Judgment Banerjee, J. These three writ applications have been assigned to this Division Bench by the learned Chief Justice for disposal. A common question of law is involved in all these writ applications. In all these writ applications, the vires of Rule 65(12)(vii) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Rules have been challenged on several grounds. 2. The facts of this case briefly for the purpose of deciding this question are as follows:- The petitioners are all co-operative societies duly registered in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, (referred to as the 'said Act'), and the rules framed thereunder (referred to as the 'said rules'). The petitioners are all Primary Co-operative Agricultural Credit Societies within the meaning of Section 2(35) of the said Act. The object of the said societies, inter alia, for creation of fund for lending short-term as well as mid-term crop loan and other agricultural inputs to its members. 3. These Primary Co-operative Agricultural Credit Societies had to take loan from Central Co-operative Banks within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the said Act, and also within the meaning of National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development, 1981. The said banks carry on their business of banking as provided in Section 6 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The said banks carryon banking business in the co-operative sector and the primary object of the said bank is to provide short-term and medium-term loans and advances to the members of the Primary Co-operative Agricultural Credit Societies and others. 4. For each Co-operative Society, besides other employees there is a Manager who is really paid chief staff of such society. The salaries of such Manager, however, are paid by the Common Cadre Authority, in other words, the Central Co-operative Bank within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the said Act and also within the meaning of National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, 1981. In one such case, Vidyasagar Central Co-operative Bank is the common cadre authority. Section 37 of the said Act authorises the said Bank to constitute cadre of service of Managers, Assistant Managers and other Co-operative Societies or class thereof Under Rule 64, read with Rule 65 of the said rules, the State Government had constituted a common cadre at the level of Vidyasagar Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., known as Vidyasagar Central Co-operative Bank Common Cadre Authority as aforesaid. The qualification and experience etc. has been laid down in this behalf for the purpose of appointment of Managers by the notification dated December 14, 1981. 5. Rule 65 of the laid rules provides for the details about the Constitution of the cadre authority, its powers and functions in this behalf. Rule 65(12)(vii) of the said rules provides for compulsory imposition of contribution to the fund of the common cadre authority @ Re.1/- per centum of the total short-term advance received from the Central Co-operative Bank, and also by the said rule the method and manner of realisation of such levy or imposition have been laid down by which such levy payable by the Primary Agricultural Co-operative Authority should be deducted by the Central Co-operative Bank and forwarded to the Common Cadre Authority. The vires of Rule 65(12) (vii) is a subject-matter of challenge in all these writ applications. 6. The provisions of Section 37 of the said Act reads as follows :- "The State Government may constitute one or more cadres of services of Managers, Assistant Managers and other employees for all co-operative societies or a class of co-operative societies an such terms and conditions and in such manner as may be prescribed." 7. Rule 65(12)(vii)(e) of the said rules reads as follows:- "Every primary agricultural co-operative credit society affiliated to a Central Co-operative Bank or unit of the West Bengal State Co-operative Bank or adopted by a Commercial Bank and having a Manager shall contribute to the fund of the respective Cadre Authority at the rate of one per centum of total annual short-term advances received from the said banks and the amount shall be realised by the concerned financing bank within fifteen days from the date of issue of such loan and credited to the fund of the concerned Cadre Authority......." 8. Mr. Anupam Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted in the first place that no levy of any tax or fee would be made by the levy making authority. Secondly, it was submitted that Rule 65(12)(vii) of the laid rules is ultra vires the provision of this Act, inasmuch as in the Act, there is no provision for imposition of a levy or fee or contribution upon the petitioners/Co-operative Societies. As such, the said rule is ultra vires the provisions of the Act. 9. On fact, it was submitted by Mr. As such, the said rule is ultra vires the provisions of the Act. 9. On fact, it was submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that although a paltry sum of Rs.3,000/- is paid on account of the salary of the Managers of such societies, by virtue of the said levy, the said Co-operative Societies have to pay compulsorily the sum ranging from Rs.5,000/- to Rs.12,000/- per year and the quantum of realisation by such compulsory levy was wholly disproportionate to the service rendered to such society by such Manager and lastly, it was submitted that there was no nexus or connection between the levy and the payment required to be made by such Managers, inasmuch as more the loan taken by such Co-operative Societies, more the amount of levy has to he paid and in case where no loan is obtained, there will be no levy or contribution under the said rules. Accordingly, there was no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by such levy under the provisions of Rule 65(12)(vii) of the said rules. 