Judgment :- 1. Respondent in I.A.No.282 of 1997 in O.P.No.292 of 1996, on the file of Principal Judge, Family Court, Madras, is the petitioner herein. The revision has been filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Petitioner herein filed a petition for divorce against the respondent. I do not want to delve into the allegations therein except stating that pending proceedings for divorce. Wife filed the above I.A. for getting custody of the child. The Family Court ordered the custody of the child to be given to the mother, and the same is challenged in this revision. 3. In her application for custody of the child, namely, I.A.No.282 of 1997 filed under Sec.26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, she has stated that a female child was born out of the wedlock, and she is now named as Deepika. According to her, the child was born on 12.12.1995, and from the date of birth, the child was in her custody. It is said that the main petition for divorce was posted on 10.3.1997. On that date, her mother-in-law and sister-in-law visited her father at hospital and informed that they are interested in reunion and also expressed their desire to take her back to the marital home, and they also assured that the main petition for divorce will be withdrawn. It is said that thereafter they also visited the respondent herein at Anna Nagar, where she is staying with her brother. On that day, respondent was taken out with all sorts of promises, and also with an assurance that her marital life will be peaceful and harmonious. According to her, she was treated well by the members of the family and she lived with them for four days. She came back to Anna Nagar since her father was hospitalised. Thereafter, on 17.3.1997 also, respondent husbands mother and sister visited her at Anna Nagar. It is said that thereafter, there was a compulsion from the mother-in-law demanding huge amounts, and she was also compelled to sign certain blank papers and she was sent back to her parents’ house with a direction that she should not return unless she brings with her a sum of Rs.50,000 for the purpose of her husbands business. The child was also retained by them. She tried her best to bring the child. The child was also retained by them. She tried her best to bring the child. But due to the vindictive attitude of her husband and in-laws, she was not allowed to take the child. It is said that the child is only about 15 months and is still under breast-feeding. The child should be kept in the custody of the mother, and that would be in the best interest of the child also. 4. A detailed counter-affidavit was filed by the petitioner herein. It is his case that there is nobody to take care of the child, and the child fell ill. The family circumstances were becoming worse day by day. There was nobody to take care of both the mother and child. He has said that when his father-in-law and sister-in-law expressed their inability to take care of the child and wanted to give custody of the child to him, and they also said that if anything happens to the child, they cannot be made answerable for that. The mother-in-law and (his wifes) sister came to then-house and handed over custody of the child. It is his further case that his wife was not in a position to understand as to what had happened, and even she did not feel the separation of the child, and that being the condition, the mother (respondent herein) cannot have custody of the child. He has said that his mother-in-law is also aged and she is often feeling sick, and except the father-in-law, there is no one to bring up the child, and right from its birth, the child was not attached to the mother, and the child was never breastfed. He has further said that his wife is mentally deranged and, therefore, she cannot claim a right under Sec.6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, to have custody of the child. Taking into consideration the welfare of the child, it should be allowed to continue with him only, and the custody of the child should not be entrusted to its mother. Regarding the demand for Rs.50,000 etc., he denied all those allegations. He also said that the child after it came to his custody, has regained its health and is happy with him, and no ground has been made out to change the custody. Regarding the demand for Rs.50,000 etc., he denied all those allegations. He also said that the child after it came to his custody, has regained its health and is happy with him, and no ground has been made out to change the custody. According to him, if the custody is now changed, it will affect the future welfare of the child. 5. The Family Court examined P.W.I (wife), and after taking into consideration the circumstances, it came to the conclusions that the child must be left in the custody of the mother, and consequently directed the petitioner herein to hand over the minor child to the respondent. 6. The main ground under which the husband seeks divorce is the allegation that the respondent herein is mentally deranged. It is his case that she is not in a position to understand or realise the consequence of her acts. Her attitude towards him as well as her-in-laws is very cruel, etc. 7. By the impugned Order, the Family Court held that prima facie the mother appears to be of good mental health, and she was in a position to understand and answer the questions properly. Even though there were some minor contradictions in the answers given by her during cross-examination, she could withstand the cross-examination in Court. It implies that she has the capacity to understand. The Family Court further found that the child is of tender age, and it requires protection from its mother. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner seriously challenged each and every finding of the Family Court in directing custody of the child to the mother. 