Honble GODARA, J. – This Civil Revision Petition has been preferred against the appellate order dated 27.7.95 passed by the learned District Judge, Sri Ganganagar dismissing Civil Misc. Appeal No. 74/95 filed against the order dated 1.5.95 passed by the Addl., Civil Judge (JD) No. 1, Sri Ganganagar in Civil Misc. Case No. 36/95 whereby the application for grant of temporary injunction filed by the emplo- yee respondent was allowed. (2). Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present- petition are that the respondent, as plaintiff, brought a suit in the trial court pleading that he passed higher secondary and thereafter received training of the Diesel Mechanic from the I.T.I., Jhunjhunu and so he was appointed on probation for a period of two years on the post of D.G. Set Operator on 3.4.92 with the petitioner-defendant No. 1 in a regular pay and he was given starting of Rs. 950/- p.m. in the aforesaid Pay Scale w.e.f. 9.9.93 and, lastly, he was also confirmed in the same grade and on the same post and the petitioner-Society also issued last seniority list of all the employees working in the aforesaid Pay Scale in token of his confirmation and continuance in the afiresaid regular Pay Scale. However, it has been pleaded that, due to irregular, uncertain and insufficient supply of electricity power, the petitioner-Society also suffered huge losses as was the case with similar sister industries and due to less production, the higher authorities of the board of the petitioner-Society held thehigher hierarchy of officers of the petitioner-Society responsible for the loss incurred by the Society and being humiliated and embarrassed, the officers of the Society, in order to find out easy excuse and to victimize subordinates, with the high- handedness, also served a charge-sheet on 31.1.95 on the plaintiff-respondent on baseless grounds. The respondent asked for certain documents before he could effectively answer the charges levelled against him and, inspite of his request, co- pies of the documents asked for were not supplied to him and, consequently, he did file his reply on 4.4.95 and, consequently, vide his order dated 13.4.95, the Appointing Authority who was working with the petitioner-Society, vide his order dated 13/15.4.95, ordered for his demotion from the post of D.G. Set Operator to the Lab. Assistant in the lower Pay Scale of Rs. Assistant in the lower Pay Scale of Rs. 775-13-840-15-1005-20- 1025 amounting to his demotion from higher post to a lower post and the Pay Scale, as referred to above. Therefore, it was pleaded that since the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was illegal and void having been passed in clear contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Service Rules as well as the Industrial Employees (Standing Orders), 1946 (for short the Standing Orders) which were also applicable in the case of the petitioner and, consequently, the impugned order dated 13/15.4.95 being so illegal and void, be set aside. (3). Besides, an application for grant of temporary injunction thereby operation of the impugned order dated 13/15.4.97 was prayed to be stayed till disposal of the suit on the ground that, in the aforesaid circumstances, in case the impugned order is allowed to be sustained or continued during the pendency of the suit, it will result in great hardship and irreparable loss to the petitioner and that the balance of convenience was also in favour of the petitioner. (4). This petition was seriously contested by the defendant- petitioners on theground that the plaintiff-respondent was duly charge-sheeted and, consequent upon the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the competent Disciplinary Authority, on behalf of the petitioner-Society, since the provisions of the Standing Orders, though as per the plaintiff-respondent the same were applicable, did not apply to the defendant-Society and there was no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order which was passed by a competent authority after due compliance with the provi- sions of law and the Rules applicable thereto. It was denied that necessary factors for issue of any temporary injunction were in existence and that the civil court was barred from taking cognizance of this dispute. (5). After hearing both the sides, the learned trial Judge granted application for temporary injunction thereby suspended the operation of the impugned order dated 13/15.4.95 till disposal of the suit and hence being aggrieved, the defendant- petitioners preferred appeal there-against in the court of District Judge, Sri Ganganagar resulting in its dismissal, as above. Hence, this revision petition in the aforesaid terms. (6). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the impugned orders passed by the lower courts and also considered their legality and regularity. (7). Hence, this revision petition in the aforesaid terms. (6). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the impugned orders passed by the lower courts and also considered their legality and regularity. (7). Presently, mostly the facts which have given rise to the present litigation are not under dispute. (8). The defendant-petitioner No. 1, which was a Board under the control and management of Kraya-Vikrya Sangh Ltd., consequent upon coming into existence of Rajasthan Rajya Sahakari Tilhan Utpadak Sangh Ltd. (Tilam Sangh), its management and control has been transferred under the Tilam Sangh and the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, on an application under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Co- operative Societies Act, 1965, under the name ``Rajasthan Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd., Jaipur accepted and registered the Society as such on 3.7.90 under Section 8 of the said Act and, consequent upon transfer of its business, control and management under the Tilam Sangh Rajasthan, Sri Ganganagar Project, the same has been registered in terms