M. Ramakrishna, C.J.— The appellants 1 to 5 were petitioners in Civil Rule No.2 of 1996 before this Court at Aizawl Bench challenging the correctness and legality of the orders of termination terminating these petitioners from service by the Govt of Mizoram for the grounds taken in the petition. However, the learned Single Judge, after hearing learned counsel on both sides, by an order made on 10th September, 1996, dismissed the writ petition with the following observations : "The creation of post is upto the discretion of the Govt. Post may be created only when the Govt finds it necessary. In this case no direction can be given to the Govt. The petitioners may approach/apply to the concerned office/department when the vacancy arises, and after receipt of their application their cases maybe considered by the department and they may be appointed if they are found fit and eligible. With this observation, this petition is rejected." 2. Aggrieved by this order of the learned Single Judge, the petitioners/ appellants have presented this appeal challenging the order of the learned Single Judge for the grounds taken in the appeal. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Advocate General, Mizoram appearing for the respondents. 4. At the outset the learned counsel for the appellants, having taken us through the grounds of appeal and the order of the learned Single Judge under appeal, urged that: (1) In spite of specific grounds taken in the writ petition and urged at the time of the argument, referring to the provisions of Articles 14 and 311 of the Constitution of India as to the legality of the orders of termination, the learned Single Judge failed to record appropriate findings on these legal contentions. (2) The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the orders of termination have been contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. (3) Some of the juniors of the petitioners having been allowed to remain in the office, indeed, one of them has been promoted to the higher cadre of Upper Division Clerk, it would not be proper on the part of the respondent State to have passed the order of termination, which is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. (3) Some of the juniors of the petitioners having been allowed to remain in the office, indeed, one of them has been promoted to the higher cadre of Upper Division Clerk, it would not be proper on the part of the respondent State to have passed the order of termination, which is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously argued that the learned Single Judge having failed to consider any one of these legal contentions, rejected the writ petition and that this is a fit case for allowing the appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, Mizoram State, however, argued that for want of adequate number of posts at the relevant point of time, the State of Mizoram had to take the inevitable action of retrenchment "resulting in termination of these petitioners. However, he submits that as on today these petitioners have been found to be" working as Muster Roll Lower Division Clerks, which may be taken into consideration by this Court. 7. An order passed by the Joint Director, Local Administrative Department, Govt of Mizoram, Aizawl on 26th May, 1997 is produced. It is stated therein that these appellants 1 to 5 are still engaged in the office of the Local Administration Department, Govt of Mizoram as Muster Roll LDC. 8. Considering the nature of the employment of the appellants, their continued service in the office on temporary basis and also the protection guaranteed to a citizen under Article 41 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with this question in Jacob M. Puthuparambil & others vs. Kerala Water Authority & others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 2228 . In this case referring to the provision of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, (1958), and Article 309 and 41 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court laid down-the following law : "But once the appointment continued for long, the services had to be regularised if the incumbent possessed the requisite, qualifications as was done by sub-rule (e). Employees who have been working on the establishment since long, and who possess the requisite qualifications for the job as obtaining on the date of their employment must be allowed to continue on their job and their services should be regularised. Employees who have been working on the establishment since long, and who possess the requisite qualifications for the job as obtaining on the date of their employment must be allowed to continue on their job and their services should be regularised. It is unfair and unreasonable to remove people who have been rendering service since sometime as such removal has serious consequences. ... ... Such behaviour would be an affront to the concept of job security and Would run counter to the constitutional philosophy, particularly the concept of right to work in Article 41 of the Constitution...." 9. In Ajit Singh & others vs. State of Punjab & another, AIR 1983 SC 494 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with a similar question. Referring to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that: "To capitulate these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Board of Trustees was dissolved, the Trusts without the name of Trust continued, the staff excluding the 11 Trust Executive Officers was retained, and in place of the officers whose services were dispensed with, some other officers were asked to take over their functions and duties, and within a short time, the Trusts were formally constituted. The only effect sought to be achieved by the bizarre exercise of first acquiring power to dissolve the Trusts and then ordering their dissolution was to dispense with service of only 11 Trust Executive Officers of 1979 recruitment. And having achieved the desired result the Trusts have been reconstituted albeit without showing the fairness of recalling the discharged 11 Trust Executive Officers. Therefore, without imputing any motive, the conclusion is inescapable that the action was thoroughly arbitrary and violative of the guarantee of equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 16 read with Article 14 of the Constitution and such thoroughly arbitrary action cannot be sustained, and deserves to be quashed." 10. In Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1854 , a Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court dealing with the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1949 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India held as follows : "It is well recognised that the Govt may have to employ temporary servants to satisfy the needs of a particular contingency and such employment would be perfectly legitimate. There can also be no doubt, if such a class of temporary servants could be recruited that there would be nothing discriminatory or violative of equal opportunity if the conditions of service of such servants are different in some respects from those of permanent employees. There is no denial of equal opportunity if out of the class of temporary employees some are made quasi permanent depending on length of service and their suitability in all other respects for permanent employment eventually and thus assimilated to permanent employees. The rule which applies to one class of Govt servants in the matter of termination but does not apply to the other two classes cannot be said to violate equality of opportunity provided in Article 16. The classification of Govt servants into these classes is reasonable and differences in the matter of termination of service between these classes cannot be said to be discriminatory in the circumstances. In particular the very fact that the service of Govt servant is purely temporary makes him a class apart from those in permanent service and such Govt servant cannot necessarily claim all the advantages which a permanent servant has in the matter of security of service. Considering the nature of the employment of a temporary Govt servant, a provision like that in Rule 5 in respect of termination of service is a reasonable provisions which cannot be said to deny equality of opportunity provided in Article 16." 11. However, it is further held as follows: "A question of discrimination may arise in a case of retrenchment on account of abolition of one of several temporary posts of the same kind in one office but can in our opinion never arise in the case of dispensing with the services of a particular temporary employee on account of his conduct being unsatisfactory." ... ... "It is well settled that temporary servants are also entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2) in the same manner as permanent Govt servants, if the Govt takes action against them by meting out one of the three punishments, i.e., dismissal, removal or reduction in rank... But this protection is only available where discharge removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise." ...... But this protection is only available where discharge removal or reduction in rank is sought to be inflicted by way of punishment and not otherwise." ...... "But even where it is intended to take action by way of punishment what usually happens is that something in the nature of what maybe called a preliminary enquiry is first held in connection with the alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work." 12. In the instant case, no action whatever has been taken under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India by the State Govt against the appellants. Therefore the question arises whether it is right on the part of the State Govt to retain the services of some of the juniors over the seniors and to give promotions to them and at the same time action is taken to terminate the services of the senior persons. This is contrary to Article 16 and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court that first come first served. 13. Since the respondents have not followed all these principles in passing the orders of termination, we are clearly of the view that these orders of termination cannot be sustained. They are liable to be quashed. 14. However, as on today learned counsel for the State of Mizoram submits that all these appellants have been working as Muster Roll workers and a certificate is produced to that effect, we are of the opinion that there is no need to quash these orders; but, we will issue the following directions : (1) In view of the foregoing, a direction shall issue to the respondents that without disturbing the services of these appellants, they shall continue to work as temporary Govt servants subject to the condition of receiving daily wages. (2) Since the appellants have already been serving for the last about six years, action will be taken by the State Govt to regularise their services in accordance with the rules made applicable to Mizoram State and by applying these rules, if these persons are found fit and suitable for such employment, action will be taken to absorb them in their services on regular basis. 15. We earnestly hope that the State Govt of Mizoram will take action to comply with the directions. 16. With these directions, the appeal stads allowed.