9. Parties to this case are Hindus. Petition for divorce has been filed under the Hindu Marriage Act, and the application for getting custody of the child has been filed under Sec.26 of the same Act. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner seriously challenged each and every finding of the Family Court in directing custody of the child to the mother. 9. Parties to this case are Hindus. Petition for divorce has been filed under the Hindu Marriage Act, and the application for getting custody of the child has been filed under Sec.26 of the same Act. The said section reads thus: “In any proceeding under this Act, the court may, from time to time, pass such interim orders and, make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible and may, alter the decree, upon application by petition for the purpose, make from time to time, all such orders and provisions with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of such children as might have been made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceeding for obtaining such decree were still pending, and the court may, also from time to time revoke, suspend or vary any such orders and provision previously made.” Though the section contemplates for entrustment of the child taking into consideration the wishes of the child, in this case, it is not possible since the child is of tender age, and it has completed two years only on 12.12.1997. Even in regard to custody, it is the welfare of the child that has to be taken into consideration, and the order passed under Sec.26 extracted above is only an interim relief. The court can also revoke, suspend or vary its order from time to time. It is further said that while considering an application under Sec.26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the provisions therein also shall be looked into, and the court is given complete jurisdiction whenever a marriage is dissolved or a judicial separation is made. At any rate, it is the duty of the court to take into consideration the welfare of the child, which is of paramount importance. 10. At any rate, it is the duty of the court to take into consideration the welfare of the child, which is of paramount importance. 10. In Maynes ‘Hindu Law & Usage’-14th Edition (1996), at page 356, commenting on Sec.26, the learned Author has said thus: “In considering the question of custody of a minor while exercising jurisdiction under Hindu Marriage Act, Sec.26 alone should be looked at, as it gives complete jurisdiction to the court whenever a marriage is dissolved or an order for judicial separation is made and it becomes the duty of the court to take into consideration the welfare of the child which is of paramount importance. The court should not be influenced by the fact of remarriage as all other considerations must be subordinate to the paramount consideration of the welfare of the minor.” 11. While taking into consideration the welfare of the minor, even though the court is guided only by Sec.23 of the Hindu Marriage Act in passing the order, certain statutory provisions are also relevant in this connection. Under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, Sec.6(a) deals as to who are the natural guardians of a Hindu minor. It says thus: “The natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minors person as well as in respect of the minors property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are — (a) in the case of a boy or unmarried girl- the father, and after him, the mother, provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother.” (Rest of the portion of that section is not necessary for our purposes). Why I am emphasing the Proviso (Italic portion supra) is that the Statute recognises the presumption that a child of tender age must be in the custody of the mother, and that alone will be good for the welfare of the child. Even though it is only a recognition by the Statute, all along that was the presumption. 12. In Hindu Law’ by Dr.Paras Diwan 1995 Edition, at page 1080, the learned Author has said thus: “Proviso to clause (a) of the section lays down that ordinarily the custody of children of tender years will be with the mother. The tender age is considered upto the age of five years. 12. In Hindu Law’ by Dr.Paras Diwan 1995 Edition, at page 1080, the learned Author has said thus: “Proviso to clause (a) of the section lays down that ordinarily the custody of children of tender years will be with the mother. The tender age is considered upto the age of five years. This is a mandatory provision, qualified by the word ordinarily. ‘The rationale of this provision is that since father is the guardian of all his children a special provision for child of tender years is needed. It is mandatory in the sense that upto the age of five the child must be committed to the custody of the mother. Obviously the mother is the only person who can take care of a child of tender years. Even before the enactment of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, our courts have taken that view. As early as 1917, the Punjab Chief Court held that a child of tender years should be in the custody of the mother. Ahmed v. Dehmatan, (1917)40 I.C. 1070. This view was followed in Zainab Bibi v. Abdul Kareem, A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 117. In this case, parties were Muslims. The same view has been expressed where parties have been Hindus. The Bombay High Court in Tara Bai v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 405said that a boy of seven years would be much better if living with his mother than with his father. Beaumount, C.J. in Saraswatibai v. Sripad, A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 103said: ‘If mother is a suitable person to take charge of the child it is quite impossible to find an adequate substitute for her for the custody of a child of tender years. Das, J. of Calcutta High Court, Kamal Rudra IN RE. Kamal Rudra IN RE. Kamal Rudra IN RE. , I.L.R. (1949)2 Cal. 374 said: “I have no doubt in my mind that the mothers lap is Gods own cradle for a child of this age, and that as between father and mother, other things being equal, child of such tender age should remain with mother.