JUDGMENT 1. :- The present revision application (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 570 of 1994) was filed by the defendant Sita Ram Agarwal impugning an order dated 20.1.1994 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) (West) Jaipur City, in Civil Suit No. 824 of 1993 whereby the application of defendant petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, stood dismissed. The plaintiff non-petitioners filed a suit for rent and ejectment against the defendant petitioner with the allegation that their late father let out a portion of the suit premises to the present defendant petitioner at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month, which was later on increased to Rs. 200/- per month. On 18.6.1965 their father executed a deed of gift in favour of the present plaintiffs. Since the defendant petitioner failed to pay rent from 1.8.1986 to 31.1.1987 and committed default in payment of rent, he was liable to ejectment. 2. In the written statement the defendant petitioner stated that the rent was only Rs. 80/- per month and the rent was paid to Fakhruddin, another brother of the present plaintiffs and as such he has not committed any default in payment of rent. It was further pleaded that the other sons of the original owner Daroga Nasiruddin not having been impladed as party to the suit, the suit was bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. The trial court by an order dated 9.9.1991 determined the arrears of rent payable to the landlords. However, the defendant petitioner who was financially in a distressed condition, could not deposit the determined rent within time. He deposited on 28.3.1992 Rs. 4720/-, and thereafter the rent from September, 1991 to 30.11.1991 amounting to .Rs. 240/- was deposited on 2.12.1991. The amount of rent from 1.12.1991 to February, 1992 amounting to Rs. 240/- was deposited on 21.2.1992 and rent from 1.6.1992 to 30.9.1992 amounting to Rs. 320/- was deposited on 29.7.1992. Thereafter, the rent for the month of October 1992 was deposited on 28.11.1992. On 9.11.1993 the defendant petitioner filed an application that due to shortage of money he could not pay the rent within time. He, therefore, prayed that the delay in depositing the rent might be condoned. The trial court by its order dated 20.1.1994 dismissed the application on the ground that the same was not filed within time. On 9.11.1993 the defendant petitioner filed an application that due to shortage of money he could not pay the rent within time. He, therefore, prayed that the delay in depositing the rent might be condoned. The trial court by its order dated 20.1.1994 dismissed the application on the ground that the same was not filed within time. The defendant petitioner thereafter filed the present revisional application contending, interalia, that the trial court acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in dismissing the application of the defendant petitioner for condonation of delay. It was further contended that the law does not provide that the application for condonation of delay is to be filed before the expiry of the period of limitation. An application for condonation of delay could always be filed after the expiry of the period of limitation. The defendant petitioner was not in a position to arrange the money within time and, therefore, he could not deposit the rent within time. His defence was also struck off on 2.3.1994 and the application for condonation of delay was filed on 9.11.1993 and it was dismissed on 20.1.1994. It was further contended that the entire quantum of rent was paid to the plaintiffs prior to the defence being struck off and the court should have condoned the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was further averred that the court below committed an error of law in not condoning the delay. It was asserted that it is a principle of law that no party should be penalised unless his negligence is so gross that it could not be cured. The petitioner could not deposit the rent for reasons which was beyond his control and in such circumstances, the trial court ought to have condoned the delay in filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was further averred that the petitioner is ready and willing to deposit all the further rents in the bank account of the plaintiff non-petitioners and an enabling order in this regard may be passed so as to safeguard the interest of petitioner. On the other hand, if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would occasion a miscarriage of justice since the defence of defendant petitioner has already been struck off on the ground that the rents were not deposited within time. 3. On the other hand, if the impugned order is allowed to stand, it would occasion a miscarriage of justice since the defence of defendant petitioner has already been struck off on the ground that the rents were not deposited within time. 3. The learned Single Judge before whom the matter came up for hearing, was of the view that a Full Bench of our Court in Vishandas v. Savitri Devi 1988(1) RLR 1 (F.B.)= AIR 1988 Rajasthan 198 , decided the question about applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of depositing rent under Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act of 1950 in the affirmative on the basis of judgment of this court in Gopal Dass & others v. Nathulal Baraya AIR 1983 Rajasthan 222 . In the said case the facts were that the plaintiff landlord filed a suit for eviction against the tenant, inter alia, on the ground of default. During the pendency of suit Section 13-A was amended by Rajasthan Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 with effect from 29.9.1975. This Ordinance was replaced by Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1975. Under Section 13-A(b) of the Act it was provided that in every such proceedings, the court shall, on the application of tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance, notwithstanding any order to the contrary, determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum and cost of the suit allowable to the landlord and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety days as may be fixed by the court and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceedings shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default. In that case the defendant tenant filed an application under Section 13-A(b) of the Act after the expiry of the period of thirty days along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that application was allowed by the trial court. In that case the defendant tenant filed an application under Section 13-A(b) of the Act after the expiry of the period of thirty days along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that application was allowed by the trial court. This order being challenged before the High Court in revision, this court held that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable in view of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is pertinent to note that Section 13-A(b) of the Act provided a period of thirty days for filing an application. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act applies only when an appeal or an application other than an application under Or.21 of the Civil Procedure Code is filed beyond the time prescribed for the same. For depositing the rent determined by the court or the monthly rent, neither any application is required to be filed nor any period is fixed for filing such an application. Under these circumstances, according to the learned Single Judge, no application for condonation of delay for depositing the rent determined or the monthly rent, was maintainable. His Lordship was of the view that this question as answered by the Full Bench about applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in matters of depositing of rent under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950, requires reconsideration by a Larger Bench. 4. It was further observed by the learned Single Judge that the other question that was answered by the Full Bench decision in Vishandas v. Savitri Devi (ibid) as to whether the court has any power in the interest of justice and equity to extend time beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act, it appears that the Full Bench decision in Vishandas v. Savitri Devi , answered the question in the affirmative on the basis of ratio of judgments of the Supreme Court passed in Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas AIR 1980 Supreme Court 587 , Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash & Others AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1664 , Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath & another AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1392 , Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari & another v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta AIR 1985 Supreme Court 964 , and M/s B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick & another AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1010 . According to the opinion of the learned Single Judge these judgments of the Supreme Court were based on different rent control statutes of various States. The provisions of these Acts are not similar to the provisions of the Act of 1950. In sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950, the Legislature has specifically mentioned that a court can extend the time for depositing the determined amount not beyond three and a half months and the monthly rent not beyond one month. Such language as is found in the Rajasthan Statute, has not been used in the statutes of other States. In Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde AIR 1978 Supreme Court 955 , the Supreme Court dealt with a matter under the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, and observed as follows "If there is statutory default or neglect on the part of the tenant, whatever may be its cause, the landlord acquires a right under Section 12(3) (a) to get a decree for eviction. But where the conditions of Section 12(3) (a) are not satisfied, there is a further opportunity given to the tenant to protect himself against eviction. He can comply with the conditions set out in Section 12(3)(b) and defeat the landlord's claim for eviction. If, however, he does not fulfil those conditions, he can not claim the protection of Section 12(3)(b) and in that event, there being no other protection available to him, a decree for eviction would have to go against him. It is difficult to see how by any judicial valour discretion exercisable in favour of the tenant can be found in Section 12(3)(b), even where the conditions laid down by it are satisfied, to be strictly confined within the limits prescribed for their operation." The learned Single Judge further opined that it was more or less a settled law that the Legislature does not use superfluous words in an enactment. In sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, the Legislature has prescribed a maximum period upto which the court can extend time for depositing the arrears determined by the court under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 and also the monthly rent. The language used in this statutory provision is clear and unambiguous. The court should interpret Sub-section (4) of Section 13 in a manner as was originally intended by the Legislature irrespective of the consequence. The language used in this statutory provision is clear and unambiguous. The court should interpret Sub-section (4) of Section 13 in a manner as was originally intended by the Legislature irrespective of the consequence. In this view of the matter, the said question about the court having any power in the interest of justice and equity to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act, should also be reconsidered. 