The petitioner herein is the mother of the accused, who was arrested on 3rd October, 1993 in connection with Nongstoin PS Case No.78 (10) 93 for alleged offence punishable under section 506 IPC. which was subsequently registered as GR Case No.80/93 under section 506 IPC. He was produced before the Magistrate on 4.10.93 and remanded to police custody for two days by Additional Deputy Commissioner, Nongstoin and after expiry of the period of police custody, on 6.10.93 he was remanded to judicial custody, without being produced before any Magistrate or Court and thereafter the period of judicial custody was extended from time to time without the accused being even produced before the Magistrate. At times, the period of remand of judicial custody exceeded the statutory limit, even by more than a month. The petitioner has averred that on 17.3.94, charge sheet No.3/94 dated 28.2.94 was submitted but no copies of the documents as required under section 207 CrPC were supplied to the accused. During all these period the accused remained incarcerated and at no point of time he was informed either by the police officer arresting him or the Presiding Officer of the Court that he had a right to be released on bail. 2. On 4.5.95, the petitioner's younger son, brother of the accused, applied for certified copies of the charge sheet, the FIR and the orders passed by the Court in GR Case No. 80/93, the certified copies as supplied are placed on record. Petitioner's grievance is that copy of the FIR though applied for was not supplied to the petitioner. Petitioner's grievance is that the offence under section 506 being punishable with two years imprisonment with fine or both. In the instant case, the petitioner, because of non performance of duty by the police officer and the Magistrate, the accused suffered imprisonment for more than one year and eight months for no fault of his and was prevented from being released on bail. 3. The accused is an illiterate villager, his rights under Article 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution have been violated by the respondents with impunity. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the proceedings and also claim compensation for illegal and unlawful detention of the accused. 4. 3. The accused is an illiterate villager, his rights under Article 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution have been violated by the respondents with impunity. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the proceedings and also claim compensation for illegal and unlawful detention of the accused. 4. In a society where justice, atleast in theory, is held as the highest ideal, it is a sad commentary that the accused charged with offence punishable under section 506 IPC is made to suffer incarceration for almost the whole term for which he could otherwise have been punished. Article 21 of the Constitution, a one line provision, enshrines the cherished ideals of the nation. Keeping aside for a while its judicial interpretations as made by the Courts from time to time, even the worst of criminals is entitled to a just, fair and reasonable procedure before he is deprived of his liberty, which comes next only to life. It is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution, the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 21 read with Article 19 (1) (d) prescribes the Court shall forthwith furnish a free transcript copy of the documents contained in the charge sheet as contemplated by section 207 CrPC. The procedure established by law, as contemplatedd by Article 21 envisages a procedure which is fair and reasonable, which includes a right to get a copy of the judgment. 5. In the instant case, the procedure followed by the Presiding Officer of the Court, let alone the police officer, arresting the accused, is far from being just and fair. It does not stand to reason as to why a copy of the FIR could not be supplied to the accused. It is not one of those privileged documents contained in the case diary. In fact the case diary comes next, after lodging of the FIR. FIR is a public document and one can obtain a certified copy of the same even from the police. But in the instant case, even the Court failed to supply a copy of the FIR despite an application having been made there for that too after filing of the charge-sheet. 6. Legal aid and assistance has now been recognised as one of the basic rights of an accused where the prisoner is disabled from engaging a lawyer for . But in the instant case, even the Court failed to supply a copy of the FIR despite an application having been made there for that too after filing of the charge-sheet. 6. Legal aid and assistance has now been recognised as one of the basic rights of an accused where the prisoner is disabled from engaging a lawyer for . whatever reasons, such as, indigence or because of difficulty in communication with outsider, say any relation or friend it is the duty of the Court to apprise him of his right and provide him the necessary facilities to engage a counsel, irrespective of the nature and gravity of the offence charged, at the State expense. The Supreme Court has held that the State which prosecute the prisoners and sets into motion the process of depriving him of his liberty shall pay for the assigned counsel with such sum as the Court may fix. What has happened in this case is that the accused was not even apprised of his right, let alone provide a counsel at the State expense. This benign prescription operates from the lowest to the highest Court where deprivation of life and liberty is in substantial peril. 