J. C. MISHRA, J. This revision has been filed by the complainant for setting aside the order dated 9-8-84 passed by III Additional Sessions Judge, Varanasi per mitting the withdrawal of the prosecution and discharging the accused under Section 302/34,i. P. C.- 2. The complainant has filed copy of the application moved by the Assistant Public Prosecutor for withdrawal of the prosecution which indicates that the State Government had permitted withdrawal of the prosecution. It has been alleged in the application that Jhalai had stated that Radhey Shyam was cleaning country-made pistol but accidentally it got fired. He had also stated that Kamal Kumar was also cleaning the country-made pistol and fur ther at the time when Radhey Shyam died Sukhu and his son Lallan were warming themselves at the house of witness Jhalai and Vijai had gone for easing. 3. The application also refers to the statement of Shanker Harijan and Rajju who had also stated that Radhey Shyam was accidentally hi t by the fire. 4. The second ground referred to in the application was the doubt expressed by the CBCID regarding correctness of the investigation made by the local police. In this regard reference has been made to the opinion of Dr. Krishna Kumar Sengar who in his report dated 24th November, 1983 stated that the deceased could not sustain injury in the circumstances stated in the First Information Report. 5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has not based his order on the first ground viz. some witnesses stated that Radhey Shyam was accidentally hit by the fire. In the impugned order the learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that C. I. D. Inspector examined a number of witnesses out of whom Jhalai Shanker, Rajju, Bhola, Rishimuni, Mangru, Sumeru and Lallu have not supported the prosecution case. He however, clarified that Ram Nihore, the complainant, and his other family members have supported the prosecution case. Thus the learned Addi tional Sessions Judge has not accepted the opinion of the A. P. O. that the withdrawal should be permitted on the ground that of the witnesses have stated that Radhey Shyarn was accidentally hit by the fire. 6. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has also not accepted the contention that C. I. D. Inspector has expressed any doubt on the investigation made by the local police. 6. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has also not accepted the contention that C. I. D. Inspector has expressed any doubt on the investigation made by the local police. He observed that the Inspec tor has not expressed any opinion and had left the matter to be decided by the court. 7. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, considered the opinion of Dr. K. K. Sengar, Medico Legal Expert, U. P. Government, who had expressed his opinion in reply to the questionnaire sent to him that looking into the place and nature of the injury it is more probable that the shot was fired from a person sitting on the ground in front of the deceased, when the deceased was sitting on the spot. The Medico Legal Expert ruled out possibility of the injury being caused by a person standing in front of the deceased. The learned Additional Sessions Judge ob served that the report of the doctor shat ters the prosecution case about the injury being caused in the manner alleged by the prosecution. 8. The learned Counsel for the ap plicant contended that Dr. K. K. Sengar had no occasion to see the injury as he was not present at the time of post-mortem examination and he has given his opinion only on the basis of post-mortem examina tion report. He contended that the doctor who had conducted the post-mortem ex amination had not expressed such opinion. He contended that the doctor who had conducted autopsy was the best person to have given opinion whether the injury could or could not be caused in the manner stated by the witnesses. The learned Counsel also contended that merely on the basis of the First Informa tion Report one cannot find the actual posture of the deceased at the time when he received fire-arm injury and after the witnesses are examined and cross-ex amined the accurate position of the deceased at the time of firing can be known. He contended that it is no doubt written in the F. I. R. that the deceased was sitting on the cot when Vijai Prasad had fired at him but it cannot be inferred at this stage that on seeing the assailants coming armed with pistol he would not have moved his body and would have continued to sit on the cot. He also contended that in the F. I. R. it was mentioned whether Vijai Prasad was running, standing or sitting when he fired at the deceased. 9. At the pre-trial stage it is highly risky to draw conclusion on the-basis of medical opinion, The prosecution case that the deceased died due to fire-arm injury as stipulated by the medical evidence. Whether the injury could be caused in the manner and fashion alleged in the F. I. R. can be considered when the details are elicited during the evidence of the witnesses. In my opinion, at the pre-trial stage the opinion in this regard is hardly relevant. 10. It is true that while permitting withdrawal the Court is not expected to enter into evidence but only to see whether the public prosecutor had acted on the instructions of the State Government or he had applied his mind. In M. N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P. V. Balakrishana and others, 1972 Cr LJ 301, has held that the essential consideration is that the withdrawal should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or. that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances it is the duty of the Court to see in furtherance of justice that the per mission is not sought on grounds ex traneous to the interest of justice or that offences which are. offences against the State go unpunished merely because the Government as a matter of general policy directs the public prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution and the public prosecutor merely does so at its behest. 11. In Rajender Kumar Jain v. State through Spl. Police Establishment and others, 1980 Cr LJ 1084, the Supreme Court held that it shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of the Court to apprise itself of the reasons which prompt the public prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. The Court should make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal and satisfy itself that the public prosecutor too was satisfied that he should withdraw from the prosecution for good and relevant reasons. The Court should make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal and satisfy itself that the public prosecutor too was satisfied that he should withdraw from the prosecution for good and relevant reasons. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to apprise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases, but under no circumstances should he allow himself to become anyones stooge. 12. In State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra and others etc. , 1977 Cr LJ 773, it was observed that it is not sufficient for the public prosecutor merely to say that it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. He has to make out some ground which would show that the prosecution is sought to be withdrawn be cause inter alia the prosecution may not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sus tain the charge or that the prosecution does appear to be well founded or that there are other circumstances which clear ly show that the object of administration of justice would not be advance or fur thered by going with the prosecution. The ultimate guiding consideration must al ways be the interest of justice and that is the touch stone on which the question must be determined whether the prosecu tion should be allowed to be withdrawn. 13. In Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1987 SC 877 , the Supreme Court has observed that "section 321 providing for withdrawal from prosecution given no indication as to the grounds on which the public prosecutor may make the application, or the con siderations on which the Court is to grant its consent. The initiative is that of the public prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. The judi cial function implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the con sent would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself that the executive func tion of the public prosecutor has npt been improperly exercised or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. When an application under Section 321 is made, it is not necessary for the Court to assess the evidence to dis cover whether the case would end in con viction or acquittal. The Courts function is to give consent. This section does not obligate the Court to record reasons before consent is given. However, it does not mean that consent of the Court is a matter of course. When the public prosecutor makes the application for withdrawal after taking into consideration all the materials before him, the Court exercises its judicial discretion by con sidering such materials and on such con sideration, either gives consent or declines consent. The section should not be con strued to mean that the Court has to give a detailed reasoned order when it gives con sent. All that is necessary to satisfy the section is to see that the public Prosecutor act in good faith and that the Magistrate is satisfied that the exercise of discretion by the public prosecutor is proper. This will be clear on perusal of some other provisions in the Code such as Sections 203, 227, 245, 257 and 258 which relate to the manner in which Courts have to exer cise their jurisdiction in pending cases when applications are made for their withdrawal or when the Court finds that there is no ground to proceed with the cases and Section 320 which is a kindred section. While Sections 203,227,245,257 and 255 require the Magistrate to record his reasons for the order he passed Section 320 contemplates consent by the Court only in a supervisory manner and not in an adjudicatory manner. " 14. In view of the aforesaid pronoun cements I am of the view that learned Additional Sessions Judge has not applied his mind in proper perspective. It would be proper to give him fresh opportunity to consider the application. The A. P. O. shall also be given fresh opportunity to re-apply his mind by going through the entire case diary and in case he desires he may be permitted to add fresh ground, if any. 15. The application is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The learned Additional Sessions Judge is directed to re-consider the application in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to above as also other pronouncements which are cited and brought to him notice Application allowed. .