JUDGMENT 1. - Both these petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. are directed against a common order dated 10.4.1997, though passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jaipur Distt. Jaipur in separate revision applications of the petitioners under sections 397 & 399 Cr.P.C. against a common order dated 3.10.1991 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, (SPE Cases) Jaipur Distt. Jaipur in the same criminal case, yet couched in almost common language. These were heard together and are now disposed of by this common order. 2. Facts, relevant and sufficient to dispose of both the petitions, are these- During September 1987 Harish Chandra and Ashok Patni petitioners were working as and posted as Superintendent of Police and Additional Super-intendant of Police Distt. Nagaur (Raj.) respectively. Police Station MAKARANA was within their administrative and supervisory jurisdiction. Salig Ram and Hakim Ali (co-accused in the case) were posted at Police Station Makrana as Station House Officer and Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police respectively. Rameshwar Lal S/o Sri Girdhari Lal R/o Kuchaman City, Distt. Nagaur, who is informant's father in the present matter and on whose behalf the petitioners have been vehemently opposed by his learned counsel Sri Biri Singh Advocate, was an Ex. MLA. On 23.9.1987 one Asha Ram 5/o Sri Bhawana Ram R/o Nimri lodged a First Information Report with Police Station Makrana against Rameshwarlal, aforesaid and nine others that they had shot dead his brother Arjun Ram at Mohan Mishtan Bhandar in the Industrial Area Makrana, at about 7.30. AM Crime No. 193 of 1987 for offences under sections 147, 149, 302/149 IPC was registered at the Police Station against Rameshwar Lal and nine others. Rameshwar Lal was arrested in that case on 26.9.1987 by the Police Officers stationed at P.S. Makrana. With the consent of the State Govt. the investigation of the case was entrusted to the Central Bureau of of Investigation/SPE,.On 20.10.1987 the Munsiff & Judicial Magistrate Makrana received a complaint by post. It was a complaint sent by one Dara Singh, who represented himself to be the son of the aforesaid Rameshwar Lal. It was alleged therein that after his arrest on 26.9.1987 his father, Rameshwar Lal, was mercilessly beaten by the Police officials at Makrana, including the present petitioners and, therefore, they all should be proceeded according to law. It was a complaint sent by one Dara Singh, who represented himself to be the son of the aforesaid Rameshwar Lal. It was alleged therein that after his arrest on 26.9.1987 his father, Rameshwar Lal, was mercilessly beaten by the Police officials at Makrana, including the present petitioners and, therefore, they all should be proceeded according to law. The learned Magistrate forwarded this complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the SHO Police Station Makrana for investigation and report according to law. On the basis of this complaint Crime No. 808 of 1987 for offences under sections 307, 342, 330, 325, 149, 120B IPC etc. was registered at the Police Station. Later on, the investigation of this case too was entrusted to the CB1/SPE with the consent of the State Govt. and RC 2/88 SIU, III, SIC-01, CBI, New Delhi was registered by the CBI/SPE. against the present petitioners and nine other Policemen, including Salig Ram SHO and Hakim Ali, AS, aforesaid. 3. After having investigated the aforesaid complaint the CBI concluded that Rameshwar Lal had no doubt sustained simple as well as grievous hurt with blunt weapons, 14 in number, but those were sustained by him while trying to escape from arrest and walking barefooted on hilly area of a hillock and falling down in a 'Kund' (pit). In this respect they referred to the opinion of the Board of Doctors constituted for the purpose. The CBI accordingly submitted a final report under section 169 Cr.P.C. in the case. However, the learned Magistrate did not accept the negative report submitted by the CBI/SPE before him. He took cognizance of the offences under sections 147/149 and 331 IPC on the basis of the negative report and summonned the present petitioners and Salig Ram SHO, Hakim Ali, ASI and Badan Singh Constable as accused thereof. The order so passed by the learned Magistrate on 3.10.1991 was challenged by the petitioners by filing separate applications under section 397/399 Cr.P.C. Their efforts having remained unsuccessful they have now approached this court through the present petitions u/s'. 482 Cr.P.C. 4. At the very outset Mr. The order so passed by the learned Magistrate on 3.10.1991 was challenged by the petitioners by filing separate applications under section 397/399 Cr.P.C. Their efforts having remained unsuccessful they have now approached this court through the present petitions u/s'. 482 Cr.P.C. 4. At the very outset Mr. Biri Singh, the learned counsel for Rameshwar Lal, raised a preliminary objection to the effect that since the correctness and validity of the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 3.10.1991 taking cognizance of certain offences in this case and summoning the present petitioners and three others as accused thereunder has already been examined by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in exerise of his revisory jurisdiction under section 397 Cr.P.C. a second revision of the same order in the garb of petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. was barred by sub-sec. (3) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. 