DISTRICT CO OPERATIVE FEDERATION LTD v. PRESIDING OFFICER
1997-12-08
S.P.SRIVASTAVA
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 72 of 1981 a reference under Section 4-K of the U. P. . Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 regarding the dispute relating to the removal of Ram Vir Singh from service with effect from 18-9-78 led to the impugned award of the labour court whereunder the respondent No. 2 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 72 of 1981 was reinstated with certain directions includ ing a direction entitling the workman to get compensation from the employer-petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 72 of 1981 at the rate of Rs. 250 per month so long as the workman continued in ser vice and so long as the concerned workman remained unemployed. 2. Both the petitioners in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 72 of 1981 and Writ Petition No. 2460 of 1981 felt aggrieved by the impugned award. The petitioner-employer has prayed for the quashing of the impugned award dated 29-7-80. The workman-petitioner however, has prayed for the modification of the im pugned award seeking reinstatement with full back wages and has prayed for a direc tion to treat the petitioner as being in employment and entitlement to full back wages and other allowances with effect from 18-9-78 till the date of reinstatement. In the alternative he has prayed for a direc tion requiring the labour court to rehear the whole matter and decide the same in accordance with law. 3. I have heard Shri Triloki Nath, Advocate for the employer and Shri K. P. Agarwal for the workman concerned and have carefully perused the record. 4. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. The workman Ram Vir Singh claims to have been ap pointed on 1-11-77 on a consolidated salary of Rs. 250 per month as a truck clearner. He further claims (hat he had been transferred and posted as Chawkidar in May, 1978. However, without any jus tification his services were dispensed with on 18-9- 78 and in his place another person Bhagwan Singh had been appointed. Apart from Bhagwan Singh the employer had appointed another person Vijay Pal Singh also. He claims that his services had been dispensed with in an illegal manner. 5.
However, without any jus tification his services were dispensed with on 18-9- 78 and in his place another person Bhagwan Singh had been appointed. Apart from Bhagwan Singh the employer had appointed another person Vijay Pal Singh also. He claims that his services had been dispensed with in an illegal manner. 5. The employer, however, claims that Ram Vir Singh the workman was ini tially appointed as truck cleaner on daily wage basis on payment of Rs. 5 per day. It is asserted that on 22-12-77 Ram Vir Singh was appointed by the President of the Federation as a temporary cleaner on con solidated pay of Rs. 250 per month. This appointment was purely temporary and liable to termination at any time without notice. It is, further asserted that the workman Ram Vir Singh on his own re quest was sent to Sadabad. On account of non-availability of any post of truck cleaner there he was appointed as Chaw kidar by the President. In paragraph 4 of the employers writ petition it has been indicated that the President of the Federa tion in pursuance of the. request made by the workman ordered his transfer as Chawkidar at Sadabad in place of Prithvi Singh, who was posted there and was transferred to Headquarter at Mathura. 6. The employer has further asserted that the recruitment and conditions of ser vice of its employees are regulated by U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975. It was alleged that the workmans services were dispensed with on the appointment of Chowkidar on regular basis through the Institutional Service Board and the reference itself was bad. 7. The labour court after carefully considering the evidence and materials brought on record, came in the conclusion that the workman had, before the date of reference, made a demand for reinstate ment but the same was not accepted by the employer so the reference was not bad. It was further found that the appointment of the workman had been made after the Regulations had been enforced and was not in accordance with the relevant Regulation No. 5 so it was an illegal ap pointment and therefore the termination need not have been made in accordance with the Regulation 19 (a) which requires prior one months notice or pay in lieu thereof.
It was further observed that the workman continued to be a temporary ser vant and so the termination of the service though abrupt, cannot be said to be in valid. The labour court, however, proceeded to hold that the service regula tions could not in view of the Regulation 103 operate inconsistently with the provision of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or the other law applicable to the service of the workman. It was found that the impugned termination of service was bad in law as employees junior to the workman concerned were continued in service and further appointments were made without giving the workman opportunity for re-employment violating the provision of Section 6 (Q) of the U. P. Industrial Dis pute Act, 1947. The labour court was of the view that considering the circumstances the junior most ought to have been first retrenched and in case retrenchment was necessary because the appointment was itself illegal, all such employees ought to have been retrenched. However, the retrenchment of the workman alone was not bona fide and he deserved to be reinstated. In the aforesaid circumstances the labour court had issued the impugned direction. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 72 of 1981 has strenuously contended that the workman-respondent was not en titled to any protection envisaged under the provisions of U. P. Industrial Dispute Act specially Section 6-N thereof which provides certain conditions precedent to be satisfied before affecting retrenchment of workman pointing out that the expres sion employed as contained therein refers to a valid employment in the industry and an appointment or continua tion thereof which was statutorily prohibited could not be taken to be an appointment so as to confer the status of an employee as contemplated under Sec tion 6-N of the Act which may entitle a workman to avail the benefits secured thereunder. 9. What has been contended is that the petitioner society fell within the perview of the U. P. Co- operative Societies Employees Service Regulation, 1975 framed under Section 122 of the U. P. Co operative Societies Act, 1965 which prescribed the mode of recruitment and appointments in Co- operative Societies.
