Honble PRASAD, J.–The present appeal arises out of the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby, the writ petition filed by the respondent petitioner was accepted. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants Bank and its Officers have preferred this appeal impugning the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. (2). The case set out in the writ petition by the writ petitioner was that he was an employee of the Central Bank of India. His services are governed by the Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 and also by the Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. While the writ petitioner was serving at Pali in the year 1976 he has allegedly discounted certain bills. Such discounting was more than the limit which was within the jurisdiction of the writ petitioner. Since the writ petitioner, delinquent employee had exceeded his limits, a memo was served on him dated 29th June, 1978 on 3rd July, 1978. Reply was submitted by the delinquent. (3). The case of the delinquent employee is that after the reply was submitted by him nothing was done by the Bank in relation to the memo served on him, and he presumed that the Bank Authorities have been satisfied by the explanation furnished by the delinquent. In the meantime, the petitioner become qualified for due promotion. Promotion was denied to him. To claim the due benefits, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging such denial on 12.8.1981. In this writ petition, the Bank appeared on 17.9.1981. (4). The case of the petitioner is that Bank management has taken a serious exception to filing of this writ petition. As a reaction to the petitioners venture in taking a writ proceeding a charge sheet and imputation of charges was served on the delinquent on 18/19th June, 1982. (5). The petitioner has further submitted that apart from the feeble merits of the charges the charges related to years 1976 to 1979. Serving of charge sheet and imputation of charges in the year 1982 after four years is perse a case of belated reaction, to an action initiated by the petitioner. No explanation has been furnished by the Bank for initiation of charges and imputation of charges, four years after the explanation being sought by the Bank. Serving of charge sheet and imputation of charges in the year 1982 after four years is perse a case of belated reaction, to an action initiated by the petitioner. No explanation has been furnished by the Bank for initiation of charges and imputation of charges, four years after the explanation being sought by the Bank. The petitioner has relied on a case decided in the matter of Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab (1), in which the following observations have been made by the Honble Supreme Court: ``The second ground of attack on the orders might be viewed from two related aspects - of ultra vires pure and simple and seconly as an infraction of the rule that very power vested in public body or authority has to be used honestly, bonafide and reasonably, though the two often slide into each other. When a power is exercised for a purpose of with an intention beyond the scope of or not justified by the instrument creating the power, in legal parlance it would be a case of a fraud on a power,though no corrupt motive or bargain is imputed. In the sense, if it could be shown that an authority exercising a power has taken into account it may even be bonafide and with the best of intentions - as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad. Sometimes the courts are confronted with cases where the purposes sought to be achieved are mixed, some relevant and some alien to the purpose. The Courts have, on occasions, resolved the difficulty by finding out the dominant purpose which impelled the action and where the power itself is conditioned by a purpose, have proceeded to invalidate the exercise of the power when any irrelevant purpose if proved to have entered the mind of the authority. This is on the principle of that if in such a situation the dominant purpose is unlawful then the act itself is unlawful and it is not cured by saying that they had another purpose which was lawful. This is on the principle of that if in such a situation the dominant purpose is unlawful then the act itself is unlawful and it is not cured by saying that they had another purpose which was lawful. Treating it as a question of ultravires the question is what is the nature of the power which has been granted to achieve a definite object in which case, it would be conditioned by the purpose for which it is vested. Taking the present case of the power vested in Government to pass the impugned orders, it could not be doubted that it was vested in Government for accomplishing a defined public purpose viz., to ensure probity and purity in the public services by enabling disciplinary penal action against the members of the service suspected to be guilty of misconduct. The nature of the power thus dis- closed its purpose. In that context the use of that power for achieving an alien purpose wreaking the ministers vengeance on the officer would be malafide and a colourable exercise of that power and would therefore be struck down by the Courts. (6). The case of the petitioner