‘ The conversion of mother Budhan v. Bahadur Khan, A.I.R. 1942 Pesh 41 or her being out-casted Kaulessa v. Jorai Kausundhan Kaulessa v. Jorai Kausundhan Kaulessa v. Jorai Kausundhan , I.L.R. (1905)28 All. 233 does not matter. Sinha and Mathur, JJ. 233 does not matter. Sinha and Mathur, JJ. of the Allahabad High Court said that for children of tender years, ‘mother is the only proper custody’. Mt.Sakina Begum v. Malika Ara Begum Mt.Sakina Begum v. Malika Ara Begum Mt.Sakina Begum v. Malika Ara Begum , A.I.R. 1948 All. 498. A non Hindu mother of a Hindu child of tender age is entitled to its custody. Rai Kumar Gupta v. Barbara Gupta , A.I.R. 1989 Cal. 165. The Madras High Court said that it is impossible to find out an adequate substitute for her. The custody of a child of tender years, whose interest should be the paramount consideration must be with the mother. In these cases children were between two and five years. In Samuel v. Stella , A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 451: 56 Crl.L.J. 1192 the court against reaffirmed its view by saying that since it is the mother who could have the interest of the minor upper most at heart, the tender years of the child needing the care, protection and guidance of the most interested person, the mother has come to be preferred to others. The court gave custody of a female child of thirteen who was delicate in health to the mother. The Patna High Court in Bhola Nath v. Sharda Devi , A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 489: (1956)2 MLJ. 179 said, the affection, love and sympathy which the child requires cannot he given by the father in the same measure as can be given by the mother, especially when the child is aged only about two years or little more.” The same Author Dr.Paras Diwan, in his book ‘Parental Control, Guardianship and Custody of minor children’ 1973 edition, has said thus at page 273: “At the time when English law was wedded to the principle of the supremacy of paternal right, the tender age of the child was of no consideration and the court did not hesitate to handover a child at the breast of his mother than to the father. With the evolution of the welfare principle, the tender age became one of the considerations. We find that in 1958 the Chancery Court has no hesitation in saying that it is prima facie rule of law that a child of tender years should be committed to the custody of the mother, though more recently the court of appeal has dissented from this view. We find that in 1958 the Chancery Court has no hesitation in saying that it is prima facie rule of law that a child of tender years should be committed to the custody of the mother, though more recently the court of appeal has dissented from this view. The Talfords Act, 1839, was the first statutory modification which recognized the mothers preferential claim to the custody (or in any event of access) of children upto the age of seven. Then custody of Infants Act, 1873, raised this age of child to sixteen. Then the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, popularly known as Mothers Act, gave statutory recognition to the rule. We find that it is only after 1886 that the English Courts gave some serious considerations to the tender age of children. In Re A and B, there were three children of marriage of the age of ten, seven and four years. The father did not dispute about the third child, but claimed the custody of the first two, Granting the custody to both the parents, each having it for six months, Chitty, J. said, ‘It is important for children that they should be brought up in their tender age on terms of affection with one another and also that they should know both their parents’. Then we find in 1925 the clear observation from Lord Merrivale, P. “Balancing as well as I can the relative advantages which are offered here, it seems to me that the well being of the child while it is of tender age requires pre-emptorily that the child should remain ordinarily in the care in which since its birth it has been.”. In Allen v. Allen the trial court gave custody of a child of eight years to the father as against the mother who was found guilty of adultery. In the Court of Appeal Evershed, M.R., said, it would not be right to snatch this female child of eight from her mother and force her to make a new start with her father and step-mother. The court gave care and control to the mother. The same view was taken in Willoughby v. Willoughbyin respect of a child of two years. In re. The court gave care and control to the mother. The same view was taken in Willoughby v. Willoughbyin respect of a child of two years. In re. S, where the child was about five years old, Rexenburg, J. said that the ‘prima facie rule (which is now quite settled) is that, other things being equal, children of the tender age should be with their mother, and where a court gives custody of a child of this tender age to the father it is incumbent on it to make sure that there are really sufficient reasons to exclude the prima facie rule’. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Rexenburg ,J., that there was such rule, however, Lord Evershed, M.R., said, “…as a matter of human sense a young child is better with its mother and needs a mothers care.”Herman, L.J. said that though there was no rule of law, yet the Chancery Judges and Judges in the Divorce Division ‘have in past years taken the view that so long as a child is young enough to need the day-to-day care of his or her mother, it is better to leave the child with the mother, it is better to leave the child with the mother unless mother is entirely unsuitable person’. The main objection of the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal in calling it a rule of law is, as Herman, L.J. put it mother would be ‘oneup’ with the father which cannot be, as the Guardianship and Infants Acts, 1925, establishes equality between mother and father.” In ‘principles of Family Law’ by S.M.Cretney and J.M.Masson- 6th Edition (1997), in chapter 21 ‘Exercise of the Courts discretion; The welfare principle’, the learned Authors have said thus (at page 717): “…the childs welfare is the ‘first and paramount consideration’ when a court determines a relevant issue and declares that neither parent had a superior claim.” At page 719, the Learned Authors have further said thus: “The conduct of a parent is only relevant to the extent that it affects parenting capacity, the childs relationship with the parent, his or her safety or development. Doing justice between the parents, or the notion that parents have rights over their children, has been said to play no part in the application of the welfare test.” Learned Authors have continued to say as follows: “… However, the view that the natural parent is the best person to bring up the child is still strongly held. Consequently the court of appeal has reversed a decision to give care and control to relatives because it was wrong in principle to balance the provision of a good home against fostering the childs relationship with his father. Only if the childs welfare positively demanded the displacement of the parents “right” should this occur.” At page 721, the learned Author have said thus: “… Also, before the court makes a divorce or separation order it must consider the arrangement for the children, treating the childs welfare as paramount but having particular regard for the childs wishes, the parties’ conduct in relation to the childs upbringing, the general principle that the childs welfare will be best served by having regular contact with these with parental responsibility and his family and maintaining as good a relationship with his parents as possible, and any risk to the child attributable to the arrangements for his care.” The ‘welfare principle’ has been extracted by the learned Authors from the judgment of Lord Mac Dermott in In re. F (minors). The relevant portion at page 722 of the same book reads thus: “… Lord Mac Dermott stated that paramountly of welfare means: “more than that the childs welfare is to be treated as the top item in a list of items relevant to the matter in question. The words cannot a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, relationships claims and wishes of parents, risks choices and other circumstances are taken into account and weighed the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the childs welfare as that term is now understood…. It is the paramount consideration because it rules upon or determines the course to be followed. Little down, the Learned Authors have said thus: “Applying the welfare test requires an individual assessment in each case. Consequently, Precedent has little value, except perhaps to indicate the approaches which currently find favour with the judiciary. It is the paramount consideration because it rules upon or determines the course to be followed. Little down, the Learned Authors have said thus: “Applying the welfare test requires an individual assessment in each case. Consequently, Precedent has little value, except perhaps to indicate the approaches which currently find favour with the judiciary. In the past, considerable emphasis was given to a number of “rules of thumb” which, although potentially conflicting, could be used to predict or justify the outcome of a case. Thus in disputes between parents, young children and girls were generally placed with their mothers while older boys went to their fathers. Unless there were special circumstances it was thought advisable to place siblings together. These decisions were essentially arbitrary but based on a commonsense rough and ready approach to the notion of welfare.However, the lack of any precise meaning to the notion of welfare enabled judges (and social workers) to use it to justify their own subjective decisions.”. [Italics supplied] At page 724 of the same book, the learned Authors have said thus, while considering the ‘attachment theory’: “Attachment theory suggests that for healthy psychological (and physical) development a child needs to have a close relationship with a limited number of adults who will relate closely to him or her, preferably in a warm and nurturing way. Bowl by, whose original work was done with institutionalised children, stressed the value of a single mother figure, but Rutter has shown that children can relate to more than one such figure and that gender is not important. Children become attached to these “psychological parents”; separation from them produces anxiety and prolonged separation leads to depression and disturbed behaviour. Younger children may regress, losing skills they had already mastered; older children may, become aggressive or withdrawn. Attachment can occur at any age although it develops more quickly with young children. Children who do not become attached, or whose attachments are disrupted, may successfully be attached to others but adoption does not necessarily provides a better outcome for abused children. Attachment is not the sole determinant; children may become attached to dangerous or disturbed parent figures and may also be attached to both or neither of the parties involved in a dispute.”. [Italics supplied] At page 726, it is further said thus: “Issues of identity and attachment are interlinked. Attachment is not the sole determinant; children may become attached to dangerous or disturbed parent figures and may also be attached to both or neither of the parties involved in a dispute.”