5. The learned Single Judge further held that under the Transfer of Property Act, a landlord has unfettered right to get possession of his premises after terminating the tenancy by a valid notice. This right of the landlord has been restricted by the Act of 1950 for the limited purpose of protecting tenants from the misuse of landlords' power to evict the tenants in these days of acute scarcity of accommodations by asserting the landlords' superior rights in property or in a manner trying to exploit the landlords' position by extracting too high rents from helpless tenants. The object was not to deprive the landlords altogether of their rights in property which have also to be respected. The Act was not enacted solely for the benefit of tenants but also for the benefit of landlords. On account of the provisions of Sub-section (3), (4) and (5) of Section 13, the landlords get the arrears of rent soon after the same is determined by the court and deposited by tenants. They also get the monthly rent in time. In case the tenants make default in payment of rent, the landlords get right so as to strike off the defence of the tenants against delivery of possession. After the passing of the judgment of the Full Bench in Vishandas v. Savitri Devi (ibid), the Supreme Court in Mrs. They also get the monthly rent in time. In case the tenants make default in payment of rent, the landlords get right so as to strike off the defence of the tenants against delivery of possession. After the passing of the judgment of the Full Bench in Vishandas v. Savitri Devi (ibid), the Supreme Court in Mrs. Manju Choudhary & another v. Dulal Kumar Chandra AIR 1988 Supreme Court 602 , while interpreting Section 13 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Ordinance 1982, which is similar to Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950, observed, inter alia, as follows- "Therefore, there is a duty cast on the court to strike out the defence if there is a failure of the tenant to deposit arrears of rent within 15 days." In this case, the rent for the month of July, 1979 was to be deposited by 15.8.1979 and there was a delay of only five days, but still the defence of the defendant was struck off. According to the learned Single Judge, these aspects of the matter could not be considered by the Full Bench inasmuch as the landlords' counsel remained absent when the case was argued. Since all these questions were interlinked and of great importance and affected very many cases, considering the language of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Sub-section (3), (4) and (5) of Section 13 of the Act, and the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde (ibid) , and Mrs. Manju Choudhary v. Dulal Kumar Chandra (ibid) the question answered by the Full Bench requires a reconsideration. 6. By an order of the Acting Chief justice dated 13.2.1996 a Full Bench was constituted for this purpose, the constitution whereof was changed by a subsequent order by the Chief justice on 16.5.1997. 7. In Gopal Dass & others v. Nathulal Baraya (ibid) an application under Section 13-A of the Act of 1950 was filed after the expiry of limitation along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This court held that the Act being a special law and as the applicability of the Limitation Act has not been expressly excluded under the provisions of the Act of 1950, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply and delay in filing application under Section 13-A can be condoned. This court held that the Act being a special law and as the applicability of the Limitation Act has not been expressly excluded under the provisions of the Act of 1950, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply and delay in filing application under Section 13-A can be condoned. In Firm Kripa Ram Ganeshi Lal v. Vijay Kumar Goyal 1986 RLR 236 , a Division Bench of our court held that a court has no power to extend the time beyond three months under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950 and further that Section 13(5) of the Act is mandatory. 8. In Vishandas v. Savitri Devi (ibid) , this court held that in Firm Kripa Ram Ganeshi Lal's case this court did not consider the judgment in Gopal Dass & others v. Nathulal Baraya , and accordingly the Full Bench overruled the judgment in Firm Kripa Ram Ganeshi Lal's case and held as follows 1. Provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be applied in a matter of deposit of rent under section 13(4) of the Act; 2. The court has power in the interest of justice and equity to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act and 3. Section 13(5) of the Act is directory and not mandatory. It was further observed in this case that the judgment in Firm Kripa Ram's case was no more a good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick & another (ibid) , where their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, held that the word 'shall' occurring in Section 17(3) of the West Bengal Act, which is similar to one in our Act, has to be read as 'may' and the provisions for striking out defence are merely directory and not mandatory. In Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas (ibid) , a Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, held that where a tenant deposits the' arrears of rent within the time allowed by the court but during the pendency of the suit for eviction and an appeal therefrom deposits the monthly rent a day or two beyond the prescribed date on some occasion, the court has discretion to condone the delay and if the court granted extension of time for payment of monthly rent, the tenant would not be liable to eviction and his defence should not be struck' out for non-payment of rent before the due date. The Supreme Court in Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om prakash & others (ibid) , while dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act, held that the striking out defence of tenant is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legislation, that drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situation where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. There must be a wilful failure, deliberate default or volitional non- performance. It was further held that if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and the court discerns a mood of defiance or gross negligence, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. In that case it was further observed that if a tenant who was a working woman, regularly paid rent to an advocate but he in turn did not deposit the same in court or paid to the landlord in time, it could not be said that she failed to pay or deposit, in any way. No case for punitive exercise of discretion to strike out the defence had been made out in the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. In Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath & another (ibid) , the Supreme Court while dealing with a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act, relying on the two aforesaid cases of Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas and Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash & others , held that the Rent Controller had power to condone default or extend time. 9. In Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath & another (ibid) , the Supreme Court while dealing with a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act, relying on the two aforesaid cases of Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas and Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash & others , held that the Rent Controller had power to condone default or extend time. In Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari & another v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (ibid) , the Supreme Court while dealing with the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act and while interpreting Section 11 of the said statute, observed that the word 'shall' appearing in this Section is directory and not mandatory and must be read as 'may'. The Full Bench in Vishandas v. Savitri Devi (ibid) , took into consideration that our legislation has used the word 'shall' both for depositing rent and also for striking out the defence but observed that merely the user of the word 'shall' would not make these provisions mandatory specially in view of the Supreme Court pronouncement in M/s. B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick & another (ibid) where the Supreme Court considred the provisions of Section 17(3) and (4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, where also there is a statutory provision to the effect that the court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit if a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Sub-section (1) or (2) within the time, limit specified therein or within such extended time as may be allowed under clause (a) of Sub-section (2-A) or fails to deposit or pay any instalment permitted under clause (b) of Sub-section (2-A) within the time fixed therefor. In that context the Full Bench did not bestow much attention on the observations of the Division Bench in Firm Kripa Ram Ganeshi Lal's case (ibid) wherein the Division Bench observed that the court has no power to extend the time beyond three months and Sections 13(4) and 13(5) of the Act are imperatively mandatory and not directory and, therefore, the trial court had no power to extend time but it was duty bound to strike out the defence on account of non-deposit of arrears of rent determined by the court under Section 13(4) within the extended period of time. What the Full Bench obviously did not appreciate in that context was the special features of the Act of 1950 where the statute did nowhere mention about applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act whereas in respect of Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar statutes, there was a dear mention in this regard. 