10. Further, it is submitted that such rule laying down such levy of fees and fees and contributions are beyond the competency of the State Legislature. 11. It is well-settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in the case of (1) Krishnadas v. Town Area Committee, 1990 (3) SCC 645 : 183 LTR 401, held that a fee is paid for performing a function. A fee is not ordinarily considered to be a tax. If the fee is merely to compensate an authority for service rendered, it can hardly be called a tax. If the object of the fee is to provide general revenue of the authority rather than to compensate it, and the amount of fee has no relation to the value of the service, the fee will amount to a tax. Thus the fee is a payment levied by an authority in respect of the services performed by it for the benefit of payer, while a tax is payable for the common benefits conferred by the authority on all taxpayers. A fee is a payment made for some special benefit as enjoyed by the payer and the payment is proportionate to such benefit and the money raised by fee is appropriated for the performance of the services and does not merge in the general revenue. A fee is a payment made for some special benefit as enjoyed by the payer and the payment is proportionate to such benefit and the money raised by fee is appropriated for the performance of the services and does not merge in the general revenue. Where it appears that under the guise of levying fee the authority is attempting to impose a tax, the Court has to scrutinise the claim to find out whether there is a real co-relationship between the service and the levy, whether it is so co-extensive as to be a pretence of a fee but in reality a tax and whether a substantial portion of the fee collected is spent in rendering service. 12. In (2) Kishanlal Laxmichand v. State of Haryana, 1993 (4) Supp SCC 461, it was held that the distinction between the tax and fee is primarily in the fact that the tax is levied as a part of a common burden while fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary purpose of regulation in public interest. A levy in the nature of fee does not cease to be that character merely because there is the element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor it is a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation with the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual nor that each should obtain the benefit of the service. 13. The Supreme Court, in the case of (3) Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. L.T. Swamiar reported in AIR 1954 SC 282 , held that a fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay. These are undoubtedly some of the general characteristics, but as there may be various kinds of fees, it is not possible to formulate a definition that would be applicable to all cases. 14. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay. These are undoubtedly some of the general characteristics, but as there may be various kinds of fees, it is not possible to formulate a definition that would be applicable to all cases. 14. Further, at Paragraph 45, the distinction between a tax and a fee was considered and it was held that such distinction lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. Fees confer a capacity although the special advantage as for example in the case of registration fees for documents or marriage licences, is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some special benefit which the individual receives. It is the special benefit accruing to the individual which is the reason for payment in the case of fees; in the case of a tax, the particular advantage if it exists at all is an incidental result of State action. 15. As fee is a sort of return or consideration for service rendered, it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should, on the face of the legislative provision, be correlated to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services. If the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated specifically for the performance of such work and is not merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general public, it could be counted as fees and not a tax. There is really no generic difference between the tax and fees and the taxing power of a State may manifest itself in three different forma known respectively as special assessments fees and taxes. 16. It is to determine whether a levy is a fee or a tax, has been considered by the Supreme Court in (4) Om Prakash Agarwal v. Giri Raj Kishori reported in 1986 (1) SCC 722 . 