. [Italics supplied] At page 726, it is further said thus: “Issues of identity and attachment are interlinked. A child with a poor sense of identity may not be able to make attachments, attachment may also affect the identity which develops. The identity of children of mixed parentage has been seen to be distinct reflecting elements from each parent and culture and children placed transracially may not identify with either community. Identity and attachment theories may lead to conflicting responses to maintaining links for children living away from their birth family. Ending contact is thought to increase security, but if contract is terminated or a “closed” adoption arranged this may have a damaging effect on the childs identity. While research studies cannot be taken as indicating how cases should be determined, they do shed some light on the welfare of children after divorce childrens adjustment following divorce was found to be poorer than that of their poors and to differ according to their age and sex. Children under five and nine years, appeared to experience most difficulties, but key factors in reducing problems are the regularity (not necessarily the frequency) of contact with the other parent and a low level of conflict between parents. It has been suggested that a bad father is more detrimental for a boy than no father. Most of the children studied have been in the care of their mothers but the studies of fathers do not appear to indicate any marked difference.” (Italics supplied) At page 728, the learned Authors apply the ‘welfare principle’ and say that it has also certain loopholes and it is not fool proof in the welfare and upbringing of the child. Learned Authors have further said thus (at page 730):- “Despite this criticism the welfare principles is widely supported because it represents an important social and moral value, that children who are necessarily vulnerable and dependent must be protected from harm and given every opportunity to become healthy and well adjusted adults. Any change in the criteria could put childrens welfare at risk because it would inevitably reduce the emphasis given to welfare. Alternative rules may be no less indeterminate. Any change in the criteria could put childrens welfare at risk because it would inevitably reduce the emphasis given to welfare. Alternative rules may be no less indeterminate. However, Goldstein, Freud and Splnit, while supporting the welfare principle, have suggested that the phraseology be changed to “the least detrimental alternative ” to remind decision-makers that they can only do their humble best.”. [Italics supplied] At page 731, the learned Authors have said as to how the ‘welfare principle’ could be further improved, by giving various suggestions. Our court has also taken the same view in various decisions. While considering the question of custody of child, neither of the parents has absolute right of custody, Everything depends upon the welfare of the child, and even the statutory right of guardianship is subordinate to the ‘welfare priniciple’. 13. Taking into consideration the above legal principles, we have to consider whether the impugned order warrants interference by this court. Here, the court cannot simply remain silent as to the effect of the proviso to Sec.6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The proviso deals with only custody and not guardianship. The guardianship is with the father. But, regarding the custody of a tender child, it shall ordinarily he with the mother. That presumption which has been statutorily recognised, has to be rebutted by the petitioner by positive evidence. The only disqualification alleged as against the preferential claim of the mother in this case is, that she is mentally deranged. The very allegation has been summarily rejected by the Family Court in view of the conduct of the petitioner himself. Petitioner filed the divorce petition against his wife, without seeking the appointment of a guardian. Summons have been served on her. She is represented by Counsel. She has also filed a counter-affidavit not only to the main Divorce petition, but has also filed an affidavit in support of her application for getting custody of the child. She was allowed to be cross-examined by the Family Court. She has been cross-examined by the petitioners counsel in detail. These circumstances prima facie show that the allegation of the petitioner herein that the respondent (wife) is mentally deranged is only an allegation for the sake of allegation, without any basis. Apart from the same, the Family Court had also occasion to directly deal with both the petitioner and respondent. She has been cross-examined by the petitioners counsel in detail. These circumstances prima facie show that the allegation of the petitioner herein that the respondent (wife) is mentally deranged is only an allegation for the sake of allegation, without any basis. Apart from the same, the Family Court had also occasion to directly deal with both the petitioner and respondent. I also talked to both of them personally in my chambers. Thereafter, I talked to the parents of the wife as well as the father of the petitioner personally, on 8.12.1997. The wife and husband also talked to each other in my presence on certain matters which I put them questions. From her behaviour, I do not find any abnormality as alleged by the husband. Except that she is a rustic woman coming from a village, prima facie I do not find anything to say that she is disqualified from having the custody of the child, which is of tender age. From her talk, it could be seen that one of the grievances she expressed even in the presence of her husband is that right from the date of marriage, the husband and her in-laws will call her in the presence of all as an idiot, and she is not given the respect which she deserves. The accusation of mental derangement is mentioned in the Divorce petition. The husband repeated the same allegation before me also. He accused her as a person who does not know to differentiate between right and wrong. As I said already, I do not want to go into the merits of the main case. But when we are considering the interim custody of the child, statutory presumption, preferential right as recognised in regard to children of tender years, and the right of the mother to have custody of the child, have to be recognised. The child was very much affectionate towards its mother, and it was visible throughout when the child was in court and also when they came to my chambers. I find that the childs custody with the mother during this tender age will be more protective, than with the father. 