5. Mr. R.K. Yadav Advocate, appearing for and on behalf of both the petitioners in their respective petitions submitted that there was no quarrel with the principle embodied in sub-sec. (3) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. and since the jurisdiction of this Court under section 397 is concurrent with that of the Sessions Judge, a second revision of the same order by the same person is not permissible at law. But, the learned counsel submitted, the interference by this Court in its inherent powers under section 482 would always be justified in such appropriate cases wherein the order passed by an inferior court leads to violation of a specific provision of law causing miscarriage of justice to a party and creates inequality between equals. Mr. Yadava pointed out that Rekha Ram, one of the co-accused in the murder case wherein Rameshwar Lal was an accused, had filed a similar complaint (Cri-Case No. 47/90) against the present petitioners and other police officials at Police Station Makrana alleging therein his severe beating by the present petitioners and others and the learned Magistrate had summonned the present petitioners and other police officials as accused thereunder for similar offences on identical facts but on their raising objection against taking cognizance against them in view of the bar under section 197 Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate, vide his order dated 27.4.1993, had sustained the objection of the petitioners and recalled and cancelled his earlier order of taking cognizance of offences against them. Mr. Mr. Yadava further submitted that the said Rekha Ram had challenged the order of the learned Magistrate in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 140/1994 but this Court after having considered the ratio-decidendi of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra, AIR 1970 SC 1661 had dismissed the said petition on 3.3.1994 on merits. Mr. Yadava submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case uniformity in the opinion of this Court on the same question of law arising out of the similar or identical facts must be maintained. The learned counsel further pointed out that the order passed by this court in the case of Rekha Ram was also upheld by the Apex Court by dismissing the Rekha Ram v. Sri Harish Meena & Ors., Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1982 of 1994 on 15.9.1994. 6. In the case of Madhu Limaya v. The State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had ruled that the bar on the power of revision was put in order to facilitate expedient disposal of cases but a harmonious construction of the provisions contained in Sections 397 and 482 discloses that still the inherent power of the High Court would come into play when there was no provision for the redressal of the grevience of the aggrieved party. In that case the provisions of Section 397(2) and Section 482 were under consideration of the Apex Court. The same principle was reiterated in the case of V.C. Shukhla v. State through CBI, (1980) 2 SCC 380 wherein it was held that sub-sec. (3) of Section 397 does not at all limit the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482 Cr.P.C. It merely curbs the revisional powers given to the High Court or the Sessions Judge under section 397 Cr.P.C. It was a decision of a four Judge Bench of the Apex Court. It appears that subsequently in the cases of Rajan Kumar Man Chanda v. State of Kerala, 1990 (Supp.) SCC 132 and Dharampal & Ors. v. Rainshiri (Srnt.) & Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 435 some what a conflicting view was expressed and the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnanveni & Anr., 1997 (1) Crime 97. v. Rainshiri (Srnt.) & Ors. (1993) 1 SCC 435 some what a conflicting view was expressed and the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnanveni & Anr., 1997 (1) Crime 97. Re-ieterating the view expressed in Madhu Limaya & V.C. Shukhla's eases the Bench held that'though the revision before the High Court under sub-sec. (I) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-sec. (3) thereof, inherent power of High Court is still available under section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous supervision of the High Court under section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice andin setting aside the order of the courts below. It was observed by their Lordships that' ordinarily when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person- accused/complainant cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under section 397(1) or under inherent power of the High Court since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo-moto power under section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under section 483 of the Code. So when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue, It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process, that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under section 397(1) r/w. Section 401 of the Code.' 7. It is thus well settled position of law that though revision before the High Court under section 397(1) is prohibited by sub-set. It is thus well settled position of law that though revision before the High Court under section 397(1) is prohibited by sub-set. (3) thereof yet the power of this Court under section 482 r/w. Section 483, being paramount powers of continuous superintendents of this Court over the Courts of Magistrates and all other courts, may still be exercised provided it is noticed on the examination of the case that there is failure of justice or the order passed by the Magistrate is contrary to the provisions of law and requires correction, while examining the case from that angle it has to be kept in mind that the powers under section 482 are exceptional powers of this Court and should be sparingly exercised in rarest of rare cases only to prevent the abuse of the process of courts or to procures justice to the aggrieved party. 