JUDGMENT 1. - These three petitions u /s. 482 Cr.P.C. raise a common question of law. These were heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. In S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 742/96 Rameshwar Lal Yadav complainant filed complaint against two officers of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and one Ram Nara in in the Court of the Special Magistrate (S.P.E. Cases), Rajasthan, Jaipur for offences punishable under sections 409, 420 of the Indian Penal Code (the IPC) allegedly committed by them in the year 1991. The learned Magistrate, by his order dated 24.5.1996, ordered under section 156(3) the Superintendent of Police, (C.B.I.) to investigate the offences and submit his report to the competent Court. 3. In S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 743/96 Jagdish Prasad Soni complainant filed a complaint under section 190 Cr.P.C. in the Court of Special Judge C.B.I. cases against thirty persons, including certain officers of Bank of Baroda for having committed offences punishable under section 13(1) (d) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (the Act of 1988). The learned Special Judge, vide his order dated 12.6.1996, forwarded the complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to Special Police Establishment/CBI for investigation and report by 14.10.1996. 4. In S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 931/96 Devi Dayal Gupta complainant filed a complaint in the Court of Special Judge, C.B.I., Cases, Jaipur against two officers of Hindustan Salts Ltd. /Sambhar Salts Ltd., Sambhar Lake, Jaipur and one private person for having committed offences punishable under section 120-B IPC and sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Act of 1988. By his order dated 20.8.1996 the learned Special Judge forwarded the complaint under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. to the S.P., C.B.I., Jaipur for investigation and report by 21.11.1996. 5. In all the three cases, the C.B.I. has though reportedly registered the cases yet the investigations therein stand stayed under the orders of this Court. 6. Mr. G.C. Chatterji, the learned standing counsel for the C.B.I., urged that though the Special Magistrate was competent to try the cases investigated by the S.P.E. and the learned Special Judge had the jurisdiction to try the cases under the Act of 1988 yet they were not competent to entertain complaints from private persons and direct the C.B.I. under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to investigate them. It was submitted by Mr. It was submitted by Mr. Chatterji that the power to direct the C.B.I. to investigate a cognizable offence vests in the Govt. of a State or the High Court and the Supreme Court. In support of his arguments Mr. Chatterji relied upon the decisions of the Kerala High Court in Cr. M.C. No. 17 of 1991 decided on 7.3.1994, of Gujarat High Court in Indumati M. Shah v. N.M. Asra, 1995 Cr. L.J. 918 and of Calcutta High Court in S.P. Spl. Crime Branch C.B.I. Calcutta v. Union of India and Anr., Cr. Rev. No. 2 of 1997 wherein the learned Single Judges of those High Courts appear to have taken such a view. 7. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently urged that once the power of the Special Magistrate to try cases investigated by the S.P.E. and the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try the offence under the Act of 1988 are beyond any dispute their powers and jurisdictions either to entertain complaints from private persons and to take cognizance of offences on such complaints u/ s. 190(1)(a) or under section 193 Cr.P.C. or to forward them under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation to the investigating agency which is empowered in law to try such cases, cannot be challenged. The learned counsel submitted that exclusion of their powers u /s. 156(3) can be inferred neither from the provisions contained in the Act of 1988 or from those in the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (D.S.P.E. Act). In support of their arguments the learned counsel relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of State of Tamil Nadu v. Krishna Swami Naidu, 1979 Cr.L.J. 1069 : AIR 1979 SC 1255 and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1984 S.C. 718. As an instance of the practice of the petitioner to register cases for investigation on the basis of orders passed under section 156(3) copy of the FIR registering crime No. R.C. 38(A) /95 on 9.11.1995 against P. Jafna and Jayant Sanyal Director and Addl. Director, Tourism, Govt. of India at S.P.E. Police Station Jaipur (Rajasthan) was also referred to. 8. As an instance of the practice of the petitioner to register cases for investigation on the basis of orders passed under section 156(3) copy of the FIR registering crime No. R.C. 38(A) /95 on 9.11.1995 against P. Jafna and Jayant Sanyal Director and Addl. Director, Tourism, Govt. of India at S.P.E. Police Station Jaipur (Rajasthan) was also referred to. 8. The points agitated before me on behalf of the petitioner should not, I think, arrest the attention of this Court for long as it is clear to me that those are no longer open for much discussion in view of the decision of the apex Court in A.R. Antulay's case (Supra). This court can do no better than to refer to the exposition of law made by their Lordships in para. Nos. 6 and 7 of the report in the following words:- "6. It is a well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating do offence indicate to the contrary. The scheme of the Criminal P.C. envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal officers to Court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (i) Section 187-A of Sea Customs Act 1878, (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968, (iii) Section 6 of Import and Exports Control Act, 1947, (iv) section 271 and Section 279 of the. Income-Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Criminal P.C. permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Criminal P.C. permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the Cr.P.C. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision; a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (See Section 2 (n), Cr.P.C.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the of fender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straight-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception. To hold that such an exception exists that a private complaint for offences of corruption committed by public servant is not maintainable, the Court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and a tangled web of argument for drawing a far-fetched implication, cannot be substitute for an express statutory provision. To hold that such an exception exists that a private complaint for offences of corruption committed by public servant is not maintainable, the Court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and a tangled web of argument for drawing a far-fetched implication, cannot be substitute for an express statutory provision. In the matter of initiation of proceedings before a special judge u/ s. 8(1), the Legislature while conferring power to take cognizance had three opportunities to unambiguously state its mind whether the cognizance can be taken on a private complaint or not. The first one was an opportunity to provide in Section 8(1) itself by merely stating that the special Judge may take cognizance of an offence on a police report submitted to it by an investigating officer conducting investigation as contemplated by Section 5-A. While providing for investigation by designated police officers of superior rank, the Legislature did not fetter the power of special Judge to take cognizance in a manner otherwise than on police report. The second opportunity was when by Section 8(3) a status of a deemed public prosecutor was conferred on a private complainant if he chooses to conduct the prosecution. The Legislature being aware of a provision like the one contained a Section 225 provided that in every trial before a special Judge the prosecution shall be conducted by a public Prosecutor, though that self would not have been decisive of the matter. And the third opportunity was when the Legislature while prescribing the procedure prescribed for warrant cases to be followed by special Judge did not exclude by a specific provision that the only procedure which the special Judge can follow is the one prescribed for trial of warrant cases on a police report. The disinclination of the Legislature to so provide points to the contrary and no canon of construction permits the Court to go in search of a hidden or implied limitation on the power of the special Judge to take cognizance unfettered by such requirement of its being done on a police report alone. In our opinion, it is no answer to this fairly well-established legal position that for the last 32 years no case has come to the notice of the Court in which cognizance was taken by a special Judge in a private complaint for offences punishable under the 1947 Act. In our opinion, it is no answer to this fairly well-established legal position that for the last 32 years no case has come to the notice of the Court in which cognizance was taken by a special Judge in a private complaint for offences punishable under the 1947 Act. If something that did not happen in the past is to be the sole reliable guide so as to deny any such thing happening in the future, law would be rendered static and slowly whither away." "7. The scheme underlying Criminal P.C. clearly reveals that anyone who wants to give information of an offence may either apploach the Magistrate or the officer in charge of a Police Station. If the offence complained of is a non-cognizable one, the Police Officer can either direct the complainant to approach the Magistrate or he may obtain permission of the Magistrate and investigate the offence. Similarly anyone can approach the Magistrate with complaint and even if the offence disclosed is a serious one, the Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the offence and initiate proceedings. It is open to the Magistrate but not obligatory upon him to direct investigation by police. Thus two agencies have been set up for taking offences to Court. One would, therefore, require a cogent and explicit provision to hold that Section 5-A displaces this scheme." 9. Once it is appreciated that an act of commission or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force is not merely an offence in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society" at large and punishment of the offender in the interest of society is an object behind penal statutes, enacted for larger interest of the society, the right to initiate criminal proceedings and bring to book the offender cannot be denied unless the statute creating the offence, expressly or by necessary implication, takes away that right from a particular quarter. The doctrine of "Locus standi" of a complainant, is, therefore, a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where he has been, in unambiguous words or by necessary implication, made in-eligible by the statute creating that offence. The doctrine of "Locus standi" of a complainant, is, therefore, a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where he has been, in unambiguous words or by necessary implication, made in-eligible by the statute creating that offence. It is more so when and where serious offences are committed by public servants in relation to the matters and properties in which the society at large has its interests for the benefit of its members in general. For an orderly and peaceful development of the society the vesting of such a right to a member of the society to set or put the machinery of law into motion for bringing the offender to book, is, unless denied by a statute, necessary and such a right to him cannot be diluted by putting the same in straight jacket formula of "Locus standi" unknown to criminal jurisprudence. 