of Section 9 of the Act on the basis of Registration Certificate so granted by the Registrar, Co-operative Society, Jaipur and, hence, the defendant-petitioner No. 1 stands registered as a body corporate having its own constitution, management and business and also having framed its bye-laws for its internal management. (9). The learned counsel for the defendant-petitioners, while relying on the provisions of Sections 75,77,137 and 143 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (for short that Co- operative Act) submitted that the provisions of the Standing Orders referred to hereinbefore are inapplicable to the proceedings or any disciplinary action arising between the defendant- Society and its employees and, consequently, it has been denied that the provisions of Standing Orders were at all applicable in this dispute and, consequently, rightly too, as also held by the Honble Supreme Court in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. & Ors. vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and Ors. etc. vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and Ors. etc. (1), in case the plea of the employee-petitioner is sustained that the provisions of the said Standing Orders are applicable in this case, resultantly, there is bar against entertainment of such disputes by a civil court under the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code) and, accordingly, the dispute shall be entertainable by Industrial Tribunal alone and, therefore, it is further submitted that the impugned orders of the lower courts are without jurisdiction and, consequently, this petition deserves to be accepted. (10). At the out set, on consideration of provisions of Section 9 of the Code, it transpires that the court (civil) shall subject to the provisions contained in the Code itself, has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Resultantly, it has to be traced out whether there are specific legal provisions whereby the jurisdiction of a civil court has been barred thereby ousting jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain and adjudicate upon controversy like the one under adjudication before this Court. (11). Since the learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly based his arguments on the provisions of Sections 75,77, 137 and 143 of the Co-operative Act and the provisions of these Sections are repeated hereinbelow : ``Sec. 75. Disputes which may be referred to arbitration— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a co-operative society. Disputes which may be referred to arbitration— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a co-operative society. (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society, or (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society, or (d) between the society and any other co-operative society, (e) between the Society and the surety of a member, past member or a deceased member, or a person other than a member who has been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had transaction under Section 66, whether such a surety is or is not a member of a society, such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, namely :– (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor whether the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer or the society. (3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a Co-operative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court. Sec. 77. Reference of disputes to arbitration. – (1) The Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of a dispute under section 75 – (a) decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or (c) refer it for disposal to one arbitrator. (2) The Registrar may withdraw any reference transferred or referred for disposal under sub-section (1) and either decide it himself or tran- sfer or refer it again for disposal to another person or arbitrator mentioned in clauses (b) or (c) of that sub- section if the person or arbitrator to whom the dispute was first transferred or referred .– (i) dies, resigns or is transferred; or (ii) has become incapable of acting or against whom., a complaint has been received regarding his msiconduct or corruption; or (iii) neglects or refuses to act. (3) The Registrar or any other person to whom a dispute is referred for decision under this section may, pending the decision of the dispute, make such interlocutory orders as he may deem necessary in the interests of justice. Sec. 137. Bar of jurisdiction of courts. – (1) Save as provided in this Act, no civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of– (a) the registration of a co-operative society or of an amendment of a bye-law; (b) the removal of a committee ; (c) any dispute required under section 75 to be referred to the Registrar, and (d) any matter concerning the winding up and the dissolution of a co-operative society. (2) While a co-operative society is being wound up, no suit or other legal proceedings relating to the business of such society shall be proceeded with, or instituted against, the liquidator as such or against the society or any member thereof, except by leave of the Registrar and subject to such terms as he may impose. (3) Save as provided in this Act, no order, decision or award made under this Act shall be questioned in any court on any ground whatsoever. Sec. 143. (3) Save as provided in this Act, no order, decision or award made under this Act shall be questioned in any court on any ground whatsoever. Sec. 143. Notice necessary in suits . – No suit shall be instituted against a co-operative society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the constitution, management or the business of the so- ciety until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar, or left at his officer, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (12). On the basis of aforesaid provisions of the Co-operative Act, the learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that