Judgment : 1. This second appeal has been preferred by the defendant. 2. The suit was for recovery of Rs.27,959-47 towards principal and interest due on a hand-loan by a receipt dated 21. 1970. .3. The plaintiffs have stated in the plaint that on 28-1-1979 the defendant telephoned to him and requested him for a hand-loan of Rs. 20,000 and the amount should be sent through his clerk Subramanian next day on 21. 1979. The defendant sent a letter though his clear Subramanian requesting the first plaintiff to send Rs. 15,000. Subramanian informed the first plaintiff that the defendant wanted to send whatever amount was available. After taking an acknowledgment from Subramanian, the plaintiff sent Rs. 19,588 to the defendant. As the transaction was a commercial one, the plaintiff claimed interest at 15% per annum. Since the money was paid by the second plaintiff, the wife of the first plaintiff, she has filed the suit along with her husband. 4. The defendant contended that there was no telephone call on 28-1-1979. The defendant was not at Maduranthakam from 17-1-1979 to 31-1-1979. The letter produced along with the plaint was written on 20-1-1978. Subramaniam who signed the receipt was not in defendants service. Subramanian was running a cycle shop. Though first plaintiff and defendant were friends they fell out. The letter is a fabricated one and used to make a false claim as the defendant could not oblige to the request of the plaintiffs. The letter used was an unutilised and old letter of the year 1978, but no amount was paid. The plaintiff had already filed three suits during the year 1980 and 1981 against the defendant. There was no mention about the suit in the notice or in the suit. The suit is vexatious and fraudulent. 5. The trial court found that the defendant did not borrow Rs. 19,558 from plaintiffs and Ex.A.I voucher is a forged and altered document. Hence, the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the District Judge Chengalpattu, reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the suit as prayed for. Hence, the defendant has preferred this second appeal in this Court. 6. The main contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant Mr.S.Sadasharam is the that the voucher dated 28-1-1979 was a forged one and no amount was paid under the said document. Hence, the defendant has preferred this second appeal in this Court. 6. The main contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant Mr.S.Sadasharam is the that the voucher dated 28-1-1979 was a forged one and no amount was paid under the said document. He also contended that the old letter dated 28-1-1978 has been created and used for the purpose of creating Ex.A.I. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents Mr. T.V. Krishnamachari, on the other hand contended that the first appellate court who is the final court of facts has found that Ex.A-I was a genuine one and decreed the suit and this Court will not interfere with the finding of the lower appellate court. 8. The document Ex.A-I contains correction. The year at the top of Ex A.I is corrected as "79" from "78". The bottom, immediately after the signature is also torn. The said document is prepared in a letter head of the defendant, but only a portion of the letter head is there. The contents of the letter appear to have been written in a different ink compared with the date. The date is in thick blue ink while the contents are light blue ink. So these facts create some suspicion about the genuineness of the said document. The next vital factor is whether the endorsement at the back of Ex.A.I is also a genuine one i.e. Whether Ex.A.2, reflects the real transaction. Ex.A.2. was signed by one V.Subrmanian on 21. 1979. The date is mentioned both at the top of the endorsement and also at the bottom of the signature. The endorsement states that Rs. 19,558 only was received from Baghavandass Reddiar. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that V.Subramanian, was never in his employment. V.Subrmanian, who has signed at the back of ExA.A. was not examined. On the other hand, the defendant has examined one Subramania Pillai, who was his clerk, as D.W.2., who alone was used to be sent to the plaintiff. D.W.2 has categorically denied that it is not his signature and he did not receive any money from the plaintiff on 29-1-1979. 10. To rebut the contention that V.Subramanian was also an employee of the defendant, the plaintiff has produced Exs.A-.3, A-6 and A.7. Ex.A.3 is an affidavit filed in O.S.No.281 of 1981, i.e., the present suit, before the principal sub-judge, Chengalpattu. 10. To rebut the contention that V.Subramanian was also an employee of the defendant, the plaintiff has produced Exs.A-.3, A-6 and A.7. Ex.A.3 is an affidavit filed in O.S.No.281 of 1981, i.e., the present suit, before the principal sub-judge, Chengalpattu. In the said affidavit, the defendant has stated that subramaniyam was not his clerk and the document Ex.A-1 was a forged one. This affidavit has been filed by the plaintiff on 19. 1982. On 11. 1982 itself in the very same suit another affidavit has been filed by Subramaniyam, i.e. Ex.A-4. In paragraph No.l of the said affidavit, it is stated that Subramaniyam was employed as commercial clerk under the petition for adjournment. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the defendant is a Her. From Ex.A.4 itself there is a clear admission that Subramanian was a clerk. .11. Further, it is contended that when the defendant examined as D.W-1 has admitted that on 21. 