Judgment : .1. Petitioners seek the assistance of this Court for issuance of the writ of certiorari, calling for the records relating to G.O. No.(l-D) 685, Home Dept., (Cinema-2) dated 30.9.1997 issued by the 1st respondent, confirming the order of the 2nd respondent in D.Dis.(d) Cinema Appeal No.57 of 1996, dated 5-12-1996, confirming the order of the 3rd respondent in R.Dis .No.28715 of 1995, dated 13-4-1996, and the quash the same. 2. The petitioners, who are man and wife have sought interference of this Court, prohibiting the 4th respondent from exhibiting cinema films in his semi-permanent theatre by name Kothandaram Talkies The relevant facts, which are necessary for the disposal of this writ petition could be summarised as follows:- 3. An area of 3.22 acres of land in S.No.l 121/2 in Vikramasingapuram Village, Ambasamudram Taluk, originally belonged to one Deva Asirvadam. He leased an extent of 1.18 acres to one Govindaswamy Naidu, the father of the 4th respondent for a period of ten years, for running a semi-permanent theatre. The lessee, Govindaswamy Naidu was running the semi-permanent theatre from 1976 to 1981, and the same was closed thereafter due to cancellation of the permit by the Commercial Tax Department for non-payment of tax and non-submission of weekly returns. It is said that the theatre itself was abandoned by the lessee Govindaswamy Naidu, and the said lessee also expired in the year 1982, and there was no renewal of the lease. 4. The original owner Deva Asirvadam, executed a registered will, bequeathing the said land to his widow and son and he died in the year 1973, and the will come into force on his death. One of the sons Devanesan Abraham, to whom 64 cents were allotted, as per the will, sold that property to the petitioners under two sale deeds, and ever since from the date of sale, it is their case, that they are in possession of the same. 5. The original lessee Govindaswamy Naidu applied for renewal of licence before the 3rd respondent, which was seriously opposed not only by the petitioners, but also by others, and his application was rejected as per order dated 29-11-1982. One of the reasons stated by the licensing authority was that in respect of the subject land, litigations are pending and litigious possession would not satisfy the Cinema Rules. One of the reasons stated by the licensing authority was that in respect of the subject land, litigations are pending and litigious possession would not satisfy the Cinema Rules. Though the licensee filed appeal and revision before the Appellate and Revisional authorities, the same were without any success. .6. In the meanwhile, the 4th respondent herein purchased 46 cents of land allotted to Devavaram Immanuel one of the sons of the original owner. The 4th respondent sold that property to his sister Roopavathi Ammal, as per the sale deed dated 30-1-1980. Subsequently, a lease was taken by the 4th respondent from Roopavathi Ammal, in regard to 46 cents. It is within this area, the semi-permanent theatre is constructed. 7. It is alleged in the writ petition that even though the 4th respondent has purchased 46 cents of land, in fact he is possession of larger area and the main auditorium is situated in the excess area of 10 cents. In regard to that 10 cents, it is said that the 4th respondent has taken an illegal lease deed, from persons who have no right over the same. It is their case, that fictitious document has been created, without having any right over the property. The 4th respondent has also moved the authorities for getting the licence renewed. Apart from the petitioners, various other persons have also made serious objections, and ultimately his application for renewal was rejected by the licensing authority. The matter was taken in appeal. The appellate authority remanded the matter, holding that the application has to be treated as an application seeking fresh licence, and not an application seeking renewal. After remand by the appellate authority, the licensing authority allowed the application, and consequently C form licence has been granted to the 4th respondent. Though an appeal and revisions have been filed before the authorities, the same were without any success. It is those orders have been challenged in this writ petition. 8. It is further said that the petitioners have filed O.S.No. 25 of 1994, on the file of the District Munsif, Ambasamudram, for permanent injunction against the said Govindaswamy Naidu, and the petitioners have also filed a suit against the 3rd respondent as O.S.No. 495 of 1994, for a permanent injunction from granting C form licence. 8. It is further said that the petitioners have filed O.S.No. 25 of 1994, on the file of the District Munsif, Ambasamudram, for permanent injunction against the said Govindaswamy Naidu, and the petitioners have also filed a suit against the 3rd respondent as O.S.No. 495 of 1994, for a permanent injunction from granting C form licence. It is also said that the father of 4th respondent has also filed O.S.No. 17 of 1994, against the petitioners seeking permanent injunction, restraining the petitioners and others from interfering with his possession. 9. In the various grounds raised in the writ petition, it is said that after the death of his father, the 4th respondent cannot be said to be a person in lawful possession, and therefore, he is not entitled to get a licence. The right over the property is now under litigation, which is to be decided by the civil court. Therefore, the claim of the 4th respondent is only a litiuous possession, and the Statute prevents such persons from getting licence in exhibiting cinema films. It is also against Rules 35, 57, 79-A and 92 of the Tamil Nadu Cinematograph Rules. It is also contended that when the legal possession is confined only to 46 cents, possession of area far in excess itself will disentitle the 4th respondent from getting C form licence for exhibiting films. 10. 