since it is a dispute regarding disciplinary action against employee of the petitioner-society and in view of the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 75 of the Co- operative Act, any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of the Co-op- erative society arising between the Society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society, the same shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such or other proceedings in respect of such disputes. (13). Accordingly, the aforesaid provisions of Section 137, specially in the present dispute, the relevant provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 137 of the Co-operative Act provides that no civil or revenue court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required under Section 75 to be referred to the Registrar necessarily including the dispute falling within the ambit of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 75 of the Co-operative Act. Section 77 further provides that the disputes under this section could be decided by the Registrar himself which necessarily means that such disputes could also be entertained and decided by the delegate of the Registrar on whom any of the powers of the Registrar under the Co- operative Act have been delegated upon in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Co-operative Act. (14). Consequently, relying on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath vs. M/s. Empire of India & Ceylone Tea Co. (2), in which the scope of jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code as well as under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was under consideration, the Honble Apex Court, while dwelling upon the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act, observed that the Industrial Dis- putes Act not only confers the right on a worker for reinstatement and back wages if the termination or dismissal is not in accordance with the Standing Orders but also provides a detailed procedure and machinery for getting this relief. Under these circumstances, therefore, there is an apparent implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court to grant such relief. The scheme of the Industrial Dis- putes Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by implication in respect of remedies which are available under the Act and for which a complete procedure and machinery has been provided in the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of language of Section 10 read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act adequate remedy is available to the worker under the scheme of the Industrial Dis- putes Act itself which provides for the relief of reinstatement and back wages. Consequently, the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that in suit for declaration that dismissal of the plaintiff from service was bad and void, for back wages and for injunction preventing the employer from giving effect to the order of dismissal is in substance a suit for relief of reinstatement and back wages and was, therefore, not maintainable before the Civil Court. (15). (15). Assuming as has been pleaded by the plaintiff-respondent in the suit itself, as borne out of the impugned order, in case the Standing Orders applied in his case, then the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was completely barred and, therefore, he was not entitled to any relief by way of either grant of temporary injun- ction or final decision in the case.. (16). However, on the face of admission of the defendant-petitioner and so also the aforesaid provisions of the Co-operative Act specially the provisions of Section 75(1)(c) read with Section 137(1)(c), since these provisions, as also held in the D.B. decision of this Court rendered in Sawai Madhopur Co- operative Marke- ting Society Ltd. vs. Raj. State Co-operative Tribunal Jaipur & Anr. (3), though it was a case in which the employee-respondents services were terminated but, presently, in similar circumstances, a disciplinary action has been taken resulting in order of his demotion, though it is also a serious subject matter of dispute as raised from the side of the defendant- petitioner but, some how, the learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that, the learned trial Judge while entertaining the suit of the respondent and passing the impugned order and so also the learned appellate Judge in affirming the same, committed serious illegality and material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction which never vested in the lower courts and, consequently, the impugned orders are illegal and void-ab-initio. (17). The lower courts also equally erroneously held that the three necessary factors for issue of temporary injunction were established whereas, as is his further contention, even if it is assumed that looking to the nature of the dispute to be adjudicated upon, no irreparable loss/injury is likely to be caused to the plaintiff-respondent in case he is required to work on the lower post and in the lower Pay Scale referred to above and, on the contrary, in case the impugned order is allowed to be sustained for an indefinite period, the plaintiff-respondent shall continue to work against a higher post in the higher Pay Scale and, in case, ultimately he comes out successfully after final termination of the litigation entered into, he can rightfully claim difference of wages and so the injury likely to be suffered, if any, cannot be said to be irreparable and, consequently, the balance of convenience also lies on the side of the defendant-petitioners. (18). (18). It has also been contended that, in view of the aforesaid provisions, when the Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order which is under challenge, the same could be challenged by invoking the provisions of Sections 75 and 77 of the Co-operative Act and, in case the final decision went against him, he could also