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1997 DIGILAW 1470 (MAD)

Kaliya Perumal v. State

1997-12-12

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM

body1997
Judgment :- Petitioner Kaliya Perumal, in this petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is seeking the quashing of the F.I.R. registered in crime number 14 of 1996, by the respondent, for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, hereinafter referred to as the S.C., S.T. Act for short, on the complaint given by one Thenmozhi wife of one Haridoss. 2. The grounds on which, this application has been filed are two fold: (i) The averments in the F.I.R. would not constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the S.C., S.T. Act and mere calling of the caste name by itself would not amount to dishonouring the caste to which the complainant belongs; (ii) Complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste. She married a person by name Haridoss, who belongs to Yadhava Community. Therefore, the complainant becomes a member of the Yadhava Community family and that too, the said husband of the complainant is the relative of the petitioner and as such, the complainant has become a member of the petitioner's family. Hence, the provisions of the S.C., S.T. Act cannot be invoked in favour of the complainant, according to the petitioner. 3. This petition was admitted by this Court on 14-11-1997. Mr. S. Doraiswamy, counsel for the petitioner and Government Advocate were heard. 4. As regards the first point, on perusal of the F.I.R. it is quite clear that the avernments would definitely attract the relevant sections under the S.C., S.T. Act. It is not merely calling a person by caste name but also, as it stated in the F.I.R., the petitioner abused the complainant Tahenmozhi in her caste name, in filthy language, thereby causing insult and intimidation to her. When there are specific averments constituing the offence alleged, this Court, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would not embark upon an enquiry to come to the conclusion whether such allegation is true or not. Hence, the first ground does not hold good. 5. The second ground is quite interesting. As pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner, even according to the F.I.R., the complainant Thenmozhi who belongs to a Scheduled Caste and passed (sic) Plus Two, married one Haridoss, who belongs to Hindu Yadhava community and their marriage was registered in a Registrar's Office at Pallavaram. 5. The second ground is quite interesting. As pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner, even according to the F.I.R., the complainant Thenmozhi who belongs to a Scheduled Caste and passed (sic) Plus Two, married one Haridoss, who belongs to Hindu Yadhava community and their marriage was registered in a Registrar's Office at Pallavaram. The petitioner Kaliya-perumal is the uncle of the said Haridoss. 6. Taking advantage of this admission made in the F.I.R. by the complainant, the petitioner has claimed that the complainant has become his relative and one of the members of is family and that therefore, even assuming that the petitioner used filthy and abusive language against the complainant in her caste name, that would not, attract the ingredients of the offence under the S.C., S.T. Act. In brief, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that once the women belonging to a Scheduled Caste marries a person belonging to a Backward Class community, she loses her birth right as Harijan and she becomes the member of the Backward Class community, to which, her husband belongs. To substantiate this, learned counsel for the petitioner has not cited any authority nor any valid reason to come to such a conclusion. 7. In order to answer this point, some of the observations made by the apex Court in Vilsammal Paul v. Cochin University would in my view, be relevant and useful. In that case, the question raised is this at page 1022 (of AIR): "However, the question is : Whether a lady marrying a Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or OBC citizen, or one transplanted by adoption or any other voluntary act, ipso facto, becomes entitled to claim reservation under Art. 15(4) or 16(4), as the case may be ?" While answering this question, the apex Court, elaborately considered by referring the object of the special provisions under Art. 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution, which are intended for the advancement of the socially and educationally backward class citizens, and on discussing the various authorities earlier given by several High Courts and the apex Court, held that the advancement of socially and educationally backward class citizens cannot be defeated by including candidates by allowance or any other mode of joining the community and it would tantamount to making mockery of the Constitutional exercise of identification of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. 8. 8. Some of the observations by the apex Court would of much use, to decide the question raised in this case: "Therefore persons who by birth belong to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes alone are entitled to the benefit of Arts. 16(4) and 15(4). By marriage, adoption or any other device, viz. by procuring". false social status certificates, they are not eligible to avail of of protective discrimination for appointment to an office or to a post under the State or admission in educational institution." "Therefore, when a member is transplanted into the Dalits Tribes and OBCs. he/she must of necessity also undergo same handicaps, be subject to the same disabilities, disadvantages, indignities or sufferings so as to entitle the candidate to avail the facility of reservation. A candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born in forward caste and had march of advantageous life but is transplanted in backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either under Art. 15(4) or 16(4), as the case may be. Acquisition of the status of Scheduled Caste etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. "9. These observations would make it clear that Haridoss who belongs to Yadhava community by merely marrying a Harijan lady cannot claim to have become a Harijan and as such, he is not entitled to the reservation as provided in Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. So, the marriage does not create a conversion of the caste. In the same way, merely because a Harijan lady, who has suffered all along from her birth the handicaps, disadvantages and restrictions to which the members of the Scheduled Caste community were subjected to, married a member of the backward class community, she cannot be said to have acquired the backward class status by losing her birth right of reservation. A Harijan lady on marriage may become a member of the family of her husband who belongs to a backward community or forward community. But is does nor mean that the caste regidity imposed upon her would become automatically broken down. 10. A Harijan lady on marriage may become a member of the family of her husband who belongs to a backward community or forward community. But is does nor mean that the caste regidity imposed upon her would become automatically broken down. 10. The allegations in the F.I.R. would also show that in spite of the complainant having married a person who belongs to a backward community, the petitioner does not accept her as one of the members of that family, instead, he scolded and insulted her by using her caste name. 11. At this juncture, I may point out the observations of the Supreme Court, as to how the Judges should interpret the sections of the particular Act by taking account of the scope and object of the Act, in the following words: The Judges should adapt purposive interpretation of the dynamic concepts under the Constitution and the Act with its interpretive armoury to articulate the felt necessities of the time. Social legislation is not a document for fastidious dialects but means of ordering of the life of the people. To construe law one must enter into its spirit, its setting and history. Law should be capable to expand freedom of the people and the legal order can weigh with utmost equal care to provide the underpinning of the highly inequitable social order. Judicial review must be exercised with insight into social values to supplement the changing social needs. The existing social inequalities or imbalances are required to be removed re-adjusting the social order through rule of law. In that case, the need for protection of right to take water, under the Civil Rights Protection Act, and the necessity to uphold the constitutional mandate of abolishing untouchability and its practice in any form was emphasised." 12. In the light of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the complainant. Thenmozhi, who acquired the status of a Scheduled Caste woman by her birth right cannot lose her right of prosecution under the relevant sections of the S.C., S.T., Act against the petitioner merely because, she married a relative of the petitioner, who belongs to a backward class community. Hence, the grounds urged in this petition by the petitioner fail and accordingly, this petition by the petitioner fail and accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Consequently, Crl. M.P. 6110 of 1997 also stands dismissed.