8. Coming now to the merits of the objections raised by the two petitioners in their respective petitions it was urged by Mr. Yadava that admittedly the two petitioners were, at the time of commission of the alleged offence, employed in connection with the affairs of the State Government and as such public servants they were not removable from their respective offices save by or with the sanction of such Govt. Therefore, since the offences alleged to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their respective official duties the provisions contained in Section 197 Cr.P.C. stood attracted in their cases and the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the alleged offences against them. In support of his arguments Mr. Yadava relied upon the decisions in the cases of State through the CBI v. B.L. Verma, 1997 SCC (Cri.) 1037 , State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subha Rao, 1993 SCC (Cri.) 901 Karan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, RLW 1991 (1) 320 and Kalyan Singh v. State, RCC July 1991 327. 9. On the other hand Mr. Biri Singh vehemently urged that Rameshwar Lal was a respectable citizen having represented and served the people of Nava Constituency for several years in his capacity as a Member of Legislative Assembly and even if he was involved in a murder case and had been arrested therein the petitioners and their sub-ordinates had no authority to abuse, slap or beat him at the Police Station. It was submitted that Rameshwar Lal was caused as many as 14 injuries with blunt weapons including one grevious and this aspect of this case not only distinguishes this case from this of Rekha Ram, aforementioned, but also takes it on different pedastal in v4ew of the social and economic status of Rameshwar Lal and accordingly requires serious attention of this court before accepting the act of his beating by the petitioners and others as having been done in the discharge or purprted discharge of their official duties. The learned counsel added that abusing, slapping or beating on accused by an investigating officier in the course of investigation and interrogation of the accused can never be approved of as an act done or purported to have been done in the discharge of any official duties. It was submitted that beating an accused in custody is no part of any official act and since the petitioners had done such acts in a brutal manner protection provided by the umbrella of Section 197 Cr.P.C. was not available to them in the facts and circumstances of this case. The learned counsel supported his arguments with the decisions in the cases of Behari Rai v. State, AIR 1952 Patna; Sakuntala Bai v. Venkatkrishna Hegde, AIR 1952 Madras 667, Kanshi Ram v. O.P. Chopra 1995 Cri.L.J. 2620 (Delhi), Bakhshish Singh v. Gurmej Kaur, AIR 1988 SC 257 , Pukh Raj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1973 SC 2591 , S.P. Vaithianathan v. Shanmuganathan, JT 1994 (2) SC 689 and Shabhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P., 1997 Cr.L.J. 2491 Mr. Bin Singh submitted written arguments also which have been considered by me. 10. On a study of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties before me it is gathered that the words "acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" occuring in the language of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. have arrested the attention of the Courts time and again. Way back in Hari Ram Singh's case AIR 1969 FC 43 Sulaiman J. of the Fedral Court observed that- "The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Way back in Hari Ram Singh's case AIR 1969 FC 43 Sulaiman J. of the Fedral Court observed that- "The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor is it necessary to go to the length of saying that the act constituting the offence should be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction." In the same case Varadachariar, J. also observed that- "There must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attach's it to the official character of the person doing it." 11. The views expressed by the learned Judges of the Fedral Court were affirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gill's case AIR 1948 PC 128 in the following words- "A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty... The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office." 12. The correctness of the view expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gill's case appears to have fallen for consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Matajog Dubey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 and their Lordships felt that the test laid down that it must be established that the act complained of was an official act unduly narrowed down the scope of the protection afforded to the public servant by Section 197. After examining earlier decisions their Lordships observed that- "There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of the official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty, that the accused would lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of performance of his duty." 13. After examining earlier decisions their Lordships observed that- "There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of the official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty, that the accused would lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of performance of his duty." 13. Applying the above test