1978 he sent Ex.A-1 in his letter head through subraminam. Since the defendant himself has admitted as mentioned above, the case of the defendant that the defendant had nothing to do with V.Subramanian whose signature is found in Ex.A-2 is falsified. But we have to read the entire Chief Examination. In the latter portion of the Chief Examination, he has stated that he did not send ExA-1 through Subramanian as stated by the plaintiffs. This statement is also clarified in the cross-examination, where in he has stated that V.Subramanian went to Madras on 11. 1981 for purchase of cycle parts and he requested him to get down at Chengalpattu to contact the lawyer in his house for taking an adjournment. He had also obtained a medical certificate and sent the same to the advocate through V.Subramainam. But Subramanian said next day that petition was filed for adjournment. Thereafter he paid him Rs 10 as batta. He has added that the statement of Subramanian in Ex.A.4 that he was his commercial clerk was wrong. His evidence does not seem to be strange, artificial or unbelievable. The defendant has already stated that Subramanian is running a cycle shop and it is probable that when the said Subramanian went to Madras, the defendant requested him to contact the Advocate and take an adjournment. His evidence does not seem to be strange, artificial or unbelievable. The defendant has already stated that Subramanian is running a cycle shop and it is probable that when the said Subramanian went to Madras, the defendant requested him to contact the Advocate and take an adjournment. It can also be taken notice in a situation like this that for thee purpose of taking an adjustment affidavits are prepared in the name of strangers unconnected with the parties to the suit, but for the purpose of showing the connection between the person who swears to the affidavit and the party, some relation ship is stated in the affidavit. In addition to the aforesaid circumstances, one other statement made by the defendant is also worth noticing. In the written statement itself, the defendant has stated that Ex.A-12 has been created with the help of Subramanian, who had recently developed animosity against the defendant. In his evidence also the defendant has stated that it was not correct to state that with a view to avoid the examination of Subramanian he has stated that the said Subramanian was not in his employment. He has further stated that Subramanian wanted Rs. 5000 for a business and he has refused, hence there arose some animosity between him and the said Subramanian. 12. It is true that the signature of V.Subramanian is found in Ex.A.2. Hence he is an important witness. When the defendant has categorically denied that he was not his clerk, nothing prevented the plaintiff from summoning and examining the said V.Subramanian. To contend that since Subramanian was the employee of the defendant and therefore he would not support the case of the plaintiff and on account of that the plaintiff need not summon and examine the said V.Subramanian, is not correct. 13. The plaintiffs case is that apart from Subramania Pillai, the defendant had another clerk by name V.Subramanian. But when the said case is denied and when the writing and the signature is also disputed, the burden is upon the person who relies upon the writing and the signature to prove the genuineness of the endorsement. Since the plaintiffs have riot discharged the burden, they cannot take shelter like contending that Subramanian who make the endorsement and singed was the employee of the defendant and he would not speak the truth and give evidence against him. 14. Since the plaintiffs have riot discharged the burden, they cannot take shelter like contending that Subramanian who make the endorsement and singed was the employee of the defendant and he would not speak the truth and give evidence against him. 14. The evidence of P.W.I, the first plaintiff contains unbelievable statement, which cannot be believed. When the letter i.e., Ex.A.l itself mentions only Rs. 15,000, there is no necessity for payment of Rs. 19,558. He admits that he was not having money and yet he enquired his wife as to whether she had any cash and he took out the money with her and counted to Rs. 19,558 and the said amount was sent through Subramanian, He has also admitted that he used to take promissory notes for the amount lent to the defendant. He has admitted that for the amounts covered by O.S.Nos.210 of 1980, 211 of 1980 and 199 of 1981, promissory notes were taken. He has further admitted that he would not keep quiet for long time without taking a promissory note after lending the amount. Another significant admission by the first plaintiff is that on pervious occasions when Subramanian brought two letters from the defendant for money, he did not pay the amounts to Subramanian, but he paid them straightaway to the defendant by going to his shop. Therefore, these facts go to show that normally the plaintiff was not in the habit of paying money thorough V. Subramanian, even after letters were sent through him by the defendant, but the amounts were paid directly to the defendant by the first plaintiff going to the shop. But in the case of Subramania Pillai, he used to pay the amount to the said Subramania Pillai, when the defendant sent letters to him. This is clearly proved by Ex.A.6, wherein we find the endorsement made by Subramania Pillai with his signature. One more factor from the evidence of the plaintiff in the cross-examination that comes to light is that before filing the suit on earlier occasions, he sent lawyers notice, but in the present case, he has not done so. .15. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances, I find that the trial Court is justified in finding that Exs.A-1 and A-2 are forged one and rightly dismissed the suit. The reasons given by the lower appellate Court in reversing the said finding are not acceptable. .15. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances, I find that the trial Court is justified in finding that Exs.A-1 and A-2 are forged one and rightly dismissed the suit. The reasons given by the lower appellate Court in reversing the said finding are not acceptable. The lower appellate Court has found that the defendant has admitted that Subramanian, who signed Ex.A-2 was his commercial clerk. Further, the lower appellate Court says that Ex.A-1 mentions Subramanian and not Subramania Pillai. This is also not correct. A close scrutiny of the name mentioned in Ex.A-1 with a magnifying glass clearly shows that the name mentioned is Subramania Pillai and not Subramanian. After the letteressflthe letter "uj" and Qrjtr are clearly visible. Thereafter there are two other letters also after esr Even though "m" is not clearly visible, the last letter "m" is seen. The trial court has given reasons also for believing that the name is Subramania Pillai and not Subramanian. But the lower appellate Court has simple stated that a close scrutiny of Ex.A.I shows that it has been stared as Subramanaiam and not Subramania Pillai. He is thoroughly wrong. After the letter 116. Another fact that we notice in Ex.A-1 is that the signing of the defendant is not in full. In Ex.A-6 after singing the last letter in the signature, the defendant has drawn a line in continuation of the list letter from right to left. That line is not seen in Ex.A-1. It is also very clear that a portion of Ex.A-1 is torn. This tearing of the bottom immediately after the signature goes to prove the contention of the defendant that in Ex.A-1 after signing his signature he put the date also. But the plaintiffs case is that there was no date at the bottom of the signature and the date was put only at the top of Ex.A.I in the date column. As we have noticed, in the beginning the date appears to be put later than the writing contained in Ex.A.l, since the ink used for putting the date is thicker than the ink used for the writing of the letter. Further, there is a correction upon the figure "8" as "9". Therefore it is clear, after some dispute arose, the plaintiff has used the old letter given to him on 21. 1978, for the purpose of making a false; claim. 117. Further, there is a correction upon the figure "8" as "9". Therefore it is clear, after some dispute arose, the plaintiff has used the old letter given to him on 21. 1978, for the purpose of making a false; claim. 117. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that no substantial question of law has arisen in this case and therefore, this Court need not interfere with the finding of the lower appellate Court. But when a document, which is the foundation for the suit is challenged and different opinions are expressed by the Courts below, this Court has to go into the reasons given by the courts below and if the reason given by one Court is acceptable, preferable to the other, this Court has to accept the view of the Court whose reasons are acceptable to common sense. 118. The learned counsel for the respondents cited the following decisions reported in (i) Kumarappa v. Manavala, AIR 1918 Mad. 1 and (ii) Parasnath Thakur v. Smt Mohani Dasi, AIR 1959 SC, 1200 : 1961(1) MLJ, 31. and contended that the scope of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, is very much limited and the High Court should not go into the question of facts. The first cited decision of the full bench is not against the High Court considering the evidence. At Page 16, one of the learned Judges, has held as follows: "While the reliability of evidence let in is for the lower appellate court, I think (with the greatest aspect) that the value to be attached to the evidence (provided it is not mere "opinion" evidence) supposing it is accepted as true and the relevancy of evidence are questions to be considered by the High Court also." Further in the said case, the question involved was whether a particular custom is existed or not. 19. The second cited decision is a case where the High Court has interfered with the concurrent finding of fact of the Courts below. In the said case, the Apex Court holds that the findings of the High Court were open to serious criticism and must be held to be unsound. Therefore, in a case where the Courts below concurrently found a fact and the High Court finds differently and the finding is open to serious criticism, the High Court has certainly erred. In the said case, the Apex Court holds that the findings of the High Court were open to serious criticism and must be held to be unsound. Therefore, in a case where the Courts below concurrently found a fact and the High Court finds differently and the finding is open to serious criticism, the High Court has certainly erred. But if the finding of the High Court were sound and were not liable for serious criticism, it can be interfered that the High Court has not erred in such cases. Therefore, the said case is not helpful to the respondents. 20. The respondents finally contended that the appellate Court was not justified in not awarding the cost after having found in favour of the plaintiff. He also cited the following decisions reported in (1) Messrs. T.S. Radhakrishnan By Sole Proprietor., T.S. Radhakrishnan. v. State Bank of India, AIR 1958 Mad. 163 : 91 L.W., 301; and (2) Rangappa Goundan (died) and others v. Marappa Goundan, 1958 MLJ, 188 and contended that the cost must follow the event and for not awarding cost reasons must be given. But the lower appellate Court has not given any such reason. But this contention need not be considered at all as the finding of the lower appellate Court has been reversed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court has to be restored. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the second appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court is restored and confirmed, with cost throughout.