Honble JAIN, J.–The defendant No. 2 has filed this revision petition under Sec. 115 CPC against the order dated 3.4.1996 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Sri Ganganagar whereby the interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 CPC was allowed and the defendant-petitioner was restrained from effecting recovery from the plaintiff-non-peti- tioner No.1 in pursuance of the assessment order dated 28.8.1995 passed by him. (2). The brief fact of the case are that the plaintiff-non- petitioner No.1 filed a suit in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sri Ganganagar with the averments that he supplied various articles to the Union of India through Military in the years 1985-86 and 1986-87 and under the above contract, the Union of India paid Sales Tax @ 4% and also furnished D-Forms in respect of the goods received from the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff-non-petitioner, the defendant-petitioner finalised the assessment in respect of both the above years vide order dated 19.7.1988. However, the defendant-petitioner without assigning any reasons arbitrary and capriciously re-opened the assessments under S. 12 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (for short the `Act) and while revising the assessment raised a demand of Rs. 4,09,048/- and Rs. 97,780/- in respect of the Assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 respectively. It was, therefore, pleaded that if the above recovery is not stayed, it would cause irreparable loss to the plaintiff. (3). The suit of the plaintiff was stoutly resisted by the defendant-petitioner on the ground that the plaintiff represented that he was supplying the Iron Boxes to the Union of India and submitted D-Forms and also deposited Sales Tax @ 4%. However, when the complaints were received and enquiry was made, it was revealed that the plaintiff was supplying furniture in the garb of supplying Iron Boxes. According to the defendant-petitioner, the rate of sales tax chargeable on sale of furniture at the relevant time was 10%. The defendant, therefore, thought it proper to re-open the above assessment under S. 12 of the Act. (4). The defendant-petitioner clarified that the assessment of the year 1985-86 was finalised on 17.7.1988 but the assessment of the year 1986-87 was finalised on 28.8.1995. The defendant, therefore, thought it proper to re-open the above assessment under S. 12 of the Act. (4). The defendant-petitioner clarified that the assessment of the year 1985-86 was finalised on 17.7.1988 but the assessment of the year 1986-87 was finalised on 28.8.1995. It was alleged that when a notice under Sec. 12 of the Act was issued to the plaintiff, the plaintiff challenged its legality by filing a writ petition before this Court and initially obtained a stay order but eventually the said writ petition came to be dismissed by this court vide its judgment dated 1.9.1994. Thereafter, the Department made the assessments for the years 1985-86 and raised a demand of Rs. 4,09,048/-. The plaintiff then moved an application purporting to be under Sec. 37 of the Act and after considering the above application, the defendant-petitioner vide order dated 18.12.1995 reduced the demand to the tune of Rs. 2,14,248.93P. The assessment for the year 1986-87 was made as stated above vide order dated 28.8.1995 and thereafter the recovery proceedings were initiated. (5). The defendant-petitioner has further contended that the plaintiff-non-petitioner also filed an appeal before the learned Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, which is still pending. It was, therefore,contended that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit for the plaintiff looking to the nature of the dispute. (6). The learned trial court examined the case of the plaintiff and found that the plaintiff has got a prima facie case in his favour. The learned trial court seriously considered the allegations made by the plaintiff that reopening of the assessment was malafide, capricious and baseless. Various provisions of the Act were exami- ned by the learned trial court in order to determine whether the allegations made by the plaintiff assailing the recovery are correct. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned trial court was not at all competent to examine the merits or demerits of the case, which squarely fell within the jurisdiction of the assessing authority or the appellate authority. In fact, the learned trial court passed an erroneous order ignoring the prohibitions contained in Sec. 19 of the Act. If the learned trial court would have read with provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act alongwith the provisions of Sec. 9 CPC, it would not have committed this serious jurisdictional error. (7). In fact, the learned trial court passed an erroneous order ignoring the prohibitions contained in Sec. 19 of the Act. If the learned trial court would have read with provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act alongwith the provisions of Sec. 9 CPC, it would not have committed this serious jurisdictional error. (7). I have considered the rival contentions made at the bar very carefully. I have also gone through the impugned order. It is not in dispute that the entire dispute relates to the assessment made by the assessing authority in respect of two years. It appears that the plaintiff felt highly aggrieved when the assessing authority decided to invoke the powers conferred by Sec. 12 of the Act for reopening the assessments already made. According to the plaintiff, the decision to reopen the assessments was malafide, capricious and baseless and by making such allegations, the plaintiff filed a suit and also succeeded in obtaining an interlocutory order in his favour staying the recovery. In my opinion, the learned Civil Judge was not aware of the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the case in correct perspective, it is necessary to reproduce the provi- sions of Sec. 19 of the Act, which reads as under : ``Any notice, summons, assessment, order, demand notice, order of attachment or like proceedings which purport to be made in pursuance of any provision of this Act or the rules shall not be quashed, or deemed to be void or viodable for want of forma, or be affected by reason of a mistake, defect or omission therein, if the same is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and meaning of the Act and the rules. (8). The learned Civil Judge was also aware of the fact that when a notice for reopening the previous assessments was issued under Sec. 12 of the Act, that was challenged before this Court by filing a writ petition and that writ petition came to be dismissed by this Court. While dismissing the writ petition, this Court declined to consider the allegations of the plaintiff and left the matter to be decided by the competent authority under the Act. While dismissing the writ petition, this Court declined to consider the allegations of the plaintiff and left the matter to be decided by the competent authority under the Act. It appears that the learned Civil Judge ignored the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act as also the observations made by this Court in the earlier writ petition. In my opinion, the learned Civil Judge has failed to examine the facts of the case specially with reference to the prohibition of jurisdiction contained in Sec. 19 of the Act and should have come to the conclusion that he had no business to interfere with the order passed by the learned Assessing Authority as the appeal against the re-assessment orders was pending before the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes. The reasons stated by him for distinguishing the impact of the dismissal of the writ petition and non-application of the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act are hard to understand. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned trial court decided the matter as an Authority under the Sales Tax Act. The learned Civil Judge considered the relevant provisions of the Act and also referred to certain decided cases relating to the Sales Tax matters and it did not take care of the fact that the case on hand involves the question of jurisdiction also. The merits of the case can only be appreciated by the authority having juris- diction to entertain the same. (9). It is settled principle of law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion of jurisdiction must be either explicit or implied. A bare perusal of the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Act leaves no doubt that the jurisdiction of civil court has been explicitly ousted. Thus, the rea- sons given by the learned trial court are totally erroneous and lacks objective application to the facts of the present case. (10). In this view of the matter, the impugned order is apparently perverse and amounts to usurption of jurisdiction and hence, cannot be sustained. (11). For the above reasons, I allow this revision petition and set aside the im- pugned order of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sri Ganganagar and the interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff-non-petitioner under O.39, Rr. 1 and 2 CPC is hereby dismissed.