Honble YADAV, J. – Heard. (2). Perused the judgments and decree under appeal passed by both the courts-below. (3) It is argued by learned counsel for the appellant that while determining the provisional rent under Sub-sec. (3) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `Act No. 17 of 1950) on 30.7.85, the learned trial court did not direct in its order that the defence of the defendant-appellant will be struck off if he failed to deposit rent so determined within stipulated period, hence his defence could not be struck off. Suffice it to hold in this regard that against the order striking off defence of the defendant- appellant passed by the learned trial court he has filed an appeal before this Court, which was dismissed on 30.1.86. Against dismissal of appeal by this Court, he filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court that too was dismissed. He further filed Review Petition against dismissal of Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court that too was dismissed. I am of the view that the order passed by the learned trial court striking off his defence has merged in the order passed by the Apex Court and as such, it is not open for the tenant-defendant-appellant to re-agitate this point in Second Appeal. Both the courts-below have committed no error in arriving at concurrent findings of fact that the tenant-defendant- appellant cannot be allowed to re-agitate this question after decision of the Apex Court. (4). It is next contended by the learned counsel for the tenant- defendant-appellant Mr. A.L. Chopra that the suit was instituted for eviction on 10.4.78 on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity of landlord and also on the ground of sub-letting but ground of default in payment of rent was subsequently added by way of amendment on 10.9.84, therefore, both the courts-below erred in law in hol- ding that the present suit was based on the ground of default in payment of rent as envisaged under Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950, therefore, the decree of eviction under appeal on the ground of default in payment of rent is not sustainable in the eye of law, especially when, the plaintiff-landlord-respondent failed to obtain a decree for eviction initially pleaded by him in the plaint. (5). (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950, therefore, the decree of eviction under appeal on the ground of default in payment of rent is not sustainable in the eye of law, especially when, the plaintiff-landlord-respondent failed to obtain a decree for eviction initially pleaded by him in the plaint. (5). The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is attractive but fallacious. It is true that when suit was filed in the year 1978 then at that time, the tenant-defendant- appellant was not in arrears of rent but during pendency of the suit from 26.3.82 to 9.9.84, neither he paid nor tender the rent due to him, hence he became defaulter within the meaning of Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950. (6). It is further to be noticed that on the basis of amended pleadings of the landlord and defendant-tenant, the learned trial court framed specific issues No. 5-A focusing the attention of both the parties to adduce evidence on the question of default of payment of rent. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their claims on issue No. 5-A. (7). After analytical discussion of the evidence on record, both the courts-below have recorded a concurrent findings of fact that the tenant-defendant-appellant has committed default in payment of rent for more than six months, therefore, he is liable to be evicted on this ground. Both the courts-below have committed no error in appreciating the evidence on record. The findings recorded on issue No. 5A by the learned trial court and affirmed by the learned lower appellate court cannot be said to be either per verse or based on no evidence, hence, it does not require interference in the instant second appeal. (8). In my considered opinion, the instant second appeal is concluded by concurrent findings of fact and no substantial question of law is involved. (9). In view of what have been discussed above, the instant second appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed in limine.