7. Article 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and the words 'procedure established by law' are words of deep meaning for the judicial sentinels. I am constrained to observe that the Presiding Officer of the Court failed to observe the procedural fairness required of him right from the day one when the accused was produced before him and thereafter on each date while remanding the accused to judicial custody from time to time without ever insisting for his physical production before the Court thus allowing him to rot in jail. It is a practice which needs to be condemned in no uncertain terms. The judicial remand granted by the Magistrate was clearly in violation of section 309 CrPC and sub-section (2) of section 167 CrPC. It is a practice which needs to be condemned in no uncertain terms. The judicial remand granted by the Magistrate was clearly in violation of section 309 CrPC and sub-section (2) of section 167 CrPC. In the instant case the accused was arrested on 3.10.93 and chagesheet filed by the police on 17.3.94, apparently beyond the period of 60 days from the date of arrest and the accused was entitled as of right to be released on bail even if the offence charged under section 5061PC is taken and treated to be as cognizable and non bailable one under the State notification. 8. Even the exercise of power to issue notification notifying the offence under secton 506IPC. as non bailable has come under scathing attack. It is a question of fact, a practice adopted by the respondent State to issue one notification, one after another on expiry of the term of six months of the earlier notification. All earlier notification issued in exercise of powers under section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932. One such notification is made available by Mr. SR Sen, who is present in Court. The notification reads : “Govt. of Meghalaya Law (B) Department Orders by the Governor Notification, the 14th December, 1994. No.LJ (B) 347/79/54. In exercise of the powers conferred under section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment 1932 (Act No.XXlII of 1932), the Governor of Meghalaya hereby declares that any offence under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code shall with immediate effect be congnizable and non-bailable for a period of six months in the whole of the State of Meghalaya. S. Dykes, Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Law (B) Department." This notification is revived every six months without the legislature ever approving the amendment. 9. The Supreme Court in Dr. DC Wadhwa & others vs. State of Bihar & others, AIR 1987 SC 579, had occasion to deal with similar situation. Referring to a circular observed as follows . "The circular letter clearly shows beyond doubt that the re-promulgation of the Ordinances was done on a massive scale in a routine manner without even caring to get the Ordinances replaced by Acts of the Legislature or considering whether the circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for the Governor to take immediate action by way of re-promulgation of the Ordinances. The Govt. The Govt. - seemed to proceed on the basis that it was not necessary to introduce any legislation in the Legislature but that the law could be continued to be made by the Govt. by having the Ordinances re-promulgated by the Governor from time to time. The question is whether this practice followed by the Govt. of Bihar could be justified as representing legitimate exercise of power of promulgating Ordinances conferred on the Governor under Article 213 of the Constitution." 10. 1 am not preaching the procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution as an amplified activists, but going by the bare minimum procedure as fair and reasonable which conforms with civilised norms like natural justice, firmly rooted in the community consciousness and not primitive procedural prosecution and barbarity, making a mockery of the procedural fairness a implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1819 had directed release of large number of undertrial prisoners in Bihar charged with multiple offences, who had been in jail for more than the total maximum period of imprisonment impossable far all the offences if the sentences were to run concurrently. In the instant case, the accused is charged with only one offence and that too an offence like section 506 IPC. Having already undergone one year and nine months of imprisonment before being released on bail. What more punishment could there be for such an accused? What purpose in such circumstance would now serve? The offence allegedly committed way back in 1993 is still continuing in face of the law laid down by the Supreme Court that an accused is entitled to speedy trial. Article 14 is inseparable and comes into play whenever and where ever a person is sought to be deprived of his life and liberty. Article 3 9 A, though contained in Directive Principles of State Policy, has now been given the status of basic right of an accused which cannot be denied to him. 11. In the case at hand, the accused, who was arrested for offence punishable under section 506 IPC and sought to be prosecuted, was denied all that is legitimately due to him. It reminds one of 'Fyodor Dostoyevsky'. 