further is that allegation of mala fides levelled by the delinquent in his writ petition have not been denied by the disciplinary authority or any higher authority and, therefore, allegation of malafides would result into having been proved. In this relation the delinquent has also relied upon a case reported in C.S. Rowjee vs. State of Andhra Pradesh) (2) whereby, it has been held that as and when the allegation of malafides are levelled, person in authority should place on record his version for denial. The delinquent bases his case on the strength of certain other Supreme Court Judgements which lay down that malafide does not always mean a corrupt motive. It also means action on extraneous consideration. It is not always necessary in each case to point out a single person whose action is malafide. These are the matters known to the institution and in the instant case of the delinquent this is a case of institutional malafides and, therefore, no single person was pointed out. The delinquent makes reliance on a Supreme Court Jugment in this connection reported in State of Punjab vs. Ramji Lal & Ors. (3) (7). The delinquent officer on yet another ground builds a case of malafides. The delinquent makes reliance on a Supreme Court Jugment in this connection reported in State of Punjab vs. Ramji Lal & Ors. (3) (7). The delinquent officer on yet another ground builds a case of malafides. It is that the Bank has not proceeded against those offices who have acted in the same manner in which the delinquent has acted. The action has been initiated against the present delinquent only. This is because he has dared to file a writ petition to seek remedy. (8). The delinquent has further pointed out that when two persons are similarly situated and the Bank proceeds against one, without any reason and does not proceed against another. In this process pick and choose is practiced by the Bank, which surely is an arbitrary action, therefore, the case of malafides against the Bank is established. The delinquent expects that he should succeed on this simple ground. (9). Next the delinquent relies on the delay in serving statement of charge to him. The case of the delinquent is that for the delay no case can proceed against him because it is highly belated. He places reliance on the following Judgments: S.K. Pareek vs. Jaipur Nagaur Anchalik Gramin Bank & Anr. (4), Vaidhya Dev Shanker Sharma vs. The State of Rajasthan & three Ors. (5), Dr. B.K. Chaudhary vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (6) (10). The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the matter of Dr. B.K. Chaudhary vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), wherein, the departmental proceedings were quashed by the learned Single Judge of this Court because the enquiry was proceeded without considering the reply on merits. There the learned Single Judge also observed that the case was of mere negligence. The case there was that the post mortem was conducted of which report was conside- red to be prepared with negligence. Thus, in the back ground that the reply of delinquent was not considered before initiating enquiry and it was the personal qualification of the Doctor which was in question. The enquiry proceedings were quashed. This case has no relevance to the facts of present case. Here the personal qualities of the delinquent are not in question. His exceeding his discretion is in question, therefore, this case is not applicable. (11). Another case relied upon is of Vidhya Dev Shanker Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan & Three Ors. (supra). The enquiry proceedings were quashed. This case has no relevance to the facts of present case. Here the personal qualities of the delinquent are not in question. His exceeding his discretion is in question, therefore, this case is not applicable. (11). Another case relied upon is of Vidhya Dev Shanker Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan & Three Ors. (supra). In the back ground where the Director Ayurved has himself stated that the charge sheet issued to the petitioner was illegal, baseless then the Head of the Department himself had written in favour of the delinquent. This five years delay coupled with the merits of the case was considered fatal. In the instant case, the facts as they are borne out, there is no departmental proceeding done the wrong way round which go in favour of the petitioner, therefore, this case is also not applicable. (12). The case reported in the matter of S.K. Pareek vs. Jaipur Nagaur Anchalik Gramin Bank & Anr. (supra) is a case where merely no loss was caused to the Bank and the charges were quashed which is directly against the ratio of Nikunj Bihari Patnayaks case, therefore, cannot be of any help to the petitioner. (13). It has further been submitted by the delinquent that the appellate authority has passed the order in a mechanical manner without properly examining the record of the enquiry and the appellate authority has not chosen to decide many questions including the practice which was invoked in relation to discounting where the officers were exceeding powers which were for the first time specified in the year 1977. This exceeding the limits was under the express instructions of the