding of fact which does not involve or raise any question of law and such should not be interfered with. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the scope of Section 30 is confined only to substantial question of law and it is not within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 30 of the workmen's Compensation Act, to entertain or interfere with the findings of fact. ( 6 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. Before I proceed to examine the contentions raised it appears just and proper to quote sub-section (1) of Section 30: "30. Appeals. ( 6 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. Before I proceed to examine the contentions raised it appears just and proper to quote sub-section (1) of Section 30: "30. Appeals. (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: (a) an order awarding as compensation a lumpsum whether by way of redemption of half monthly payment or otherwise of disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lumpsum; (aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4-A; (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of half a monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependents of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependent; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees: provided further than no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against". ( 7 ) A reading of the first proviso to Section 30 reveals that the appeal provided under Section 30 is not in the nature of first appeal under Section 96 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 7 ) A reading of the first proviso to Section 30 reveals that the appeal provided under Section 30 is not in the nature of first appeal under Section 96 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In any appeal under Section 96 (1) of Civil Procedure Code it is open to the First Appellate Court to examine the question of fact and question of law as well as to re-appreciate the evidences. But appeal under Section 30 is concerned with and the appeal lies only on 'substantial question of law' involved in it. The expression 'substantial question of law' has been the subject- matter of consideration under Section 100 of Civil Procedure code in the case of Raghunath Prasad Singh v Deputy commissioner of Pratabgarh and in the case of Guran Ditta and Another v T. Ram Ditta , as well as by Hon'ble Supreme court and by this Court as well. ( 8 ) SO far as the question of condonation of delay is concerned the jurisdiction is conferred on the Court to condone the delay provided it is satisfied that sufficient cause for delay has been explained. It is well-settled principle of law that rules of law should be interpreted with the object to advance justice and in approaching the question of sufficient cause, Court has to adopt a justice-oriented approach and if the facts and circumstances in the ordinary course indicate and explain the cause to be reasonable, it is open to the Court to condone it. In the present case the cause that has been shown, as per reading of the order, and translation thereof into English made by learned Counsel for the appellant before the Court orally and delay has been condoned on the ground that the claimant was kept under misapprehension by assurance from employers of being duly and properly compensated by the employer after interim payment, as the appellant/claimants who are poor, for good long time waited in hopes for humanitarian and generous action on the part of the employer. But when time passed and things did not take place satisfactorily as per expectations shown, there was a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. It appears plea of defence was not taken to be acceptable it was opined by Tribunal that cause shown for delay was taken sufficient. Reliability or non-reliability is a question of appreciation. But when time passed and things did not take place satisfactorily as per expectations shown, there was a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. It appears plea of defence was not taken to be acceptable it was opined by Tribunal that cause shown for delay was taken sufficient. Reliability or non-reliability is a question of appreciation. Therefore the finding on the question of sufficient cause for delay which has been recorded cannot be said to be raising a substantial question of law. There was nothing to show any mala fide on the part of the claimants in not filing the claim. In this view of the matter in my opinion the finding of sufficient cause being the finding of fact it does not call for interference. When I so observe that this finding is a finding of question of fact, I find support from the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Limited v bkutnath Banerjee and Others. The observations made in paragraph 12, page 1340 reveals that the question whether the application for condonation of delay has sufficient cause for not making application within time and that Court had exercised its jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and recorded finding of question, that primarily the Court had jurisdiction to decide and then record on question of sufficient cause for delay. That finding of sufficient cause may be said to be a finding of question of fact, as such this finding cannot be interfered with in an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, that as regards the question whether the claim was barred by section 53 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948? Such question cannot be decided one way or the other unless there is an allegation to the effect that the deceased was an insured employee under the Act of 1948. Section 53 of the Employees insurance Act, 1948 reads as under :"an insured person or his dependents shall not be entitled to receive or recover, whether from the employer of the insured person or from any other person, any compensation or damages under the Workmen's compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise, in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee under this Act". In order to make it applicable and to assert that the claimant was not entitled and to make claim for compensation under workmen's Compensation Act in view of the provisions of section 53 it is for the employer to assert that the injured or the deceased is or has been or had been an employee insured under employees State Insurance Act, 1948. Whether the deceased had been an insured person or not under the Employees State insurance Act, 1948 and unless this fact is admitted or proved by the person claiming benefit of Section 53 of the Act, the bar cannot be made applicable. The first thing to be alleged in pleadings, in defence objection i. e. , written statement and to be proved is that the deceased or injured was a person insured under Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, when such a fact had first to be pleaded then proved, and thus considered, the question that has been raised now in appeal is not a pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and fact. When this involves a mixed question of fact and law and such a plea has not been taken or raised in the present case before the workmen's Compensation Officer, it is now too late in the day, after the expiry of almost 8 years and 5 months, to permit the appellant to raise this plea, and nothing but delaying the proceedings for further period by nothing but remand which may be next step to be sought by appellant. The appellant cannot be allowed to take the benefit of his own fault. This is a well-settled principle that the case has to be decided by the authority on the pleas taken by the parties in the case and if any such plea was not raised the Commissioner cannot be said to have committed any error of law or substantial error of law in deciding the claim petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The bar is not against the entertainment of the claim petition by the workmen's Compensation Commissioner but bar is against the claimant, injured heirs of deceased person if person comes under the workman (sic) to be insured under the Employees State insurance Act of 1948, to get his claim decreed or awarded. The bar is not against the entertainment of the claim petition by the workmen's Compensation Commissioner but bar is against the claimant, injured heirs of deceased person if person comes under the workman (sic) to be insured under the Employees State insurance Act of 1948, to get his claim decreed or awarded. Though this does not raise any question of jurisdiction but it raised question whether the claimant would have been entitled to claim and to get his claim allowed and decreed if it would have been proved that the deceased Mehboob Basha was an employee insured under the Act of 1948. Learned Counsel for the appellant places before me decision of their Lordships of the supreme Court in the case of A. Trehan v M/s. Associated electrical Agencies and Another. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court no doubt interpreted Section 53 have opined that the effect of Section 53 is bar against receiving or recovering any compensation or damage under Workmen's Compensation act or any other law, for the time being in force or otherwise in respect of injury or death of an employee insured under the employees State Insurance Act, 1948. The bar is against the person who is insured under the Act or his heirs or dependents. That as bare and simple proposition of law it cannot be denied when there is an insured person under Act of 1948 that he may not be entitled to get any compensation provided he is insured under Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 and he may not be entitled to any compensation except as under the provision of employees State Insurance Act of 1948, but first thing and first question of fact in order to raise such a plea which is to be raised as the plea is to assertion that the deceased or injured had been a person insured under the Act, as no such plea has been raised in this case which involves question of fact in my view, it would not be just and proper at this stage to allow the appellant to raise such a plea. As such the first appeal is devoid of merits and it is hereby dismissed, with costs. --- *** --- .