1 heard the learned Additional Government Pleader also. 11. The main point raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is that the original owner who has executed the will allotted 46 cents of land alone to one of his son Devavaram Immanuel, from whom the 4th respondent purchased the property, and he sold the same to his sister, and thereafter obtained a registered lease from her. It is their further case that in regard to 46 cents, eventhough the 4th respondent has title and possession, and the main auditorium of the theatre is situated outside the 46 cents, and the 4th respondent is in possession of an excess area of 10 cents. It is said that the 4th respondent is claiming possession of 10 cents on the basis of lease deed executed by the grand-daughter of Roopavathi Ammal, who is minor represented by her mother. It is said that the 4th respondent is claiming possession of 10 cents on the basis of lease deed executed by the grand-daughter of Roopavathi Ammal, who is minor represented by her mother. It is the case of the petitioner that in regard to 10 cents, the lease deed is invalid, and the person who executed the same have no right over it. It is also contended that the said 10 cents of land is within the 64 cents of lands purchased by the petitioners under two different sale deeds from Devanesan Abraham, one of the sons of the original owner. 12. In this connection, it may also be noted, that the father of the 4th respondent has filed a suit and has obtained on order of injunction against the petitioners from in any manner interfering with his possession, 46 cents and 10 cents of land are forming part of one block of property, and the very theatre was constructed by the father of the 4th respondent, as per the earlier lease deed executed by the original owner. No portion of the theatre has come to the possession of the Legal Heirs of the original owner, after the expiry of the term, and the possession continues with the 4th respondent only. The above fact will have to be taken into consideration, while considering the legal position submitted by the learned counsel. 13. In Krishna Kishore Firm V. The Govt. of A.P. and others, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2292 Their Lordships considered the question as to what is the difference between the "lawful possession" and legal possession. In paragraphs 4 and 5 at pages 2294 and 2295 of the reports, Their Lordships held thus:- "True the appellant was neither owner nor lessee. Yet was his possession forbidden in law? Was there no excuse for his possession? The error committed by High Court was to equate lawful with legal. Legal and lawful, normally, convey same sense and are usually interchangeable. What is legal is lawful, But what is lawful may be so without being formally legal. " The principal distinction between the terms Lawful and Legal is that former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To any of an act that it is lawful implies that it is authorised, sanctioned or at any rate not forbidden by law. " The principal distinction between the terms Lawful and Legal is that former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To any of an act that it is lawful implies that it is authorised, sanctioned or at any rate not forbidden by law. (Blacks Law Dictionary) Same thought about lawful has been brought out by Pollock and Wright by explaining that Lawful possession means in legal possession which is also rightful or at least excusable. (Pollock and Wright possession in the Common Law) thus that which is not stricto legato may yet be lawful. It should not be forbidden by law. In fact legal is associated with provisions in the Act, rules etc. Whereas lawful visualises all that is not illegal against law or even permissible. Lawful is wider in connotation then legal. Although provision in Specific Relief Act empowering a person or tenant to recover possession if he has been evicted forcibly by the landlord may be juridical and not lawful or a tenant holding over is not in lawful possession unless landlord agrees or acquiesces expressly or impliedly but that does not alter the legal position about possession of a person not legal yet not without interest. The provision in Specific Relief Act is founded more on public policy than on jurisprudence. But concept of lawful as opposed or in contradistinction to litigious assumes different dimension. M.C.Chockalingam v. M. Manichavasagam, 1974 (2) SCR 143 : AIR 1974 SC 104 is of no help as it was concerned with possession which could not be said to be warranted or authorised by law. Distinction between nature of possession of a lessee after expiry of period of lease can better be explained by resorting to few illustrations. For instance a lessee may before expiry of lease acquire entire lessors interest resulting in "drowning" or "sinking" of inferior right into superior right. That is right of one merges into another. It has been statutorily recognised by section 111 (a) of Transfer of Property Act. Similarly a tenant after expiry of period of lease may be holding over and the lessor may acquiesce in his continuances expressly or implied. That is from conduct of lessor the tenants possession may stand converted into lawful. The other may be where lessor may not agree to renew the lease nor he may acquiesce in his continuance. Similarly a tenant after expiry of period of lease may be holding over and the lessor may acquiesce in his continuances expressly or implied. That is from conduct of lessor the tenants possession may stand converted into lawful. The other may be where lessor may not agree to renew the lease nor he may acquiesce in his continuance. Such a lessee cannot claim any right or interest. His possession is neither legal nor lawful, such was the Chockalingams case, 1974 (2) SCR 143 : AIR 1974 SC 104 . The Court held that continuance of lessees possession after expiry of period of lease was not lawful for purposes of renewal of licence under Madras Cinema Regulation Act, 1955, obviously because lessee was left with no interest which could furnish any excuse or give it colour of being legal. Yet another illustration may be, not very common where lessee requires some interest in part of the undivided property as in present case. Can it be said in such a case on ratio of Chockalingams, AIR 1974 SC 104 authority that possession of such lessee or to be more specific of appellant was unwarranted or contrary to law: Share of V.V.in 7000 sq.yds. was half. He had agreed to sale his half interest. V.V. was joint owner with his son and grandson. He had "both single possession and a single joint right to possess" (Pollock and Wright) Whether such joint owner could transfer his share even when he was not in exclusive possession and what would be effect of such transfer need not be gone into an title suit is pending between parties but when a person having physical control acquires an interest to hold or continue by virtue of an agreement of sale it cannot be said that he