seniors, wherein, the higher authorities said that the officer can exceed his power. (14). In the case of exceeding the limits of his powers what was required was that the officer should have submitted such excess discounting in form F-1 and every thing related to F-1 was in a big mess and the appellate authority has not decided the points raised in appeal and, therefore, on the strength of the ratio in Anwar vs. Ist Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and Ors. (7) it has been conten- ded that if the contention raised is not decided then the order is vitiated. (15). On the strength of Supreme Court judgment reported in Sheela Barse & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (7) it has been conten- ded that if the contention raised is not decided then the order is vitiated. (15). On the strength of Supreme Court judgment reported in Sheela Barse & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. (8) the delinquent further submits that even an order of affirmance is required to be a speaking order. The order of disciplinary authority, according to the delinquent, is bad because it is based on a factual mis-reading of the entire situation. The disciplinary authority relied on such documents which were never tendered in evidence and they were not proved by evidence. On the strength of a Judgment reported in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. vs. Ludh Budh Singh (9) it has been contended that when material evidence is ignored while passing the order, the order stands vitiated. (16). The disciplinary authority has proceeded with clear bias and that it has been out to find fault with the delinquent. The delinquent further contends that he has been deprived of a chance of promotion due to pendency of the enquiry for long and, therefore, he has been subjected to multiple-jeopardy. (17). According to the delinquent the approach of disciplinary authority is, as if the burden is on the employee and not on the departmental authorities. In a prosecution the burden is always on one who wants to prove the charges and he places reliance in this context on the Supreme Court judgment in case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills case (Supra). It is further contended that the disciplinary authority has wrongly assumed that it was for the delinquent to prove that F-1 statement has reached the head office. In absence of cross examination being directed on this point the submission made by the delinquent before the authority should have been accepted. Further, the charge in this regard is not explicit. The disciplinary authority has proceeded to find out the inherent deficiency in defence case and has ignored the salient features of the defence. In fact, the delinquents case is that Shri S.K. Gauba has allowed him to exercise powers beyond the limits vested in him and this statement of the delinquent has not been refuted by anyone. He has also not been cross examined on this point. In fact, the delinquents case is that Shri S.K. Gauba has allowed him to exercise powers beyond the limits vested in him and this statement of the delinquent has not been refuted by anyone. He has also not been cross examined on this point. The prior approval condition was incor- porated for the first time in 1978 by a circular of the Central office dated 1.9.1978 and if the higher authority had tacit support for the delinquent officer in exceeding the powers then no fault could be found with the action of the delinquent. (18). The Bank contested the writ petition and placed reliance on the fact that the delinquent in terms of Regulation 24 has committed a breach of the regulation 3(1)(3), whereby, he has exceeded his powers and has thus committed breach of regulations. The Bank relied on a Supreme Court judgment rendered in the matter of Nikunj Bihari Patnayak reported in (10) and stated that the delinquent has exceeded his discretionary powers, therefore, his action is beyond regulation 3(3) of the Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 and as such this is a clear case of mis-conduct. Regulation 24 of the Regulations, 1976 reads as under :- ``ACTS OF MISCONDUCT 24. A breach of any of the provisions of these regulations shall be deemed to constitute a misconduct punishable under the Central Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1976. (19). As regards the four years delay in serving the imputation of charges, the Bank has contended that this delay was caused because the action of the delinquent had to be investigated. The Bank records are voluminous and, therefore, investigation takes time. Because the delay was caused in investigating the action of the delinquent, it is wrong to construe that the Bank felt prejudiced against the delinquent. It is rather vague to suggest that filing of the writ petition enraged the Bank Officers to initiate a case of departmental proceedings against the delinquent. The delinquent has mis-construed the delay in filing of the charge sheet to be a case of malafides. Such technical levers may be when coupled with some substan- tive grounds it can make out a defence case. But such things by themselves are not sufficient to give any premium to the delinquent. (20). The delinquent has mis-construed the delay in filing of the