14. The allegation of the petitioner that the child was entrusted to his custody by his mother-in-law and sister-in-law, is specifically denied in the counter. The best evidence would have been that of the petitioner. himself. I find that the childs custody with the mother during this tender age will be more protective, than with the father. 14. The allegation of the petitioner that the child was entrusted to his custody by his mother-in-law and sister-in-law, is specifically denied in the counter. The best evidence would have been that of the petitioner. himself. But for reasons better known to him, he did not think of getting himself examined to prove his contention that the child was entrusted to him by his mother-in-law and sister-in-law. If that was proved or attempted to be proved, there would have been some meaning in rebutting the presumption. No evidence was adduced to prove the same. One of the reasons mentioned in the petition for getting the custody of the child is, that the child is even now breastfed, and the child of such a tender age was removed from the mothers custody. The Family Court has also found the averment to be true. Learned counsel for petitioner argued that now that few months have lapsed, that reason cannot now stand. The argument is only to be rejected, and the same does not require any consideration by court. 15. A child of tender age is better protected only if it is with the mother, than the father. It is not the feeding alone that has to be considered. In this connection we have to take into account what the Family Court has said in paragraph 8 of to its order:- “… The mothers claim that the child was breastfed had not been challenged by the respondent during his cross-examination of P.W.1.” Considering the tender age of the child, and also taking into consideration the paramount welfare of the child, I feel that the order of the Family Court has to be confirmed. 16. The mother is not earning. She has no independent source of income. A Hindu marriage is sacrament and not a contract. At the time of marriage, the husband assures that he will protect his wife and children and it is lifelong. The father, though he is not having the custody of the child, is bound to maintain it. I, therefore, direct the petitioner herein to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs.750 to the child. 17. At the time of marriage, the husband assures that he will protect his wife and children and it is lifelong. The father, though he is not having the custody of the child, is bound to maintain it. I, therefore, direct the petitioner herein to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs.750 to the child. 17. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, (1997)9 Supreme Today 220it was held thus: “…Orders relating to custody of children are by their nature not final, but are interlocutory in nature and subject to modification at any future time upon proof of change of circumstances requiring change of custody but such change in custody must be proved to be in the paramount interests of the child.” 18. Learned counsel for petitioner (husband) also relied on the following decisions: Lonand Gram Panchayat v. Ramgiri , A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 222; Mohini and C.S.Reddy v. Yamuna C.S.Reddy v. Yamuna C.S.Reddy v. Yamuna , A.I.R. 1975 Karn. 134. In all these decisions, the court has only reiterated the principle that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and not the right of the parent to have custody. As was held by the learned Authors in ‘Principles of Family Law’ (referred to supra), ‘precedent has little value’. Each case has to be decided taking into consideration the paramount welfare of the child. Individual assessment is required. Therefore, how the decision cited differ from the case on hand is not a matter of importance. Hence, they are not separately discussed. 19. As per the interim direction, the mother was entrusted the custody of the child, on 8.12.1997. I direct the custody of the child to be with her. The civil revision petition is dismissed with a further direction to the petitioner (husband) to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs.750 to the child. The amount shall be paid on or before the 5th of every month, either directly to the wife (respondent herein), or the same may be sent by money order, or by any feasible means. But the payment should be made within the stipulated time. 20. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that if the court confirms the order of the Family Court regarding the custody of the child, the petitioner may be given an opportunity to see the child at certain intervals. But the payment should be made within the stipulated time. 20. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that if the court confirms the order of the Family Court regarding the custody of the child, the petitioner may be given an opportunity to see the child at certain intervals. Even though one or two suggestions were made, both parties were not in a position to come to a meeting point. According to me, It is better to leave that question to be decided by the Family Court itself. If the petitioner (husband) moves an application before that court for that purpose. 21. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed with directions as indicated above. No costs. C.M.P.No.16000 of 1997 is also dismissed consequently.