G. C. BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein is aggrieved by the order dt. 10-12-1996 (ann. 'l') passed by the respondent Chairman of the Karnataka State Pollution Board (in short hereinafter the Board) whereunder the Chairman purporting to exercise his powers under S. 31-A of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (in short hereinafter the Act only), has directed for closure of the industry owned by the petitioner with a further direction to the concerned statutory authorities to stop the supply of electricity, water or any other services extended to the said industry. He has also directed the petitioner to shift their industry to an industrial locality. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is running a grain cleaning unit in the name and style M/s. Suma Traders at 7th Main, Gopalagowda Nagar, Syndicate Bank Colony, Moodalapalya, Bangalore. For processing the food grains, the petitioner has installed various machines. The area in which the factory is located is admittedly residential. It appears that the residents of the area being aggrieved with the causing of pollution of air and environment due to running of the said industry, had lodged a complaint with the respondent Board for closure/shifting of the industry. Pursuant to the said complaint, the Chairman of the respondent Board took upon himself to hear the affected parties including the petitioner and passed the impugned order. ( 3 ) THE short, but an important question touching upon the very functioning of the Board has crept up for consideration in this case. It has been admitted by the respondents that the impugned order has been passed by the Chairman of the Board and not the Board itself. The impugned order has been articulated in a manner so as to give an impression as if it has been passed by the Board itself. The question is, as to whether the Chairman of the Board has any competence under the Act to pass any order under S. 31a of the Act. The impugned order has been articulated in a manner so as to give an impression as if it has been passed by the Board itself. The question is, as to whether the Chairman of the Board has any competence under the Act to pass any order under S. 31a of the Act. ( 4 ) SECTION 31a of the Act reads as under -"section 31a - POWER TO GIVE DIRECTIONS - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act and to any directions that the Central Government may give in this behalf a Board may, in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under this Act, issue any directions in writing to any person, officer or authority, and such person, officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions. Explanation - For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that the powers to issue directions under this section includes the power to direct - (a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process; or (b) the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other services. ( 5 ) FROM the above provision, it is clear that the power under S. 31a of the Act can be exercised by the Board. But S. 15 of the Act empowers the Board to delegate its powers. This section reads as under-"delegation OF POWERS - A State Board may, by general or special order, delegate to the Chairman or the member secretary or any other officer of the Board subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified in the order, such of its powers and functions under this Act as it may deem necessary. " ( 6 ) IN the present case, it has been fairly admitted by the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent Board and its Chairman that there was no delegation of power in favour of the Chairman to pass order under S. 31-A of the Act with regard to the industry of the petitioner. " ( 6 ) IN the present case, it has been fairly admitted by the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondent Board and its Chairman that there was no delegation of power in favour of the Chairman to pass order under S. 31-A of the Act with regard to the industry of the petitioner. Nonetheless, his submission is that since the order has been passed in consonance with the object of the Act, namely, to prevent and control the air pollution and to remedy the inconvenience of the residents of the area, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the order in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Any how, subsequent to completion of hearing of the case, a memo has also been filed on behalf of the respondent Board stating therein, that the impugned proceedings will be withdrawn and in that view of the matter the writ petition may be dismissed as having become infructuous. ( 7 ) IN the present case, I do not propose to examine on the aspect as to whether on merits the order like the impugned one could have been justifiably passed by the Board or not. It will be essentially for the Board, after due enquiry conducted in accordance with the law, to come to a conclusion as to whether the industry should suffer an order of closure of shifting in terms of S. 31-A of the Act or not. But the Chairman under no circumstance, except under due delegation of powers in his favour, could have embarked upon the enquiry against the petitioner's industry and passed the impugned prejudicial order. ( 8 ) IN the case of Panduranga v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1987 SC 535 : (1986 Cri LJ 1975) it has been held that at Page 536 (of AIR):-"what can be done only by at least two Judges cannot be done by one Judge. Even if the decision is right on merits, it is by a forum which is lacking in competence with regard to the subject matter. Even a right decision by a wrong forum is no decision. It is non existent in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. Even if the decision is right on merits, it is by a forum which is lacking in competence with regard to the subject matter. Even a right decision by a wrong forum is no decision. It is non existent in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. " ( 9 ) TO substantiate the validity of the impugned order, it has further been stated on behalf of respondent No. 1 and 2 that the practice of passing of orders by the Chairman even without any delegation of powers in his favour was being continued for a long and so far no body had objected to the competence of the Chairman, who had been undertaking the proceedings like the impugned one, whereunder the Chairman had been issuing purported statutory directions to the prejudice of the industry. Such directions were meant to be complied with not only by the industry, but also by other statutory authorities by way of stoppage of supply of electricity, water or other services. The act of passing of such orders at the hands of the Chairman in flagrant violation and misuse of statutory powers only demonstrate his arbitrary manner of functioning without having any regard to the statutory provisions under which he has been created and recognised. Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act mandates that, the Chairman has to be a person having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of the matters relating to environment protection. The State Government has been empowered to nominate the persons as Chairman having the said expertise. Therefore, the person who is appointed as Chairman has to be presumed as having sufficient knowledge of statutory provisions as well. But this presumption has been completely defined by the Chairman by acting in an uncomprehensively irresponsible manner, which is exfacie ultra vires his powers. I wish, the State Government would seriously apply itself, as to whether such person could still be continued as Chairman of a statutory Board like the present one, which has been armed with stringent powers under the Act having far reaching bearing on the competing requirements of maintaining the environment, air and water pollution preventions and controls and the existence and survival of industries falling within the mischief of the regulatory statutes. ( 10 ) FOR the said reasons the impugned order at ann. L is not sustainable and is accordingly quashed with cost assessed at Rs. ( 10 ) FOR the said reasons the impugned order at ann. L is not sustainable and is accordingly quashed with cost assessed at Rs. 2,500/- to be paid by the 1st respondent Chairman as his personal liability through a crossed Bank Draft to be drawn in favour of the petitioner within two weeks from today. Order accordingly. --- *** --- .