9. What has been contended is that the petitioner society fell within the perview of the U. P. Co- operative Societies Employees Service Regulation, 1975 framed under Section 122 of the U. P. Co operative Societies Act, 1965 which prescribed the mode of recruitment and appointments in Co- operative Societies. Reference has been made to Regulation 5 of the aforesaid Regulations which clearly require that the recruitment for all ap pointments in a co-operative society were to be made through U. P. Co-operative In stitutional Service Board. These regula tions govern besides other the modes of appointments to be made directly. Regula tion 5 (ii) however, provides for certain exceptions authorising appointment by direct recruitment as a stop-gap-arrange ment to be made by the appointing authority for a period not exceeding six months. 10. In the present case, it is not dis puted that the workman had been ap pointed initially on the post of Truck Cleaner on daily wage basis but by an order dated 22-12-1977 passed by the President of the Federation he had been appointed as a temporary cleaner on the con solidated pay of Rs. 250 per month whereafter he was posted as Chaukidar. The petitioner claims that he has been in the service for the period 30th October, 1977 to 16-9-1978, i. e. for a period of over sixmonths. 11. The fact that the aforesaid ap pointment granted to the workman was in flagrant disregard of the statutory prohibi tion stipulated in the provisions contained in the U. P. Co-operative Societies Service Regulations, 1995 is not disputed. In fact, the finding returned by the Labour Court against the workman holding that the appointment in question was not made in accordance with the relevant Regulation No. 5 and it was illegal has not been chal lenged in the present proceedings. 12. The question which arises for consideration therefore, is as. to whether in such a situation when the appointment of the workman itself is in violation of the statutory prohibition, the benefits avail able or secured in favour of a workman under the Industrial Law regulating the relationship of the master and servant could be extended to such an appointee falling in the category of a workman. 13.
to whether in such a situation when the appointment of the workman itself is in violation of the statutory prohibition, the benefits avail able or secured in favour of a workman under the Industrial Law regulating the relationship of the master and servant could be extended to such an appointee falling in the category of a workman. 13. The provisions contained in Sec tion 6-N of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act as indicated hereinabove while laying down the conditions precedent for affect ing a retrenchment extend the benefits stipulated therein to a workman employed in any industry. I am clearly of the opinion that the existence of the relation ship of employer and employee is the-essence of the matter. The expression "employed", taking into consideration the scheme un derlying the Act and the Regulations, it seems to me, clearly envisages an employ ment which gives rise to a relationship of master and servant which should be ade quate in law and not otherwise than in accordance with law in any manner. 14. In the aforesaid connection, what is noticeable is that an appointment taking recourse to the method of direct recruit ment for a period exceeding six months had to be made through the U. P. Co operative Institutional Service Board and any appointment made in violation of the aforesaid provision was to cease to have effect from the date on which the period of six months expired. The provision to this effect as contained in the U. P. Co-opera tive Societies Employees Service Regula tions, 1975, it seems to me, is mandatory and not directory. The aforesaid provision in effect imposes a check over un scrupulous arbitrary back door appoint ment of undeserving candidates without following the principles underlying Ar ticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. If a person is appointed in flagrant disregard of the mandatory requirement referred to hereinabove such an appoint ment has to be taken as non est in the eye of law. 15.
If a person is appointed in flagrant disregard of the mandatory requirement referred to hereinabove such an appoint ment has to be taken as non est in the eye of law. 15. It may be usefully noticed at this stage, the observations of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, AIR 1964 SC 521 , occur- ring at 525 of the report which are to the following effect: "in our opinion where a Government ser vant has no right to a post or to a particular status though an authority under the Govern ment acting beyond its competence had pur ported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law will be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given a particular status. " In the present case, what I find is that the appointment on the basis whereof the concerned workman claims to have been employed and has asserted the con tinuance of the relationship of master and servant so as to claim the protection en visaged under Section 6-N of the Act could not be treated to be an appointment in the eye of law or taken to be the basis for holding the continuity of service or the relationship of master and servant which could entitle the workman concerned a security of tenure or any other benefit con templated under the U. P. Industrial Dis putes Act. 16. The learned Counsel for the respondent has however, urged that the petitioner employer cannot take ad vantage of his own wrong. The submission in essence is based on the principle of estoppel. This principle of estoppel, can not, in my opinion, come to the rescue of the workman as there could be no estoppel against the law. The workman concerned has come forward in this case seeking protection envisaged under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. He has to satisfy that he had been employed in accordance with law and a valid relation ship of master and servant was continuing on the date of the impugned action of the employer.
The workman concerned has come forward in this case seeking protection envisaged under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. He has to satisfy that he had been employed in accordance with law and a valid relation ship of master and servant was continuing on the date of the impugned action of the employer. This basic requirement had to be satisfied by the workman who had in itiated the proceedings giving rise to the impugned award before any relief could be granted to him under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Even accord ing to the finding returned by the Labour Court, this requirement was not satisfied at all. That being so, the question of grant ing any relief on the strength of the provisions contained in Section 6-Q of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act providing that where any workmen are retrenched and the employer proposes to take into his employ any person, he shall, in such man ner as may be prescribed give an oppor tunity to the retrenched workmen to offer themselves for re-employment and the retrenched workmen who offer themsel ves for re-employment shall have preference over other person, or the benefit contemplated under Section 6-P of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act enforcing the principles of last come first go did not and could not arise. 17. In the aforesaid view of the mat ter, it is not necessary to enter into the other submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties as the impugned award is liable to be quashed in view of the fact that the conclusions indicated hereinabove are sufficient for quashing of the impugned award. 18. Considering the facts and cir cumstances brought on record and my conclusions indicated hereinabove, the writ petition No. 72 of 1981 succeeds and the impugned award of the Labour Court is quashed. 19. As a consequence, the writ peti tion No. 2460 of 1981 deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 20. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Order. accordingly. .