had no interest and his possession was forbidden by law. The High Court lost sight of the fact that by virtue of the transaction entered between V.V. and appellant which was not challenged by him nor any cloud was cast over it by creating any subsequent interest the appellant may not have become owner but he could certainly claim that he was in lawful possession. In law he was entitled to file suit for specific performance if there was any treat to his right or interest by V.V. Such right or interest could not be termed as litigious. In law he was entitled to file suit for specific performance if there was any treat to his right or interest by V.V. Such right or interest could not be termed as litigious. It was at least not without any excuse for forbidden by law. In words and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 25A, and reprint 1976 a somewhat similar situation was described as not litigious: "Where client conveyed undivided half interest in land to attorney in consideration of attorneys rendering services and paying court costs, giving irrevocable power of attorney to sue, settle, or compromise, attorney received good title as third person purchasing upon faith of public records, precluding reformation as against attorney, on the strength of an instrument recorded after deed to attorney and client claimed title, as against contention that attorney required a "litigious right". In that judgment, their Lordships said that if a person is in lawful possession, he is entitled to get a licence for exhibiting films, even if he is not the owner or a tenant. If he is in lawful possession, the authorities are bound to consider his claim for granting licence. 14. In M. Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Government of Tamil Nadu rep. by The Secretary To Govt. Home and Cinema DepL, 1993 WLR 958 a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider similar question. In that judgment, the Division Bench has considered all the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as this Court. The Bench, in paragraph 16 of the judgment, said that "if the applicant is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment and satisfied the requirement of Rule 13 of the Rules, she is entitled to get the licence renewed or to get licence." In that case also, various civil disputes were pending between the parties. But the Division Bench said that the civil dispute is only with regard to the title, to the property, which cannot be taken into consideration for the grant of licence. 15. Both the decisions cited supra, are again taken into consideration by this Court, in the decision reported in Hanumar Vahana Panchaparva Kattali Attached to Sri Venkatachalapathi Perumal Temple, Pulivalam v. B.P. Subramanian, 1994 (II) M.L.J.239. In that case the property was leased, and the lessee was over-staying in the premises. The question was whether his claim can be considered for granting renewal of licence. In that case the property was leased, and the lessee was over-staying in the premises. The question was whether his claim can be considered for granting renewal of licence. The learned Judge of this Court held that Rule 13 of the Rules, enables such a person to consider his claim for renewal of C form licence. 16. On the basis of the above legal position, let us see what Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957, says. Rule 13(1) and (2) of the said Rules, read thus:- 13 (1) If the applicant for the licence is the owner of the site, building and equipment, he shall produce to the licensing authority the necessary records relating to his ownership and possession thereof. If he is not the owner, he shall, to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, produce documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment. (2) If the land for which the applicant requires a "No Objection Certificate"is under jurisdiction of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department, the Licencee shall produce to the licensing authority along with his application a letter of permission from the commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Madras specifically permitting the leasing out of the land to the applicant. In the absence of such a letter of prior permission the Licensing authority shall reject the application for No objection Certificate". 17. There also, the statute insists on lawful possession. In this case, even according to the admission of the petitioners themselves, it is clear, that the old cinema theatre constructed by the father of the 4th respondent was not only in the 46 cents of land, but in a larger areas, which according to the 4th respondent is including the 10 cents of land, in which also he is in lawful possession. In this care, we are not concerned with the right of the executants of the lease. When the 4th respondent is entitled to enjoy the theatre, which is covered in both the lands, which remain undivided, he is entitled to be conferred for renewal of licence. In fact, in the decision reported in M. Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Government of Tamil Nadu rep. by The Secretary To Govt. Home and Cinema DepL, 1993 W.L.R. 958 the lessee was in joint possession of the movable in the theatre. In fact, in the decision reported in M. Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. Government of Tamil Nadu rep. by The Secretary To Govt. Home and Cinema DepL, 1993 W.L.R. 958 the lessee was in joint possession of the movable in the theatre. It was in that circumstances, their Lordships said that he was in lawful possession. It is a better case for the 4th respondent. 18. The authorities below have rightly considered the case of the 4th respondent and came to the conclusion that he is entitled to get the licence. The authorities have rightly said that the civil dispute does not stand in the way of incorporating Rules 13(1) of the Cinemas (Regulation) Rules. The authorities further held that the suit filed by the father of the 4th respondent is still pending and an interim injunction has been granted against the petitioners from disturbing their possession, Taking into consideration these facts, the authorities have held that the 4th respondent is in lawful possession, and therefore, entitled to get licence under the Cinemas (Regulations, Rules. I agree with those conclusions). 19. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. Consequently, the connected W.M.Ps., are also dismissed.