charge sheet to be a case of malafides. Such technical levers may be when coupled with some substan- tive grounds it can make out a defence case. But such things by themselves are not sufficient to give any premium to the delinquent. (20). The case of the delinquent that inadmissible evidence has been considered is again going to the technicalities of civil law and appreciation of evidence. The departmental proceedings are not the civil courts and as such strict rules of evidence are not applicable there. In an enquiry before the Tribunal the delinquent knew what documents are there, therefore, the Bank contended that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is baseless. (21). The learned Single Judge while considering the case of the delinquent came to the conclusion that four years delay by itself would not have caused any prejudice, but there is no explanation of delay. In this back ground when it is seen that no loss has been caused to the Bank and all the money which was the subject matter of the advance has been recovered the learned Single Judge observed that no case of misconduct can be said to be made out. In absence of any loss to the Bank, and delinquent writing to the Bank for seeking approval it on the other hand establishes that discounting was made by him in the interest of Bank. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge felt that the case against the delinquent is not proved and accordingly set aside the impugned order of penalty of stoppage of three grade increments against the delinquent officer. (22). In the special appeal, the Bank has contended that the case of the delinquent is squarely covered by the ratio of the case decided by the Supreme Court in the matter of Nikunj Bihari Patnayak (Supra). The learned Single Judge proceeded on wrong premises when he observed that regulation 24 was not the subject matter of charge. (22). In the special appeal, the Bank has contended that the case of the delinquent is squarely covered by the ratio of the case decided by the Supreme Court in the matter of Nikunj Bihari Patnayak (Supra). The learned Single Judge proceeded on wrong premises when he observed that regulation 24 was not the subject matter of charge. In fact, regulation 24 is a regulatory provision, but the sub- stantive provision is 3(3) and in the judgment of Nikunj Bihari Patnayak (Supra) which relates to the interpretation of the very same provision it squarely applies to the case of the delinquent and when the delinquent is clearly charged with the violation of regulation 3(3) the ratio of Nikunj Bihari Patnayaks case (supra) clearly applies. In terms of the law laid down in Nikunj Bihari Patnayaks case (Supra) the departmental proceedings have culminated into the award of punishment to the delinquent. The Bank has placed reliance on a case decided in the matter of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors. (11), wherein, it has been held that the High Courts while exercising powers on judicial review have to keep in mind that it is a review of decision making process, if the findings are based on some evidence, then the court will not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings. (23). Another case relied on by the Bank is in the matter of Govt. of Tamil Nadu vs. K.N. Ramamurthy (12), wherein, it has been held that failure to exercise powers properly and with negligence have been held to be ``misconduct and in such proceedings the court can interfere only if inference of misconduct cannot be drawn from the charges and the supporting particulars or if charges are contrary to law. In a case relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant viz. Union of India & Anr. vs. G. Ganayutham (13), wherein, the Apex Court has held that it would not interfere with the administrative decisions, unless it was illegal or it suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defi- ance of logic or moral standards. He further relies on a Supreme Court judgment in case of Tara Chand Vyas vs. Chairman, Disciplinary Authority & Ors. He further relies on a Supreme Court judgment in case of Tara Chand Vyas vs. Chairman, Disciplinary Authority & Ors. (14), wherein, it has been held that any conduct of the Bank employee which adversely affects the achievement of those goals should be meted out with disciplinary action and that such conduct is misconduct. (24). In the instant case, the contention of the delinquent that no loss has been caused to the Bank is again a mis-representation because the recovery was made with great difficulties and after the invoking of coercive methods. If a commercial institution is required to invoke coercive procedures then its attention diverts from banking process to the recoveries. When a Bank indulges in recovery proceedings with such seriousness then surely its faculties get frustrated and its efficiency is diminished. Thus, the finding of the learned Single Judge that no loss has been caused to the Bank is factually incorrect and on this score also the Bank has relied upon a Supreme Court judgment reported in State of Mysore & Ors. vs. Shiva Basappa Shivappa, Makapur (15), wherein it has been held that domestic Tribunals exercising quasi judicial functions are not courts and therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in courts nor they are bound by strict rules of evidence. In respect of taking of evidence in an enquiry before such Tribunal, the person against whom, a charge is made should know the eviden- ce which is given against him so that he might be in a position to give his explanation. And in these circumstances, the documents were before the disciplinary authority and the delinquent knew what is the case against him. In this back ground the learned Single Judge could not have found against the ratio of Nikunj Bihari Patnayaks case, wherein it has been that :- ``even though no loss has been caused to Central Bank of India even then acting beyond ones authority is by itself a breach of discipline and breach of Regulation 3 which constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. (25). The Bank has further relied on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court given in State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Shiv Dutt Bissa decided on 12th September, 1997 (16), wherein, it has been held that exceeding of powers conferred on an employee amounts to misconduct. (26). (25). The Bank has further relied on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court given in State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Shiv Dutt Bissa decided on 12th September, 1997 (16), wherein, it has been held that exceeding of powers conferred on an employee amounts to misconduct. (26). In reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for the Bank, the delinquent has submitted that the arguments raised by him before the writ court are valid and re-emphasised that the delay of four years in initiating the proceedings establishes malafides which are in the nature of institutional malafides. Further the case of the delinquent is that not having taken action against the similarly situated employees who have also indulged in discounting exceeding their ordained limits is arbitrary and such arbitrary action having been taken by the Bank against the deli- nquent in an isolated manner prejudiced him. Institutional malafides vitiate the proceedings against the delinquent, more so in the background when the evidence relied upon by the departmental authorities suffer from technical faults and there was no rebuttal of the evidence of the delinquent that the documents were not proved and the appellate authority has not decided the appeal on merits by passing a speaking order. (27). We have considered the case of the delinquent. As regards the delay, the learned Single Judge himself was not of the opinion that the delay itself was sufficient to defeat the departmental prosecution. The cases relied upon by the delinquent are also of no assistance as they clearly stated that the question of delay could not be relevant when the facts are required to be investigated into and voluminous records were to be examined, therefore, the ground of delay by itself is of no assistance to the delinquent. (28). As regards the case of the delinquent in relation to the institutional malafides, suffice it to say that the delinquent has tried to create a ghost out of a writ petition filed by him in 1981, in which in September, 1981 the Bank had appeared. It was not a counter blast which was made by the bank immediately, but nine months were still taken by the Bank. It was not a counter blast which was made by the bank immediately, but nine months were still taken by the Bank. It shows that there was sufficient time lag between the knowledge of the Bank about the writ petition filed by the petitioner and the service of the charge sheet and in this context the explanation of the Bank that time was taken by the Bank in scrutinizing the papers is a sufficient explanation and cannot be treated to be a ground for malafides. (29). The delinquent has relied on a case decided in the matter of R.S.E.B. vs. Iqbal Singh (17), wherein, the requirement of misconduct has been discussed by the Division Bench of our Court. This case has no application to the present case. Admittedly, the delinquent exceeded his entitled sanctioned limits which is not even disputed by him, but his case is that he sought approval in Form F-1, which was not expressed in clear terms by his superior. But, the case decided by the Supreme Court in Nikunj Bihari Patnayaks case (supra) clearly makes out that such exceeding of powers is misconduct. In the instant case the misconduct has been defined in the regulation itself and, therefore, the requirement of going to abstract of law is not the case invoked by the writ petitioner respondent in the instant case. The regulation itself defines what the misconduct is and, therefore, this case has no manner of application. (30). Another case relied upon by the delinquent is in the matter of M. Krishna Swami vs. Union of India & Ors. (18), wherein, the misconduct was also not provided any statutory definition in relation to a judgement of the Supreme Court. The question was examined by the Apex Court and it is manifestly clear that it would not be applicable as in the instant case the definition of misconduct is avail- able in the regulation itself. (31). Another case relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent is in the matter of Union of