10. In the instant cases it was not disputed before me that the learned Special Magistrate was duly appointed by the State Govt. and High Court duly conferred upon him the powers of the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class under section 13 Cr.P.C. in respect to the cases investigated by the S.P.E. at Jaipur, Rajasthan. It was also not challenged that the learned Special Magistrate has the power and jurisdiction to take cognizance of such cases/of-fences on reports, whether positive or negative, submitted by the S.P.E. at Jaipur. 11. Similarly it is beyond any dispute that the learned Special Judge has been duly appointed under section 3 of Act of 1988 by the appropriate Courts to try the offences punishable under that Act and conspiracies, attempt to commit and abetments of such offences. It was also not disputed before me that for the purposes of the trials of the cases under Act of 1988 the learned Special Judge is, for all practical purposes, a court of original jurisdiction and takes cognizance of such cases without being committed to him by the Magistrate. He directly receives and entertains reports from the officers of the S.P.E. which is competent to investigate such cases. He directly receives and entertains reports from the officers of the S.P.E. which is competent to investigate such cases. Being a court of original jurisdiction in relation to the cases triable under the Act of 1988 and being competent to take cognizance of such cases under section 193 Cr.P.C. on the basis of the reports submitted to him his power and jurisdiction are akin to those of a Magistrate under section 156(3) and 190(1)(a), (b) and (c) of Cr.P.C. His jurisdiction to act under section 193 cannot, therefore, be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by pressing into service the doctrine of "Locus standi" of a complainant/informant by putting the same in a straight jacket formula. 12. For appreciating the powers of the Special Magistrate and/or the Special Judges in relation to the cases investigated by the C.B.I. it is worthwhile to make a brief reference to the history behind the enactment of the D.S.P.E. Act 1946. It is a matter of common knowledge that a good number of unscrupulous and antisocial persons, both officials and non-officials, made fortunes in and out of the enormous expenditure incurred for purposes connected with war during the period of World War-II by dishonestly entrenching themselves at the cost of public and the Govt. Necessity to investigate such dishonest and fraudulent transactions was felt. Therefore, the D.P.S.E. was established in the year 1941 by an executive order of the Central Govt. under the administration of Deputy Inspector General of Police with Head-quarters at Lahore (Pakistan) and the supervision of the Special Police force was vested in the War Department. Later Ordinance No. XXII of 1943, constituting a Special Police force for investigation of certain offences committed in relation to interests of Central Govt. in their departments was promulgated. The said Ordinance was subsequently replaced by the D.S.P.E. Ordnance No. XXII of 1946 which was later replaced by the present D.S.P.E. Act of 1946 w.e.f. 19.11.1996 and the superintendence of the Special Police Force was transferred to the Home Department of Govt. of India. Independence could not and did not discourage the unscrupulous and antisocial persons, both officials and non-officials, from carrying on their nefarious and dishonest activities against the interests of the Central Govt. and the people and necessity to check curb such activities forced the continuance of the Act. By notifications, issued from time to time by the Central Govt. of India. Independence could not and did not discourage the unscrupulous and antisocial persons, both officials and non-officials, from carrying on their nefarious and dishonest activities against the interests of the Central Govt. and the people and necessity to check curb such activities forced the continuance of the Act. By notifications, issued from time to time by the Central Govt. in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Section 3 of the D.S.P.E. Act offences and class of offences were specified for the purposes of said section. In exercise of the powers vested under section 5 of the D.S.P.E. Act, the Central Govt. has, with the concurrence of the States, extended, by appropriate orders, the jurisdiction of the D.S.P.E. Divisions to all the States in India. In this behalf : Not. No. 25.7.1960 AVD dated 12.1.1961. Not. No. 25.3.1960 AVD 11 dated 1.4.1964. ORDER No. 25.9.1964 AVD dated 6.8.1966. ORDER No. 28.3.1966 AVD II dated 10.7.1970. etc. which extends the powers and jurisdictions of the members of the Delhi Special Establishment to, besides others, the State of Rajasthan may be referred. 13. The C.B.I. was constituted by the Govt. of India by Resolution No. 4 /31 /61 dated 1.4.1963 with the following object and reasons, viz. "The Government of India have had under consideration the establishment of a Central Bureau of Investigation for the investigation of crimes at present handled by the Delhi Special police Establishment including specially important cases under the Defence of India Act and Rules particularly of hoarding, black-marketing and profiteering in essential commodities, which may have repercussions and ramifications in several States; the collection of intelligence relating to certain types of crimes; participation in the work of the National Central Bureau connected with the international Criminal Police organization; the maintenance of crime statistic and dissemination of information relating to crime and criminals; the study of specialised crime of particular interest to the Government of India or crimes having all India or inter-State ramifications or of particular importance from the social point of view; the conduct of police research and the co-ordination of laws relating to crime. As a first step in that direction, the Government of India have decided to set up with effect from 1.4.1963 a