10. Firm Kripa Ram Ganeshi Lal's case was a case where the trial court proceeded under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950 and by passing an order, provisionally determined the amount of rent to be paid to the landlord by the tenant within fifteen days. The aforesaid amount was not paid within fifteen days and the defendant submitted an application under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act praying for extension of time to make the payment. The trial court by passing an order granted two months's time to the tenant to make the payment. The tenant still then made no payment within the time allowed by the court and after the expiry of the said time the tenant again moved an application and prayed for extension of time to enable him to make the payment of the calculated amount. The application was opposed by the landlord who prayed that since the tenant had failed to deposit or pay the amount of rent determined under Sub-section (3), his defence against eviction should be struck out. The trial court dismissed the tenant's application for extension of time taking a view that time for payment of the amount of rent provisionally determined under Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act cannot be extended beyond three months in view of the express provisions in Sub-section (4). Since the three months' time had already ended, no further extension of time was possible. By the same order he struck out the defence of tenant against eviction. The tenant came up in appeal to the High Court and the learned Single Judge held that since the tenant had failed to pay or deposit the amount of rent provisonally determined within the maximum period prescribed under Section 13(4), his defece against eviction was rightly struck out by the court below. Aggrieved, the tenant came up in special appeal and the special appeal also stood dismissed. Aggrieved, the tenant came up in special appeal and the special appeal also stood dismissed. The Division Bench held, distinguishing the case in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari & another v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (ibid) , that the position is entirely different in our Act. The Legislature was quite conscious that at times the tenant may not be able to pay the amount of arrears of rent determined by the court under Sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of the determination and may also not be able to pay the monthly rent by the 15th day of each succeeding month for one reason or the other. In order to meet such an eventuality and to relieve the defendant from the hardship, the Legislature inserted the provision for extension of time not exceeding three months in respect of the payment of arrears of rent determined by the court under Sub-section (3) of the Act and for the extension of time not exceeding fifteen days for the payment of the monthly rent. The Legislutre has already taken note of the hardship likely to be caused to the tenant on account of his bona fide mistake etc. The defence of a tenant is to be struck out under Sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act only when he fails to pay the arrears of amount within the extended period of three months or within the extended period of fifteen days, as the case may be. In view of this provision for extension of time inserted in Sub-section (4), the Division Bench expressed the opinion that the word 'shall' occurring in Sub-section (5) should be held as imperative, mandatory and of compulsory force and not as merely directory or permissive. The Division Bench further observed that it is true that the question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language on which the intent is couched. For the purpose of finding out the intent of the Legislature the words 'may' and 'shall' have been treated at times as interchangeable. The use of word 'shall' does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory. It depends upon the context in which the word 'shall' occurs and the other circumstances. For the purpose of finding out the intent of the Legislature the words 'may' and 'shall' have been treated at times as interchangeable. The use of word 'shall' does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory. It depends upon the context in which the word 'shall' occurs and the other circumstances. The Legislature while enacting our State Act was fully conscious of the hardship of the tenant and that is why provision for extension of time by three months and fifteen days, were inserted in Sub-section (4) of Section 13. If the tenant still does not pay the arrears of amount and the monthly rent within the time extended, he incurs the disability envisaged in Sub-section (5) of the Act, and his defence must then be struck out. There is no escape for the defaulting tenant from the rigors of Sub-section (5) of the Act if he fails to deposit the arrears of rent or the monthly rent within the extended time. The Division Bench thus observed that the view as expressed by the Supreme Court in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari & another v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (ibid) , has thus no bearing so far as the provisions of Sub-section (4) and (5) of Section 13 of the Act are concerned. The observations made in Ganesh Prasad's case relates only to the provisions of Section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings Act. Had there been a parallel provision in the Bihar Buildings Act similar to that in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of our Act, the position then might have been different. Sub-section (4) and (5) of Section 13 of the Act have come for judicial scrutiny before this court more than once and the consistent view taken by this court is that the expression "the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out" is mandatory and leaves no option for the court but to strike out the defence of the tenant. The word 'shall' in the aforesaid expression has been construed as mandatory. The Division Bench thus expressed the opinion that the use of word 'shall' in the expression "the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out" has a compulsive force. The word 'shall' in the aforesaid expression has been construed as mandatory. The Division Bench thus expressed the opinion that the use of word 'shall' in the expression "the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out" has a compulsive force. Since the tenant was to pay or deposit the amount on or before a stipulated date and he did not deposit or pay the amount within the statutory period of fifteen days but applied for extension of time under Sub-section (4) whereupon the trial court allowed him two months' time to pay or deposit the amount of rent determined under Sub-section (3). The tenant, therefore, could pay or deposit the amount on or before the extended date. But still then since he did not pay or deposit the amount, the Court could not extend the time beyond three months from the original date. The tenant remained silent. It was only after the expiry of three months' period that he moved an application for further extension of time and that was only on the expiry of three months that he submitted an application for extension of time and the court was powerless to extend that time beyond three months. Since the tenant had been a continuous defaulter after the determination of the provisional rent, no indulgence could be granted to him in view of the mandatory provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 13 and thus his defence was held to be rightly struck out. 11. Both Mr. M.M. Ranjan and Mr. U. N. Bhandari, appearing for the landlords, submitted before us that the Hon'ble judges who comprised the Full Bench in Vishandas's case (supra), did not consider the distinction between Gopal Dass & others v. Nathulal Baraya (ibid) and Firm Kripa Ram Ganeshi Lal v. Vijay Kumar Goyal (ibid) , and did not bestow any attention on the special features of the Rajasthan statute. It is indeed true that under Sub-section (4) of Section 13, the tenant shall deposit the determined amount within fifteen days from the, date of determination as per provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 13 or within such further time not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. It is indeed true that under Sub-section (4) of Section 13, the tenant shall deposit the determined amount within fifteen days from the, date of determination as per provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 13 or within such further time not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 further provides that the tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by 15th of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rent at which the rent was determined by the court under Sub-section (3). This Sub-section provides that the tenant has to deposit the monthly rent within fifteen days from the date of determination or within the extended time upto three months. The court has also been given the power to extend time but not exceeding three months. Likewise, the court may also extend the time for deposit of monthly rent but not exceeding fifteen days. Both Mr. Bhandari and Mr. Ranjan submitted that the Legislature itself excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. The learned counsel drew our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. & others AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2161 . That was a case where the application for renewal of permit was to be made not less than 120 days before the date of expiry of the permit. Sub- section (3) of Section 58 gave a discretion to the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal of a permit even if it is beyond time, but in that case the delay should not be more than fifteen days. The Supreme Court was of the view that it was clearly meant that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than fifteen days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it, or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. The Supreme Court was of the view that it was clearly meant that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than fifteen days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it, or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. The Supreme Court held that there was thus an express provision in Sub-section (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 in such cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than fifteen days. 13. The Division Bench of Orissa High Court in Kulamani Kar & othels v. Orissa Land Reforms Tribunal-cum-Subordinate judge, Cuttack & others AIR 1983 Orissa 63 , while considering Section 57-A proviso (b) of Orissa Land Reforms Act, held that application of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act stood excluded on account of negative provision of Section 57-A. The relevant provisions of Section 57-A(3) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act was to the following effect "Any trustee or trustees desiring to get any trust declared to be a religious or charitable trust of a public nature under sub-d. (e) of clause (24) of section 2 may make an application to the Tribunal in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. Provided that no application under this sub-section shall be maintainable if- (a) xx xxxx (b) it is filed after the date of expiry of a period of six months from the date of commencement of the Act." The judgment of the Orissa High Court is based on the judgments reported in Hukumdev Narain v. Lalit Narain AIR 1974 Supreme Court 480 , and Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P., Lucknow v. M/s. Parson Tools & Plants AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1039 . It is thus evident that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act could not be made applicable as its applicability was expressly excluded by the Legislature by enacting the sub-section (4) of Section 13 by which a court could extend time for depositing the arrears of rent and also the monthly rent but it could not extend the time more than three months for the determined rent and for the monthly rent beyond fifteen days. 14. 