challenge the same under Section 123(6)(c) of the Co-operative Act. Accordingly, his further submission is that there was an legal and equally efficacious remedy available to the plaintiff-respondent who has not availed of the same. (19). The learned counsel for the respondent, while relying on the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court rendered Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. & Ors. etc. vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad & Ors. etc. (supra), Daccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain & Ors. (4) and S.B. decision of this Court rendered in Smt. Sushila Devi vs. The Rajasthan State Co- operative Tribunal (5), in which both the aforesaid decisions of the Honble Supreme Court have been relied upon, attempted to counter submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the present dispute was not covered by the aforesaid provisions of Section 75(1)(c) as the impugned order of demotion and posting against a junior post and in the lower Pay Scale is not a dispute touching the business of the Society and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be barred and, in this view of the fact, he further submitted that even if it is assumed that there was an efficacious and alternative remedy, if any, available to the plaintiff-respondent before any other forum, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not completely barred from granting the relief as prayed for by the respondent. (20). The learned counsel, to supplement his arguments, relied on certain decisions which are briefly referred to hereinafter. (21). (20). The learned counsel, to supplement his arguments, relied on certain decisions which are briefly referred to hereinafter. (21). In Nagaur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. Kesa Ram (6), being challenged by way of filing a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India against the retrenchment order passed by the Administrator with prior approval of the Registrar, on challenge regarding vires of Section 36 of the Co-operative Act, it was held that the order shall be deemed to be passed by the Registrar and, consequently, it was held that in case no remedy by way of arbitration under Section 75 of the Co-operative Act or one under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act was also there, since the impugned order was deemed to be an order passed by the Registrar in exercise of powers conferred on him under Section 36 of the Act in exercise of the statutory powers and, therefore, a writ of mandamus could be issued against the Registrar. (22). Similarly, in the decision rendered in Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya Sitapur (U.P.) & Ors. (7), while disposing of appeal filed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy under Section 68 of the U.P. State University Act, 1973, the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that the writ was maintainable and not barred because of availability of alternative remedy as held by the Allahabad High Court on the ground that the order of dismissal of Principal of a College, being quasi judicial order, was further sent to the Vice-Chancellor for approval and in the first instance the order having been disapproved and, consequently, reinstatement but, subsequently, the Vice-Chancellor having reviewed the order and approved the dismissal order, the subsequent order was held illegal and passed in absence of any power under any law and, consequently, the writ petition was also held to be maintainable. (23). In Vivek Prakash Mathur vs. The State of Raj. & Anr. (8), before this Court, in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner was entertained despite availability of alternative remedy of appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal in its exercise of extra- ordinary constitutional powers and not otherwise. (24). (23). In Vivek Prakash Mathur vs. The State of Raj. & Anr. (8), before this Court, in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner was entertained despite availability of alternative remedy of appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal in its exercise of extra- ordinary constitutional powers and not otherwise. (24). In Prathma Bank, Head Office, Moradabad, through its Chairman vs. Vijay Kumar Goel and Anr. (9), an employee of Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, on termination of his service filed a civil suit there against before the civil court under Section 9 of the Code and, on interpretation of provisions of Article 12 of the Constitution of India as well as Section 3 of the aforesaid Act of 1976 it was held that there was no specific provisions which excluded powers of a civil court from entertaining suits of this nature and, consequently, it was held that in a suit filed by an employee challenging termination of his service by an instrumentality of the State (Regional Rural Bank herein), the court could pass a decree for his reinstatement in service with consequential benefits if termination was found to be illegal. (25). On careful consideration of the aforesaid provisions, the facts of all the decisions referred to above and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respon- dent are clearly distinguishable. All these decisions were rendered by the courts in exercise of their constitutional powers vested under Article 226 or 32 thereof and, consequently, in absence of any specific provision which could be directly interpreted to bar jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain all suits of a civil nature unless such suits were excepted from being taken cognizance thereof expressly or impli- edly and, therefore, no help could be derived from the ratio of the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. (26). Now, reverting to the merits of the case, the respondent brought the suit on the ground that he has been departmentally dealt with on disciplinary matters