JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C.J.—The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Peon in the Chemistry Department of the respondent-University on April 13, 1973. He was appointed as a clerk w.e.f. 20-9-1974. The relevant part of the order of appointment reads as follows : "Pending appointment of office/Laboratory staff in the Department of Chemistry, on regular basis, the proposal to appoint the following persons purely on temporary basis against the posts shown against each sent by the Head Department of Chemistry vide his letter No. nil dated 19-9-1974 has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor." 2. In the same order, it is stated : “Their services will be liable to be dispensed with, without any notice and assigning reosons therefor.” 3. He was reverted to the post of Peon w.e.f. 27-11-1975 and again he was appointed as Clerk from 11-8-1976. That order dated 7th June, 1979 reads as follows : "In supersession of office order No. 3131 dated the 29th December, 1975 issued from the Head, Department of Chemistry, H.P. University, the Vice-Chancellor, Himachal Pradesh University has been pleased to revoke the reversion orders of Shri Waryam Singh from the post of Clerk on ad hoc basis to the post of Peon with effect from the 27th December, 1975 to 10th August, 1976. 2. That Shri Waryam Singh will have no claim for regularisation of his ad-hoc promotion as Clerk with retrospective effect on the basis of the above orders as he has already been regularised as Clerk with effect from 11th August, 1976.” 4. The seniority of the petitioner was fixed on the basis that he was regularised as Clerk w.e.f. 11th August. 1976 and he was entitled to have the seniority as and from that date. But the contention of the petitioner is that his seniority should have been fixed from the date be entered the service as a Clerk i.e. 20-9-1974. According to the petitioner, the appointment, which was made in 1974 was followed by a regularisation and there was a continuous functioning of the petition r as Clerk even though there was n reversion, which was set aside by the order dated 7th Jane, 1979. According to the petitioner, the appointment, which was made in 1974 was followed by a regularisation and there was a continuous functioning of the petition r as Clerk even though there was n reversion, which was set aside by the order dated 7th Jane, 1979. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner that reversion became ineffective as the said order was cancelled with retrospective effect, It is, therefore, argued that once there is an ad-hoc appointment, which was followed by a regularisation, the person concerned is entitled to count for the purpose of seniority the period from which he started functioning as such appointee. The second contention of the petitioner is that though on the date on which he was appointed as a Clerk, he was not qualified and he was required to pass a type-writing test and he was given three chances for doing so, he had subsequently passed the test in the 4th chance in 1981 According to learned Counsel, once he passed the typing test and qualified himself that qualification relates back to the date of original appointment as a Clerk and his seniority should have been fixed on that basis. In support of these two contentions, learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class 11 Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1990) 2 SCC 715, a judgment of this Court in C.W.P. No. 280/85, dated July 24, 1985, Rajinder Dev and others v Himachal Pradesh University and another. 5. Before refering to the judgment of the Supreme Court cited above, it is necessary to refer to the relevant Rules of the University for requirement and promotion Under Rule 8, the Recruitment and Promotion Committee shall be for the posts below the post of Superintendent and equivalent posts as follows : 1. Vice Chancellor. 2. Dean of Studies. 3. Dean of Agricultural Complex. 4. Registrar- 5. A nominee of the Vice-Chancellor. 6. Vice Chancellor. 2. Dean of Studies. 3. Dean of Agricultural Complex. 4. Registrar- 5. A nominee of the Vice-Chancellor. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioners appointment was not at the instance of the Recruitment and Promotion Committee contemplated by Rule 8 The appointment of the petitioner in the year 1974 was in exercise of the power of the Vice-Chancellor under Rule 7, which reads as follows : "Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Vice-Chancellor will have the authority to make an ad hoc appointment against any of the posts covered by these rules for a period not exceeding one year ; provided that the period, will be extendable by one year with the concurrence of the Executive Council.” 7. It was pursuant to that rule, the petitioners appointment was made in 1974 According to the qualifications prescribed for the post of Clerk/typist, it is seen that the educational qualifications are Matriculation or equivalent examination and knowledge of type-writing with a minimum speed of 25 words per minute. Admittedly, the petitioner did not have the knowledge of type-writing on the relevant date. The second qualification is minimum length of approved service. The person Governed should have three years of approved service for being appointed as Clerk/typist. It is not necessary for us to refer to the other qualification’ prescribed for the rules. Suffice it to point out that the petitioner did not have three years of approved service. Approved service’ has been defined in Rule 2 (k) as the service rendered in the field of choice for promotion by an employee appointed by the competent authority on regular basis and includes service of the University on deputation. The petitioner was admittedly appointed only as a temporary Peon on April 13, 1973. He had completed only one year and five months at the time he was appointed as a Clerk. Thus, he does not satisfy the definition of approved service ; nor does he satisfy the requirement of service qualification prescribed in the Rules for being appointed as Clerk It follows very clearly that the petitioners appointment was only a stop-gap arrangement and it was not a regular appointment even on temporary basis. 8. Thus, he does not satisfy the definition of approved service ; nor does he satisfy the requirement of service qualification prescribed in the Rules for being appointed as Clerk It follows very clearly that the petitioners appointment was only a stop-gap arrangement and it was not a regular appointment even on temporary basis. 8. We have already extracted the relevant portion of the office order of appointment of the petitioner as a Clerk, That estates very clearly the position that pending appointment on regular basis, the petitioner was being appointed on temporary basis as a Clerk. 9. In the background of the above facts, if we look into the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to earlier, it is seen that various propositions laid down in that case are summed up in paragraph 47 of the judgment. For our purposes, it is enough if we refer to Clauses (A) and (B) of that paragraph. They read as follows : “(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stopgap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority, (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted." 10. It is seen that under Clause (A), the Court has held that where the initial appointment is only ad-hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. We have now found on the facts that the appointment of the petitioner as Clerk was only a stop-gap arrangement on ad-hoc basis and not according to rules. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to count for the purpose of seniority the period during which he worked in the post. The second Clause is also against the petitioner as the initial appointment was not in accordance with the rules. 11. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to count for the purpose of seniority the period during which he worked in the post. The second Clause is also against the petitioner as the initial appointment was not in accordance with the rules. 11. The judgment of this Court on which reliance is placed by the petitioner was rendered in a case in which some persons were promoted as Clerks on the recommendation of the Recruitment and Promotion Committee. A perusal of the judgment itself shows that the persons, who were before the Court in that case were promoted as Clerks on the recommendation of the Recruitment and Promotion Committee. The petitioner cannot claim to be on the same pedestal as the petitioners in CWP No. 280 of 1985. Hence, whatever observation is found in the judgment of this Court dated 24th July, 1985 will not help the petitioner in any manner. It should be mentioned here that the petitioner had filed earlier a writ petition in this Court, which was pending as CWP No. 157 of 1982, when the judgment in CWP No. 280 of 1985 was rendered on 24th July, 1985. The petitioner got an impression that his case will also be governed by that ruling and withdrew his writ petition with liberty to approach the Court again in case he is aggrieved. We have now pointed out that the ruling in CWP No 280 of 1985 is not applicable to the petitioner. Even though liberty has been given to the petitioner to approach this Court again, we have now found that the petitioner has no right whatever to claim seniority from 1974, as has been done by him. 12. It is rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the University that as many as 64 persons would be affected if the petitioners prayer is granted and none of them having been impleaded in the writ petition, the prayer of the petitioner should not be considered in this writ petition. Even assuming that the petitioner is entitled to maintain the writ petition, without impleading those persons as parties, we have now found that there is no merit in the case of the petitioner and he is not entitled to claim seniority from 1974. 13. In the circumstances, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.