JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Order passed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur (in short, "RDC") in an appeal relating to cancellation of caste certificate issued to petitioner is subject-matter of challenge. The dispute has a long chequered career. 2. Caste certificate issued in favour of the petitioner under Caste Certificate (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Rules, 1980 (in short the "Rules") was cancelled by the Collector, Bolangir (opposite party No. 2) by order dated 20.5.1991. Said order was challenged before the RDC in Appeal No. 4 of 19.91. By order dated 24.4.1992, order of the Collector was set aside primarily on the ground that principles of natural justice had not been followed. The matter was remanded to the Collector for a fresh adjudication. The Collector, Bolangir by order dated 14.5.1993 again reiterated the conclusions justifying cancellation of the certificate issued. The matter was again carried in appeal before the RDC in Appeal No. 1 of 1993. By order dated 9.2.1994 the matter was remitted back to the Collector for fresh, adjudication. The Collector for the third time upheld the order passed by his predecessor cancelling the certificate issued in favour of the petitioner holding that the petitioner does not belong to "Kuli" caste which is covered -by the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 (in short, 'the Order'). Petitioner filed Appeal (Misc.) No. 3 of 1995 before the RDC. By the impugned order the appeal has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. The delay in presentation of appeal was considered to be abnormal, and the appeal was dismissed. It is to be noted that the impugned order of the Collector is dated 25.8.1995, and the appeal which ought to have been filed by 5.10.1995, was in fact filed on 10.10.1995 and therefore, there was delay of five days in preferring the appeal. The certified copy was collected on 29.9.1995 by post by the appellant, who was residing at Bhubaneswar. 3. Mr. R. K. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the two certificates issued were in terms of the Order. Those were issued more than three decades back and successive attempts have been made by the Collector to nullify such certificates issued on 11.9.1956, and 1.12.1967. copies of which have been annexed as Annexures 2 and 3 to the writ application. Those were issued more than three decades back and successive attempts have been made by the Collector to nullify such certificates issued on 11.9.1956, and 1.12.1967. copies of which have been annexed as Annexures 2 and 3 to the writ application. The delay was not so unusually high and reasons were indicated for the delayed filing. Without taking a realistic view, the RDC has rejected the appeal on the ground of limitation. It is urged that serious consequences will flow if the certificates are cancelled and same would have severe effect on the service conditions of the petitioner. Appeal should have been heard-and decided on merits. The learned counsel for State on the other hand supported the orders and submitted that no urgency was shown by the appellant who took the matter casually and without any plausible explanation filed the appeal belatedly justifying rejection thereof on the ground of delayed presentation. 4. Question of limitation is in the realm of adjective law. It has its own significance, but it cannot be permitted to function as a pivotal point. It cannot be regarded as a factor having paramount importance in the process of adjudication. It has been emphasised by the Apex Court on many occasions that liberal approach has to be taken while dealing with the question of limitation. The expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, "the Act") is sufficiently elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice which is heartbeat of judicial process. Limitation is a matter of technicality. Unless it is shown that the party acted with any ulterior motive aimed at defeating the ends of justice or is manifest with evil designs that should not stand on the way of adjudication on merits. 5. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult Apex Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined of crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult Apex Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined of crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram : AIR 1917 PC 156 , it was observed that true guide for a Court to exercise the discretion u/s 5 is whether the appellant acted, with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and Ors. : (1969) 1 SCR 1005, Apex Court held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 6. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Nirmala Devi and Others which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Mata Din Vs. A. Narayanan Apex Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bonafide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bonafide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive. 7. In O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) and Others Apex Court had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others Apex Court considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that Apex Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in Apex Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all other Courts in the hierarchy. Apex Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 8. In Ram Kishan and Anr. v. U. P. State Roadways Transport corporation. and Anr. : (1994) 2 SCC 507, Apex Court had held that although the story put forward by the applicant for not filing the application for condonation under the Motor Vehicles Act within the period of limitation was not found convincing but keeping in view the facts and circumstances and cause of justice, the delay was condoned and the appeal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal to dispose it on merits. In Narlu v. Gangotribai and Anr. : (1995) 1 SCC 37, Apex Court condoned the delay of 11 years in filing the special leave petition. 9. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in Apex Court - be it by private party or the State are barred by limitation and Apex Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. This position was elaborately stated by the Apex Court in State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, . 10. The background facts show that several rounds of litigation have been undertaken by the petitioner to protect the certificates issued to him. That aspect appears to have been lost sight of by the RDC. The delay was not so unusually high as to weigh heavily against condonation. Order passed by the RDC reflects a hyper-technical approach. 11. In the circumstances, we feel that the delay deserved condonation for adjudication on merits. The impugned order dated 11.4.1997 (Annexure-15 to the writ application) is vacated, and the matter is remitted back to the RDC for adjudication on merits. To avoid unnecessary delay, and keeping in view long chequered career of the litigation, it would be appropriate if the petitioner appears without any further notice before the RDC on 23.7.1997 on which date the RDC shall fix up a date for hearing. It would be in the interest of all concerned if the RDC disposes of the appeal after granting due opportunity to the petitioner expeditiously. It is open to the petitioner to move the RDC for such interim protection as is available in law. The writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above. No cost. S.C. Datta, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Allowed