India & Anr. vs. R.K. Desai (19), wherein, it has been held by the Supreme Court that in the absence of allegation as to corrupt motive or extraneous considerations no disciplinary action could be taken. That was in the facts of that case where were peculiar to the said case. vs. R.K. Desai (19), wherein, it has been held by the Supreme Court that in the absence of allegation as to corrupt motive or extraneous considerations no disciplinary action could be taken. That was in the facts of that case where were peculiar to the said case. In the instant case the misconduct has been defined in the regulations and even in this case the Honble Supreme Court has observed that :– ``But we are certain that if there is some degree of culpability in a large sense, disciplinary proceedings can be taken. (32). Therefore, this case even observes that if there is a case in large sense, then disciplinary proceedings can proceed and, therefore, no help can be taken by the delinquent of this case in this regard. (33). Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the delinquent in this regard is in the matter of Union of India vs. J. Ahmed (20), which again deals with definition of misconduct, wherein, loss of efficiency was the question. Failure to attain highest standards of administrative ability was held to be a case of misconduct. Here, it is not a case of old incapacitated officer. Here, the delinquent claims to be a promoted officer and has every claim for his efficiency. Thus, the facts of this case are also clearly distinguishable. (34). Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is in the matter of Gauri Shanker Misra vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (21), where this Court held that from the facts of the said case no misconduct could be made out because there was no charge of acting beyond jurisdiction. Therefore, facts of the said case are also clearly distinguishable. Without charge no employee can be punished of the charges which are not levelled against him. Therefore, these cases in arriving at a conclusion of misconduct are of no assistance to the petitioner. Thus, the definition of misconduct is also of no consequence to the writ petitioner as laid down by the aforesaid decisions. The case of the writ petitioner is a case of exceeding his powers in terms of sub regulation 3(3) of Regulation 24. (35). Thus, the definition of misconduct is also of no consequence to the writ petitioner as laid down by the aforesaid decisions. The case of the writ petitioner is a case of exceeding his powers in terms of sub regulation 3(3) of Regulation 24. (35). As regards the admissibility of evidence and other technical pleas, it may be suffice to state that law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedis Case (supra) clearly applies, wherein, it has been held that :– ``Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. Ade- quacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. (36). Similar kind of observations have been made by the Honble Supreme Court in the matter of Govt. of Tamil Nadu vs. K.N. Ramamurthys case (supra), wherein, it has been held that :- ``In the case on hand, the finding accepted by the disciplinary authority was to the effect that by the act of negligence in making the assessment, the delinquent caused loss to the government exchequer to the extent of Rs. 44,850. This finding of the disciplinary authority is not open to challenge on the facts of the case. This Court in Upendra Singh case has ruled that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness of truth of the charges and the Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. This Court, in the said case, further observed that the function of the Court/Tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this Court. This Court further held that in case of charges framed in a disciplinary enquiry, the Tribunal or the court can interfere only if on the charges (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. (37). It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner cannot take shelter behind the delay and allegation of malafides. He has admittedly exceeded his limits. Exceeding of limits has been held to be misconduct by the Supreme Court in the matter of Nikunj Bihari Patnayaks case (supra). The authorities have categorically found that the petitioner had no sanction. (37). It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner cannot take shelter behind the delay and allegation of malafides. He has admittedly exceeded his limits. Exceeding of limits has been held to be misconduct by the Supreme Court in the matter of Nikunj Bihari Patnayaks case (supra). The authorities have categorically found that the petitioner had no sanction. There is sufficient evidence in this perspective and a critical examination of that evidence which has been sought by the delinquent is in the domain of the disciplinary authority. The learned Single Judge in quashing the proceedings had gone wrong and, therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. By the writ petition, the delinquent wanted to invoke such powers of the Court which are beyond the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. (38). In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.