14. Rajasthan High Court from the very beginning was of the view that Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950 is mandatory and not discretionary and further that the court has no jurisdiction to extend time and condone the delay. In Hiralal v. Haribux 1975 RLW 140 , which was a case under the old law, the Rajasthan High Court held as follows:- "If a landlord filed a suit for eviction of a tenant on the ground of default as envisaged under sub-section 13(1)(a), the legislature gives an additional opportunity to the tenant to deposit arrears of rent with interest on the first date of hearing. He is also required to deposit rent for the subsequent months within 15 days of each month. Thus, Section 13(4) is an additional benefit to the tenant. If a tenant wants to avail protection he must deposit the rent strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 15(4). It is not a matter where the benefit can be extended for any reason howsoever good in might be. In my opinion Section 13(4) does not contem lplate extension of time by the court." In Daulat Ram v. Smt. Champa Devi 1980 (2 (2) RCJ 12 , this court observed as follows- "The law on the point has been well settled in Hiralal v. Haribux-1975 RCJ 328 , and the Hon'ble Judge is in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court. The court has no power to extend time and condone delay where the rent was not deposited as required by law. In the present case, even the application was submitted after the time for depositing the arrears of rent had expired." Another Single Judge of our court in Kailash Kumar Pareek v. Somoti Devi 1980 (2) RCJ 128 , held that delay cannot be condoned under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act but time can be extended only under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950. 15. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act has been made applicable when the period prescribed for filing an appeal, application other than an application under O.21 Civil Procedure Code has expired and the applicant shows sufficient reason for not filing the appeal or application within time. This Section is not applicable for payment or deposit of rent. Both W. Ranjan as also Mr. This Section is not applicable for payment or deposit of rent. Both W. Ranjan as also Mr. Bhandari went to repel the argument advanced by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the amount deposited by tender is in the shape of an application, by contending inter alia that such a tender cannot be deemed to be an application at all. They drew our attention to the procedure of depositing the rent by tenant in Section 19-A of the Act of 1950, which is as under:- Sub-section (3) of Section 19-A prescribes that the payment of rent to landlord, remit or deposit may be by any of the following methods- (a) Personal payment to landlord. (b) By postal money-order. (c) In the bank where account of landlord lies-if the landlord specifies within ten days account No. and name of tenant. (d) In the court, if the landlord do not specify the bank account No. etc., or refuses to accept the money-order or to returned back with a note of unfound. (e) The above deposit in the court may be either in cash if the amount of money does not exceed Rs. 25/- under rule 255(4) of General Rules (Civil) 1986 or payment into court under rule 260 of rules (ibid), in the tender form No. 23 containing following details- (1) Name of party on whose behalf the money is tendered. (2) Name of parties and No. of suit. (3) Nature of payment. (4) Amount tendered. Therefore, for the purpose of construing an application it must have the following contents - (a) There must be a written statement of mate. (b) There must be grounds on which applicant submits an application. (c) Prayer for granting relief. (d) The copy of application containing above contents should be given to opposite party and opportunity of being heard be afforded. (e) Discretion of the court by way of rejection or allowing. (f) There should be a court fees under item 11 Schedule II of Court Fees Act. (g) Application should be as per the requirement of Rules 21 or 28 of General Rules (Civil) 1986. In Prem Raj. v. Ram Charan AIR 1974 Supreme Court 968 , The Supreme Court held that in order to constitute itself as an application, there should be some request without which it cannot betreated as an application. (g) Application should be as per the requirement of Rules 21 or 28 of General Rules (Civil) 1986. In Prem Raj. v. Ram Charan AIR 1974 Supreme Court 968 , The Supreme Court held that in order to constitute itself as an application, there should be some request without which it cannot betreated as an application. In P.Phillip v. Director Enforcement, New Delhi AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1185 , the Supreme Court observed that an application is synonymous with the term 'petition' which means a written statement of material facts, requesting the court to grant the relief or remedy based on those facts. 16. In Karnataka Theatres Ltd. v. Venkatesan AIR 1996 Karn.18 , the Karnataka High Court held that an application would include an appeal asking the appellate court to set aside an order made by any authority. This decision is based on the decision of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey's case AIR 1932 PC 165 . Both the learned counsel appearing for the landlords contended that an application must contain a statement of material facts and a prayer for granting relief. Where a tender for deposit of money either in court or in bank without containing a statement of material fact or without any prayer for granting relief is filed, it_ could not be regarded as an application and if it is not an application, Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not have been called into play. 17. In M/s. Janta Cycle & Motor Mart, Kanpur v. Assistant Commissioner , Kanpur & another AIR 1969 Allahabad 200, the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court held that Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable in matters of deposit of money. A similar view was expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Deep Chand v. Babu Ram AIR 1976 Allahabad 478 , where in respect of deposits under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply. As per the judgment in Mohd. Ashfaq's case (ibid), Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act excludes such cases of applicability of Section 5. 18. When the language is clear and capable of only one meaning, anything enacted by the Legislature must be enforced even though it might result in startling consequences. As per the judgment in Mohd. Ashfaq's case (ibid), Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act excludes such cases of applicability of Section 5. 18. When the language is clear and capable of only one meaning, anything enacted by the Legislature must be enforced even though it might result in startling consequences. The decisions in Babu Ram & others v. State of U.P. & another (1952) 2 SCC 689 , Dr. Nay Pradhan v. State of M.P. & others AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1875 , and Y udhishter v. Ashok Kumar AIR 1987 Supreme Court 558 , were cited in this context. 19. In the instant case under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950, it has been specifically enacted by our Legislature that the tenant shall deposit in court the calculated amount by way of provisional determination of rent and go on depositing the monthly rents by a stipulated date. The words "not exceeding three months" and "not exceeding fifteen days" are significant enough and carry only one meaning that it must be so done. It is also pertinent to mention that this provision does not exist in any similar rent control statute of other states. It must have to be borne in mind that Rent Control Act is a beneficial legislation not only to the tenant but also to the landlords and it would safeguard the interest of both the landlords as well as the tenants. In She Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum (Smt.) & others (1994) 2 SCC 671 , it was observed:- "it is not correct to hold that the Rent Control Act is a beneficial enactment only to the tenant." It was submitted before us by citing the decision in Mrs. Manju Choudhary v. Dula Kumar Chandra (ibid) , Mranalini B. Shah & another v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah (1980) 4 SCC 251 , Sulochana Damodar (Smt.) v. Ratnaprabha v. Topple (Smt.) (1983) 2 SCC 256 , Madan Mohan & another v. Krishan Kumar Sood 1994 Supp (1) SCC 437 , J.L. Varandari v. Ashalata Mukherjee (Dead) By LRs. (1990) 4 SCC 40 , that the present provisions ought to have been in the light of the decisions in the aforesaid cases, be held to be mandatory and not directory. (1990) 4 SCC 40 , that the present provisions ought to have been in the light of the decisions in the aforesaid cases, be held to be mandatory and not directory. By citing the decision in Jagjit Singh & others v. Sankatha Singh & another AIR 1950 Allahabad 675 , it was submitted that Section 148 Civil Procedure Code cannot be applied to the facts of the present case where the order has not been passed under the Civil Procedure Code and Section 151 Civil Procedure Code could not also be invoked to over-ride the specific provisions of law and in support of this proposition, the following cases were cited 1. Manilal Mohan Lal Shah Sind others V. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad & another AIR 1954 Supreme Court 349 . 2. Nityananda Kanango V. Smt. Pala Devi. AIR 1952 On. 120 3. Cotton Corporation Of India Limited V. United Industrial Bank Limited & others AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1272 . 4. Chettiam Veettil Ammad & another V. Taluk Land Board & others AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1573 . 5. A.R. Antulay V. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another air 1980 sc 587 and Osuers V Kamdev Maity & others AIR 1984 Supreme Court 718 . 6. Nabu Sahu Ltd v Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and others AIR 1928 Calcutta 179 . 