11. In the case at hand, the accused, who was arrested for offence punishable under section 506 IPC and sought to be prosecuted, was denied all that is legitimately due to him. It reminds one of 'Fyodor Dostoyevsky'. who said, "He that first cries out to speak the thief is often that has stolen the treasure." Those who caught the accused for a criminal intimidation are themselves intimidators and depredators of the rights of an accused. It is regretable that when this petition which has been pending for last two years came up for hearing, even the Govt. Advocate was not available. The panel lawyer Mr. Thankiew had to be summoned from other Court, he also expressed his inability in assisting the Court since he was not handling the case. One is prone to ask how long this matter should be allowed to hang fire? 12. The accused was produced on 6.10.93. A certified copy of the order sheet as drawn by the Magistrate has been placed on record. The prayer for judicial remand for 14 days was allowed and the accused was remanded to jail custody. The subsequent ordersheet dated 20th October. 1993 does not indicate that the accused was produced nor any reason assigned or disclosed in the ordersheet for his non production in person. All that it says is that if the accused is granted bail it would hamper and tamper the investigation. It is left to one's guess if on the date, the notification as quoted above, was really in force? The learned Magistrate has not addressed himself to this aspect of the matter. The order dated 4.11.93 simply records non production of the accused who was lodged in Shillong Jail, same is repeated on 17.11.93, 2.12.93, 16.12.93, 3.1.94. From these ordersheets it appears that no report from the IO was received as regards the stage and completion of investigation of offence like 506 IPC and the accused continued languishing in jail. 13. As can be gathered from ordersheet dated 11.1.94 two persons filed an application 10.1.94 opposing grant of bail to the accused. On 17.1.94, 15.2.94, 1.3.94, 15.3.94 the accused was not produced. For the first time on 17.3.94 the learned Magistrate directed production of the accused on 26.4.94 with further direction to supply copies. Yet the accused was neither produced on 26.4.94 nor on 29.3.94 as directed vide ordersheet dated 15.3.94. On 17.1.94, 15.2.94, 1.3.94, 15.3.94 the accused was not produced. For the first time on 17.3.94 the learned Magistrate directed production of the accused on 26.4.94 with further direction to supply copies. Yet the accused was neither produced on 26.4.94 nor on 29.3.94 as directed vide ordersheet dated 15.3.94. Even subsequently oh 2.6.94 and 14.7.94, 16.8.94, 16.9.94, 17.10.94, 17.11.94,19.12.94, 19.1.95,20.2.95 and 20.3.95 on all these dates the accused was not produced, and it is obvious that the remand granted by the Magistrate was far exceeding 15 days and even month. This is sheer abuse of the power of remand. It was only on 4.5.95, on an application moved on behalf of the accused, that copies of the charge sheet were directed to be supplied by 26.5.95. It appears that the Court was blissfully oblivious of section 207 CrPC. 14. The matter relates to liberty of a citizen. There is only one indication at the intermediary stage that two persons came forward to oppose the bail, in case it was to be granted to the accused but that was never to be. The accused himself was never produced, much less actually called upon to show cause against what the two persons had stated against him opposing the grant of bail. The whole procedure adopted by the Court is simply stinking and makes one doubt whether there is something like Articles 21 or 22 in the Constitution. 15. In the circumstances, it is not the accused alone whose liberty is in peril but the way the case has been approached and handled endangers the liberty of any other honest law abiding citizens. This tendency needs to be curbed with all sternness. Accused, if the law permits, can even be hanged provided the procedure established by law is followed. The procedure cannot be allowed to be circum­vented or whittled down by the minions of law and the officers entrusted with the task of dispensing justice and the sentinels of the rights and liberty of a citizen. 16. Considering the fact that the accused has already undergone one year and nine months imprisonment, pending criminal proceedings as liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed. 17. The petitioner has also prayed for compensation and it is a case for awarding one. The liberties of a citizen cannot be equated in terms of money, it is far more precious than any denomination. 17. The petitioner has also prayed for compensation and it is a case for awarding one. The liberties of a citizen cannot be equated in terms of money, it is far more precious than any denomination. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in DK Basu's case, (1997) 1 SCC 416 ) pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of fundamental right to liberty and life of a citizen, and this award of compensation in public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damages which is otherwise available to the victims. To my mind, an amount of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) only as compensation for the blatantly illegal detention and deprivation of liberty of the petitioners's son would substantially meet the ends of justice. It is accordingly awarded. 18. The respondent State is at liberty to recover the same from the erring officials who put the liberties of the accused in peril. The amount of compensation as awarded shall be paid within two months from the date of communication of the order, failing which it will carry interest as well.