in the case of Pukh Raj (supra) the acts of kicking the complainant and of abusing him were considered as having been done in the course of performance of his duty by the public servant. But in the case of S.P. Venthiana than (supra), dealing with the scope of protection provided by Section 53 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1869 the Apex Court observed that ''merely because the appellant was called through a summons issued under law, the conduct of beating and torturing the appellant on the latter appearing in obedience to the summons cannot establish any nexus between the official act of issuance of summons and the action of the respondents on the appearance of the appellant. Unless a relationship is established between the provisions of law 'under' which the respondent purports to act and the misdemeanour complained of the provisions of Section 53 will not be attracted." It was, therefore, emphasised in Bakhshish Singh's case that: "It is necessary to protect the public servants in the discharge of their duties. They must be made immune from being harassed in criminal proceedings and prosecutions, that is the rationale behind Section 196 and Section 197 Cr.P.C. But it is equally important to emphasise that the rights of the citizens should be protected and no excesses should be permitted. "Encounter deaths" has become too common. In the facts and circumstances of each case protection of public officers and public servants functioning in discharge of official duties and protection of private citizens have to be balanced by finding out as to what extent and how far is a public servant working in discharge of his duties or purported discharge of his duties and whether the public servant has exceeded his limit.." 14. Above was a case of custodial death, which has all along been viewed seriously by the Apex Court and is being now considered as violation of the fundamental human right of a citizen attracting compensatory penal and pecuniary liability on the offender. Above was a case of custodial death, which has all along been viewed seriously by the Apex Court and is being now considered as violation of the fundamental human right of a citizen attracting compensatory penal and pecuniary liability on the offender. (See : Radul Sahu's, AIR 1983 SC. 1083, Bhim Singh's case AIR 1986 SC 494 , Sint. Neelabati's case AIR 1993 SC 1960 , jogender Kumar's case 1994(4) SCC 260 ), 15. The issue was elaborately considered by the Apex Court in the case of B. Saha & Ors. v. M.S. Kochar, 1979 (4) SCC 177 wherein the following pertinent observations were made by their Lordships in para Nos. 17 and 18 of the report "The words "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed to narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be". In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath v. State of M.P. "it is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted." In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this section is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him." 16. In its latest decision in the case of Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of LIP., 1997 (5) SCC 326 their Lordships of the Supreme Court again examined the same question in sufficient details and laid down the law in para 4 of the report as under- "Section 197(1) postulates that "when any person who is a public servant not removable from his office, save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him, while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous per-mission/sanction" of the appropriate Government/authority. The essential requirement postulated for the sanction to prosecute the public servant is that the offence alleged against the public servant must have been done while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. In such a situation, it postulates that the public servant's act is in furtherance of the performance of his official duty. If the act/omission is integral to the performance of public duty, the public servant is entitled to the protection u /s. 197(1) of the Cr.P.C. Without the previous sanction, the complaint/charge against him for the alleged offence cannot be proceeded with in the trial. The sanction of the appropriate Government or competent authority would be necessary to protect a public servant from needless harassment or prosecution. The protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his public duty honestly and to the best of his ability. The threat of prosecution demoralises the honest officer. The requirement of the sanction by competent authority or appropriate Government is an assurance and protection to the honest officer who does his official duty to further public interest. However, performance of official duty under colour of public authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. Public duty may provide him an opportunity to commit crime. The Court to proceed further in the trial or the enquiry, as the case may be, applies its mind and records a finding that the crime and the official duty are not integrally connected." 17. Public duty may provide him an opportunity to commit crime. The Court to proceed further in the trial or the enquiry, as the case may be, applies its mind and records a finding that the crime and the official duty are not integrally connected." 