20. In Ms B.P. Khemka another, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1010, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the words "shall order the defence against delivery of possession to the be struck out" occurring in Section 17(3) have to be construed in a directory provision and not a mandatory provision as the word "shall" has to be read in "may". Such a canon of construction is warranted because otherwise the intendment of the Legislature will be defeated and the lass of tenants for whom the beneficial provisions were made by the Ordinance and the Amending Act will stand deprived of them. It was further observed that the court is vested with discretion to order either striking out of the defence or not depending upon the circumstances of that case and the interests of justice. It was further observed that the court is vested with discretion to order either striking out of the defence or not depending upon the circumstances of that case and the interests of justice. If the Court has the discretion not to strike out the defence of the tenant committing default in payment or deposit of rent as required by a provision in any State Rent Restriction Act, then the court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment or deposit and such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence. 21. In Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353 , as regards application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was observed that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subservs the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. it is common knowledge that the Supreme Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted before the Supreme Court. But the message does not appear t have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. Such a liberal approach is percolated other Court. other as it is realised that. 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very thresh hold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay in condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing, the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in justice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 22. In Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2272= (1995) 5 SCC 5 , it was observed that Kerala Rent Control Act is a special law prescribing a period of limitation for filing appeal and in absence of any provision therefor under Limitation Act the period of limitation provided under Section 18 must be treated as different from under Limitation Act. But still then, the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is satisfied and as a consequence Section 5, Limitation would be automatically attracted to appeal under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Control Act in absence of any express exclusion under the said Kerala Rent Control Act and the courts are not disentitled to resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act and even if the appellate authority need not be a full-fledged civil court constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure in order to be entitled to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 there will be appropriate application under Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. For applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the Authority invoking the said provision : (i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application. (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated Section 29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under- (i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the Schedule. (ii) Determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 23. It was observed that the Kerala Buildings (Leas and Rent Control) Act is a special Act or a local law. It prescribes for appeal under Section 18 a period of limitation which is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, as the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal. A situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the Schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting section 29(2) would get satisfied. Thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. Thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. Once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied, Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted so as to make an application and if Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted so as to make an application and if Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that section, all the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply and Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. There is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied. As per Section 29(2) of the repealed Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 5 thereof was to apply only if it was not expressly excluded by the special law. So if the power to condone delay contained in Section 5 had to be exercised by the appellate body-it had to be conferred by the special law. But under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is not necessary to expressly state in a special law that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the determination of the period under it. By the general provision contained in Section 29(2) this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special laws and express mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion. In absence of such express exlusion, the provisions of Section 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings. 24. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another v. Shah Manilal Chandulal & ors. (1996) 9 SCC 414 it was held that as regards delay in making application for reference, the Collector/LAO has no power to condone the delay. In absence of such express exlusion, the provisions of Section 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings. 24. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another v. Shah Manilal Chandulal & ors. (1996) 9 SCC 414 it was held that as regards delay in making application for reference, the Collector/LAO has no power to condone the delay. The Collector/LAO while making a reference under Section 18(1) acts as a statutory authority and is not a court for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to proviso to Section 18(2) of the Limitation Act. In view of the specific limitation provided under proviso to Section 18(2), sub-section (2) of Section 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The Collector/LAO, therefore, is not a court when he acts as a statutory authority under section 18(1) and, therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. 25. In Om Shantilal M. Bhayani v. Shanti Bai 1995 Supp (4) SCC 578 it was held that even though admittedly there is no specific exclusion of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 a perusal of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act read with Section 5 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply to an appeal filed before the appellate authority under Section 23(1)(b) of the Tamil nadu Rent Control Act. 26. In State of West Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das and others (1996) 5 SCC 342 , it was held the procedure prescribed on appellate side by virtue of Rule 35 of the Rules framed by the Calcutta High Court under Contempt of Courts Act did not expressly exclude application of limitation under Limitation Act. By operation of Section 29(2) read with section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act stood prescribed as a special law and limitation in filing letters patent appeal stood attracted. Consequently, Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act attracted to Letters Patent to the extent not expressly excluded by the special or local law. Consequently, Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act attracted to Letters Patent to the extent not expressly excluded by the special or local law. Since the rules made on the appellate side, either for entertaining the appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent or appeals arising under the contempt of courts, had not expressly excluded Sections 4 to 24, the provisions of Section 5 Limitation Act become applicable to the appeals filed against the order of the Single Judge for the enforcement by way of a contempt. 27. A special bench of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Gopal Ghosal v. Mihir Baran Nandy and others 1987(2) Calcutta Law Journal page 297 , held in the context of a reference made before it, that the court has jurisdiction to condone the delay or to extend the time for deposit or payment of sums specified in sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, in the manner and to the extent indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.P. Khemka v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and another reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1010 . As regards other question as to whether the court has jurisdiction, in case it has any, for condonation of delay or granting extension of time in making deposit or payment under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, whether poverty or financial handicap of the tenant defendant could be taken as such a ground the answer to this question was also given by the Special Bench to the effect that for exercising the Court's power to condone delay or to extend time for delayed deposit or payment of rent under Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act the Court is bound to take into consideration the circumstances of each particular case. Poverty or financial handicap of a tenant defendant who might have deposited or paid rent beyond the time prescribed by Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act may constitute sufficient cause for condonation and/or extension of time by the Court. 28. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Devokinandan Boobna V. Harsundar Sakar 1988(1) Calcutta Law journal 278 observed that when one instalment in deposit of arrears of rent has been delayed, the Court has inherent power to condone the delay. 29. 28. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Devokinandan Boobna V. Harsundar Sakar 1988(1) Calcutta Law journal 278 observed that when one instalment in deposit of arrears of rent has been delayed, the Court has inherent power to condone the delay. 29. We have given our anxious thought to the matter. