A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from Jail preferred by Sharat Adha (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused' ). He calls in question legality of order of conviction recorded under S. 302, Indian Penal Code, 1960 (for short the 'i. P. C. ') and sentence of imprisonment for life as awarded, by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case, as unfolded during trial is as follows :on 30-9-1990, Maheswar Naik (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') went to house of the accused to ask him to repay the amount he had borrowed. At about 5 p. m. while Akhila Naik (P. W. 1) the informant was returning from the field, he came to the place of occurrence hearing shouts and saw the accused dealing a blow on the head near the left ear by means of a bamboo stick. As a result of such assault deceased fell down. Accused gave some more blows with the saidstick. At that time, informants' brother came there and on being informed about the assault, he called his mother. Akhila Naik (P. W. 1) requested some villagers to help them to take the injured to his house. He was made to lie on a cot. A little later, the deceased breathed his last. Informant accompanied by Mukteswar Kale came to the Deogarh Police-station and reported the occurrence, which was reduced into writing. Investigation was undertaken on the basis of report submitted by the informant. Certain articles including the weapon of offence (M. O. 1) were seized. M. O. 1 was seized on the basis of information furnished by the accused while in custody. Charge-sheet was submitted. During trial, accused pleaded innocence. ( 3 ) IN order to bring home the accusations, ten witnesses were examined, P. Ws. 1, 6 and 7 claimed to be the eye-witnesses. P. W. 6 is wife of the deceased. Accepting the prosecution version and placing reliance of P. Ws. 1, 6 and 7, learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. Though P. Ws. 6 and 7 were aged about 13 years and 6 years respectively, reliance was placed on their evidence. ( 4 ) IN support of the appeals it was submitted that the witnesses were partisan, and in any event, P. Ws. 6 and 7 are child witnesses and their versions should not have been accepted. Though P. Ws. 6 and 7 were aged about 13 years and 6 years respectively, reliance was placed on their evidence. ( 4 ) IN support of the appeals it was submitted that the witnesses were partisan, and in any event, P. Ws. 6 and 7 are child witnesses and their versions should not have been accepted. Alternatively, it is submitted that a case under S. 302, I. P. C. has not been made out. Learned counsel for the State supported the order. ( 5 ) THERE is no probation that a relation is an unreliable witnesses. Normally, a relation would not shield the actual offender and falsely implicate an innocent person. Court, however, has to carefully weigh the evidence where partisan approach is pleaded. In the case at hand, there is no allegation of partisan or hostile approach. P. Ws. 1 and 6, have been cross-examined at length but no infirmity in their version has surfaced. Learned trial Judge is justified in placing reliance on their evidence. So far as P. W. 7 is concerned, she is a child witness who was aged about 6 years at the time of occurrence. From her evidence, it is clear that she had not seen assaults on the deceased. This is apparent from the fact that she had not spoken about the assaults to anybody. No explanation has been offered as to how she came to be examined by the Police and that too after considerable length of time. Though delayed examination in all cases cannot corrode credibility of prosecution case, if no explanation is offered, it is a circumstance to be considered. In any event. even if her evidence is kept out of consideration, in view of the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 6, the learned trial Judge was justified in finding accused guilty. ( 6 ) RESIDUAL question is whether conviction under S. 302, I. P. C. is proper. For judging that question, it has to be seen whether clause Thirdly of S. 300 has application. It has to be noted that for commission of offence of murder it is not necessary that the accused should have intention to cause death. ( 6 ) RESIDUAL question is whether conviction under S. 302, I. P. C. is proper. For judging that question, it has to be seen whether clause Thirdly of S. 300 has application. It has to be noted that for commission of offence of murder it is not necessary that the accused should have intention to cause death. If it is proved that the accused had the intention to inflict the injury actually suffered by the victim and such injury was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, ingredients of clause Thirdly of S. 300 are fulfilled and the accused is to be held guilty of murder punishable under S. 302, I. P. C. (see Bakhawar v. The State of Haryana) AIR 1979 SC 1006 : (1979 Cri LJ 883 ). The sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in the ordinary way of nature is the gist of the clause, irrespective of an intention to cause death. In order to bring an application of the clause the following has to be proved by the prosecution. (1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. (2) The nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. (3) It must he- proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and (4) it must be proved that the injury of the type described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under Clause Thirdly of S. 300. This position was illuminatively stated by the Apex Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : (1958 Cri LJ 818 ). ( 7 ) IN the background of the case, considering nature of weapon used and the place where the injuries were noticed by the Doctor, it cannot besaid that any particular injury which resulted in death was intended. ( 7 ) IN the background of the case, considering nature of weapon used and the place where the injuries were noticed by the Doctor, it cannot besaid that any particular injury which resulted in death was intended. Therefore, a case is not made out under Clause Thirdly of S. 300, I. P. C. , and consequently S. 302, I. P. C. has no application. Conviction would be proper under S. 304, Part II, I. P. C. Accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 (eight) years. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. ( 8 ) S. C. DATTA, J. , I agree. Order accordingly. .