Judgment :- 1. The two Civil Revision Petitions have been filed by the judgment-debtor. They are preferred against the order passed by the Sub-Court, Trichy in E.P. No. 661 of 1984 in O.S. No. 192 of 1974 and on a memo filed by the judgment-debtor. 2. It is submitted that the decree was passed by the Sub-Court, Trichy in O.S. No. 192 of 1974. It is seen from the records that after the constitution of the Sub-Court at Karur the execution proceedings were commenced in the said Court. The Sub-Court, Karur, conducted the sale. After the sale, it appears, an application to set aside the sale was filed under Order 21 Rule 91 C.P.C. As there was some complaint against the Subordinate Judge, Karur the execution proceedings were transferred to the Sub-Court, Trichy and the Sub-Court, dismissed the application under Order 21, Rule 91, C.P.C. against which a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed and thereafter the matter was taken to the High Court by way of Letters Patent Appeal. After dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal the High Court has made an observation at the end of the judgment dated 16.7.1996 in the following terms: “It is needless to point out that the executing Court shall proceed to confirm the sale and it is open to the decree holder to take further steps pursuant thereto.” After the disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the matter was taken up for confirmation of sale by the Sub-Court, Trichy. At that stage the judgment-debtor filed a memo stating that the Sub-Court, Trichy has no jurisdiction. However, the Sub-Court, Trichy, rejected the memo and proceeded with the execution proceedings. He also confirmed the sale and directed issue of two Sale Certificates. Against the order rejecting the memo and the order directing to issue the Sale Certificate, the judgment-debtor has filed the above two Civil Revision Petitions. 3. The main contention urged by the learned senior counsel Mr. S.V. Jayaraman for the petitioner is that the present Court which is having jurisdiction over the property is the Sub-Court, Kulithalai because the properties have been admittedly situate in Manapparai which has come under the territorial jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Kulithalai. Therefore, according to him, the Sub-Court, Kulithalai alone will have jurisdiction. S.V. Jayaraman for the petitioner is that the present Court which is having jurisdiction over the property is the Sub-Court, Kulithalai because the properties have been admittedly situate in Manapparai which has come under the territorial jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Kulithalai. Therefore, according to him, the Sub-Court, Kulithalai alone will have jurisdiction. He also relies upon Sections 38 and 39, C.P.C. According to him, as per Section 39 C.P.C., the Court which passed the decree may on the application of the decree holder send it for execution to another Court of competent jurisdiction. According to him, ‘competent Court’ is defined under sub-clause (3) of Section 39. It is stated that the competent Court will be a Court which will have jurisdiction to try the suit at the time of making the application for transfer. According to learned counsel, at the time of the transfer the Court which had jurisdiction was Sub-Court, Kulithalai since it had jurisdiction from 12.7.1995. But, we do not know when it was transferred. Learned counsel for the respondent however contends that the jurisdiction does not mean territorial jurisdiction but also monetary jurisdiction. He cited a decision in P.M. Unni v. M.J. Nadar (AIR 1973 Madras 2) wherein it is observed as under: “It appears to us that the word ‘competency’ used in the above Section cannot be used to restrict the power of the District Court or the High Court under Section 24, Civil P.C. to transfer the execution proceeding only to a Court which has territorial competency, or jurisdiction over the place where the judgment-debtor resides or works for gain. It has to be given a sufficiently wide interpretation to include each and every Court within the jurisdiction of the superior Court, empowered to deal with the above observations of the learned Judge. We consider that the power of transfer, under Section 24 of the Code, of a suit, appeal or other proceedings, by a High Court or a District Court to a Court within their respective jurisdiction is a very effective remedy and no fetters should be placed upon it on grounds of want of territorial jurisdiction of the transferee Court.” 4. From the above facts I find that the decree originally was passed by Sub-Court, Trichy. Only the execution was commenced in the Sub-Court, Karur. From the above facts I find that the decree originally was passed by Sub-Court, Trichy. Only the execution was commenced in the Sub-Court, Karur. Now, the Sub-Court, Karur has lost the jurisdiction over the subject matter because of the creation of the Sub-Court at Kulithalai. The learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to contend that the transfer originally from Sub-Court, Trichy to Karur must be only under Section 39 C.P.C. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondents contends that the transfer was by the notification issued by the Government and the consequent creation of Sub-Court at Karur. From the records I am not in a position to find under what circumstances the transfer of the decree from Sub-Court, Trichy to Karur was made. One thing is certain and it is admitted by both the parties that the decree was passed only by Sub-Court Trichy. Therefore, without going into the controversy I am of the view that Section 38, C.P.C., will apply. According to that Section the Court which passed the decree can execute it. Now the proceedings are before same Court. As I said earlier, I need not go into the details as to how the decree was transferred to the Sub-Court, Karur, and how it came back to Trichy Sub-Court itself. Since the competent Court is proceeding with the execution that, too in the light of a direction issued by this Court in Letters Patent Appeal there is no justification that the said Court should be deprived of its jurisdiction. In the circumstances, I see no merit in the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore both the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently C.M.P. Nos. 13496 and 14092 of 1997 are dismissed.