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the fact that in view of the stringent provisions in the Act of 1950, as regards the ultimate time limit of three months within which the delayed payment of the calculated amount has to be made or the extended time of 15 days within which every month the monthly post-suit deposits are to be effected, there is no scope for an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act at all. In view of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, it applies in respect of such statutes where there is a time limit prescribed either for filing an appeal or an application. The Act of 1950 is a special law and there is no express provision contained in it for excluding the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and as such, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act will come into operation and Section 5 of the said Act will be applicable in respect of all applications filed under the said Act. 30. We are conscious of the fact that there are stringent conditions as made by the provisions of statute that the determined amount of arrear rents has to be deposited within the ultimate time limit of three months or the post suit rents have to be deposited within the extended period of fifteen days and on account of a failure thereof, the defence against delivery of possession is liable to be struck out. Such provisions are also there in similar statutes of other States even though there may not be any provision for extended period of three months or fifteen days, as mentioned above. Despite the word 'shall' being there in other statutes as that of Bihar and West Bengal, by judicial decisions Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made clearly applicable even though the provision regarding striking out of defence is very much there. Despite the word 'shall' being there in other statutes as that of Bihar and West Bengal, by judicial decisions Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made clearly applicable even though the provision regarding striking out of defence is very much there. That would only make our Courts in Rajasthan more cautious and discrete in the reception of applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of the extended period of limitation as prescribed in' the statute itself. But that does not mean that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is over-ruled altogether unless and until the intention of Legislature is so expressly mentioned in the statute itself. That would create also a very bad precedent for hard cases where because of some eventuality the defaulting party i.e. the tenant would be put to a great hardship. We can contend that if the statute of 1950 has fixed a particular point of time within which the deposits are to be made, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not clearly ruled out unless and until it is so expressly mentioned by the statute itself, even though it would not be a case strictly speaking within the meaning of or within the ambit of Section 148 Civil Procedure Code which applies only in respect of ats prescribed or allowed by the Civil Procedure Code. It matters little whether it is an application by way of a tender of the money or not, because when a money is to be deposited beyond the time prescribed in Court, obviously by way of a legal fiction, an application is envisaged whereby the powers of the Court are invoked so as to make the deposit. 31. In the result, we are of the considered opinion that even though we have reconsidered the Full Bench decision in Vishandas V. Savitri Devi (ibid) , we think we cannot rule out the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act at all unless and until the statute has clearly mentioned about the non application of the said provision of the statute and more so by virtue of the application under section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It would, however, be indeed proper for all courts to apply the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act with due caution and with appropriate discretion as an when the Court's jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is specifically invoked.After taking into account the various Supreme Court decisions on the point, we are of the considered opinion that the Court has ample powers in an appropriate case, to condone the delay and permit the tenant defendant to deposit the rent beyond the prescribed period as filed by the statute and for such particular purpose, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be called into play. 32. In this particular perspective of things, we do not think that it would be necessary for us to hold that the earlier Full Bench decision has been incorrectly given or that its findings should be set at naught. We answer the Full Bench reference accordingly. (Per Hon'ble M.P. Singh, J.) : 33. I have the pleasure of going through the judgments prepared by Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mukherji and also by Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.K. Jain and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.K. Sharma. After considering all the three judgments I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken by Hon'ble the Chief justice and I have nothing to add to it. (Per Hon'ble N.K. Jain, J.) : 34. I have opportunity of going through the elaborate judgment of my brother Hon'ble the Chief Justice. With great respect, I do not agree with the conclusion arrived at that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable. My reasons are as below : 35. The learned Single Judge vide its order dated 3.6.94 observed that the earlier decision rendered by the Full Bench in Bishandas's case (supra) requires re-consideration and hence, the Full Bench consisting of five Judges, has been constituted for deciding the reference. 36. Mr. My reasons are as below : 35. The learned Single Judge vide its order dated 3.6.94 observed that the earlier decision rendered by the Full Bench in Bishandas's case (supra) requires re-consideration and hence, the Full Bench consisting of five Judges, has been constituted for deciding the reference. 36. Mr. Ranjan submits that till the decision of the Division Bench, reported in 1986 RLR 236 (Kripa Ram's case) wherein it was held that the court has no power to extend time beyond three months under Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and further Section 13(5) of the Act is mandatory, it was consistent view of this Court reported in number of cases by this Court viz., Heeralal v. Hari Bux (1975 RLW 140) , Daulat Ram v. Champa Devi (1982 RCJ 359) , Kailash Kumar Pareek v. Somatiji (1982 RCJ 129) , order dated 1.11.1991 passed in the case of Inderchand v. Smt. Leelawati 1991(1) RCJ 213 and DNJ 1993(2) 373 as also Shankerlal v. Ved Prakash 1993(2) WLC (Raj.) 381 that Section 13(5) of the Act is mandatory and not directory. But the Full Bench in the decision rendered in the case of Bishandas's Case (supra) has not considered the reasoning of the above mentioned case. The approval of D.B. decision in Gopal Das's case (supra) which pertains to Section 13-A of the Act inserted by Ordinance whereby tenants against whom suits were pending were given benefit to deposit by moving the application within 30 days and Ordinance was given retrospective effect has no bearing as it is not a case of Section 13(4) of the Act. It is also submitted that the other decisions of West Bengal Rent Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the W.B. Act') pertaining to Section 17(2-A) & (2-B) of the W.B Act which was considered in B.P. Khemka's Case (supra) was considered by the Full Bench in the case of Bishandas (supra) have also no bearing more particularly in view of Section 39 of the said W.B Act. The Limitation Act has been made applicable in W.B. Act, so the application filed in that case after expiry of limitation, the benefft of Section 5 of the Limitaiton Act was granted and thus the case of B.P. Khemka (supra) is also not helpful. The Limitation Act has been made applicable in W.B. Act, so the application filed in that case after expiry of limitation, the benefft of Section 5 of the Limitaiton Act was granted and thus the case of B.P. Khemka (supra) is also not helpful. The Phraseology used in the respective Sections of the two Acts are not the same and quite different. It is further submitted that merely from the phraseology used without considering the real intention of the words used in Section 13(4) of the Act and derision on imported analogy, is not correct one. Thus, over-ruling of Kripa Ram's case is not correct law and therefore, the decision of the Full Bench in Bishandas's case cannot be said to be a good law. 37. On the other hand, Mr. Bhandari submits that the Act is a special law and does not expressly exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, as such Section 5 is applicable. It is also submitted that Full Bench in Bishandas's case has already decided the controversy so it is not necessary to answer the referred question. 38. Since the case law and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Section 13(3), 13(4) and 13(5) of the Act and S. 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure have already been reproduced in the judgment prepared by my brother Mukherjee, C.J. it is not necessary to reproduce the same. 39. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. Firstly, it will apply when an appeal or application, for filing of which time has been fixed, has been filed after expiry of time. It has not been made applicable for payment or deposit of rent/arrears of rent. A reference can be made to M/s. Janta Cycle and Motor Mart, Kanpur v. Assistant Commissioner (J) Ill, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur & others (AIR 1969 Allahabad 200 ) wherein an appeal filed in time but tax deposited was falling short. It was held that delay in depositing admitted tax and Section 5 which applies to appeal by virtue of Section 9(6) of the Sales Tax Act is not attracted and application for condonation of delay in depositing the entire amount held not maintainable. So far as the argument of Shri Bhandari that deposit of rent by tender can be treated to be an application is not acceptable. So far as the argument of Shri Bhandari that deposit of rent by tender can be treated to be an application is not acceptable. Section 19-A of the Act provides various modes for payment/deposit of rent and one of them is by tender. No period under the Limitation Act is provided for submitting a tender. Further more, a tender is not registered as an application. The procedure is provided under Rule 255(4) of the General Civil Rules. In this view of the matter, a tender cannot be considered or construed as an application. 40. Secondly, Section 13(4) of the Act prescribes an outer limit for payment/deposit of the arrears of rent/monthly rent. 41. So the argument of Mr. Bhandari that in absence of express exclusion, the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act would automatically get attracted is not sustainable. If we go through the provisions, it is clear that the tenant has to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under Sub-section (3) of S. 13 of the Act within 15 days from the date of such determination or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. In other words, the legislautre in its wisdom have framed this Section in negative form by amending the Act No. 14 of 1976 that time cannot be extended more than permissible period i.e. not exceeding three months. Under these circumstances, it goes to show that the provisions of the Limitation Act are expressly excluded and outer limit in dear terms has been fixed under the Act. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. 