and that the provisions of the aforesaid Standing Orders, being applicable in his case, have not been complied with. As already observed hereinbefore, so also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the provisions of the aforesaid provisions are not applicable in this case. As already observed hereinbefore, so also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the provisions of the aforesaid provisions are not applicable in this case. Besides, the provisions of the Co-operative Act are directly, as referred to hereinbefore, applicable. (27). Therefore, for the disposal of the present controversy, it has to be adjudi- cated upon as to whether the civil courts have got any jurisdiction to entertain this dispute as empowered by Sec. 9 of the Code or the aforesaid provisions of the Co- operative Act excludes this dispute from being settled/decided by the civil court. (28). As already referred to hereinbefore, sub-clause (c) of sub- section (1) of Section 75 clearly lays down that any dispute touching upon the constitution, mana- gement or the business of the Co-operative society shall be referred to the Registrar and, no court, including the civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of the dispute. (29). Similarly, Section 137(1)(c) thereof mandates that all such disputes as referred to above shall be referred to the Registrar and sub-section (3) of it further provides that save as provided in this Act, no order, decision or award made under this Act shall be questioned in any court or any ground whatsoever. The provision of Section 123(6)(c) further provides for appeals against such orders passed by the Registrar before the Rajasthan State Co-operative Tribunal constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 123. (30). As a result, there is complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil court from entertaining disputes as are referred to hereinbefore and which fall inter alia within the provisions of clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) Sec. 75 of the Co-operative Act. (31). In this casee, on the interpretation of scope of Section 75 of the Co-operative Act stands fully covered by the D.B. decision in the Case of Sawai Madhopur Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. (supra) and since the decisions rendered in the cases of Co- operative Central Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and Daccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra), have been fully referred to in the D.B. decision referred to hereinbefore and the same does not warrant any detailed discussion for the present disposal. (32). (supra) and Daccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra), have been fully referred to in the D.B. decision referred to hereinbefore and the same does not warrant any detailed discussion for the present disposal. (32). The learned counsel for the respondent has still emphasized that, in view of the specific decisions rendered by the Honble Supreme Court and being relied upon by him, since any disciplinary action which also inter alia covers matters of demotion, reversion, suspension, termination of services of officers and service of a Co-operative Society touching the business and constitution of the Society and the impugned act of the petitioner presently falls within the phrase ``touches the management of the society and, in view of this submission, the jurisdiction of civilcourt cannot be held to be explicitly debarred and, therefore, the respondent cannot be driven out from the civil court to seek relief elsewhere. (33). As regards the decision of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra), the interpretation of the Andhra Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act was under consideration and sub-section (1) of Section 61 of the Act inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute tou- ching the constitution, management or the business of a society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society, on account of disputes mentioned therein, the same has to be referred to the Registrar. (34). In view of these provisions, any dispute regarding disciplinary action, as is the case in hand, taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society has been excluded from the explicit provisions of Sec.61 of the Act. (35). Similarly, since any disciplinary action falls within the phrase ``touching upon the management of the Society and it was neither submitted before the Honble Supreme Court in either case for adjudication nor any consideration was made and, consequently, on careful consideration of the aforesaid provisions and, besides, as prescribed under Rule 41 of the Co- operative Societies Rules, in the instant case, the provisions of Sections 75, 123/125 (re. revision ) and 126, as referred to above, so far as the present case is concerned, the jurisdiction of a civil court is completely barred from entertaining any suit against any dispute as is cov- ered by the specific provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 75 of the Co-operative Act and, consequently, appellate/revisional jurisdiction of the civil court is equally barred on the face of Sections 123 and 125 of the Co- operative Act. (36). In view of the conclusion so arrived at, there is merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the civil courts have got no jurisdic- tion to entertain the present dispute and, consequently, the cognizance of such dispute resulting in impugned orders is without jurisdiction and as such being illegal, are ab-initio-void. (37). Consequently, though there is hardly any need to dwell upon the merits of the case but, suffice it to observe that looking to the serious dispute requiring a thorough adjudication in case even if it is held that there existed a triable serious dispute before the trial court, making out existence of any prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction, it is also equally