Central Bureau of Investigation at Delhi with the following six Divisions namely:- (i) Investigation and Anti-Corruption Division (Delhi Special Police Establishment). As a first step in that direction, the Government of India have decided to set up with effect from 1.4.1963 a Central Bureau of Investigation at Delhi with the following six Divisions namely:- (i) Investigation and Anti-Corruption Division (Delhi Special Police Establishment). (ii) Technical Division, (iii) Crime Records and Statistics Division, (iv) Research Division, (v) Legal and General Division, (vi) Administration Division, The Charter of functions of the abovesaid Divisions will be as given in the annexure. The assistance of the Central Bureau of Investigation will also be available to the State Police Forces on request for investigating and assisting in the investigation of inter-State crime and other difficult criminal case." The annexure to the Resolution gives the particulars of the functions of each of the Six Divisions as mentioned in the Resolution. Witki the establishment of C.B.I. in 1963 the Special Police establishment has been made one of its Divisions and the nature of cases to be investigated by the SPE have been specified from time to time. 14. Under sub-sec. (3) of Section 2 r/w sub-sec. (3) of Section 5 of the D.P.S.E. Act the members of the D.S.P.E. of and above the rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police may exercise the powers of the Officer in-charge of a Police Station in the area in which they are appointed. While exercising such powers they are to be deemed to be Officers In-charge of a Police Station discharging the functions of such an officer within the territorial limits of his Police Station. For the purposes of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the Officer of S.P.E. Jaipur Rajasthan is to be considered the Officers-in-Charge of a Police Station. 15. To sum up, a Special Magistrate appointed under section 13 Cr.P.C. for trying cases under the S.P.E. Act may entertain a private complaint and direct the Officer-in-Charge, S.P.E. Jaipur (Rajasthan) u /s. 156(3) Cr.P.C. to investigate an offence specified in the Schedule issued by the Central Govt. in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 3 of the D.S.P.E. Act 1946. The Schedules attached to the notifications and orders, referred to above, show that the offences under sections 409 & 420 IPC are the specified offences. 16. in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 3 of the D.S.P.E. Act 1946. The Schedules attached to the notifications and orders, referred to above, show that the offences under sections 409 & 420 IPC are the specified offences. 16. Similarly a special Judge appointed under section 3 of the Act of 1988 to try the cases under that Act, being a criminal court of original jurisdiction for the purposes of Act of 1988 may forward a private complaint under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. to the Officer-in-Charge S.P.E. cases, Jaipur (Rajasthan) for investigation into the offences under the Act of 1988. That being so, the impugned orders do not suffer from the vice of want of power and jurisdiction on the parts of the learned Special Magistrate and the learned Special Judge. 17. In the case of Indumati M. Shah (Supra) the Gujarat High Court dissented from the view of this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Phool Chand Garg, 1991 Cr. L.J. 125 and also distinguished the Supreme Court decision in the case of State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal, AIR 1985 SC 195 : 1985 Cr.L.J. 516 and held that the Special Judge could not have entrusted the investigation to any party except referred to in Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. In arriving at that conclusion the learned Single Judge appears to have taken into consideration the concession made by Mr. Pandya, the Learned Counsel for the complainant in that case, as recorded in para 29 of the report. That apart, the learned Judge held in para 47 that the complaint before him did not disclose the commission of any offence and that the same had been filed only with a view to get an order under section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. and that the learned Special Judge had passed orders under section 156(3) without application of mind. With due respects to the learned Judge I find myself unable to subscribe to his view in the light of the discussion made here in above and the direct decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.R. Antulay (Supra) which appears to have escaped from the attention of the learned Single Judge. 18. With due respects to the learned Judge I find myself unable to subscribe to his view in the light of the discussion made here in above and the direct decision of the Apex Court in the case of A.R. Antulay (Supra) which appears to have escaped from the attention of the learned Single Judge. 18. The Calcutta High Court decision does not indicate as to whether the Learned Judicial Magistrate had been appointed a Special Magistrate under section 13 of Cr.P.C. to try case investigated by D.S.P.E. The Kerala High Court decision, however, proceeds on the reasoning that though there was a branch of the C.B.I. at Cochin yet the same was not considered a Police Station and the officer looking after that branch an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station. With utmost respect to the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court the observations made by him are in conformity with neither the construction of the provisions contained in sub-sec. (3) of Section 2 and Sub-sec. (31 of Section 5 of the D.S.P.E. Act, 1946 nor the law declared by the Supreme Court in the cases of A.R. Antulay and V.K. Naidu, referred to above. I am, therefore, in respectful disagreement with the observations made by the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court. 19. In the result all the three petitions are dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******