42. Undoubtedly, the Rent Control Law is a special enactment. The special 'Statute' has been enacted for the protection of the tenant against the unreasonable'eviction. The provisions show that if the landlord file a suit for eviction against the tenant on the ground of default as envisaged in Section 13(a) of the Act, the legislature gives an additional opportunity to the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent after the determination by the Court under Section 13(3) of the Act. The tenant shall also require to deposit the rent for subsequent months within 15 days of each month and can get the extension of time at the most for three months as per the Section. The tenant shall also require to deposit the rent for subsequent months within 15 days of each month and can get the extension of time at the most for three months as per the Section. Thus, the right of the tenant has been protected by giving extension of time upto 3 months. The legislature has safeguarded the interest of the tenant that so long he is willing to pay the rent as provided under the Act, his defence cannot be struck down and no decree of eviction can be passed. As stated, one of the main aim is to protect such tenant but it does not mean to harm the landlord to get timely rent even after the determination of the rent as per the provisions. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that this Act is only beneficial to the tenant. The Act is beneficial to both tenant and landlord. A reference can be made to 1994(2) SCC 671 (Laxmi V.E.(P) Ltd. Vs. S.V. Begum.) Therefore, this beneficial legislation ought to have construed justly and reasonably. 43. No doubt, the ambiguous expression to be construed is to fulfil the object of the legislation but it is not the duty of court either to enlarge scope of Legislation or intention of Legislature when language of provisions in plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, or re-case legislation and add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. The Court is to take constructive approach to fulfil the purpose of iron creases. It is pertinent to note that the legislature does not use superfluous words in an enactment. The real intention of the legislature has to be seen and determined whether the provisions are mandatory or directory. The use of the word "shall" and "may" is not decisive and the provisions of the Statute should subserve the purpose of the Act in the interest of justice. The words "not within 15 days and not exceeding 3 months" are dear and not vague. 44. So, as discussed above, in my view, on a simple perusal of Section 13(4) of the Act, it is dear that the benefit of extension of time could only be awarded as per Section 13(4) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. In view of the above, the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time beyond it. In view of the above, the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time beyond it. A reference can be made to Mohd. Ashfaq Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, UP & Ors. AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2161 wherein it has been as under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes Section 5 applicable in the case of an application for renewal unless its applicability can be said to be expressly exluded by any provisions of the Act. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 58 in so many terms says that the Regional Transport Authority may condone the delay in making of an application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided the delay is of not more than 15 days. The clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it, or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in Sub-section (3) and that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. 45. In Kulamani Kar & Ors. Vs. Orissa Land Reforms Tribunal-cum- Subordinate Judge, Cuttack & Ors. (AIR 1983 Orissa 63) it has been held as under The provision to Section 57-A(3) is the negative form holding out the legislative mandate of providing a six months period. The provision is indicative of the anxiety of the legislature to fix a clear time limit for making of an application under Section 57-A(3) and not to allow the proceedings to originate at a time beyond the period thus provided and as such, application of section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded in relation to the proceedings under Section 57-A(3)." 46. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments and not accepting that it is beneficial to the tenant only, then also, when one has to read between the lines and to see the real intention of the legislation, whatsoever be the consequences. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments and not accepting that it is beneficial to the tenant only, then also, when one has to read between the lines and to see the real intention of the legislation, whatsoever be the consequences. If S. 5 is made applicable by giving liberal interpretation and further chance is given to such tenant for moving an application even after extending the time of 3 months then there will be no end and Section 13(5) of the Act will become redundant. The object of beneficial legislation of speedy justice will frustrate which is not the intention of the legislation. In other words, if more limitations are imposed on the right of the landlord to get the rent from such tenant after determining the rent as per the clear provisions as stated, it would expose itself to the vice of unconstitutionality. 47. As stated, the Limitation Act is not applicable. Section 13(5) of the Act is mandatory and not directory. The interpretation given in the case of Bishandas (supra) considering the case of Gopal Das and W.B. Act case on the basis of phraseology without considering the intention of the Act and reasoning of Kripa Ram's case (supra) is not sustainable. In view of the above discussions, the case of Bishandas (supra) is not based on good law. 48. So far as the argument about the applicability of Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code is concerned, once the Limitation Act is not attracted under the application filed under Section 13(4) of the Act, the tenant cannot take aid of Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code. On bare perusal of S. 148 reveals that it is applicable only when any period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act or allowed by the Code. The period of depositing the rent has not been fixed in the Code of Civil Procedure but has been fixed in Sub-section (4) of S. 13 of the Act which is special Act and a complete code in itself, as such the provisions of S. 148 are not applicable. 49. So far as the argument regarding the applicability of the provisions of Section 151 Civil Procedure Code of Mr. Bhandari is concerned, Mr. 49. So far as the argument regarding the applicability of the provisions of Section 151 Civil Procedure Code of Mr. Bhandari is concerned, Mr. Ranjan submitted that though the court has inherent powers by virtue of duty to do the justice between the parties before it, but the inherent power cannot be invoked to nullify the statutory provisions. The provisions of the said Sections are applicable only where no provisions have been made in the Act. 5.13(4) of the Act provides maximum period of depositing the arrears of rent after determination and subsequent monthly rent and Section 13(5) of the Act provides penalty in not depositing the rent in time i.e. striking off the defence. A reference can be made to the case of Nain Singh v. Koonwarji AIR 1970 Supreme Court 997 and Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank Ltd . Therefore, Section 151 Civil Procedure Code is also not applicable. That apart, the scope of reference cannot be enlarged. The question of applicability of Section 148/151 has not been referred. 50. In view of the above what I have discussed, I am of the considered opinion that reference deserves to be allowed. It is held that Section 5 of the Limitation Acct in the matter of depositing the rent under Section 13(4) of the Act is not applicable. Section 13(5) of the Act is mandatory. Sections 148 and 151 Civil Procedure Code are not applicable in the matter of depositing/paying the rent under Section 13(4) of the Act determined under Section 13(3) of the Act. 51. The reference is allowed and answered in affirmative. (Per Hon'ble P.K. Tewari, J.) : 52. I have the opportunity of going through the judgments prepared by my learned brother Chief Justice Hon'ble M.G. Mukherji and Hon'ble N.K. Jain. Hon'ble S.K. Sharma, JJ. After considering all the three judgments in the light of the controversy, I am in complete agreement with the view taken by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and have nothing to add to it. (Per Hon'ble S.K. Sharma, J.) : 53. I have perused the draft of the judgment prepared by my brother Chief Justice Hon'ble M.G. Mukherjee. Since I respectfully beg to differ with the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and conclusion drawn therein, I am implied to deliver this dissenting Judgment. 54. (Per Hon'ble S.K. Sharma, J.) : 53. I have perused the draft of the judgment prepared by my brother Chief Justice Hon'ble M.G. Mukherjee. Since I respectfully beg to differ with the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and conclusion drawn therein, I am implied to deliver this dissenting Judgment. 54. Vishan Das v. Savitri Devi ( AIR 1988 Rajasthan 198) was the case where Full Bench of this Court answered the reference after placing reliance on M/s. B.P. Khemka v. Birendra Kumar AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1010 . In para No. 10 of the said judgment this court observed thus : "In the face of this authoritative pronouncement, it is not necessary for us to discuss this point in detail, or comment on the observations of the division bench in Vijay Kumar Goyal's case (supra) as in our view, the view of the division bench does not hold to be a good law in view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Birendra Kumar's case (supra)." 