S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) FEELING aggrieved by the award of the Labour Court in the reference made under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereunder holding the dispensing with the services of the respondent workman to be a retrenchment which had been affected without complying with the mandatory requirements stipulated under Section 6-N of the Act, the said workman had been reinstated in service with full back wages, the petitioner employer has now approached this court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the aforesaid impugned award. ( 2 ) I have heard, the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Counsel representing the respondent No. 3 and have carefully perused the record. ( 3 ) THE facts in bride shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. The respondent No. 3 had been employed as a workman in the establishment of the petitioner in the year 1973. He had applied for leave for the period 20. 4. 1980 to 30. 4. 1980 which was duly sanctioned. According to the respondent No. 3 he could not return to duty after the expiry of the leave on account of his having fallen seriously ill and had sent an application, seeking extension of leave upto 31. 5. 1980 alongwith a medical certificate and on recovering from the illness, he returned to duty on 2. 6. 1980 alongwith a fitness certificate which was torn and thrown away refusing allotting of the duties to him. Thereafter the respondent No. 3 moved an application dated 11th June, 1980 to the management bringing the aforesaid facts to their notice and asseting that he had been repeatedly going to the factory requesting to be taken back on duty and requested that he may be taken back in service and his entire back wages may be paid to him within ten days failing which he will be compelled to take necessary legal steps. On the receipt of the aforesaid communication from the respondent No. 3 the management informed him vide the letter dated 21. 6. 1980 that he had not reported to duty on 1. 5. 1980 and subsequent to 30. 4. 1980 had remained absent without permission upto 21. 6. 1980. On the receipt of the aforesaid communication from the respondent No. 3 the management informed him vide the letter dated 21. 6. 1980 that he had not reported to duty on 1. 5. 1980 and subsequent to 30. 4. 1980 had remained absent without permission upto 21. 6. 1980. It was also pointed out that in the circumstances in view of the provisions contained in Standing Order 10 (j) he had lost his lien in respect of his job but still an opportunity was being afforded to him for submitting a satisfactory explanation within 24 hours from the receipt of the letter. It is claimed by the management that inspite of the aforesaid opportunity, no explanation had been submitted by the workman. ( 4 ) LABOUR Court on an appraisal of evidence on record placed reliance upon the statement of the workman that he had infact reported to duty on 2. 6. 1980. It was further noticed that in its letter dated 21. 6. 80 the management had proceeded on the assumption that the workman had ceased to be in service. The assertion of the workman that on 2. 6. 1980, he was refused to join the duty and fitness certificate of the doctor submitted by him had been torn and thrown away, was accepted. The Labour Court treated the dispensing with the services of the workman as retrenchment and since admittedly, the mandatory pre-requisite conditions for affecting retrenchment had not been satisfied or complied with, the workman was re-instated in service. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that in the circumstances of the case, it was not possible to hold that the impugned action amounted to a retrenchment as contemplated under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as it was the result of the own act/default of the workman and his own omission had resulted in his losing the right to continues as a workman or enjoy the security of job provided under various provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The contention is that if a workman loses his right to continue to retain the job by operation of law on account of his own voluntary act then in such a situation, no retrenchment could be said to have come into existence so as to require compliance of the mandatory pre-requisite conditions which must be satisfied before the service of a workman is dispensed with. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has urged that it is only in those cases where the dispensing with of the services of a workman results by an overt act on the part of the employer that a retrenchment can come into effect but in all such cases where the job is lost on account of the own voluntary act of the workman or by operation of law, the workman concerned is not entitled to any protection whatsoever as contemplated under the provisions of the Act in respect of any retrenchment or termination of any service etc. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent workman has, however, urged that taking into consideration the wide amplitude of the definition of the term retrenchment as provided for under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act no such distinction as is sought to be drawn is possible as the Act itself has specified the situations where a voluntary act of the workman will not fall within the ambit of retrenchment. What has been urged is that apart from the voluntary acts of a workman as specially referred to in the definition bringing them out of the ambit of the term retrenchment no other voluntary act of the workman can be utilised by the employer to dispense with his services, without complying with the minimum requirement prescribed by law. What has been urged is that in the present case, even the Standing Order 10 (j) provided for an opportunity for explaining the delay in returning to duty after expiry of the sanctioned leave. The petitioner was however deprived even of this opportunity as he was taken to have ceased to be in employment from 1. 5. What has been urged is that in the present case, even the Standing Order 10 (j) provided for an opportunity for explaining the delay in returning to duty after expiry of the sanctioned leave. The petitioner was however deprived even of this opportunity as he was taken to have ceased to be in employment from 1. 5. 1980 that is the date immediately after the expiry of the sanctioned leave on the assumption that no explanation had been furnished within the time prescribed immediately on his return after the expiry of the sanctioned leave, although on the own showing of the employer the explanation had infact been furnished in the letter of the workman dated 11. 6. 1980. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the contesting respondent has urged that no justifiable ground has been made out for any interference by this Court and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 9 ) I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the Learned Counsel for the parties. ( 10 ) THE Standing Order 10 (j) is to the following effect : "10 (j) In the event of a workman remaining absent in excess of the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless (1) he returns within 8 days of the expiry of the period of leave and (2) gives explanation to the satisfaction of the employer of is inability to return immediately after the expiry of the leave period. In case a workman loses his lien on his appointment he shall be entitled to be kept on the list of substitutes. " ( 11 ) THE word retrenchment has been defined under Section 2 (s) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes act which reads as follows ; "retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman or any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (i) voluntary retirement" of the workman; or (ii) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf. ( 12 ) THE definition of the term retrenchment is quite wide in its sweep. It comprehends termination of service and is infact a mode of termination of service. ( 12 ) THE definition of the term retrenchment is quite wide in its sweep. It comprehends termination of service and is infact a mode of termination of service. The termination of service may, however be brought out by dismissal, discharge, or removal from service apart from retrenchment, resignation or voluntary retirement. It may however, be clarified that every termination of service is not retrenchment in as much as it is specifically provided under the definition reverred to hereinabove that retrenchment means the termination of the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The termination of service may be by way of discharge simplicitor apart from by way of punishment where it is a discharge simplicitor, it might fall within the purview of the definition of retrenchment except in the excluded cases. ( 13 ) THE words termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whosoever, have, a special significance. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner this expression covers those cases where the service stands dispensed with not on account of any termination by the employer but on account of the own act, omission or default of the workman himself. In such circumstance, it is urged, that the termination of service comes into effect by operation of law and cannot be taken to be a termination of the service by the employer as contemplated under Section 2 (s) referred to hereinabove. ( 14 ) IT may be noticed that retrenchment in ordinary parlance means discharge of the surplus. Taking into account the special meaning assigned to the expression, retrenchment under the statute, it has to be held that it includes within its ambit termination of service of employment of a workman for any reason whatsoever excluding termination on account of inflicting punishment by way of disciplinary action and further excluding voluntary retirement or retirement on reaching the age of superannuation as specifically excluded from its purview by the Statute itself. ( 15 ) IT may usefully be noticed that the implications arising under a similar provision as contained in Standing Order 10 (j) referred to hereinabove came up for consideration by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of D. K. Yadav v. M/s. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. , reported in J. T. 1993 (3)S. C. 617. The Honble Supreme Court in its aforesaid decision referring to its earlier decisions had reiterated the view that the expression retrenchment was a comprehensive one intended to cover any action of management to put an end to employment of any employee for any reason whatsoever, clarified that the striking off the name from the rolls for unauthorised absence from duty amounted to termination of service rejecting the contention that the expiry of eight days absence from duty brings about the automatic loss of lien on the post and nothing more need to be done by the management to pass an order terminating the service. The submission that the stipulation contained in the Standing Order resulted in automatic termination of service was negatived. ( 16 ) IN its aforesaid decision, the Apex Court also held that the procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvie of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by a Statute or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14. So it must be right just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In the aforesaid case, the appellants plea put-forth at the earliest was that despite the reporting to duty and readiness to join the duty, he was prevented to report to duty and was not permitted to sign the attendance register. In that case, it was found that the principles of natural justice had to be read into the Standing Order No. 13 (2) (iv) which was under consideration there which is similar to the Standing Order 10 (j) under consideration in this case. ( 17 ) IN the present case, what 1 find is that the Labour Court has accepted the claim of the contesting respondent workman that he had reported to duty on 2nd June, 1980. He was prevented from joining the duties. ( 17 ) IN the present case, what 1 find is that the Labour Court has accepted the claim of the contesting respondent workman that he had reported to duty on 2nd June, 1980. He was prevented from joining the duties. Further in his application dated 11. 6. 1980, the respondent workman had furnished the explanation for his not reporting for the period elapsing between 1st may, 1980 to 1st June, 1980. The management in its letter dated 21st June, 1980 instead of considering the aforesaid explanation had proceeded on the assumption that the respondent workman had ceased to be in service in view of his having not reported to duty as stipulated under 1st part of the Standing Order No. 10 (j) in question. Inspite of the explanation being there in the letter dated 11th June, 1980, the respondent workman was required to submit the explanation within 24 hours. The reference made under Section 4-K required a decision on the question as to whether the action of the employer in discharging the workman from service/preventing him from performing the duties was valid and in accordance with law and if not, to what relief the workman was entitled to. Even according to the employer, the petitioner, the alleged opportunity to submit explanation had been furnished to the workman on 21. 6. 1980 that is much after 2nd June, 1980 before which date even accordance to the employer, the concerned workman had been taken to be out of service or discharged from service. Such an opportunity in my considered opinion was merely an eye wash and could not be taken to be an opportunity as contemplated under Standing Order No. 10 (j ). ( 18 ) IN the circumstances, therefore, I am clearly of the view that taking into consideration the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of D. K. Yadav (supra), the principles of natural justice have to be read into the Standing Order in question and when so read the impugned action has to be held to be violative of the principles of natural justice. ( 19 ) TAKING into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of D. K. Yadav (supra), I am clearly of the opinion that the finding of the Labour Court to the effect that the impugned action infact fell within the ambit of retrenchment as contemplated under Section 2 (s) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act is not liable to be disturbed. I am further of the view that the impugned action is vitiated on account of being violative of the elementary principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, it seems to me that the respondent workman was equally to be blamed for the impugned action. In his deposition he had accepted that he could not produce the copy of the medical certificate which was sought to be relied upon in support of his alleged illness. He also could not tell as to whether the medical certificate had been sent to the employer alongwith the acknowledgment due. No effort was made by the respondent workman to establish that the registered letter alleged to be containing the medical certificate had infact been delivered to the addressee. He could not produce even the copy of the explanation seeking extension of the leave. He had accepted that subsequent to 21. 6. 1980, he had never reported to duty. ( 21 ) IN the circumstances, it seems to me that the payment of only 50% of the back wages would have met the ends of justice. ( 22 ) IN view of my conclusions indicated hereinabove, this writ petition success in part. The impugned award of the Labour Court shall stand modified accordingly with a direction that the respondent No. 3 shall be entitled to only 150% of the back wages. In other respects, the impugned award shall remain undisturbed. ( 23 ) THERE shall, however, be no order as to costs. . .