16. It is to determine whether a levy is a fee or a tax, has been considered by the Supreme Court in (4) Om Prakash Agarwal v. Giri Raj Kishori reported in 1986 (1) SCC 722 . In that case, it was held that the levy of cess under the Act is not a fee but it is a tax not leviable by it as it does not fail under any of the Entries in List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution under which the Legislature call levy a tax. In that case, levy of cess under Section 3 of the Haryana Rural Development Fund Act, 1983, was considered and held that levy of cess under that section was in the nature of tax and not fees and quid pro quo was absent. It was held that the primary meaning of taxation is raising money for purposes of Government by means of contributions from individual persons, a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes enforceable at law and not a payment for services rendered. A tax has three principal characteristics: (i) It is imposed under statutory power without the texpayer's consent and the payment is enforced by law; (ii) It is an imposition made for public purposes without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax; and (iii) It is a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon the taxpayer depending generally upon the capacity of the taxpayer to pay. 17. Accordingly, it is well-settled principle that a tax in the compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and not a payment for services rendered. 18. In the instant case, it is not a tax, as such a levy or contribution is not a tax. The question is whether it can be termed as a fee or something other than fee, if it is held to be a fee, in that event it must be such levy and must be commensurate with the services rendered or the principle of quid pro quo should be present. The question is whether it can be termed as a fee or something other than fee, if it is held to be a fee, in that event it must be such levy and must be commensurate with the services rendered or the principle of quid pro quo should be present. 19 the Supreme Court, in the case of (5) P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1989 SC 100 , held that if the character of the 'fee' is established, the vagaries in its distribution among the class do not detract from the concept of the 'fee'. That was a case considered in connection with the levy of Court fees under the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961, and it was held that the Court fees under the said Act was not discriminatory on the ground that it is imposed on ad valorem basis. 20. There are five main grounds on which the bye-laws may be treated as ultra vires:- (a) That they are not made, sanctioned and published in the manner prescribed by the statute which authorises the making of them; (b) That they are repugnant to the laws of England; (c) That they are repugnant to the statute under which they are made; (d) That they are uncertain; (e) That they are unreasonable. 21. Applying the said test, it cannot be said that the said rule is valid as it is repugnant to the statute under which it was made and the same is also unreasonable. 22. Item No. 32 of List-II-State List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, provides power upon the State Legislature to make law relating to incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations other than those specified in List-I and Universities, unincorporated trading, literacy, scientific, religious and other societies and Associations, Co-operative Societies, and under Item No. 66 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution provides power to impose fees in respect of matters in the State List. 13. Accordingly, the State Legislature was competent to impose any fee in connection with the Co-operative Societies. But, in the instant case, there is no provision for imposition of any fee upon any Co-operative Society in rendering any service. Under Rule 65(12)(vii), a compulsory levy is imposed @ 1 per centum on the loan obtained by the Co-operative Societies. 13. Accordingly, the State Legislature was competent to impose any fee in connection with the Co-operative Societies. But, in the instant case, there is no provision for imposition of any fee upon any Co-operative Society in rendering any service. Under Rule 65(12)(vii), a compulsory levy is imposed @ 1 per centum on the loan obtained by the Co-operative Societies. Accordingly, when the Co-operative Society takes a huge loan, it will increase pro rata. But service given by the Manager is uniform in nature in all the Co-operative Societies and the expenses for maintaining a Manager is Rs.3,00/- per year, irrespective of the contribution made or to be made. The question in this case is whether in the absence of any provision in the Act, such a levy @ 1 per centum on the loan obtained from the Bank is valid and/or ultra vires and whether the levy of tax or fees could be made by a rule-making authority. 24. The Supreme Court, in the case of (6) Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported 18 AIR 1971 SC 517 , held that no tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. The basil of the statutory power conferred by the statute cannot be transgressed by the rule-making authority. A rule-making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it. 25. The doctrine of ultra vires is regarded as one of the most important features in the administrative law jurisprudence. When power vested in any public authority or body is exceeded or act done in excess of power and which is not incidental or ancillary to such power are clearly invalid and ultra vires. The essence of the doctrine of ultra vires is that a person or a body acting under the statutory power can only do those things the statute authorises him to do so and anything beyond the power conferred in this behalf would be without jurisdiction and consequently the same would be ultra vires. 16. The essence of the doctrine of ultra vires is that a person or a body acting under the statutory power can only do those things the statute authorises him to do so and anything beyond the power conferred in this behalf would be without jurisdiction and consequently the same would be ultra vires. 