17. A study of the above cases and others relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties thus clearly discloses that in order to attract the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. it is to be seen whether there existed a reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge of official duty by the public servants. If the act complained of bears such nexus of the duty, the accused may successfully claimed the protection provided by Section 197 Cr.P.C. If the act constituting the offence directly and reasonably, stands connected with the discharge of official duty by the public servant, Section 197 Cr.P.C. would stand attracted. Thus it is the quality of the act which is important. In any case, the answer to the question would depend on the facts of each case. Let us examine whether the claim of the present petitioners satisfies the conditions for the applicability of Section 1978 Cr.P.C. for their benefit. 18. It is not disputed that both the petitioners had been working at the relevant time in their capacities of SP and ASP. The offence of murder of Arjun Ram had been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of p/s. Nagor and Rameshwar Lal had been named as a co-accused in that case. Salag Ram, SHO of the said Police Station was the Investigating Officer of the tease and was arrested in the investigation by his subordinate officer, Hakim Ali, ASI. Both these police officers are already facing their trial before the lower court. Rameshwar Lal had been arrested on 26.3.1987 as an accused in that case and was taken to the Police Station. The case of the petitioners is that on being apprehended by Hakim Ali, ASI., and other policeman Rameshwar Lal had tried to evade arrest and had run away on the hilly path where he fell down in a pit and sustained simple and grievous hurt. As against it the case put forth in the complaint was that Rameshwar Lal had been beaten by the Police Officers, including the present petitioners, at the Police Station in order to extract confession of guilt from him. As against it the case put forth in the complaint was that Rameshwar Lal had been beaten by the Police Officers, including the present petitioners, at the Police Station in order to extract confession of guilt from him. It is evident that both the petitioners had been discharging their official duties of supervising the investigation of a murder case wherein Rameshwar Lal had been named as one of the accused and had also been arrested as such. It is further evident that allegedly he sustained the simple and grievous injuries with blunt weapons in the course of being interrogated by the Investigating officer and may be by the petitioners also. Here I may agree with Mr. Bin Singh that at this stage the defence theory cannot be considered for the benefit of the petitioners though such theory had found favoured with the Investigating Officer of the case. In any view of the matter, it is prima facie evident that the act of the petitioners was quite reasonably connected with the discharge of their official duties. It was a part of their official duties to have interrogated Rameshwar Lal in relation with his alleged complicity in the crime. Their act, was, therefore, non un-connected with the discharge of the official duties by them. Here, it may be observed that the question of applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. would arise when the public servant is alleged to have committed such an act which amounts to an offence. Therefore, at the time of considering the application of Section 197 Cr.P.C. it is not to be seen where the public servant has or has not committed the alleged offence. The provisions contained in Section 197 Cr.P.C. come into play where the alleged offence is prima facie stated to have been committed by the public servant. Section 197 Cr.P.C. simply provides a protection to the public servant against prosecution for such acts, which constitute an offence and which are committed by him in the discharge or purported discharge of his official duties. If a nexus is found existing between the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant, Section 197 Cr.P.C. would stand attracted. If a nexus is found existing between the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant, Section 197 Cr.P.C. would stand attracted. In the present case, therefore, it is noticed that it was in the course of the discharge of the official duties by the petitioners, that they are alleged tq have abused, kicked or assaulted Rameshwar Lal in order to extract a confession of his guilt from him. In my opinion, therefore the petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the offences, they had been summoned for, without the sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. from the State Govt. Here I may point out that in the case of Rekha Ram, referred to above, this court had, on almost identical facts, taken the same view. Rekha Ram was also a co-accused with Rameshwar Lal in the murder case. He had also alleged his beating by the present petitioners after his arrest in connection with that case. The facts of the two cases are, therefore, quite identical. Judicial discipline demand that consistency of views must be maintained on same or similar issues of facts or of law. 19. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that the prosecution of the present petitioners cannot proceed in the absence of sanction u /s. 197 Cr.P.C. from the State Government and, therefore, the orders passed by the courts below are liable to be set aside. In that view of the matter, therefore, there exist satisfactory grounds for this court to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. and direct dropping of the proceedings of criminal case against the present petitioners. 20. In the result, the impugned orders of the courts below are set aside and the proceedings of the criminal case against the present petitioners are dropped. Both the petitions are allowed.Petition allowed. *******