55. I also consider it necessary to refer para 7 of the said judgment which reads thus : "....in a recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. B.P. Khemka v. Birendra Kumar AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1010 where their Lordships were dealing with the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and held that the word "shall" occurring in Section 17 Sub-section (3) of the West Bengal Act which is similar to the one in our Act has to be read as 'may' and the provisions for striking out defence are merely directory and not mandatory." (Emphasis added) 56. In my humble view the provisions of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act (for short West Bengal Rent Act) and provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short the 'Rajasthan Rent Act') are not similar. Sub-section 2-A and 2-B of Section 17 of the West Bengal Rent Act provides as under:- "(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), on the application of the tenant, the court may, by order:- (a) extend the time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) for the deposit or payment of any amount referred to therein. Sub-section 2-A and 2-B of Section 17 of the West Bengal Rent Act provides as under:- "(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), on the application of the tenant, the court may, by order:- (a) extend the time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) for the deposit or payment of any amount referred to therein. (b) having regard to the circumstances of the tenant as also by the landlord and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited or paid under Sub-Section (1) on account of default in the payment of rent permit the tenant to deposit or pay such sum in such instalments and by such dates as the court may fix; Provided that where payment is permitted by instalments such sum shall include all amounts calculated at the rate of rent, for the period of default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the order under the sub-section is to be made with interest on any such amount calculated at the rate specified in sub-section (1) from the date when such amount was payable upto the date of such order. (2-B) No application for extension of time for the deposit of payment of any amount under clause (a) of sub-section (2-A) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified therefor in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and no application for permission to pay in instalment under clause (b) of sub-section (2-A) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1) for the deposit or payment of the amount due on account of default in the payment of rent." 57. There is no such provision for filing application seeking extension of time for depositing the arrears of rent in the Rajasthan Rent Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Rent Act may be looked into which provides thus : "13(4) the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination or within such further time, not exceeding three months as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen days as may be extended by the court at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3). (Emphasis supplied) 58. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Rent Act consists of two parts, the first one is about the amount determined under sub-section (3) and the second one is month to month payment of rent during the pendency of the suit by 15th of each succeeding month. The law directs the tenant to adopt any one of the two modes. The tenant may either deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount of rent determined by the court within fifteen days from the date of determination. The court can extend this time and allow the tenant to deposit the said amount within extended period not exceeding three months. The tenant is further expected to deposit continuously month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which the determination was made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month. The court can extend this time and allow the tenant to deposit the monthly rent within extended period not exceeding fifteen days. 59. A dose look at sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Rent Act demonstrates that the legislature was quite conscious that at times the tenant may not be able to pay the amount of arrears of rent determined by the court under sub-section (3), within fifteen days from the date of determination and may also not be able to pay the monthly rent by the fifteenth day of each succeeding month for one reason or the other. In order to meet such an eventuality and to relieve the tenant from the hardship the legislature inserted the provision for extension of time not exceeding three months in respect of the payment of arrears of rent determined by the court under sub-section (3) and for the extension of time not exceeding fifteen days for the payment of the monthly rent. I am of the view that for the purposes of extension of time no application is needed and this time can be extended by the court at the oral request of the tenant. 60. It is necessary at this juncture to refer section 39 of the West Bengal Rent Act which provides thus : "Subject to The provisions of this Act relating to limitation all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to suits, appeals and proceedings under the Act." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court (Hon'ble Mr. Charanchand C.J., V.D. Tulzagyrkar and A.P. Sen J.J.) in Rajendra Nath Kar vs. Ganga Das and others 1979(1) RCR 447 had occasion to consider section 17-A and Section 39 of the West Bengal Rent Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein it was held that "Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides, to the extent relevant, that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. On the applicability of section 5 to the proceedings under section 17-A of the Act, the provisions of section 39 of the Act provide:- "subject to the provisions of this Act relating to limitation all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to suits, appeals and proceedings under this Act." This provisions, which is dear and specific, leaves no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act." 61. In Rajasthan Rent Act there is no such provision akin to section 39 of the West Bengal Rent Act. My brother justice Mukherjee is of the view that since the Rajasthan Rent Act is a special law and there is no express provision contained in it for excluding the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and as such section 29(2) of the Limitation Act will come into operation and section 5 of the said Act will be applicable in respect of all applications filed under the said Act. I respectfully differ with the view expressed by brother Mukherjee. I respectfully differ with the view expressed by brother Mukherjee. The provisions contained in section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Rent Act are in the negative form holding out the legislative mandate of providing three months and 15 days outer limit for extending the time to deposit the arrears of rent. The provisions are indicative of the anxiety of the legislature to fix a clear time limit for making of an application and not to allow the proceedings to originate at a time beyond the period thus provided. 62. In Hukam Dev Narain vs. Lalit Narain AIR 1974 Supreme Court 480 whee a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges was considering whether the limitation provided in the Representation of People Act constituted express exclusion of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. In paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Court stated: "....It is contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual, the meaning given in the dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that in this case the Act and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nothetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation." 63. The same question arose again before another three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1039 and on the occasion the point arose with reference to application of section 14 of the Limitation Act in the matter of filing of a revision under the Taxing Act. The Apex Court then proceeded to observe at page 1043 : "Three features of the scheme of the above provision are noteworthy. The first is that no limitation has been prescribed for the suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction by the Revising Authority. The second is that the period of one year prescribed as limitation for filing an application for revision by the aggrieved party is unusually long. The third is that the Revising Authority has no discretion to extend this period beyond a further period of six months even on sufficient cause shown...." Three start features of the scheme and language of the above provision unmistakably show that the legislature has deliberately excluded the application of the principles underlying sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act....." 64. Be that as it may from the scheme and language of section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Rent Act, the intention of the Legislature is to exclude the unrestricted application of the principles of section 5 of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. These provisions of the Limitation Act which the legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Rajasthan Rent Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation which overrides all other, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it." The will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land and demands perfect obedience." (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pages 1, 2 and 251). "Judicial power whenever exercised", said Marshall C.J. of the United States, "for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or in other words to the will of the law." Therefore I am of the considered view that the provisions contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable in the matter of deposit of rent under Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Rent Act and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court has no power to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Rent Act. However, I may like to observe that the court is vested with the discretion under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure from time to time to enlarge the period even though the period originally fixed or granted might have expired. If the Court is of the view that the rent could not have been deposited on account of circumstances beyond the control of the tenant in can enlarge the time under Section 148 Civil Procedure Code and only to this extent I subscribe the view expressed by my brother Chief Justice. 65. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure can be made applicable in view of section 28 of the Rajasthan Rent Act, which provides thus : "The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not derogatory of any other law on the subject for the time being in force in the whole or any part of Rajasthan." Thus, in exceptional circumstances, the court can extend the time and allow the tenant to deposit of rent under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure . 66. Full Bench in Bishan Das vs. Savitri [1988(1) RLR 1= AIR 1988 Rajasthan 198] answered the reference without property appreciating the provisions contained in sub-sections 2-A and 2-B of Section 17 as well as Section 39 of West Bengal Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in B.P. Khemka vs. Birendra Kumar (supra) in para 14 referred the following passage of Crawford on Statutory Construction (Edn. 1940) : "The question as to whether a statue is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in B.P. Khemka vs. Birendra Kumar (supra) in para 14 referred the following passage of Crawford on Statutory Construction (Edn. 1940) : "The question as to whether a statue is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also while considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow construing it the one way or the other." 67. As already stated by me, the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Rent Act is indicative of the anxiety of the legislature to fix dear time limit for making deposit of arrears of rent. The language is plain and unambiguous. Therefore the court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation by analogy or implication something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity.Reference answered as per majority view. *******