16. In (7) A.G. v. Great Eastern Railway Company, (1880) 5 AC 473 at 481, Lord Blackburn said, "Where there is an Act of Parliament creating a Corporation for a particular purpose and giving it powers for that particular purpose, what it does not expressly or impliedly authorise, has to be taken to be prohibited". 27. In (8) State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath reported in AIR 1983 SC 550 , it was held by the Supreme Court that conferment or the rule making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act which is inconsistent therewith or impertinent thereto and in such a case, the rule or the bye-law would be held to be ultra vires. 28. Similarly, in (9) A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1986 SC 2160 , the Supreme Court held that the rules framed under a statute cannot go against the provisions of the statute on the basis of the principles of ultra vires. 29. The similar question that has been raised here, came up for consideration before a Division Bench or the Bombay High Court in the case of (10) Maharashtra State Co-operative Land Development Bark Limited v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1982 Bombay 199. Under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 a fund established by State Level Caderisation Committee and demand for contribution from notified society whether valid or not, were considered. Under Section 69A of the Maharashtra Act, certain categories of primary societies were specified and provided for establishment of a cadre and recruitment thereof by the notified central societies. Subsection (2) of Section 69A of that Act authorised the central society to depute such recruited personnel with the society specified in subsection (1) and the said societies were required to take them over. Their emoluments, however, are liable to be paid from the fund. Subsection (3) thereof provided for establishment of a 'fund' by an apex plan to be so notified to be utilized for maintenance of the cadre. Their emoluments, however, are liable to be paid from the fund. Subsection (3) thereof provided for establishment of a 'fund' by an apex plan to be so notified to be utilized for maintenance of the cadre. In that connection, it was observed that the benefit apart from being too indirect is too remote and far-fetched and cannot furnish basis for levying any fees and make the petitioner/society liable to contributions. On the basis of the materials placed before the Court, no other conclusion was possible. The case before the Bombay High Court was that a certain levy was made under the provisions of the Act, and in that connection, it was held that the benefit was too indirect and too remote and far-fetched and could not furnish basis for levy for any fees and further it was held that the fixation of the quantum of the contribution towards the fund was arbitrary, irrational and unusual. 30. In the instant case, on consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act, it is clearly evident that there is no enabling provision in the Act which authorised the State Government to levy any fee or contribution, and it is well-settled principle by the various decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned above that in the absence of any provision in the Act, the rule-making authority had no authority and/or jurisdiction to impose any tax or fees and/or levy any contribution. Any rule de hors of the statute is ultra vires. 31. Accordingly, we are clearly of the view that in the absence of any statutory provision in this regard, the said Rule 65(12)(vii) is clearly ultra vires the provisions of the Act and it is not said to be incidental or the ancillary provision. In order to bring it within the scope of incidental rule, it must be established that there are some powers in this regard and if the power is there, in that event whatever be regarded as incidental and ancillary to exercise such powers, those powers should be deemed to be implied. In the instant case the rule-making authority had no jurisdiction to promulgate Rule 65(12)(vii). The rule is clearly ultra vires the Act and further it is highly disproportionate to the service rendered by the appointment of Manager. This is not so as far as the Co-operative Societies are concerned. In the instant case the rule-making authority had no jurisdiction to promulgate Rule 65(12)(vii). The rule is clearly ultra vires the Act and further it is highly disproportionate to the service rendered by the appointment of Manager. This is not so as far as the Co-operative Societies are concerned. But, in the instant case, the loan is ultimately taken by the farmers and the loan is for the farmers and for the benefit of the farmers and so far as the lonee farmers are concerned they cannot be saddled with the liability to bear the expenses of a Manager and for that purpose to make to contribute one per centum of the loan claimed by them. From that point of view, the benefit that is sought to be given was too indirect and was too remote and far-fetched and cannot furnish any rational basis for levying such fees or contribution. 32 We are clearly of the view that the rule-making authority had no power to impose one per centum levy on quantum of loan when there is no express provision in any act authorising such imposition. Fees could be levied on Co-operative Societies under Entry 66 of the State List in respect of the Co-operative Societies. But in the instant case the levy has been made in a manner which is wholly unauthorised by the law. Accordingly, the Rule 65(12)(vii) is declared ultra vires the provisions of West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Dutta, J.: I agree.