necessary that the factors of causing irreparable loss/injury, in case of refusal of temporary injunction to the plaintiff respondent and so also the balance of convenience should also be established in favour of the latter, otherwise, in absence of establishment of these three factors, the plaintiff respondent cannot be entitled for grant of any interim relief by way of temporary injunction as well. (38). The plaintiff respondent has admitted in his own plaint itself that the petitioner-Society has suffered heavy losses and, consequently, the officers consti- tuting its higher hierarchy have been hauled up by their higher authorities and, being aggrieved by the same, the officers of the petitioner Society have been motivated to falsely proceed against their subordinates including the plaintiff-respondent and, consequently, they have been charge-sheeted illegally without having full recourse to the provisions as are laid down under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules but, it may be stated here that these Rules as referred to and relied upon by the plaintiff-respondent are not applicable to the employees of the petitioner-Society and, consequently, no help can be drived from the provisions of these Rules. Besides, in case the plaintiff- respondent has been charge-sheeted and, consequently, demoted to a junior post in a lower Pay Scale, in case he ultimately comes out triumphantly, he shall be able to claim recover difference of wages and other corresponding benefits from his employer and, therefore, there is no question of any irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff-respondent in case no interim relief is passed in his favour. Besides, whatever losses, in case it is so, he is forced to suffer, can be exactly calculated in terms of money and the difference of amount of which the plaintiff- respondent shall be deprived of, could be recovered by him pursuant to his ultimate success before the competent forum, if any. Therefore, there is hardly any question of causing any irreparable loss or injury to the plaintiff-respondent on account of refusal or any interim relief as being sought for. (39). Similarly, the balance of convenience is also hardly in his favour. In case interim relief is not allowed, he will be deprived of balance of pay and allowance which he was drawing against his working on the post of D.G. Set Operator and, in case any such interim relief is granted he shall be required to work on the post of Lab. Assistant in a lower Pay Scale to which, so long as the impugned order dated 13/15.4.93 is in force, there is no question of causing any unwarranted incovenience and hardship to the plaintiff-respondent and, contrarily, in case, the defendant-petitioners are forced to keep the impugned order passed against the respondent un- der suspension and to allow the respondent to work as before, it would result in greater hardship to the petitioners who shall be forced to accept continuance of the respondent who has been held to be in-efficient and liable for a contributory role in causing great losses in monetary terms to the defendant-petitioners and, therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that in case no interim relief is granted or the one granted is taken back, it would result in great hardship to the respondent who shall be unnecessarily required to work on a junior post in a lower Pay Scale putting him to a great embarrassment and financial loss. (40). (40). In view of the nature and background of the dispute giving rise to the present litigation, as discussed hereinbefore, the trial court and so also the learned appellate court fell into a serious error while holding that the addition to existence of prima facie case for issue of a temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, the other two necessary factors regarding causing of an irreparable injury/loss and existence of balance of convenience are also in favour of the respon- dent and, consequently, on merit also, the impugned orders cannot be sustained otherwise the same are likely to result in irreparable injury/loss to the defendant petitioners occasioning a failure of justice. (41). This leads to the conclusion that the impugned orders have been passed illegally and in exercise of material irregularity of jurisdiction vesting in them by the lower courts which leaves no option but to accept this Revision Petition. (42). Consequently, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the observations of the Honble Supreme Court in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria & Anr. (10), that in view of concurrent findings arrived at by the lower courts in passing interim injunction against the respondent, no interference is warranted under Section 115, C.P.C., suffice it to observe, as referred to above, since this Court has arrived at a conclusion that no jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code vests in the trial court to entertain such disputes and, consequently, the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the one in hand. (43). Resultantly, from which ever angle it is considered, on the basis of above discussion, this Revision Petition deserves to be accepted and the impugned orders are not sustainable. (44). Therefore, this Revision Petition is accepted and the impugned orders granting and affirming relief of temporary injunction to the plaintiff-respondent are hereby set aside and the application for grant of temporary injunction moved therefore by the plaintiff-respondent before the trial court is hereby dismissed. (45). No order as to cost. (46). However, since these observations have been made while disposing ofthis Revision Petition and the civil suit is yet pending before the trial court and, there- fore, it is ordered that these observations shall not effect the final decision of the suit by the trial court. (47). This Revision Petition along with its connected stay petition is hereby disposed, as above.